

Plumbing the Memory Hole

Somewhat the press never reported the gross deficiencies of all the official investigations. It did publish articles and letters praising those who were busily engaged in covering up what they were supposed to be uncovering and punishing and ending with remedial legislation. It was as uncritical as the average person enthralled by TV. Leaking to it helped it ~~to~~ abstain from criticism and ~~thereby~~ strengthened the predisposition to be "objective" and to shun real investigative reporting, other essential conditions of Nixon's unimpeachment.

So superficial was the Watergate committee's sham of an investigation of CIA involvement and pressures on it that, as Laurence Stern wrote in The Washington Post of November 22, 1973, which was the tenth anniversary of the JFK assassination, there was another Helms memorandum and he was being recalled from Iran for further testimony-
not public:

Lil-

first 5 grafs

Formal CIA Director Richard M. Helms is returning to Washington soon from his post in Iran for another round of testimony on the agency's role in the Watergate scandal.

Helms' return visit has "no connection" with State Department business, according to State Department officials. But the Watergate special prosecutor's office is understood to want to interview the former CIA director about seeming discrepancies in his various appearances.

The interest of the special prosecutor's office is understood to focus on a June 28, 1972, memorandum from Helms to his deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters, asking that the FBI be requested to confine its Watergate inquiries in Mexico to "personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion."

The Helms memorandum also requested that the FBI "desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

Previous testimony by Helms, Walters, and other CIA officials was that the agency never sought to limit FBI inquiries into Watergate scandal.

C. 11/6

Dealing with events posing so deadly a threat to his agency, with what had never before happened in this country, Walters took five days to make a "Memorandum for the Record" of his first meeting with Gray. Under date of June 28, In it he reported Helms' reminder of the delimitation agreement between their agencies and what Nixon, who admitted it May 22 of the next year, had ordered said, ^{continuation of} the FBI's investigation's "continuation" might to some projects" of the CIA. "Gray said he was aware of this and understood what I was conveying to him. His problem was how to low key the matter now."

Gray was also a man whose heart bled for the nation's integrity and future, for the sanctity of our institutions, a man who pursued justice and enforced the law whatever sacrifice it required of him:

[Redacted text block]

621

[Handwritten scribbles]

Is it not a coincidence that this Walters memo telling Gray that with five in the can why lift the lid was written exactly the same day that Helms wrote Gray exactly the same thing, more pointedly?

identically

Next to the last paragraph quotes Dean with all the subtlety of a clap of thunder:

TSI
He then asked if I had any ideas and I said that this affair already had a strong Cuban flavor and everyone knew the Cubans were conspiratorial and anxious to know what the policies of both parties would be towards Castro. They, therefore, had a plausible motive for attempting this amateurish job which any skilled technician would deplore. This might be costly but it would be plausible.

Things were heated up a bit by the time Walters executed an affidavit ^{on May 12, 1973,} supposedly attesting to these same matters under oath. Of the June 26 meeting with Dean and the lie that "none of the suspects had been on the Agency payroll for the last two years," Walters swore that he "had checked carefully to see whether there was any jeopardy to the Agency's sources" and there was none. By defining Martinez as other than a "source" this can avoid being perjury.

The last paragraph on ~~xxx~~ the fifth of the six pages is fascinating:

I saw Gray again on the 12th of July and gave him one additional memorandum regarding the contact furnished Hunt. We reviewed the matter reiterating the position we had taken previously. I said that I had told Dean that the best solution would be to fire those responsible. Gray said he had made the same recommendation.

Most of Walters' memo of July 13, making a record of this meeting of the day before with Gray, is devoted to matters other than this "one additional memorandum." That memorandum has not been leaked or surfaced in any other way. In his contemporaneous memo he describes the memo he gave Gray in a manner that does not indicate it contained anything new. He describes it as "the memorandum concerning the assistance given to Hunt" and to further convey the deception and to hide his secret deeper he follows this with a lie; "which terminated in August 1971 when his demands escalated to an inappropriate level."

Whatever can be meant by "the contact furnished Hunt" except a human contact? Not the material help, certainly.

Jackson?

Ogarrio or someone else in Mexico City?

Why should the CIA, which says it didn't help except with a one-time "interview"

"Barnish" any kind of "contact" to a man of whom it knew what ~~the~~ it did of Hunt?

The leakers were circumspect on this, fortifying the belief that the leaks were self-serving, not to enable the press to report fully.

There is more than the quoted late-August memos that establish the falsity of all CIA representations of having "terminated in August 1971" its illegal assistance to Hunt's illegal domestic dirty-works.

There was a leak after the CIA admitted to the House "oversight" committee that it had ~~twice~~ ^{thrice} given Hunt access to files after August, the second time in October 1971. Leaking

this permitted powdering ~~it's~~ ^{if} face. It still means lying ~~if~~ not perjury. Hunt was given

~~when what Hunt wanted was delivered to his White House office by the CIA.~~

when what Hunt wanted was delivered to his White House office by the CIA. The third time, in December, he was permitted to examine the personnel files of retired CIA employees in the Miami area where, the record shows, he made repeated efforts to recruit for his gang.

January 29 CBS News and

Not all leaks pretty the CIA./January 30, 1974 the Associated Press ~~and CBS news~~ exposed the CIA's destruction of tapes said to have related to Watergate and after Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, in anticipation of a Senate investigation, had written to ask that all evidence be preserved. As soon as Mansfield's letter was received, the tapes were shredded. The current CIA Director, risen to that post under Nixon from Vietnam assassination programs, said this destruction was "automatic" and nothing related to The Watergate was memory-holed.

Naturally. Why else go on automatic the moment of warning?

The oversighters chimed in fast. The House held an "investigation" at which the only possible evidence was the CIA's word, Chairman Lucien Nedzi issued a statement summarized in The Washington Post's February 22, 1974 headline. "CIA IS Backed On Tapes; Not Watergate Material, Nedzi Says."

Before Nedzi became the CIA's foreman Helms was reported (post 2/25/74) on his fourth shuttle back from Iran because this destruction of tapes was when he was still Director. There were no follow-up stories.

On the other side of Capitol Hill, the Senate side, Nedzi had strong competition in "clearing" the CIA.


The Watergate committee minority staff in particular, ^{was active - helpful} By July 31, 1975, which ~~was~~ left only one ~~working~~ day before the testimony of the top CIA people began, two staffers, Tom Ritter and Emily Sheketoff, wrote memos for Assistant Minority Counsel Howard S. Liebengood. They are whitewash formulas in that they indicate the dirty stuff that will come up and what is to be suppressed. To a degree they repeat Walters' memos so they are reproduced here in part only. (Lil-marked in blue only, in facsimile)

Well, Nixon did obstruct justice by ordering Walters to get Gray to cut it off with the five arrested, later ² ~~of~~ reformulated, as Nixon's own tape transcripts disclose, to a cutoff with Liddy.

And Nixon's gang did burglarize the files of the Chilean Embassy. Senators would close ranks on this, regarding that as a proper state secret, regardless of how improper or repugnant they found the fact. Those of us who do not run for re-election in districts in which federal funds are an important electoral factor need not ~~indulge~~ believe that when a President is responsible for a monstrous violation of all law, decency and comity between nations and their peoples should have his responsibility suppressed.

Senatorial courtesy cannot explain the need to classify "Dean ~~mentioned~~ possible \$500,000 would be needed if ^{was} ~~the blame~~ were to be transferred to Cubans," on page three. ^{rejected} Not if one believed the CIA's protestations that they refused Dean's approaches on bribing the Cubans to take the blame for Nixon.

Why an expensive tape recorder - the same brand used to erase the incriminating tape of June 20, when ^{to Nixon} ~~the~~ ^{results reported by} ~~aldeman~~ reported, ^{FBI} ~~the contents of~~ Gray's memo on the investigation ^{to} ~~to~~ Nixon - ~~it~~ need be camouflaged as a portable typewriter if it is to be used "for overt investigatorial recording of meetings with agents" only, seems to have piqued no/curiosity. Nor the admission that Hunt had these "agents" working for him. And when a kid can go to the discount house and successfully operate an "overt" recorder he can buy from his allowance,



LOWELL P. BRADLEY, JR., DIRECTOR
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(APPROVED TO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 31, 1973

MEMORANDUM

To: Howard Liebengood
From: Tom Ritter
Subject: WALTER'S PERSONAL MEANS OF CONVERSATIONS WITH ENRICHMAN, HALDEMAN,
DEAN AND GRAY AND HELMS

COVERING NOTE:

Attached memoranda were not intended to be full or verbatim account of meetings they covered--for Walters use only.

Apparent inconsistency between testimony, President's name not used, and note that Haldeman had said "it is President's wish..." Walters states this only implicit in his mind--he did not correct memo because it was for his own use only. The fact that Walters did not think it was used is shown by his saying so Gray on July, 6--"it was implicit" and in other talks with Dean and Gray showing clearly that Walters did not believe that the President knew.

In his talks with Dean on June 26 and June 28 and his talks with Gray July 6 and 28, reflects Walter's view that those not touched would be so if Walters was to do what Dean wanted.

Walters remarks concerning Cubans with Dean on June 28 were only intended as hypothetical assumptions.

JUNE 23, 1973

1. On June 23, Walters talked with Enrichman, Haldeman and Helms in Enrichman's office at the White House.

Haldeman stated that "bugging" affair at DNC was making headlines and the Democrats were trying to maximize it. The FBI investigation was leading to a lot of important people and could get worse, and was getting embarrassing to the President. Walter states in the memo that Haldeman said that the President

July 31, 1973

Memo to Liebengood from Ritter

Page Two

wanted Walters to contact Gray and suggest to him that it was sufficient that five suspects were arrested and it was not advantageous to have inquiry pushed, especially in Mexico. Gray would be receptive.

Helms stated that the CIA was not involved. He had talked to Gray on the previous day. He told him that none of the five suspects had worked for the CIA in the last two years. Helms had told Gray that none of the FBI investigation was touching any CIA covert activities, current or ongoing.

Haldeman repeated his request for Walters to talk to Gray.

2. At 14:30, June 23, Walters called on acting Director of FBI, Gray, and saw him alone in his office of the FBI building. Walters told Gray that he came to see him after talking to the "White House", no names mentioned by either party. Walters told Gray that he was aware of Gray's conversation with Helms, adding that continuation might lead to some projects. Gray stated that his problem was how to "low-key" the matter now that it was launched. He stated that there was a matter of a check drawn on a Mexican bank for \$89,000, ie, Dahlberg. Walters repeated that if the investigation was pushed "South of the Border" it could trespass upon some CIA covert projects. Gray stated that he would need to talk to Dean about how the matter could best be handled.

3. On June 21, at 10 a.m., Dean called Walters from the White House wanting to see Walters about the matter which Walters had discussed with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Walters and Dean met alone at 11:45. Dean stated that FBI investigation was awkward and leads to important people. FBI supposedly working on three theories: 1. matter was organized by the CRP; 2. it was organized by the CIA; 3. it was organized by some other party.

Dean stated that (Barker had been involved in clandestine entry into the Chilean Embassy)* and asked if Walters was sure the CIA wasn't involved. Walters assured Dean that none of the suspects had been on the CIA payroll for two years.

Dean asked whether CIA could pay bail for suspects and if CIA could pay salaries while they were in jail out of the covert action funds.

Walters replied that CIA must remain apolitical and that if CIA should do those two things, they would become part of current "leaking" atmosphere of Washington. The scandal would be ten times as bad and such action could only be done on direction from the "highest level". The CIA would be discredited and it would lose all value to the President. Dean agreed.

* The portion in parentheses should remain classified.

July 31, 1973

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June 24, 1973
to Liebengood from Ritter
Three

JUNE 27

At 11:45, June 27, Walters met with Dean at his office in the Executive Office Building. Walters told Dean that he had talked with Helms. Helms had agreed with Walters that CIA involvement would be counter-productive and that the CIA had a legislative constraint about expenditures of funds within the U.S. CIA had to clear them with the chairmen of CIA Oversight Committee in both the House and the Senate.

Walters concluded by repeating arguments that involving the CIA would transform what was now a medium-sized explosive into multi-megaton explosion and not worth risk to all concerned.

JUNE 28

On June 28 at 11:30, Dean and Walters met alone in Dean's office in the EOB. Dean told Walters that Helms' meeting with Gray had been cancelled and that Ehrlichman suggested that Gray deal with Walters. He asked Walters for suggestions to stop the FBI investigation beyond the five suspects. Dean said leads led to Ken Dahlberg and Mexican named Guena. The \$89,000 was unrelated to the bugging case. Dahlberg was refusing to answer any questions.

Walters repeated that CIA involvement would make the scandal worse if it became known. Walters suggested that this affair had a strong Cuban flavor, that everyone knew the Cubans were conspiratorial and anxious to know what policies of both parties would be to Cuba, that they had a plausible motive for attempting the job.

Dean agreed on Cuban issue and that CIA involvement would be unacceptable. (Dean mentioned possible \$500,000 would be needed if blame was to be transferred to Cubans). Dean also said that Gray's cancellation of his meeting with Helms might be reversed in the next few months.

JULY 5, 1972

On July 5, 1972, at 5:50 p.m., Walters received phone call from Gray. Gray had told Walters that pressures had been great on Gray to continue the investigation, that unless he had a documents from Walters to the effect that the FBI investigation was endangering national security, he would have to investigate Dahlberg and Daguierre. Gray said he had talked to Dean. Walters told Gray that he would give him an answer by 10:00 on July 6.

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JULY 6, 1972

At 10:05 on July 6, Walter and Gray met alone at Gray's office. Walters handed Gray memo which covered entire relationship between Watergate suspects and the CIA. Walters told Gray that he could not tell Gray to leak his investigation on the grounds of compromising national security interests. Walters also stated that he could not write a letter to this effect. Gray understood. Gray stated that he had told Haldeman and Ehrlichman that he could not suppress investigation. Walters then reviewed with Gray Walter's involvement in this case. Haldeman and Ehrlichman were not mentioned by name. Walters told Gray that the only way he would be able to write the letter is by direction from the President. Gray said that he had told Kleindienst that he couldn't suppress the investigation. Gray also said he was prepared to resign, except his resignation could be interpreted incorrectly. Gray did not talk to the President. Both agreed that it would be more damaging to the President if they suppressed the investigation.

JULY 13, 1972

On July 12, at 14:15, Walters and Gray met at Gray's office. Walters told Gray that he had learned of CIA assistance given to Hunt, from a memo which he subsequently turned over to Gray. Walters told Gray that assistance given to Hunt terminated in August, 1971, when his demands escalated to an inappropriate level. Walters told Gray that the CIA had assisted Hunt on request from the White House, Hunt's purpose here was to track down security leaks in the government. Gray told Walters that Dahlberg had gotten check from Stans and deposited it in a Mexican bank (political money). Gray said that the President had asked Gray for recommendations in this case and that Gray had replied that the President should get rid of anyone involved, no matter how high. He told the President that any CIA or FBI involvement would be a mortal wound, and that Walters agreed. Gray told Walters that he had informed Dean of his conversation with the President.

Gray told Walters that the U.S. Attorney had subpoenaed the financial records of the CRP.

Before leaving, both reaffirmed their preparation to resign in order to maintain the integrity of their offices.

JULY 28, 1972

At 11:00, July 28, Walters met with Gray in Gray's office. Walters came to clarify the last memo Walters had given Gray regarding "Cleo". "Cleo" was (Cleo Gephart)*, an electronics engineer who was in contact with Hunt during August, 1971. Cleo supplied Hunt with an Usher recorder and assisted him in getting in shaped to use it for overt recording of meetings with agents. No attempt was made for clandestine recordings. Cleo called Hunt twice more

Hide recorder in
overt use? Needed CIA
more than 1
Mike in overt
what happened
to recorder that
was never

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to straighten out problems regarding microphones. The CIA never recovered the recorder.

The CIA also provided Hunt with false documents, disguises for himself and an associate. Hunt was loaned a clandestine camera (which was returned). The CIA developed one roll of film for Hunt which showed an unidentified place possibly the Rand Corp. The CIA had no contact with Hunt after August 31, 1973.

Gray said that "heavy Texas money" had given Barker checks to convert into cash. They both agreed to terminate 965-9598 number.

* Classified material

Schlesinger
FEBRUARY 9, 1973--WALTERS MEMO OF DEAN'S PHONE CALL TO SCHLESINGER

On February 9, 1973, at 6:10, Dean called Schlesinger to discuss two topics.

1. Dean requested that the package sent from the CIA to Justice in connection with Watergate investigation be returned to CIA, since it was no longer needed for the investigation.
2. Dean indicated there may be some sensitive cables regarding the Senate investigation of ITT affair in relation to Chilean problems. Dean mentioned the story by Seymour Hersh of New York Times wherein it stated that Sturgis was responsible for burglarizing the Chilean Embassy in Washington.

After Dean's call, Schlesinger found that Sturgis had not been on the payroll for several years, so whatever allegations of the Chilean Embassy, the CIA had no involvement. He would discuss package relating to Watergate investigation with Walters.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ON FEBRUARY 21, 1973

At request of Schlesinger, Walter met with Dean at Dean's office. Walters explained that CIA could not ask Justice to return the package which was sent to them regarding the Watergate investigation. A note would have to be left in the Justice files saying that the material had been sent back to the CIA and that the CIA had been asked not to destroy any material related to this case. Walters states that Dean looked disappointed.

TR:brc

NY TIMES JUN 1 1974

C.I.A. SAID TO FIND 'PLUMBERS' DATA

Transcript Is Believed Only Record of Ehrlichman's Asking Cushman Aid

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 31 — The Central Intelligence Agency has reportedly discovered a partial stenographic record of a telephone conversation in 1971 that may represent a crucial piece of evidence in the Government's upcoming prosecution of the White House "plumbers."

The transcript, whose existence was made known by an extremely well-placed source, is believed to be the only record of a telephone call on July 7, 1971, in which John D. Ehrlichman reportedly requested C.I.A. assistance for one of the "plumbers" from Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., the agency's deputy director.

The significance of the document is that it could show the extent to which the C.I.A., which is barred by law from engaging in domestic intelligence operations, was told by the White House about the use the "plumbers" planned to make of materials the C.I.A. provided them.

Mr. Ehrlichman, then a top aide to President Nixon, has said that he had no recollection of having made such a request to General Cushman. Mr. Ehrlichman was charged with the over-all responsibility for the "plumbers" task force, which was aimed at halting leaks of information to the press.

The general, now commandant of the Marine Corps, told the Senate Watergate committee last summer he received a telephone call in early July, 1971, that he believed was from Mr. Ehrlichman, requesting some technical assistance for E. Howard Hunt Jr., a member of the "plumbers" who was later convicted for the bungled Watergate break-in.

But the reported existence of the shorthand notes, taken by a secretary who is said to have listened in on the conversation, assumes importance in view of General Cushman's testimony in August that his recollection of the caller's identity was based on circumstantial evidence alone.

As a result of the White House request, Mr. Hunt was eventually provided by the C.I.A.'s Technical Services Division with false identification papers and equipment, including a hidden camera that was used for photographic recon-

Beverly Hills, Calif., psychiatrist who had treated Dr. Daniel Ellsberg. Mr. Ehrlichman and four others, not including Mr. Hunt, were indicted by a grand jury in March through evidence presented by the special Watergate prosecutor on charges of conspiring to violate the civil rights of Dr. Lewis I. Fielding, the psychiatrist, in connection with a burglary at his office in September, 1971.

Hunt's Account

Mr. Hunt, who was granted immunity in the case, has told a Federal grand jury heretofore he arranged for the burglary, which proved to be unfruitful, to seek information about Dr. Ellsberg, who was then suspected of having leaked the Pentagon papers to the press.

Mr. Ehrlichman has denied that he authorized the Fielding break-in or had any foreknowledge that such a move was being planned by the "plumbers," learning of it only after Mr. Hunt returned empty-handed to Washington.

Last July, Mr. Ehrlichman told the Watergate committee that he could not remember "ever making such a call" to General Cushman. Informed by telephone of the report that a partial record of the call had been found in C.I.A. files, the President's former chief domestic adviser insisted that he still could not recollect the incident.

According to the original source, the brief stenographic record, which amounted to three typewritten lines, was made by a C.I.A. secretary who listened to the Ehrlichman-Cushman conversation on what is called a "dead key"—a button on a telephone instrument that allows a second party to listen to a conversation in progress without being overheard.

The use of a secretary to take notes of a telephone conversation is not uncommon in Washington. One C.I.A. official described it as standard procedure at the agency.

A second well-placed source said that the second had been "sent to the hill," and another said that he believed a copy had also been forwarded to the office of Leon Jaworski, the special Watergate prosecutor.

Fred D. Thompson, the chief minority counsel to the Watergate committee, has been investigating, in behalf of Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., of Tennessee, the Republican vice-chairman, the C.I.A.'s involvement in the Watergate affair. But Mr. Thompson declined to say whether the document was among the materials he had received from the agency thus far.

The initial source would not characterize the details of Mr. Ehrlichman's request for technical assistance for Mr. Hunt, who retired from a long career in the C.I.A.'s clandestine service before joining the "plumbers" group shortly after it was set up to investigate Mr. Ellsberg's role in the Pentagon papers case.

twice

the trained and experienced Hunt needed technical help "to straighten out problems ~~xith~~ regarding microphones?" Note the plural. More than one mike? How many agents in how large a room? Students use ~~tape~~ cheap t. pe recorders in large classrooms without "problems." Multiple mikes do require mixers but they are not used in "overt...meetings with agents." This is a dead giveaway that the intended use was clandestine and the CIA knew it.

So did the minority staff.

This com ittee "investigated" or intended to?

Emily Sheketoff unbagged cats, too: ~~xxxxxxixxix~~il-both pages, all

She meant 1972, not 1973 in citing the secret transcript/ on the dates of the memos.

Nobody ever referred to Walters' failure to use his secretary or looked at the madwritten drafts to see how he may have changed them or what he may have decided to omit.

If Walters really did "suggest" to Dean, as this says without equivocation, it is exactly opposite the "overt" story. If it is not what Walters said, what kind of investi-
Watergate
gators did the ~~Senatix~~ committee have? Or counsel not to correct it?

~~andixifzhexdidzwhyzisxhazmatziixgailzforzabstractingzjusticez~~

The Senate could argue, from John M. Crewdson's New York Times story of June 1, 1974, that the CIA is no better at investigating and can't begin to run files, the ostensible reason for its giving training to local police departments in violation of the law.

5
"il- 4 graf's marked in red. ~~plusxpartixixgraf~~

With the Department of Dirty Tricks' ~~forgery~~ ~~xxxx~~ forgery branch of such eminent unforged credentials, can this mysterious finding of what should never have been "lost" be regarded as merely fortuitous?

What does all of this mean?

Exactly what former CIA Director Allen Dulles told his fellow Warren Commissioners on January 27, 1964, in that illegally-classified "TOP SECRET" executive session transcript it took me six years to get, The Director and everyone under him would swear falsely if there seemed to be the need, with Dulles to everyone except the President. And in that session Dulles also said that some records are coded so nobody can make them out except

SAMUEL D. H.
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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 16, 90 CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MEMORANDUM

TO: Howard Liebengood

FROM: Emily Sheketoif

DATE: July 31, 1973

SUBJECT: ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE SESSION
ON CIA WITH WALTERS TESTIFYING

May 19, 1973 - Transcript, Walters statement, Volume 6

TR 295-6 On June 28, 1973, Walters wrote memos about his meetings with Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Dean. The memos were written out in long hand as a refresher for Walters' memory and they were seen only by his secretary to type them and then by Helms.

TR 299 When Walters returned from Far East, he took the eleven memos from his private safe and decided to show a copy to the prosecutor, Silbert, the Attorney General, Kleindeinst, and, from the White House, Buzhardt.

TR 300 On May 11, 1973, Walters went first to Buzhardt on Dr. Schlesinger's suggestion and left the memos with Buzhardt on his own initiative--kind of at Buzhardt's insistence.

Long discussion of where a possible leak to Jack Anderson might be.

TR 315 Two possibly classified phrases were taken out of eleven memos: (1) phrase on break-in at Chilean Embassy was extracted. (2) name of Cleo Gephart, the technician to whom Hunt was supposed to have talked, was taken out.

TR 322-3 Dean talked with Walters on June 26, 1972, about Watergate. While conversation ensued, Walters realized Dean was trying to stick CIA with problem. Alarmed, Walters reported his conclusions to Helms.

- TR 325 June 28, 1972 memo about June 23, 1972 meeting with Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Helms, and Walters: Helms didn't think Haldeman mentioned the President, and Walters couldn't remember, but didn't change it because it was staying in Walters' personal safe.
- TR 327 Helms reminded Walters of agreement between CIA and FBI not to uncover one another's sources.
- TR 331-32 Walters considered Ehrlichman and Haldeman high level and Dean middle level at the White House. Walters considered Dean middle level because of his age and because he was in the EOB and not the main White House.
- TR 334 Walters suggested to Dean, as reported in one of the memos, that they make it seem the Cubans did the Watergate bugging to find out what the Democrats' policy to Cuba was and that it would cost \$500,000 "presumably to investigate this possibility." Walters was mainly interested in keeping the CIA out of this.
- TR 336 The \$500,000 would really go to buy the Cubans into saying they had bugged Watergate.
- TR 339 Walters was suspicious that Dean's friends were involved in Watergate, as culprits, because he was so desperate to have the CIA take the blame.
- TR 342 Walters has diary entry for June 15, 1973, meeting with Dean. Must have been very short, remembers nothing.
- TR 346 Walters did not ask Gray if Dean had told Gray about there being no implication of the CIA by an investigation into the Mexican financing.
- TR 347 Walters told Gray he did not want to be a party to cutting off the investigation.
- TR 347-8 Walters saw Gray in Silbert's office. Gray said in Silbert's office that he had asked Walters to talk to the President about what was happening.

ES/go

two people.

But if they all swear falsely, if they all would be felons and commit perjury, who could believe their decoding?

Or that these records just keep on being found because the CIA that Helms said was the country's most sophisticated filer can't find its urgent records?

Or Walters' oath?

Or Helms?

Or Cushman?

What can be believed?

What can be believed? Did Walters really offer to bribe the Cubans to take a bum rap for Nixon? There was bribery, sure enough, but little of it reached the Cubans. The admitted sum was close to that \$500,000 figure. Who knows what was not admitted when there were unaccounted Nixon millions kicking around?

Can it be believed that the people were not gulled with the appointment of committees who "investigated" with whitewash brushes?

One thing that can be believed by the lawyers' test of admission against interest is that all these top CIA officials and Gray did obstruct justice because they say they did in pretending there were secret CIA operations that an investigation could disclose.

Unless, of course, it is true. But if it is true they perjured themselves in swearing there was no such secret "project" that could be uncovered.

Had there been any real investigation, there would have been a definitive answer to the perplexing question that is basic in determining criminality, which people can decide for themselves when their corrupt government avoids making the charges in court.

One possible place to look is the Hullen agency, which was "uncovered" in the earliest of Watergate stories. With Hunt there, how could it be avoided? With Bennett operating with consummate professionalism, it was all played down.

The most honored of Watergate reporters and a long list of the most powerful in the media also refused to look into it.

My own investigation, limited as it was and handicapped by no funding,

establishes more than the foregoing chapters include. It is here relevant because it addresses these questions of CIA involvement and what if anything had to be hidden;

How much of it was publicly available may surprise. ~~xxxxxx~~

But whether or not the ease with which the information was acquired does surprise, the fact that no other investigation, official or journalistic, did bring it to light may well be taken as a commentary on those protections on which society had always felt it could depend.

And because it is difficult not to wonder if the CIA had its own interest in the unimpeachment of Richard Nixon.