

The White House Connection

Long before The Watergate committee began taking testimony from the three top
men at the CIA on August 2, ¹⁹⁷ there were widespread reports ^{ing} that strongly suggested the
White House and Nixon personally had been out to frame the CIA, to blame it for what
the White House had done. Even Nixon had been forced to take note and attempt to justify
what had been done by his ^{or} top staffers in his name. (In his
~~follow with quotes~~

*exhibited
the complacency exuded by it
displayed*

One of the more remarkable if not incomprehensible aspects of the Ervin committee's hearings is its and these CIA ^{officers'} complaisancy so long after the inferences of White House framing of the CIA were public.

As with all testimony, questions and answers sometimes introduce other evidentiary factors. Whether they are pursued or not can be a guide to the intent of the investigation. Thus, when Dorsen opened his questioning that neither he nor any member of the committee ever ~~asked~~ said was of framing of the CIA, he unbagged another cat:

Mr. Dorsen. I would like to address your attention to June of 1972 and ask you when ~~you~~ for the first time ~~you~~ did you hear of the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate?

Mr. Helms. It is my impression that I ~~read~~ ^{heard} about it, ~~heard~~ ^{read} about it in the newspapers and heard it on the radio, but this is not any lapse in memory. This is just one of those things that this far back it is hard to know. ...Certainly it was big news from the moment it happened.

Mr. Dorsen. And during the days immediately following the break-in were there conversations at the CIA concerning the break-in?

Mr. Helms. In the first place, sometime on the weekend I received a telephone call from Mr. Howard Osborne, the Director of Security, to inform me that - of the names of the individuals who had participated in the break-in and also to say that Mr. Hunt in some fashion was connected with it. Mr. Osborne's call to me was a perfectly routine matter that had been -there was a charge on him as Director of Security to inform me whenever anybody in the Agency got in any trouble, whether they were permanent employees or past employees. In other words, right now, so I don't have to catch up with these events like suicides and house break-ins and rapes and various things that happened to employees in any organization in a city like Washington, so this was a perfectly routine thing and when he heard about these ex-CIA people who had been involved in this burglary he called me up and notified me about it.

On Monday, when I came to the office, there had been no mention in the papers of Mr. Hunt. So I got hold of Mr. Osborne and said how come you told me Mr. Hunt was involved in this and he said, "well, there were some papers found in the hotel room, one of the hotel rooms with Hunt's name on it and it looks as though he were somewhere in the area when the break-in took place." So I said, "All right," and then from then on, obviously there were various conversations in the Agency as we went to work on various requests from the FBI for information about the people and their backgrounds, and so forth, that had formerly been employed by the Agency." (pp.3236-7)

This is where Dorsen left it as he turned to the White House actions relating to the CIA.

He did not ask details of how Osborne knew what he knew so early, of the involvement of all these former CIA people in an unprecedented political crime on which the election and all of history thereafter could turn.

He did not ask what internal investigation the CIA made of itself, even if it was indicated or the practise, so he did not ask or learn the results, ^{if any.} If the committee's knowledge of the workings of bureaucracy or its specific knowledge of specific agencies or its understanding of political realities did not suggest this line of questioning,

But Rosen failed to ask

Helms volunteered what should have led to it, that this previously-unreported weekend phone call from his Director of Security "was a perfectly routine matter...in any trouble" and routine with "past employees." *Not did he ask when and from whom Osborne learned the names of the individuals who had participated in the operation.*

The committee and Helms knew that the CIA was involved with the Hunt operations because of its illegal assistance to him in matters obviously clandestine and questionable and they are often by their nature illegal matters. Suppose CIA materials had been used in this crime or suppose this crime led to others in which they had been used?

Under the existing circumstances there is no part of government that would not have conducted an immediate and thorough investigation of its own involvement and no organizational head who would not have determined whether there was guilty involvement. Failure to do this could be expected to end in ruin. More than the traditional agencies, those whose work is in any way investigative do these things, as Helms testified, routinely.

Yet even when Helms indicated that the bureaucracy worked as it is supposed to, that the CIA had been informed immediately and privately, that it had a head start because its involvement was not yet public as inevitably it would be, and even that his Director of Security had begun the expectable investigation, he was not asked if an investigation was made, of what it consisted and what its results were. *or if he had ordered an investigation.*

Not even when at this early date Osborne knew "the names of the individuals who had participated" and *all say CIA men?* they were, with one exception, all former CIA employees.

When Osborne knew during the weekend "the names of the individuals" and all those arrested *that* and Hunt were ~~former CIA employees~~ connected with the CIA, can it be that all Helms did when he reached his office on Monday was to get "hold of Mr. Osborne" and ask "how come you told me Mr. Hunt was involved?" When Martinez as of that moment *at 11* was working for the CIA? When all traced back to the "Day of Pigs"? When Helms personally knew of the special Hunt complication?

None of these things can be and the committee knew it. The questioning stopped where it should have begun because the committee wanted it to stop without the required questioning. This means the committee did not really want to go into the CIA matter and that is entirely consistent with this questioning and with all questioning of all witnesses in any way related to it.

In and of itself this introduction to The White House Connection says that the Senate investigation was not and did not intend to be a thorough investigation and that whatever the cost it would not investigate the CIA. ^{This} The Congress never had done

^{The Committee - Senate's} It says also that its investigation of the possibility of White House framing of the CIA has to be examined ~~critically~~ and with care.

~~Between this testimony and that Dorsen asked merely a few innocuous questions, had McCord worked for the Agency and when did he and Hunt leave it. No then turned to~~ ^{asking about}

~~Helms' June 22 conversation with Pat Gray and his "meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Maldeman and General Walters at the White House,"~~ ^{SH (p. 3237)}

~~Horsen asked a few innocuous questions about ~~McCord's~~ McCord's and Hunt's CIA employment ^{and} that then asked Helms about his~~

In his response Helms fell short of saying he did not recall this June 22 conversation with Gray. Instead, he said, "I have no reason to doubt" it.

Mr. Dorsen. In these conversations did you discuss the possibility of CIA involvement in the break-in?

Mr. Helms. I assured Mr. Gray that the CIA had no involvement in the break-in. No involvement whatsoever. And it was my preoccupation consistently from then to this time make this point and to be sure that everybody understand that. It doesn't seem to get across very well for some reason. But the Agency had nothing to do with the Watergate break-in. I hope all the newsmen in the room hear me clearly now. (p. 3238) ^{SH}

Helms did not often permit himself the expression of emotion and he did not often respond forcefully. This was one of the infrequent moments of what for him were of passion. His dedication to and love for the Agency ^{are} without question. And his response is direct and unequivocal. However, it was to the wrong question. Nixon did not allege that the break-in was an Agency job. He did allege that investigating it thoroughly could lead to the exposure of Agency secrets. The two are not the same.

Dorsen went on to the next day's meeting in Ehrlichman's office. Conspicuously, ^{Ehrlichman} General Chshman ^{did not have} ~~was not there and had not been asked to be there,~~ although he is the one with whom Ehrlichman and Hunt had dealt:

Mr. Helms, General Walters and I arrived first, and waited for a few minutes. Then Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman came into the room. As best I can recall what was said, Mr. Haldeman did most of the talking so — and whatever Mr. Ehrlichman contributed in the course of this was either to nod his head or smile or to agree with what Mr. Haldeman said. Mr. Haldeman ... wanted to know whether the Agency had anything to do with it. I assure him the Agency had nothing to do with it. He then said that the five men who had been found [sic] in the Democratic National Committee headquarters had been arrested

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and that seemed to be adequate under the circumstances, that the FBI was investigating what this was all about, and that they, unified, were concerned about some FBI investigations in Mexico.

He also at that time made some, what to me was an incoherent reference to an investigation in Mexico, or an FBI investigation, running into the Bay of Pigs. I do not know what the references were alleged to be, but in any event, I assured him that I had no interest in the Bay of Pigs that many years later, that everything in connection with that had been dealt with and liquidated as far as I was aware and I did not care what they ran into in connection with that.

At some juncture in this conversation, Mr. Haldeman then said something to the effect that it had been decided that General Walters will go and talk to Acting Director Gray of the FBI and indicate to him that these operations - these investigations of the FBI might run into CIA operations in Mexico and that it was desirable that this not happen and that the investigation therefore should either be tapered off or reduced or something, but there was no language saying stop it as far as I recall.

At this point the references to Mexico were quite unclear to me. I had to recognize that if the White House, the President, Mr. Haldeman, somebody in high authority, had information about something in Mexico which I did not have information about, which is quite possible - the White House constantly has information which others do not have - that it would be a prudent thing for me to find out if there was any possibility that some CIA operation was being - was going to be affected, and, therefore, I wanted the necessary time to do this. ...Nobody ~~ever~~ knows everything about ~~anything~~ everything. So at this point I think it was repeated a second time that General Walters was to go and see Acting Director Gray with this charge. It was then indicated that Acting Director Gray would probably be expecting the call, that he was looking for some kind of guidance in this matter...I think that at this point Mr. Ehrlichman made his sole contribution to the conversation, which was that he [Walters] should get down and see Gray as fast as he could. (311 3238-9)

Walters hot-footed it to Gray's office and he reported to me later in the day about his meeting with Gray, ~~and then~~ ... and then for the first time I learned that some money having been sent to Mexico... and even that explanation did not say what the money was for. But also floating around in this was the name of a Mexican lawyer that we had been asked to check out by the FBI to find out if this man was in any way connected with the CIA. His name was Ogarrio...we had been running a tracer...to find out...but we never had any connection with him and I so notified the FBI. ()

Here, without any questions, Dorsen switched to Dean's phone call to General Walters three days later. In doing that he left unasked and unanswered just about all the questions essential to a real investigation and even to minimal understanding.

At one point in his long, rambling answer, Helms had volunteered what was not in Dorsen's question, that he had reminded Walters about this "delimitation" agreement between the FBI and the CIA and had asked "him to make a legitimate request... if they ran into any CIA operations in Mexico or anyplace they were to notify us immediately, and I thought general Walters should restrict his conversation with Acting Director Gray to that point."

Oddly enough, the Chief Spook never asked his Assistant Chief Spook if he had. (p. 3239) ^{8H}

This is typical of the entire farce.

It was- entirely - a farce.

All the participants were among the most sophisticated men in the country, certainly in these matters and certainly also in government and the way it is supposed to work as well as the way it does work. Nothing in this questioning and answering reflects this knowledge and sophistication. Everything about it pretends it is all natural and normal.

It was not, ^{not} ~~next~~ in any sense.

The Senators and their staff knew it, the experienced Chief Spook knew it and all the press knew it.

But all did play the charade through, with Helms as the witness and with Cushman and with Walters.

If for the moment we forget that this was a week after the break-in and forget what cannot be forgotten, that without possibility of any doubt the CIA rushed its own internal investigation, all of which means that, whether or not it was communicated to Helms, the CIA did have answers and did know the questions to ask to get these answers, there is much that cannot be ignored.

However, it was ignored.

Can it be that Helms was summoned to the White House a week after this moment of greatest embarrassment and compromise to both the White House and the CIA and after the exotic "conversation" he described he returned to his office without making any record of what had transpired?

He was not asked, he did not volunteer, and the record, which includes a number of similar memoradna for the record does not include one by him on this, one of the most exceptional moments in his long career of politicking and intelligence. It was, as Helms had to know and events soon established, the turning point in his career. It was also a crucial stage in the CIA's history, and he loved his Agency. He dared not trust to fragile memory all recollection of this crisis and this crucial development in it, the White House meeting that he himself described as extraordinary and quite unnatural.

What about that "delimitation" agreement? Had the FBI observed it? And the other question not asked, how had Osborne learned? Helms had let slip that Osborne knew all ^{those} the ^{involved} men were CIA men by the time he had phoned Helms. Regardless of these facts, can it be that the FBI ran into what would embarrass the CIA and thus all federal investigative agencies and the FBI's own life and would not even check with the CIA?

But ~~as~~ we have seen, the FBI knew all about the Mexican money long before this imperial summons to the White House.

The answers were known. They were in the possession of the committee for, in fact, they were public domain and we have already examined them. They are in the printed record of the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings on Gray's nomination (pp.46 ff), which virtually began with them.

And the answers were ~~known~~ known relatively long before this June 23 session. ^{four} ~~days~~ ^{days} in these kinds of ^{investigations} ~~invest~~ ~~is~~ is a long time. Most were known earlier, for by June 19, which was ~~xxxxxxx 48 hours after the break-in~~ only two days after the break-in and was the first normal working day after it, the FBI had prepared a detailed preliminary ^{himself personally} report and Gray had sent it to ^{so Nixon would know,} Haldeman, personally. So, as this Watergate committee knew ^{but} and neither ^{and} said nor indicated in its questioning, "Haldeman had a certain amount of detailed knowledge. This included not only the CIA connections of those caught in the act and of Hunt, which would have been enough. It also is explicit in saying that the CIA had been consulted and that it was making "further ~~check~~ check." (Judiciary hearings, p.47)

If Osborne learned no other way and not earlier, then someone in the CIA did know. The FBI memo does not report when the CIA was consulted or the name or names or positions of those with whom contact was made. Neither Senate committee cared enough to ask.

Neither had to ask if the CIA was making any kind of investigation. The FBI's very first report records that one had been commenced and was being continued -prior to the drafting and retyping of the memo and prior to Gray's forwarding a copy to Haldeman on Monday, June 19,

In the light of this, a relatively minor consideration should not be ignored, as Dorsen did. Helms swore, "I assured Mr. Gray that the CIA had no involvement in the break-in.

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no involvement whatsoever." This was false. ^{a involved} Perhaps it had no direct involvement. ~~it~~
The break-in not being a CIA job would make it no direct involvement. But with ^{Hunt and} each of
the five captured burglars and Hunt CIA men, there certainly was some CIA involvement.
Gray and the FBI, therefore, had to doubt Helms' word and Haldeman, knowing this, had a
handle on Helms and the CIA, one he used.

Supposedly this committee was investigating Haldeman's and the White House's and
Nixon's use or misuse, whichever the case was, of the CIA in covering up its own Water-
gate involvements. As it didn't really question Haldeman about this, instead giving him
an excellent propaganda forum for an audience he had no other way of reaching, so also did
it not really intend to do more with Helms as its witness. Here at the very outset, within
mere minutes of Helms' taking of the oath, and the dead give-aways. Many more followed,
~~the~~ ^D doubt was eliminated in the first minutes by not asking Helms the obvious questions
about what he had done or had not done to learn all the facts as fast as possible, by
letting him respond deceptively if not falsely that there had been no CIA involvement
whatsoever," and by ^{and through him Nixon} hiding from its record and its vast audience, the people whose futures
were at stake, that Haldeman knew from almost the moment of the arrests that ^{they} he had the
means of leaning on the CIA.

^{The record of}
Dorsen's, Helms' and the committee's and the ^{the} press' record with that White House
meeting is even worse.

As soon as Helms said, "As best I can recall what was said," someone, Dorsen or a
committee member, should have interrupted to exclaim, "Are you saying that after such a
meeting on such an unprecedented event in our history you made no contemporaneous record
of what was said?"

If he had, as assuredly he should have, he should have been asked to produce it,
assuming he had not and that the committee did not have it. If he said he had not, the
natural question was why not. To this there could be no adequate answer.

But the probability is what the requirement was, that there was as precise a record
as possible made the first available moment, when Helms got back to his office while Walters
was dutifully tagging off to see Gray.

The committee that did not take this line knew the answers and hid them or did not

want any answers and didn't even want the questions asked.

No full and honest investigation was possible without these questions asked and answered.

That Ehrlichman, the man who put the arm of the CIA [?] through Cushman, the man in charge of these White House improprieties and illegalities and a direct, supervisory participant, did nothing but "shake his head or smile or agree with what Mr. Haldeman said" is still another giveaway. If the committee was not sharp enough to catch this, as one would expect the staff and all the members to have been, Helms certainly was. He was the intelligence chief, the man who understands these things. Ehrlichman's silence reflected more than that Haldeman was the boss. Domestic affairs were Ehrlichman's, not Haldeman's department. And Ehrlichman did have personal knowledge and involvement. It was not possible that Helms did not know this if only because he knew that it was Ehrlichman who arranged direct CIA involvement through the help given Hunt and through him ^{to} all the others. More than this, it is not probable that Helms did not know that Hunt et al were under Ehrlichman, who was boss of the "Plumbers." And here Helms' direct and personal knowledge of Nixon's official plan for operations precisely like this one was important.

Helms had been fully and assentingly involved in ^{an actual} that police-state plan that ^{Tom Charles} Huston correlated, and Huston also was on the domestic-affairs staff, or under Ehrlichman and to Helms' knowledge. ^{inside the White House} ^{A This was a real Nixon plan for a duplication of Hitler's Gestapo operations (Footnote to NYT, W.P. Aris)}

To any experienced intelligence man or analyst, and Helms was more than just a hand, he was the ~~knows~~ boss - Ehrlichman's silence meant only that he had full knowledge and involvement and didn't dare say a word for fear of implicating himself.

In turn, this meant that if he did not fully understand the kind of game that was being played with him before he got to the White House, Helms knew as soon as the meeting ^{was up} started what ~~kind it was~~, who the major players were and what the ^{stake} ~~stake~~ ^{was} was. His future and that of his beloved Agency were at issue. But so also, he had to know, were those of ~~those~~ Nixon and his top men, Ehrlichman at the very least if Helms had no factual knowledge.

^{It was his business to know} ^{immediately} ^{soon was beyond question}
In failing to oppose what was ^{apparent} to him and ~~this later representation~~ ^{shows} was ~~apparent~~, Helms opted to curry Nixon's favor, accept the unacceptable, and become part of Nixon's covering ^{up} of Nixon's involvement.

*"It is restricted to the break-in only -
for restricted."*

It was a coward's, a self-seeker's choice.

Helms' own representation is that Haldeman "wanted to know whether the Agency had anything to do with it." There is no need to quibble over what "anything" here meant.

Helms says his answer was, "I assured him the Agency had nothing to do with it." Helms

n' what do you know n's suspect n' "What are you driving at?"
did not say he asked Haldeman, "Do you have any reason to believe the Agency had anything to do with it," or "Do you have proof?" Helms was no green kid. There was no reason for him not to ask these questions or to be afraid to and there was every reason to ask them. However, the nature of the questions and the absence of offers of valid reasons for them also told Helms that the questions were, in fact, tantamount to orders. There could be no other meaning to the experienced Helms. ~~and when Helms says Haldeman says~~

If there had been any doubt, and doubt among the sophisticated is not possible, it had to have been eliminated by what Helms says Haldeman then said, that the arrest of the five men ~~is~~ "seemed adequate under the circumstances."

There was one way only in which this could be "adequate" and that is in covering Nixon and those under him. Aside from the fact that the arrests did not solve alone the crimes or lay all the crimes bare and thus were entirely inadequate and far from the discharge

B.O.M. & If and FBI know what Gray did not spill out, that Liddy worked with Hunt.
of official responsibilities, all knew that Hunt ~~was~~ ^{was} Liddy were implicated for that is set forth in the FBI report of four days earlier that Gray had sent Haldeman and Hunt and Liddy both tied the White House into it.

Helms knew and the committee knew that Helms was being leaned on to give the FBI an excuse for not investigating what ~~it was desired~~ Nixon and his henchman wanted not to be investigated.

That Helms was under no illusions is clear from his own account of what then followed, what he described as Haldeman's "incoherent reference to an investigation in Mexico." As Helms explained, the Bay of Pigs stuff was malarkey because "that had been dealt with and liquidated."

The nub was the Mexican Connection.

As were the improbable true, that

~~and if~~ Helms was totally ~~and if~~ ^{the CIA and to} ~~improbably~~ ignorant of any and all factual developments in the case, one Mexican connection had to have come to his mind. The Ervin committee saw fit to ignore it, but Hunt's CIA career was heavy with Mexican assignments, ^{The best} including

acting
 as CIA (station chief. (~~Source, if not summary, Compulsive Spy~~)

Helms didn't have to be the top man in CIA and a man who has spent most of his adult lifetime in that business to know that with Hunt involved in The Watergate Hunt could have involved ~~old~~ CIA contacts in whatever was being probed in Mexico.

Whether or not Helms knew it - and the deliberately incompetent questioning by indubitably competent people is the only reason for uncertainty on the point - there is no doubt that the FBI knew about the Ogarrio laundering operation and there is therefore *(He also could have had other sources.)* no doubt that Haldeman knew it before he spoke to Helms. The facts were exposed the minute the FBI went to Barker's bank and that also was four days earlier. Gray's ~~the~~ Judiciary committee testimony establishes that the Ogarrio connection was the ^N/learned and xeroxes of the checks were obtained. These xeroxes were placed in the Ervin committee's evidence on Wednesday, June 6, two months prior to Helms' appearance. ^(12 H 892-5) So, there was neither mystery nor doubt when Helms testified. There was this certain knowledge and everyone involved in that hearing shared it.

If Helms did not know that these checks were the lever or part of it, he did know that Hunt's past might well have been and he did know that the FBI knew all about Hunt's past before The Watergate because it had ^{to} investigated him as a condition of his White House employment.

~~But if Helms knew the way of Pigs could not be a fact and if he found whatever Haldeman was driving at unclear or, as he ^{Helms} described it, "incoherent," why did he not tell Haldeman he did not understand or what did he not ask what was on his mind or what the evidence was?~~

Helms was not a "ilquetoats" after a lifetime in the CIA's dirty-works department and its chief before becoming ~~the~~ chief of the whole CIA. If he did not ask ~~the~~ question it is because he didn't have to or because he didn't want to expose Haldeman's game. Not asking any question was to be part of the game and to tell Haldeman as clearly as the bent knee could have that he was ^{would be servile} playing that game.

~~What in Helms' own version then followed is another of those things that are so meaningful to a man in Helms' position and so unequivocal to one of his experiences.~~

One would never think that Helms was chief of the CIA. He portrays himself as the merest child. ^{to yet} "It had been decided" without consultation with him and before he got to the White House that "General Walters will go and talk to" Gray and give Gray to understand that "these operations - these investigations of the FBI might run ~~into~~ into CIA operations in Mexico" and that ~~this~~ ^{without assents} "not happen."

First of all, this ~~never happens~~ ^{did} "aldeman ~~does~~ not tell any agency chief what to do and not to do nor does he ^{not go} go over any agency ~~xxx~~ chief's head and give orders to one of his subirdinate. ^{ed} He asks, Even a Haldeman or an Ehrlichman. Kleindienst, servile and Nixonian that he was, told Ehrlichman off on precisely this and to his face and then testified to it before the Ervin committee. ^g He told Whrlichman that if he ever again spoke to a ^e department of Justice employee except through him as Attorney General, he, Kleindienst, would resign. Ehrlichman backed off and Kleindienst was not fired or troubled in any way. ^g This is the way government works, even under Nixon, even with the authoritarian concepts of the Nixon administration.

Helms knew ^{The ropes. when} ~~if~~ he took this, ^{had} Haldeman ~~and~~ still another, an unneeded redundant proof that Helms was in his pocket.

Helms did not protest. Nor did he suggest that as the man in charge he should undertake the mission. Nor did he remind Haldeman that the standing operating agreement between the FBI and the CIA precluded this, as that "delimitation" agreement did. ^g This is separate from whether he knew Gray to be the total lackey and the diligent suppressor that the White House knew him to be, the only reason he was around and the only reason he had been nominat.d to head the FBI.

Particularly should the man who had already ^{said} ~~sworn~~ there was "no involvement whatsoever" have asked to know what the alleged involvement was. More because he claims it was "incoherent" and most urgently because it was unhidden that he was being ordered to provide an excuse for FBI suppression disguised as investigation.

To this must be added Helms' knowledge that Walters owed his job to Nixon, to whom he had been close, ^{as had the personally implicated Cushman.}

In short, there is and there can be no excuse for Helms' participation in this White House

operation that was, overtly, a crime, obstructing justice.

Without spelling it out, Helms' next tried to justify the unpardonable with the limp explanation that "the White House constantly has information which others do not have - that it would be a prudent thing for me to find out if there was any possibility that some CIA operation was being - was going to be affected, and, therefore, I wanted the time necessary to do this..."

Helms did not say this in response to any question. he was, in fact, not asked about it. He volunteered it to excuse what could not be excused and what he and the committee knew could not be excused.

If the White House had "information", Helms didn't need time; he needed that "information." To get it all he had to do was ask Haldeman. He didn't.

Haldeman didn't offer it and Helms didn't ask for it.

The only reason possible is the reason Haldeman and Helms both failed to do the obvious.

It was a ~~fake~~ stall, to provide time to obstruct justice.

Both knew it was.

There was additional reason for Helms demanding to know what the alleged evidence was. He had to prepare to counter ~~it~~ ^{falsehood} or help develop ^{truth} more. This meant he could not wait for some later filtering through of partial or inaccurate information. And when it is recalled that Helms is the man whose whole life was the CIA, from his representation, there was emotional ^{and} well as factual and legal need for him to have done the obvious and asked what he failed to ask.

From his own account he asked no single question ^{and} as he made no single protest.

Even before the Ervin committee, unlike ~~even~~ ^{and others,} Kleindienst and Petersen, he was completely without protest.

The committee did not ask him why.

~~and~~ This tells all that need be told about both parties. ^{Helms and the committee,} They did not want or intend the whole story to come out.

Helms followed this by testifying that he did not learn until later that day, when Walters reported back after his tete-a-tete with Gray, of the "money having been sent to Mexico," his gentle, diplomatic description of an overt illegality, a criminal act.

And here, too, all the members of the committee should have ^{voiced} ~~raised~~ their question, "What! ["] ~~after four days~~ Nobody asked you and nobody asked you to investigate?"


That nobody, member of counsel, asked this tells again what all the testimony tells, that the committee's intent was to cover up. *Congress always shields the spoils.*

Nixon and ^{his gang} ~~company~~ didn't have to be told. Nor could they have been told more fully or persuasively. ~~If they did not know earlier, and there is no reason to presume they didn't, they~~ knew by this point, about a quarter of an hour into Helms' testimony, that ^{still} they had the hex on the committee *and on Helms.*

The servility of these stalwart supermen of the CIA was more sickening, more unmanly than this, including the generals.

There is appropriate characterization in ~~the~~ tape of a conversation between Dean and Ehrlichman when Pat Gray was perjuring his guts out before the Judiciary committee to protect Nixon: Pick up turning in the wind quote here

Because these characters didn't even trust each other and Ehrlichman apparently taped his own conversations indiscriminately if they related to The Watergate, there is the White House transcript of his conversation with Dean after one of ~~Tex~~ Gray's reports of how he was doing in hiding everything from the Senate Judiciary Committee, which was considering Gray's appointment as permanent FBI chief. In speaking to Ehrlichman, Gray had asked him to be sure Dean would support Gray's perjury, which had to do with ~~Tex~~ Gray's personal destruction of some of Hunt's White House files. Ehrlichman joked about this to Dean: marked part 7H 2951, with dots for omissions:



SECRET

8 January 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Joan Ehrlichman

SUBJECT : Contact with Mr. Howard Hunt

1. I met with Howard Hunt on the 22nd of July 1971. At some point during the period from about two weeks to about two days prior to his visit, I received a call over the White House line from either Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson, or perhaps Mr. Dean (I simply cannot recall at this late date just which one it was) stating that Mr. Hunt would call on me to ask for some support and that he was working on a matter for the person calling.

2. Mr. Hunt stated that he had to elicit information from an individual whose ideology he was not certain of and for that reason would like to talk to him under an alias and requested that I provide some documentation to back up his alias identity. He said this was a one-time interview. I said that, yes, we would provide a driver's license and what is called pocket litter, which would indicate the identity which he wished to assume for this one-time operation.

3. On 27 August I found that Mr. Hunt was requesting further support in the form of credit cards and a New York phone number which he could use through an answering service.

4. In my opinion this tended to draw the Agency into the sensitive and forbidden area of operations against Americans and I could no longer comply with his requests. Consequently, at 1100 on 27 August I called Mr. Ehrlichman and explained why we could not meet these requests. I further indicated that Hunt was becoming most demanding and troublesome and, in my opinion, indiscreet. Mr. Ehrlichman indicated assent to our cessation of support for Mr. Hunt.

R. E. Cushman, Jr.
General, USMC

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Belately, at the time of the first trial or to replace destroyed records, it was decided that Cushman, then Commandant of the Marines, had to make some kind of "record" of how the CIA got involved in what even John Mitchell described as "The White House Horrors." So, on January 8, 1973 he sent the following to John Ehrlichman. The illegible stamp at the bottom is declassification: Lil- all beginning with secret stamp, included in facsimile here. Memo of 3 Jan 73

But Ehrlichman did not like this. It involved him and others, ^{by name.} So he demanded that this he-man Marine Corps Commandant change it to eliminate what he didn't like. Abjectly, Cushman did under date of January 10. This is the altered first paragraph: (facsimile - *cut into pieces*)

The change eliminates "from either Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson or perhaps Mr. Dean (I simply cannot recall at this late date just which one)", which pinpoints one of three at the top - and it was Ehrlichman - replacing it with the filler, "direct to my office as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence."

To hasty, not word-for-word, examination the memos appear identical except that in the second one Cushman added at the top a formal identification of Ehrlichman: facsimile 3 lines. ^{up} with

To sum ^{up} this disgusting business ~~up~~ of The White House Connection ~~of~~ The Mexican Connection and the inherent connection of both with the CIA:

From the first moment unofficially, not later than Hunt's 4 a.m. phone call, and later in the first day the White House and certainly Nixon knew of Hunt's complicity in the caught single crime of all these "White House" Horrors" and knew it would be connected with them;

It knew any investigation would immediately disclose the multifaceted Mullen agency involvements with both the White House and the CIA;

It started obstructing justice immediately, with false statements and illegal orders to both the CIA and the FBI;

If Gray or others in the FBI were not keeping the White House updated day-by-day or disclosure-by-disclosure, at the very ^{least-latest} later the Gray memo to Haldeman of the first ~~work~~ day after the arrests told Nixon and all those he trusted all they had to know to obstruct justice, the only way he could remain unimpeached (and while it is not necessary here, John Dean was riding herd on Gray and the Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable John D. Ehrlichman
Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs
The White House

SUBJECT : Contact with Mr. E. Howard Hunt

1. I met with Howard Hunt on 23 July 1971. At some point during the period from about two weeks to about two days prior to his visit, I received a call over the White House line direct to my office as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence stating that Mr. Hunt would call on me to ask for some support and that he was working on a matter for the person calling. I cannot recollect at this late date who placed the call, but it was someone with whom I was acquainted, as opposed to a stranger.

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Criminal Division of the Department of Justice kept Nixon personally informed, including even the ultra-secret grand-jury testimony);

The White House was in touch with Bennett, which meant the whole Mullen/CIA operation; Bennet operated a successful department of Disinformation;

The White House leaned on the CIA to give Gray the excuse required not to trace The Mexican Connection, and Gray didn't ~~un~~ until well into July, after Hunt returned from his nonmysterious non-disappearance;

There was other covering up of the White House trail in Watergate crimes, made possible by these obstructions of justice;

And essential evidence, in the White House and at the CIA was destroyed, aside from what was published and aired insufficiently, by the Senate Watergate committee, at CREEP headquarters by Liddy and others.

Were this not enough, the Congress sat still for this, which was largely public, and what by its abdication did not become public.

That we must now start weaving into the fabric that hid Richard Nixon and made his unimpeachment possible for so long a time.

C