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Spy Gave Pearl Harbor Clue

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An Allied counter-espionage agent who the Germans thought was their best wartime spy in Britain brought the United States an unmistakable intimation of Axis plans to attack Pearl Harbor, four months before the event.

The disclosure comes in a book, "The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945," to be published here and in Britain next month. The author, Sir John C. Masterman, onetime Vice Chancellor (president) of Oxford University, was head of the British—later Allied—counter-intelligence unit which controlled all double agents in wartime Britain.

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The book, to be published by Yale University Press reveals that from the summer of 1940 until the end of the war every spy the Germans thought they had working for them in the United Kingdom, was without exception, operating under the orders and control of Masterman's unit. Some had been "turned around" by British intelligence; others, always loyal to the Allied cause, and bamboozled the German secret service from the beginning, and still others were fictional creations of the British.

The agent who brought the clear but unheeded warning of Axis interest in Pearl Harbor was a Yugoslav patriot who bore the code-name Tricycle (on official orders, the book gives no current identidication of the double agents).

Described by Masterman as an upper-class Yugoslav, Tricycle had been a student in Germany and had business connections in Britain. He was cultivated by a German intelligence agent in Belgrade and invited to become a German spy. He reported the matter promptly to the British Embassy and thenceforth acted entirely under British instructions.

Once established in the Abwehr (German secret service), Tricycle went to England in 1940, ostensibly as a businessman, and —thanks to material supplied nim by Masterman's organization— started a running flow of purportedly strategic intelli-

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Apparently as cool as he was courageous, Tricycle to Lisbon to meet with his Berman contacts. On one auch trip to Lisbon, in June, q941, the Germans determined that he should go to the United States—to set up German espionage there. He left Portugal on Aug. q0, carrying with him a "questionnaire"—instructions on what subjects to report on —that filled three full pages when when wnlarged from the microdots in which the text was concealed.

In a recent interview in Oxford, where he has retired, Masterman recalled that the microdots were printed on Tricyle's necktie.

The dots were given to the FBI, which was of course working in liaison with British intelligence, and developed. Copies were sent to M.I.5 internal counter-intelligence) in London.

The complete questionnaire is publiched, in translation, as an appendix to "The Double-Cross System.'

Two-thirds or it poses information requests of a very general nature, such as "reports regarding U.S.A. strong points of all descriptions."

Pearl Harbor Focus

But the remaining one-third is much more sharply focused, and is entirely on Pearl Habor and Hawaiian defenses.

Airfields are named and details of them are demanded, as well as sketches of them and information about hangars, workshops, bomb depots and fuel stores. Acharacteristic question was:

"Pearl Harbor—exact details and sketch of the situtation of the State Wharf and power installations, workshops, petrol (gasoline) installations, situation of Dry Dock No. 1 and the new dry dock which is being built."

Masterman comments:

"It is therefore surely a fair deduction that the questionnaire indicated very clearly that in the event of th United States being at war, Pearl Harbor would be the first point to be attacked, and that plans for this attack had reached n dvanced state by August 1941. "Obviously it was for the Americans to make their appreciation and to draw their deductions from the questionnaire rather than for us to do so. Nonetheless, with our fuller knowledge of the case and the man, we ought to have stressed its importance more than we did. With greater experience and a few more years' work, we should certainly have risked a snub."

gence infomation to his spymasters, by then in Lisbon.

FBI sources said the importance of the agent's information was clearly seen and processed through domestic intelligence channels to military officials in Hawaii. But they pointed out that the agent's questionnaire was neither the first nor the most important intelligence that Pearl Harbor was a potential target of the Japanese. Some of the best information, the sources said, was gathered from the Japanese themselves.

In the investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster, the commission headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts said the surprise attack succeeded chiefly because of

the "dereliction of duty" and "errors of judgment" of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short in Hawaii and their failure to take proper defensive measures despite "repeated" warnings by the War and Navy Departments, which were fed information by the FBI as coordinator of intelligence. Both men were removed from their commands Dec. 17, 1942.

The commission said that on Oct. 16 and Nov. 27, 1941, both Kimmel and Short were warned of the possibility of a Japanese attack and ordered to take proper defensive measures.

In the authorized history of the FBI, Don Whitehead's "The FBI Story," there is a contradiction over exactly who discovered the German's use of microdots to carry secret messages. The book says ". . . one of the FBI's most exciting achievements was in uncovering the Nazi secret of the "microdots," perhaps the cleverest espionage weapon of World War II."

Questions on Uranium

Tricycle spent many months in the United States, apparently giving the Germans little of value and attributing his failure to lack of enough money to move around and recruit a network of agents. The Germans seem to have accepted the excuse; they gave him more and more confidence as the war went on.

It is noteworthy that one of the questions he received from his spy-masters in April, 1942, while he was still in the United States, was a long paragraph about Uranium-235. It's first, badly translated, sentence:

"According to some information obtained, there is reason to believe that the scientific works for the utilization of the atomic-kernel (nucleus) energy are being driven forward into a certain direction in the U.S. partly by use of helium."

The memorandum went on to demand information on tests, processes, raw material and locations of experimentation and work.

In the last year of the war, another double agent, in London, was queried about atomic affairs in a way that betrayed considerable German knowledge of what was going on.

"In which part of London," the question read, "is the Uranium Research Institution, in charge of Prof. Lise Meitner, a Jewish emigrant, in connection with Prof. O. R. Frisch?"

The two named were the principal scientists of the British atomic energy program.