Nikita Ehruschev is the late John Foster Julies' most and pupil.

This is the real, untal story of the Cuben crisis of 1962.

Unlike the originator of Brinkmanship, Mhruschev's venture into this trickiest and most hazardous diplomacy had immediate and tangible results. It cincluding ending an imminent threat of nuclear ware accomplished specific purposes he had in mind, The world, and relations between the hough a little major powers, better off for it. Peace, which hung on a hair, is firmer for it.

and how analyze and comprehend what the Soviet leader did, why he did it, what the results were, and what it might in the future mean. Unless we do, we may progress from "eyeball to eyeball" to total destruction.

Every event in those harrowing days was planned or anticipated by that emazingly shrewd man in the Kremlin. Developments were exactly or approximately as he planned them. Actually, we in the United States, while we thought we were forcing him, were merely rescting to his moves. We could have followed him no closer in he'd had a ring in our nose.

That made a Brinksman of Aruschev? Nuclear war was the alternative he faced. His crises came not in the fall of 4962, but in early summer, with the well-roorted visit of Raul Castro and Che Guevara. They built the fire under

Khruschev's witches brew.

As Ampending essent on Cuba was so well publicized it was photographed on U.S. TV.

The Bay of Pigs fiesco get a him little reason to trust the judgement of the CIA.

He was deeply and publicly committed to defend Cuba "with every means" at disposal. Inevitably, nuclear war.

The only way he could control events was to take the initiative.

"eanwhile, the whole world knew he was surrounded by American missles, some even on his border, not separated by the ocean.

Thy not turn the tables and bring the whole crisis to a head - and make the American government reconsider its Cuban policy and its potentialities - by putting his missles in Cuban

In Cuba, they served only a diplomatic purpose. They were of no essential value for either Russian defense or offense. At best, they could contribute a questionable overkill capacity for the briefast moment, and then only if the Soviets attacked.

There is no evidence there ever was a warhead in Cuba, not even an irresponsible claim of any.

There is no evidence of even a rudimentary attempt to camoflage the installations and deliverage

There was no effort to impede serial reconsissance, and reason to believe the "secret" was leaked to the well-infiltrated Cuban exile groups. When it served H's purpose to shoot down a reconnaissance plane, he did so and showed he could do so.

could affect he plan, and when Castro finally realized what had happened, he conflicted long and loud. He now realizes why it had to happen that way and is satisfied.

President Kennedy's alternatives were limited. He could attack and unleash nuclear disaster or demand the withdrawal of the rockets. This meant really no alternative, and his dilpometic position was weakened by the presence of similar, and known to be nuclear armed, rockets all around the Soviets.

He was in no position to deny Khruschev's quid pro quo, a guarantee that the U.S. would not attack Cuba. Had he tried to, he would have been completely isolated.

meanwhile, Ehruschev had seem to it that Kennedy had a ready-made face saver, in the withdrawal of the Russian rockets which the Soviets never wanted

and never needed in Cuba taxbaginxwithx

The result the elimination to the greatest immediate danger to peace in the world, a guarantee against a Cuban invasion not otherwise attainable, and the beginning of a normalization of trade relations between Cuba and the rest of the world, despite opposition and economic threats from the U.S.