Senator Richard Brevard Russell, Georgia Democrat and the most conservative Member of the Warren Commission, refused to agree to the basic conclusion of that Commission, that one bullet, which came to be known as "the magic bullet," inflicted all seven nonfatal injuries on President John F. Kennedy and Texas Governor John B. Connally.

In an army test for the Commission, the best shots in the country were unable to duplicate the shooting attributed to Lee Harvey Oswald alone. However, this single-bullet theory was still presented as fact by the Commission. Contrary to this theory, the Commission's own evidence proves that the crime was an officially unadmitted conspiracy.

In Russell's firm disagreement he was joined by the liberal Republican, Kentucky Senator John Sherman Cooper.

In refusing to sign the Report as drafted, based on this single-bullet theory, Russell forced a Commission executive session, all of which was to have been recorded stenographically for history's record. But the Commission's executive head, J. Lee Rankin, former Solicitor General of the United States, saw to it that no court reporter was there, Instead, he had a staff stenographer pretending to take it all down in shorthand. He then produced a fake transcript but withheld that until after the Report was published and there was no interest in it. All the Members save one were overly committed and had no time for what to them was the past.

When Harold Weisberg gave Russell the proof of this, he broke his long and close friendship with Lyndon Johnson. He never spoke to him again. He liked Weisberg's to then four books on the assassination and as long as he lived he encouraged him to disprove the Report he had been tricked into believing accommodated his objections and Cooper's. It did not.

The fact is that Rankin, probably with Warren's approval, saw to it that the record of their inflexible disagreement with what is basic to the Report was consigned to history's memory hole.

Russell did prepare a five-page statement he read at the executive session he had forced for September 18, 1964. Weisberg has it and also Russell's and Cooper's later correspondence reaffirming their never-ended disagreement with this basis of the Commission's Report; the phonied transcript; the Commission and court reporter records showing that no court reporter was present to record that executive session; and Russell's then assistant's memorandum to him praising Weisberg's four books then published and stating that Weisberg agreed with the Senator in his disagreement with the Report.

Russell also told Weisberg of Warren's consternation when Russell told him he would not sign the single-bullet theory Report, then in page proof. Russell said he told Warren not to worry, that all he had to do was put in a little ol' footnote saying "Senator Russell dissents."

Warren, very much wanting unanimity, instead had Rankin reformulate what Russell would not agree to. They then convinced Russell that his disagreement was accommodated. It was not when printed.

"Senator Russell Dissents" is the title of a 43-page article Weisberg has written about the foregoing and much that relates to it. He has the records he cites from the archives Russell and Cooper established at their State universities and the documents acquired in his own investigations.