Weather

Today—Partly cloudy, chance of storms, high 86 to 90, low 68 to 74. The chance of rain is 30 percent. Friday—Partly sunny and hot, high in low 90s. Yesterday—3 p.m. AQI: 60; temp. range: 95-76. Details on B2.

The Wash

102nd Year · · No. 247

© 1979, Washington Post Co.

THURSDAY,

Foreign Spy Activity

ington Post

Index

Amusements	D14	Food	E 1
Classified	D19	Metro	B 1
Comics Weekly		Obituaries	B 6
Editorials	A18	Sports	F 1
Fed. Diary	B 2	Style	D 1
Financial	C 1	TV-Radio	D13

Inside: The Weekly

AUGUST 9, 1979

Subscription Rates
See Box A2

15c

Found Rampant in U.S.

Shah Threatened Reprisal If Curbed

During his final three years in power, the shah of Iran repeatedly warned U.S. officials that he would expel CIA agents from his country if action were taken against Iranian intelligence operatives for improper activities within the United States.

These warnings were conveyed to the highest level in Washington by then-Ambassador Richard M. Helms in 1976 and again by his successor, William H. Sullivan, last year.

Helms, in a December 1976 cable to then-secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger, cautioned against "an inflammatory public brouhaha over possibly ill-advised intelligence activity. As you well know, we are very beholden here in the intelligence area and therefore correspondingly vulnerable."

This cable traffic and numerous other communications between Tehran and Washington are disclosed in a still-classified staff report on questionable foreign intelligence operations in the United States prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on international operations. Portions of the secret report, drafted by committee legal counsel Michael Glennon, were made public last week by columnist Jack Anderson. Glennon was unavailable for comment yesterday.

The subcommittee report examined cases of harassment and surveillance, as well as suspected assassination plots, against U.S. residents by intelligence agents of Chile, Iran, the Philippines, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

The activities were aimed at critics of some of those governments as a means of influencing American public opinion by silencing opposition voices in this country, according to the report.

Major allegations in the staff study, which is being submitted to government intelligence agencies for review, include:

• Kissinger and his press spokesman, Robert Funseth, made "incorrect and misleading" public statements on

See AGENTS, A12, Col. 1

AGENT, From A1

the extent of the government's knowledge of Iranian intelligence activities in the United States in 1976.

The report said that as long as three years before the Kissinger and Funseth statements the FBI had advised the State Department of investigations it was conducting of harassment of Iranian students by SAVAK agents in the United States. SAVAK was the Iranian secret police.

• The State Department has actively discouraged FBI investigations of likely crimes committed in the United States by friendly intelligence services. Moreover, the department has not expelled known spies using diplomatic cover, despite repeated allegations of misbehavior by those spies.

• The CIA passed on to SAVAK some of the intelligence it received from the FBI on a prominent critic of the shah who resided in the United States, Nasser Afshar, who was later targeted for assassination by the Iranian intelligence agency. The CIA, according to the report, also provided information to the intelligence services of Chile and the Philippines on U.S. residents about whom those governments wanted information.

A Serbian emigre, Dragista Kashikovitch, was shot to death in Chicago in June 1977 after the FBI had received information from the CIA indicating he was a potential assassination target of the Yugoslav intelligence services (UID). A 10-year-old girl who reportedly witnessed the murder was also killed. The report said that the FBI had received "a reliable report" that Yugloslav intelligence officers were involved in the murder. The case is unsolved.

• The Republic of China (Taiwan) intelligence services paid and supervised four "well-known" Sino-American professors to help it keep students under surveillance as recently as August 1978.

"Traditionally," the report said, "official governmental concern has been directed at foreign-sponsored efforts to subvert the United States government through such means as covert operations and espionage.

"The foreign intelligence activities that were the subject of this study were of a new sort, however; they were aimed not at direct subversion of the U.S. government through classic clandestine techniques but rather at influencing American public opinion by controlling, by 'counetring," in the jargon of the intelligence community, those groups and individuals who might affect that body of opinion in ways perceived to be inimical to the interests of the foreign countries involved."

The CIA has a "disincentive" to collect and evaluate such intelligence because of the threat of retaliation against CIA personnel in their host countries, the study concluded. Any prosecution could also run the risk of revealing agency sources and methods.

The FBI does investigate specific complaints of criminal violations but it makes no systematic effort to ascertain the activities within the United States of "friendly" foreign intelligence services, according to the report.

Asked, for example, how the FBI would know about SAVAK agent operations within the United States, one FBI official was quoted as responding: "Watch '60 Minutes'."

Nonetheless the State Department said it relies almost exclusively upon the CIA, FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA) for information on the activities of "friendly" foreign intelligence agencies within the United States.

The theme of reprisal as a deterrent to investigation of SAVAK was a dominant one. A Jan. 3, 1977, cable from the U.S. embassy in Tehran said that if the practices of Iranian intelligence were to become an issue in the United States, the shah "would not be able to overlook the presence of 70 of your people who are carrying out activities contrary to Iranian law.' "

At the time there were 13 SAVAK officers reportedly operating in the United States.

On Sept. 11, 1974, the FBI installed a telephone tap at the Iranian Consulate in San Francisco, with State Department concurrence, after learning that SAVAK informers operating within the United States reported their information to a telephone number at that location.

It was learned through the tap that SAVAK officers assigned to the consulate were directing agents in the western United States targeted against Iranian students.

In January 1975 William G. Hyland, then director of the State Department's Bureau of Information and Research, disapproved the tap, which was immediately terminated.

The FBI later told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the tap was turned off for "foreign policy reasons," although an earlier version of the statement said it was terminated for "political reasons," according to the staff report.

The episode in which Kissinger and Funseth were accused of issuing misleading public statements grew out of an appearance of the shah on Oct. 24,

1976, on the CBS "60 Minutes" program.

Asked about SAVAK operations in the United States, the shah said the purpose of those activities was "checking up on anybody who becomes affiliated with circles, organizations hostile to my country, which is the role of any intelligence organization."

At a news conference three days later in Hartford, Kissinger said, "It is not correct that the United States is aware of the fact that Iranian intelligence personnel are checking on individuals living in the United States or keeping them under surveillance. We are making inquiries about this matter, and if it is correct we are going to ask that it be stopped."

Two weeks later State Department spokesman Funseth said, "We found no evidence confirming allegations of any illegal or improper activity. And the Iranian embassy has assured us that none of their officials are committing any such activities .... On our part, we informed the Iranian embassy that we do not accept the exercise of police functions by foreign officials in the United States for whatever reason."

Three years earlier, notwithstanding Kissinger's denial, the FBI had requested State Department clearance to investigate an Iranian intelligence operation designed to infiltrate anti-shah student groups. Within 10 days the FBI request was withdrawn. No explanation was cited.

On two subsequent occasions before the Kissinger and Funseth statements the FBI sought authority to place telephone taps on the Iranian consulate in San Francisco to monitor reports of harassment. One request was granted, and the tap was later terminated at the behest of the State Department.

"Thus, at the time of Dr. Kissinger's Oct. 24, 1976, statement, at least three documents had been transmitted to the State Department by the FBI providing information diametrically contrary to his statement," the report said. "State Department spokesman Robert Funseth's Nov. 10, 1976, statement was both incorrect and misleading."

A "working paper" later produced by the State Department, used to brief Kissinger, raised several options for dealing with the SAVAK issue.

One of the options was to ask the attorney general to order a thorough



HENRY A. KISSINGER



THE SHAH OF IRAN

... some sparks of difference after an appearance on television's "60 Minutes."

FBI investigation of SAVAK. There was a caution, however, that the Iranians "would be irritated by the fact of the investigation alone, which could lead to counteractions against us in Iran. . . . If evidence were found of past impropriety, we would be left with an endless source of friction with Iran."

The option that was finally selected recommended simply that a department official explain to Iranian Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi that Iranian intelligence in the United States should respect U.S. laws, while pointing out that the United States had no evidence they would act improperly, the Senate report said.

"This option was the one selected," it further reported.

The Carter administration was also informed in detail of SAVAK activities after national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski asked the Justice Department for a full report on Iranian operations that might run afoul of the law.

A July 6, 1978, secret memorandum from then deputy attorney general Benjamin R. Civiletti warned Brzezinski that SAVAK was carrying out "significant police, security and non-diplomatic political activity" in the United States. The report does not indicate that Brzezinski or other officials took any action to tighten control over SAVAK actions.

In fact, on Aug. 18, 1978, Ambassador Sullivan, who was in Washington, went to the Justice Department to warn personally of the foreign policy implications of the possible indictment of SAVAK agents and Iranian embassy personnel by a Chicago grand jury investigating SAVAK's role in organizing pro-shah demonstrations in Washington in November 1977.

There is no evidence that Sullivan's warning was transmitted to the grand jury. But State Department officials recall independently of the Senate report that Sullivan emphasized to the Justice Department the "unique" nature of U.S. intelligence "assets" in Iran.

The Chileans

The most highly-publicized intrusion into the United States of Chile's Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) grew out of the assassination of Orlando Letelier, former Chilean ambassador to the United States, in September 1976.

The indictment of the director of Chile's intelligence service, Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, by a federal grand jury in Washington provided a remarkable case study of foreign espionage operations aimed at silencing political dissidents within the United States.

Letelier's assassination fit into a pattern of reprisal practiced not only by DINA but also by a wider network of Latin American intelligence agencies comprising Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, according to the Senate report and independent testimony of U.S. intelligence officials. The joint effort is known as Operation Condor.

The Senate report mentions a "phase three" aspect of Operation Condor which involves the formation of special teams to carry out "sanctions"—including assassinations—against the enemies of its constituent governments.

One such operation was targeted in 1974 against a group of European leftists, including the notorious terrorist known as Carlos. In this case the CIA learned of the plans and warned the governments of France and Portugal, where the assassinations were expected to be carried out, according to intelligence officials. The plan was called off when the governments of those two countries warned representatives of Condor against carrying it out.

The Senate report disclosed that Condor had considered establishing its own station in Miami in 1974. When the CIA learned of this scheme, too, it alerted the State Department.

ORLANDO LETELIER
. . . assassinated in 1976

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger rejected a State Department proposal to protest formally to the governments involved in Condor. Instead it was decided that the CIA would express U.S. disapproval through regular intelligence channels, by informing DINA. No Condor station was opened in Miami.

The Senate report said the FBI had concluded early in its investigation of the Letelier assassination that the murder "may have been carried out as a third phase of Operation Condor."

The Filipinos

Although the Philippine intelligence community is described as a highly structured group of organizations based in general on the American system, its efforts appear to have been both more low-key and more amateurish than have those of its Iranian and Taiwanese counterparts.

But its concerns are remarkable similar.

Beginning in May 1973, the Intelligence Service of the Armd Forces of the Philippines began infiltrating the United States with agents assignd to neutralize political opponents of President Ferdinand Marcos.

One of those agents walked into an FBI office in San Francisco bearing a letter of introduction from the Consul General of the Philippine Consulate there and an offer to establish a liaison relationship to trade information about Philippine immigrants. The FBI and the San Francisco Police Department turnd down the offer.



PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT MARCOS
. . . neutralizing Political opponents

The Soviets

Initially, the FBI told the Senate staff investigation that Russian agents conducted "acts of harassment, intimidation and surveillance" in the United States "with alarming regularity." Repeated requests for examples, however, produced only one: a 1977 case in which a Soviet intelligence officer was reported to have solicited a young Soviet Jew, who had recently emigrated to the United States, to write and publish anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli articles.

The emigre was reportedly told that his family would be arrested if he refused. The Senate study does not disclose what happened.

The study's author seems convinced that the FBI's responses indicate that the KGB is indeed engaged in traditional spying, and apparently devotes little of its resources in the United States to silencing its critics.

The Yugoslavs

Yugoslav intelligence operations in the United States are described as "extensive" and aimed at the penetration, neutralization and destruction of anti-communist emigre groups, according to evidence gathered by the FBI.

The catalogue of activities carried out by agents of Yugoslavia's Administration for Research and Documentation (UID) includes harassment, intimidation and, perhaps, assassination, the bureau believes.

The Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee report cited the Chicago murders of Serbian emigre Dragista Kashikovich and a 10-year-old girl believed to have witnessed that killing as acts in which Yugoslav intelligence is widely suspected to have played a part, although no connection has yet been established. The murders are still listed as unsolved by Chicago police.

The Senate report also said the Yugoslav Consul General in San Francisco, Tugomir Dzalto, was accused by numerous emigres of threatening them if they declined to be recruited as informers.

"The State Department's continued refusal to expel such officials lends plausibility, among his targets, to the claim Dzalto repeatedly made that it would do little good to go to the FBI: the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, he said, can manipulate American authorities to minimize the impact of such an occurrence," the Senate report said.

Although the Yugoslav intelligence service has not been directly implicated in any assassination, the report said "knowledgeable FBI officials believe that the likely modus operandi of Yugoslav agent-assassins is to pose as tourists or businessmen who have traveled first to other foreign countries. Approximately 10 to 15 murders have occurred in Europe which have been attributed to Yugoslav intelligence agents, although verification by United States authroities has not been possible."

The report also said that the majority of the reported incidents of intimidation by Yugoslav agents "do not constitute activities which violate federal statutes within the jurisdiction of the FBI they therefore have not been investigated or verified by the FBI."

The Taiwanese

The American opening toward Peking has turned Taiwan's intelligence agency from a trusted ally with no interest in spying inside the United States into a wounded, hostile force that "could carry out the same types of operations—paramilitary activities, sabotage and espionage—against United States persons and interests as now are targeted" against Peking, the Senate Staff report concludes.

Intelligence reports on a meeting in Taipei in September, 1971, of the three main Taiwanese intelligence organizations disclose that Taiwan began plotting a strategy to delay or, if possible, undermine the normalization of relations between Washington and Peking, in part by actively countering pro-Peking groups and individuals as they emerged here.

Considered and rejected at the 1971 meeting was a plan to send letter bombs to Peking's newly established liaison office in Washington. The lethal letters would also have been sent to Americans supporting Peking, particularly prominent academics who had made recent trips to China and then spoken in favor of recognition of that government. Prime Minister Chiang Ching-kuo vetoed the idea because of the probable political backlash.

But the National Security Bureau did win approval to send an important operative, Mei K'o-wang, to Washington to take charge of all intelligence activities inside the United States and to prepare the network to go completely "underground" when the United States established diplomatic relations with China. Mei arrived in Washington in 1974 and worked under the cover of a New York-based business called the China Development Corp., according to intelligence sources interviewed for the Senate study.

U.S. intelligence reports show that the Taiwanese thought normalization was just around the corner in 1974. But they concluded with the fall of Saigon in April 1975 that they had at least three more years before President Ford (or his successor) would consider recognizing Peking. They set out to make maximum political use of that breathing space.

A new intelligence chief, Wang Hsi-lin, was dispatched to Washington and he attempted to launch a program to recruit Chinese-Americans to travel to China and then report what they learned to Taiwanese intelligence agents upon return. Agents were infiltrated into pro-Peking groups with instructions to disrupt their activities. Violent clashes occurred in demonstrations in San Francisco in May 1978.

At least 45 Taiwanese intelligence officers were present in the United States at the beginning of this year. Ten to 25 of them are believed to be on U.S. college campuses, where they engage in infiltration, surveillance and the organization of anti-Peking demonstrations. Four "well-known" Sino-American professors have reportedly been put on the payroll of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense in Taipei.

U.S. investigators have identified an additional Taiwanese objective, but there is no information available on how successful the effort has been. It is to "develop assets in the United States government who might provide useful information" to Taiwan.

The Iranians

SAVAK, formally known as the National Security and Intelligence Organization, was set up with CIA funds and advice in 1956. Iran's agents have been trained in surveillance and other espionage activities by the CIA, and the Senate report suggests that some of those agents returned to the United States and put those techniques into practice here.

At the peak of its influence, SAVAK had at least 13 full-time case officers running a network of informers and infiltrators covering 30,000 Iranian students on U.S. campuses. The head of U.S.-based SAVAK agents until last February was Mansour Rafizadeh, who operated under the cover of an attache at the Iranian mission to the United Nations. FBI, CIA and State Department officials were aware of Rafizadeh's true job.

Rafizadeh's agents routinely recruited and paid student informers in the United States throughout the 1970s. The going rate at one time was $70 for a fast report on a student meeting. There was enough business to justify setting aside an entire room in the Iranian consulate in San Francisco for the unlisted telephone to which informers called in their reports.

Far more sinister covert actions, including attempted murder, surface in the Senate report, which says that "the most significant SAVAK operation in the United States known to the intelligence community" was a plan in early 1977 to murder Nasser Afshar, an Iranian-born U.S. citizen who angered SAVAK by taking out ads in U.S. newspapers denouncing the shah.

The report offers confirmation for an account of the plan to kill Afshar given in 1977 to The Washington Post by Afshar's would-be assassin, Jules Khan Pira, shortly after Pira defected from SAVAK in Paris.

Richard Cottam, a former CIA agent who became a professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh and who was one of the most articulate critics of the shah in the Iranian ruler's final years, on the throne, reported to the FBI as early as 1976 that Iranian assassination squads were in the United States. Reza Baraheni, an Iranian poet and dissident, was one known target of the hit teams, which were supposed to make executions appear to be common crimes such as muggings, Cottam said. Baraheni was never harmed.

In January, 1978, an official of the Iranian Students Association—the leading anti-shah group in this country—was lured to a meeting in Chico, Calif., where five bullets were fired at him. All missed. One of the two Iranians suspected of the shooting attempt was later linked to SAVAK in a Justice Department report to the National Security Council. The two accused assailants were acquitted at their trial.

In addition to the activities directed at Iranians here, SAVAK became deeply involved in conditioning U.S. opinions toward the shah and toward the Iranian-U.S. alliance worked out by Nixon and Kissinger and reaffirmed by Carter and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Officials acknowledge now that SAVAK volunteered detailed information on Iranian student organizations in the United States to an eagerly listening FBI, which reciprocated with information for SAVAK. U.S. immigration officials in Chicago also cooperated with Iranian diplomats believed to have been SAVAK agents. The agents were given the passports of two Iranian dissident students involved in a Chicago court case last year, according to Chicago lawyers interviewed by The Washington Post.

An on-going Chicago grand jury investigation of SAVAK financing of pro-shah demonstrators who traveled to Washington from all over the country in November 1977 also underscores SAVAK's involvement in political activity in the United States. That involvement had become so visible by February 1978 that Brzezinski felt compelled to ask the State Department to warn the Iranians "not to use SAVAK and the Pahlavi Foundation to orchestrate a pro-shah campaign in the United States," according to the Senate study.

The report does not state whether Brzezinski had in mind the Tehran-based Pahlavi Foundation or the New York-based organization of the same name.

'Colony' in Southern Chile Formed by Nazi Fugitives

In a remote province of southern Chile, an extra ordinary community was formed by Nazi German fugitives from the defeat of World War II.

Spreading over 3,000 acres in the province of Linarest and populated by 250 men, women and children, the "colony" is reportedly run by a strict military disciplinarian, "the Commander" Franz Pfeiffer Richter, according to the reports of intelligence officials.

It was established as a "farm property" by a group of Luftwaffe officers. The colony's leadership of former German pilots gets along well with the Chilean Air Force.

Intelligence sources have told the Senate subcommittee that DINA is suspected of having maintained a detention center at the colony and that training in torture techniques has been offered by ex-Gestapo officers.

It is allegedly equipped with sophisticated communications equipment for maintaining contact with other pro-Nazi elements in South America and Europe.

Beyond this, little is known of the extraordinary community.


"I'M OK—YOU'RE OK"
COVERT ACTIVITIES BY FOREIGN AGENTS IN THE U.S.
COVERT ACTIVITIES BY U.S. AGENTS
©1979 HERBLOCK

Five Nations Have Conducted Systematic Campaigns

Intelligence agencies of five foreign governments have conducted systematic campaigns inside the United States to spy on, harass and in some cases plan assassinations of their opponents, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials have disclosed to Senate investigators.

A principal target of the campaigns by four of the five countries—Iran, the Philippines, Taiwan and Chile—appears to have been American public opinion. Spies were set loose on critics whose speaking out might have disturbed the traditionally close relations between each of the four authoritarian regimes and Washington.

Methods ranged from the reported sending of "hit teams" from Iran and Chile to the United States to the tedious business of monitoring and cataloging student political discussions here by each of the four countries, according to a secret Senate staff study of foreign intelligence operations inside the United States. Independent accounts obtained by The Washington Post, tend to confirm or expand many of the study's disclosures.

Each service developed its own special wrinkles. Preparing to go totally "underground" when Washington established relations with Peking, Taiwan's National Security Bureau drew up plans to recruit Chinese-Americans to travel to China to spy for Taiwan. Chile hoped to establish a Miami branch office of an international consortium of intelligence agencies it had helped establish.

But the four spy outfits had an important common feature. All had intelligence liaison agreements with the CIA, and they operated with a relatively free hand here.

The report strongly suggests that SAVAK, the Iranian espionage organization, also had a cozy working relationship with the FBI during 15 years of "significant police, security and nondiplomatic political activity" in the United States by SAVAK.

The Senate study also investigates the cover activities of two communist nations, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Accounts gathered by the FBI

See SPY, A13, Col. 2

Dog Was Key To Bomb Plot

A plot to assassinate the late Premier Chou En-lai by means of a trained kamikaze dog wearing a remote-controlled bomb was conceived by intelligence agents for the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1971, according to a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee staff report.

An ROC emissary had been sent to Switzerland with funds to pay for the operation, which was to be carried off by members of an Italian neo-fascist organization during a trip by Chou to Paris.

There was one hitch. The trip was canceled because of internal political difficulties in China.

SPY, From A1

and CIA from Croatian and Serbian emigres depict Yugoslav agents posing as diplomats routinely threatening dissidents here with death and then boasting that the U.S. government would not take any action against them.

Unlike the other five spy services, the Soviet Union's KGB is reported by the FBI to concentrate almost exclusively on classical espionage efforts rather than on combatting anti-Soviet views. The one known exception cited by the Senate study involved an unsuccessful Soviet effort to get a Russian Jewish emigre to write anti-Israeli propaganda.

The staff report was based on 45 interviews with intelligence and law enforcement officials completed in January 1979, before the shah's overthrow and also before the Justice Department's indictment of Chilean intelligence officials in the 1976 Washington assassination of former Chilean ambassador to the United States Orlando Letelier and an American citizen, Ronnie Moffit.

The disclosures in the report were labeled "preliminary findings rather than final conclusions." Its purpose was described as being to determine whether more extensive investigation is warranted.

A major conclusion of the study was that none of the agencies most directly involved in the activities of foreign intelligence agents—the CIA, the FBI and State Department—had direct responsibility for monitoring political harassment by foreign governments of their own nationals in the United States.

The Senate report, moreover, has to be impressionistic on points where the FBI, CIA, the State Department, the White House and other agencies have refused to give up sensitive information. It is like most works on intelligence activity in that it has far more details of plans that were never put into effect or did not work than it has of successful operations.

But the report argues persuasively that, even when the foreign intelligence agencies have not carried out their more startling plans the pattern of "harassment and intimidation" of dissidents had had a "chilling effect"

on public discussion and attitudes in this country toward government with controversial human rights records at home.

The intimidation has worked to deprive the targeted emigres, some of whom were naturalized U.S. citizens, of constitutional rights to freedom of speech, assembly and association that are guaranteed to all U.S. residents.

Moreover, the evidence collected strongly suggests that the pattern of intelligence activities may have prevented U.S. officials and citizens from getting accurate information about emigre and student attitudes toward stability and human rights in their home countries.

While President Carter was praising the shah's Iran in January 1978 as "an island of stability," the shah's agents in the United States were intensifying their campaign to silence dissident students who sought to get across a different message, according to intelligence community sources and legal documents filed in Chicago court cases involving the students.

Six months earlier, Taiwan's secret service had organized and paid for an anti-Peking demonstration attended by 1,000 people in Lafayette Square to protest a visit by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance to China, the Senate staff report says.

SAVAK, disbanded after the fall of the shah's government in February, and Taiwan secret service had organized and paid for an anti-Peking demonstration attended by 1,000 people in Lafayette Square to protest a visit by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance to China, the Senate staff report says.

SAVAK, disbanded after the fall of the shah's government in February, and Taiwan's National Security Bureau established the most extensive and active antidissident networks inside the United States of the countries studied.

Iran and Taiwan reportedly set up case officers with diplomatic cover, who ran dozens, if not hundreds of agents who infiltrated campus life and student organizations across the country. Each also reportedly planned large-scale propaganda campaigns to be orchestrated through front organizations, according to statements of senior U.S. officials quoted in the study.

The most diverse and compelling of the report's six cameo descriptions of foreign spies at work in the United States is the section on Taiwan, which was transformed from being among what one intelligence official calls "the white hats" to the "black hat" camp as Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger began their 1971 opening to Peking. The transformation became formal in June 1977, when Taiwan became the only non-communist country to make the FBI's "criteria list."