

the national intelligence estimates being used by an economy-minded Eisenhower Administration. There was good reason for this Air Force viewpoint, if the Soviet Union moved to exploit its early lead.

But in May, 1960, the Russians shot down Gary Powers in his U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance airplane, and in the uproar that followed President Eisenhower ended such missions over the USSR. This made it impossible to obtain hard evidence of the speed with which the Soviets were producing and deploying ICBM's, leaving the question of whether or not a missile gap was developing entirely to speculation.

It was not until January 31, 1961, 10 days after President Kennedy took office, that the US successfully launched its first reconnaissance satellite, known by the acronym of Samos; and it was late in the fall of 1961 before a second Samos could be successfully launched. Thus it was probably a year after the election before US intelligence had obtained sufficient, hard photographic evidence to determine with moderate assurance that the missile gap had not developed. This also would explain why the Kennedy Administration could not disclose the reasons for its reappraisal without risk of compromising the new and sorely needed reconnaissance device.

Interviews with Kennedy and Castro

Further Clarification

Jean Daniel's report in last week's New Republic, in which he quoted at length what he had been told by John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro has provoked numerous inquiries - most of them centering on the circumstances of the missile impacement in Cuba. According to Castro's account, President Kennedy had told Khrushchev's son-in-law that "the new situation in Cuba was intolerable," reminding him that the US had not intervened in Hungary. From such statements, Castro and the Soviets concluded that an American invasion was imminent; missiles were installed shortly thereafter. Mr. Daniel here replies to questions put to him:

Q: How do you record your interviews?

DANIEL: It depends. Important persons behave very differently, depending on whether or not one takes extensive notes during the course of an interview. This is

what makes the real difference between an interview and a conversation. In the case of President Kennedy, whom I met alone, it had been understood that not until I had returned from Havana, after having seen Castro, and not until I had seen the President of the United States for the second time, would we agree together on what would be appropriate for publication. The President's tragic death, of course, made that impossible. In this instance, I rushed to the typewriter to write up my notes in detail as soon as I left the White House. But if I am asked to document the accuracy of my reporting, allow me to say that I have reported on conversations with about 10 chiefs of state who are still alive today. I have had not a single denial from any of them. In April, 1958, one month before the May 13 *coup d'état* in Algiers which resulted in bringing General de Gaulle to power, I had an interview with M. Robert Lacoste, then French minister for Algeria, at the latter's request. This interview, which lasted two hours, was picked up by the European press, because Lacoste's words were considered a signal to authors of the *coup*. The only public reaction of M. Robert Lacoste was to accuse me (through his spokesman at that time) of wearing a watch equipped with a tape recorder.

Q: Could you clarify on whose initiative the missiles were installed in Cuba, as Castro views it?

DANIEL: On this point Fidel Castro was perfectly clear. What he told me varied in no essential respect from what he already said over television, in a memorable speech, as well as what he had said to a French journalist, Claude Julien, of *Le Monde*. Castro confirmed that the initial idea originated with the Russians, and with them alone: "The only thing we asked the Russians to do was to make it clear to the United States that any attack on us was an attack on the Soviet Union. We had extensive discussion before arriving at the proposal of installing guided missiles, a proposal which surprised us at first and gave us great pause. We finally went along with the Soviet proposal because, on the one hand, the Russians convinced us that the United States would not let itself be intimidated by conventional weapons, and secondly because it was impossible for us not to share the risks which the Soviet Union was taking to save us."

Q: How definite was Castro in his account of the conversation between Adzhubei and Kennedy?

DANIEL: Castro gave an absolutely categorical answer. The Cuban Prime Minister said that whereas the United States thought it could negotiate with the Russians behind Castro's back, the Cuban government was, in

point of fact, informed on the most minute details of all the conversations between the Soviets and the Americans. Thus, for example, Castro had received a copy of the official report on Adzhubei's interview with the President. In this report (again, according to Castro), Adzhubei said clearly that Kennedy had mentioned US non-intervention in Hungary at the time of the Budapest uprisings, and had specifically said that the Russians were not respecting the rules of the game, since they were intervening in Cuba. Was Kennedy

sounding the Russians out or was he making a threat? I, of course, do not know and can only report that Fidel Castro believed that it was a specific threat. Adzhubei, according to Fidel, thought that perhaps Kennedy was just sounding him out. But a month later Khrushchev reached the same conclusion as Fidel. I have not myself seen the Adzhubei memo. I note, however, that Pierre Salinger last week confirmed that Mr. Kennedy had mentioned Hungary when he saw Adzhubei, but "not in the context" Castro placed the President's remarks.

Toys and Boys and Christmas

The sound of sleigh bells will soon be punctuated by the blare of missile-warning sirens as American youth gathers 'round the Yule tree and unwraps what promises to be a record-breaking arsenal. "Military will lead the league this year," says *Toys and Novelties*, the toy industry's major trade publication.

Twenty-eight American manufacturers and half a dozen importers are vying for the spoils. One of the largest of the former, the Aurora Plastics Corporation, which grossed close to \$14 million last year, announced this December that its "output of military and naval equipment could supply all of NATO's needs and then some." The Aurora assembly lines in West Hempstead, L.I., N.Y., turn out "more planes, more ships, more tanks than all the world's man-sized factories put together," a company advertisement proclaimed.

The customers for this new martial abundance are the nearly 16 million three- to ten-year-old boys in the United States who have been pre-sold, through Saturday morning television commercials, on exactly what manner of armament they want for Christmas.

This year, the emphasis is on achieving a nuclear capability, although there will be hand grenades and bazookas for World War II buffs, ray guns and "degravitators" for those with an eye to the future, and high-powered rifles with "sniperscopes" — although surely the latter will be shunned the rest of this year.

For sheer, uncompromising overkill, nothing on the market can match the three-foot long, high-impact plastic, battery-operated "Mighty Matilda," an aircraft carrier with "nuclear power drive" and equipped with a 100-man crew, 12 jet fighters, 9 bombers, 16 surface-to-air missiles, four helicopters, two aircraft elevators and a tow truck for \$14.95 from Remco Industries, Inc. Under her own power, the "Mighty Matilda" can navigate the living-room carpet on unseen wheels, catapult her aircraft aloft, spring-fire her mis-

siles, raise and lower elevators, whirl her radar antenna, and ring out "battle stations" over her intercom.

Also keeping abreast of the nuclear boom are the model railroads. The 1963 Lionel catalog lists among its rolling stock no less than nine types of missile-bearing cars. One of these, an inoffensive-looking brown box-car priced at \$9.95, responds to a signal by slowly opening its roof, erecting a "Minuteman" intercontinental ballistic missile to the firing position and then suddenly dispatching the weapon on a mission of "long-distance bombardment."

Another plaything in the megaton range is the "Electric-Powered Diving Submarine" which comes in kit form from the Ideal Toy Corporation for \$9.95. This sleek 24³/₄-inch vessel takes to the water like the *Skipjack* and can cruise, make figure-8's, submerge, surface and fire its "nuclear-powered guided missile." More bang for the buck, however, may be found aboard the 25-inch plastic "Polaris-Launching Nuclear Sub SSB (N) 618 *Thomas Jefferson Kit*," which Renwal Products, Inc., is offering for as little as \$2.98. Of course, the *Jefferson* is not a versatile toy; it cannot cruise, make figure-8's, submerge or surface. All it can do is let fly with 16 Polaris missiles, the prototypes of which "are equal to all the bombs dropped by both sides during World War II."

So inexpensive are the new plastic fabrications that no child need be deprived of a nuclear deterrent. The Processed Plastic Company sells a three-stage "Intercontinental Ballistic Missile" for 39 cents. The Ideal Toy Corporation makes a six-shot "USA *Combat Atomic Cannon*" for \$1.59. For older boys the same firm has an "Electrically Operated Thor Missile Base," complete with missile shelter, missile trailer, missile elevator, launching pad and electric warning siren for \$2.95. Also for \$2.95, the Andy Gard Company supplies a five-piece Army field set and on the container