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ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK,  
SECRETARY OF STATE,  
BEFORE THE GEORGE C. MARSHALL MEMORIAL DINNER,  
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY,  
SHERATON BALLROOM, SHERATON PARK HOTEL,  
WASHINGTON, D.C., WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1966

"Organizing the Peace"

President Stahr, Mrs. Daniel, Distinguished Guests, Fellow members  
of the Association of the United States Army:

This great dinner revives many personal memories of a connection  
with the Army which began when I was twelve years old -- with R.O.T.C.  
training in Boys High School in Atlanta.

It is a signal privilege to speak on this historic occasion honoring  
two men whose joint achievements deserve the everlasting gratitude of all  
who cherish freedom. One was a great soldier who was also a great  
civilian. The other is a great civilian who was also a sturdy soldier  
and a great Commander-in-Chief. Both exemplified the simple, basic virtues  
of duty, courage, and love of country.

Both made available to those who worked for them much practical  
wisdom. I beg leave to recall again some of General Marshall's advice  
to members of his staff:

"Don't ask me a question without bringing me your proposed answer."

"Don't wait for me to tell you what you ought to be doing -- you  
tell me what I ought to be doing."

"Gentlemen, let's not talk about this matter too much in military  
terms; to do so might make it a military problem."

It was also my good fortune to see President Truman at work. I  
remember the little sign on his desk: "The buck stops here." No state-  
ment could have been more accurate. He made the decisions and none of

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us ever had the slightest doubt about their meaning.

Both President Truman and General Marshall were builders of peace. Both knew that the United States could no longer find security apart from the rest of the world or through defenses and policies confined to the Western Hemisphere or to the North Atlantic basin.

President Truman made the organization of the United Nations his first order of business - side by side with finishing the wars in Europe and the Pacific. Within an hour of taking his oath of office, he announced his decision to go ahead with the Charter conference at San Francisco.

A few months later, General Marshall, in a final biennial report as Chief of Staff of the Army, noted an epochal change in the problem of our national security, due to new weapons developed near the end of the great war just concluded. He wrote: "...The technique of war has brought the United States, its homes and factories into the front line of world conflict. They escaped destructive bombardment in the Second World War. They would not in a third.

"...We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world."

That was after intercontinental planes and the atomic bomb. Since then the validity of his conclusion has been underwritten by intercontinental and submarine-borne missiles and thermonuclear warheads.

Both President Truman and General Marshall knew that peace cannot be had merely by wishing for it or making lofty pronouncements or adopting hortatory resolutions. Both knew that peace -- an enduring peace in which free societies can survive and flourish -- requires infinite patience and perseverance...and that there can be no peace unless it is defended against those who are ready to use force to impose their will.

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The guidelines to peace laid down by President Truman and General Marshall have served us -- and the world -- well. They are still sound. Tonight I shall review briefly where we, and others of like purpose, stand in the effort to organize peace.

Our goal is high -- and it should be. General Bradley said some years ago that we should set our course by the distant stars, and not by the lights of each passing ship. Our goal is a peaceful world in which all men live under governments and institutions of their own choice, and work together to further their common welfare.

But we know that that goal cannot be achieved overnight. In the Department of State we receive some beautifully-tooled designs for a perfect world -- designs that have not the slightest chance of enough acceptance to become realities in the measureable future.

There is no short-cut to peace.

Look at the political boundaries on this shrunken globe: the human family divided into more than 100 sovereignties which vary enormously in size, power, and technical advancement, in internal institutions, in degree of awareness of the rest of the world, in national or ideological purposes, and in attitudes toward the use of force to achieve their aims.

And, if you will, imagine all the different kinds of relations among nations spread along a line, with total cooperation at one end and total conflict at the other. Near the end marked "cooperation" we find such technical matters as standards of weights and measures and delivering the mail across international frontiers.

Near the halfway point along the line are multitudes of problems in which national interests clash but which usually are negotiable. Most of these are economic and many are extremely complex.

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As we approach the other end of the line we begin to find issues in which nations feel threats to their deepest interests -- issues of territory, of violations of sovereignty, of the claims of ethnic or religious minorities. In our lifetime such issues have been made even more dangerous to the peace of the world by the ambitions of new imperialists, under one ideological banner or another. Hitler used such issues as the German minority in Czechoslovakia and the status of Danzig as entering wedges for conquest. During the postwar period, Communist aggressors have often sought to inflame and capitalize on local disputes.

Since the Second World War there have been, by one count, 379 instances of armed conflict, external or internal. And there have been at least 150 disputes or situations which so disturbed world order as to engage the concern of the international community.

Organizing the peace has meant containing these situations so that they would not explode into big wars. This has been done in various ways.

Many disputes were settled or contained through quiet diplomatic intercourse between the parties, sometimes with the help of third parties.

Some have been handled by regional organizations. The peace machinery of the Western Hemisphere has been brought into play in 28 cases, ranging from border disputes to charges, through threats of aggression and subversion, of violations of human rights. In the Dominican Republic we supported the Organization of American States in assuring the Dominican people the right to choose their own government, thus averting a takeover by either the extreme right or the extreme left, both of which had been condemned by the Republics of the Western Hemisphere.

In the last few years the fledgling Organization of African Unity has been effective in four or five disputes: notably in bringing about

about a cease-fire on the Algerian-Moroccan border in 1964.

Since the International Court of Justice was set up under the U.N. Charter, it has decided 35 contentious cases and rendered 13 advisory opinions. Not many in either category involved high temperature problems but a few, such as the Corfu channel, did and others had a feverish potential.

In some 70 cases, the United Nations has become involved, either as principal peace-maker or in a complementary role. UN action has taken many forms: airing an issue, spot-lighting unacceptable activity, providing good offices and mediation, and, in eleven instances, introducing a peacekeeping force to supervise a cease-fire, restore order, and hold the line for the processes of peaceful settlement.

Thus, making and keeping the peace has involved a wide variety of machinery. Much of it has meant reducing the heat from a boil to a simmer. We have learned to live with uneasy truces on the theory that the first step to a solution is to stop shooting. Yet we are aware that not all disputes fade with time and that, both realistically and as a matter of justice, peacekeeping needs to be complemented with attention to underlying issues.

Some people think the United Nations should handle all international disputes. But the authors of the Charter thought otherwise. Article 33 of Chapter VI on Pacific Settlement of Disputes says that the parties "shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

Some think the United States has become involved in too many disputes. We have an interest in the peaceful settlement of quarrels

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which waste resources and energies that are needed for economic development and which may flare into wars. But we don't go around looking for business as peace-makers and peace-keepers. We have no aspiration to be the gendarmes of the universe. We are very pleased when other agencies or nations succeed in averting war or winning a cease-fire or settling a quarrel. For example, we were pleased and encouraged by the Soviet initiative in bringing India and Pakistan together at Tashkent.

Out of the scores of disputes in the last two decades, we have become directly involved in only a dozen or so.

In organizing a reliable peace, the first essential is to eliminate aggression -- preferably by deterring it, but, if it occurs, by repelling it. That was the lesson seared in the minds of those who drafted the Charter of the United Nations while the fires of the most destructive war in history still raged.

The paramount obligation of all members of the United Nations is to take effective collective action to prevent and remove threats to the peace and to suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. Unhappily, some members have refused to live up to that pledge.

President Truman -- and General Marshall -- and his successor as Secretary of State, Dean Acheson -- knew that if peace was to be secured, aggression had to be deterred or repelled. And when they saw that the machinery of the United Nations was not adequate, they reinforced it with other measures: aid to Greece and Turkey, the Rio Pact, the North Atlantic Alliance, the defense of the Republic of Korea, defensive alliances in the Pacific, military aid to many nations whose independence was threatened.

When

When the aggression against the Republic of Korea was unleashed, a Soviet boycott of the Security Council enabled the United Nations to act. President Truman saw instantly what had to be done and did it. As Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at that time, I was never in doubt about his resolve.

Under President Truman we signed defensive alliances with 37 nations: 20 under the Rio Pact, thirteen under the North Atlantic Pact, and four in the Western Pacific: Australia and New Zealand through the ANZUS Pact, and the Philippines and Japan through bilateral treaties.

Also, we had close associates who became treaty allies early in the Eisenhower Administration: The Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China on Taiwan.

And, early in 1950, after extended consultations with his principal foreign policy and military advisers, President Truman determined that we had an important national security interest in keeping South-east Asia, including Viet-Nam, within the Free World. That finding was repeatedly reviewed -- by him, and then by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson -- always with the same conclusion.

I have heard it said or implied that President Kennedy did not regard the security of Southeast Asia generally, and of South Viet-Nam in particular, as important to the Free World and the United States. If he ever had such views -- or even any doubts about the importance of our stake in that area -- he never revealed them to his Secretary of State.

In his news conference of September 12, 1963, President Kennedy summed up our objective in Viet-Nam in these words: "...we want the war to be won, the Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home....But we are not there to see a war lost, and we will follow the policy which I have indicated today of advancing those causes and issues which help win the war."

The great

The great decisions of President Truman in both Europe and Asia remind us that the community of nations must have the courage to resist aggression no matter what form it takes.

Once again we are hearing, from dissenters at home and abroad, arguments and slogans with which President Truman and all who served him came to be familiar:

"Don't be alarmed by the other fellow's bellicose talk -- he's just suffering from an inferiority complex; treat him kindly, and he'll be good."

"It's a long way off; nothing to worry about."

"You're unreasonable: you're asking for unconditional surrender" -- when you're not asking the aggressor to give up anything except his aggression.

"You must compromise" -- that is, give the aggressor at least half of what he demands. Is there any surer way to encourage further aggression?

"It's not an aggression; it's just a civil war."

And now, again, we are told that an aggression is just a "civil war."

There is an indigenous element in the war in South Viet-Nam but relatively it is even smaller than was the indigenous element in the case of Greece. We consider it well within the capacity of the South Vietnamese to handle. We and others are there because of aggression from the North -- an aggression which the other side has repeatedly escalated and now includes many regiments of the regular army of North Viet-Nam. And we shall leave when these invaders and arms from the North go home.

Of course there are differences between Greece and Viet-Nam -- and differences between Hitler and the militant Communist imperialists. But superficial differences should not be allowed to obscure the heart of the matter, which is aggression.

And, let me emphasize, we had better not forget the ghastly mistakes which led to the Second World War. For, there won't be any opportunity to apply



to apply any lessons after a Third World War. We had better remember what we know and see to it that a Third World War does not occur.

At the same time, we must take care not to use more force than is necessary. Now, as in previous conflicts and crises during the last two decades, there are those who want to go all out -- apply maximum power and get it over with. That would be a perilous course, which conceivably could escalate into the thermonuclear exchange which no rational man could want. Prudence dictates that we use enough force to achieve the essential purpose of deterring or repelling aggression. That has been the practice of all four of our postwar Presidents. That is the road which offers the best hope of reaching a reliable peace.

For we can never forget that our objective is a secure peace. We want nothing else from anybody, anywhere in the world.

President Johnson has made clear, again and again, our desire for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. To that end we have made every conceivable suggestion compatible with the right of the South Vietnamese to live under governments and institutions of their own choice.

We do not regard as final public and negative reactions from the other side to our latest proposals. We hope for a more considered reply, whether through public or private channels. If there is uncertainty about the meaning of our proposals, the way to clear it up is through discussion -- and we are quite ready to engage in such discussion. We are animated by the conviction that a common interest exists on which peace can be built in Southeast Asia, and that sincere discussion will reveal where that common interest lies. This being so, it seems all the more tragic that the suffering and destruction of war should be further prolonged.

We will not turn our backs on the fate of Southeast Asia. But neither can we -- nor would we wish to -- impose our will on this area.

It follows that peace in Southeast Asia must be an organized peace -- one which enlists the cooperation of many nations.

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The organization of peace requires that, even while helping to repel aggression, we search incessantly for points of common interest and agreement with our adversaries. Above all, we have sought, and seek, agreements and arrangements that reduce the danger of a great war. And high among these are agreements and arrangements to control and reduce armaments.

Here again, President Truman set the pace. Among many illustrations, I cite only one: the comprehensive plan to assure that the atom would be used only for peaceful purposes by making all production of atomic energy throughout the world the exclusive monopoly of an international agency under the United Nations. When the United States proposed that, we alone had the atomic bomb. After long study and discussion, most of the nations of the world approved the essentials of our proposal. The Communist states blocked it. Had that plan been adopted, the race in super-weapons would have been averted and Homo Sapiens would have been spared the threat of atomic obliteration.

All of President Truman's successors have continued the quest for agreements and understandings with our adversaries. And last Friday, President Johnson set forth a comprehensive program for working toward a "far-reaching improvement in relations between the East and the West."

The organization of peace required that we help to restore the strength of the economically advanced nations of Europe, that we encourage them toward integration and that we try to work in close cooperation with them. Those efforts began under President Truman.

The organization of peace required that we try to make friends of our former enemies, that we encourage them to find a place in the Free World as democratic, self-respecting, independent nations. It was under President Truman that the United States embarked on the reconciliations which have so vastly strengthened the cause of freedom and peace. We are proud to have as partners the flourishing democracies which have risen from the ashes of that great struggle.

The organization

The organization of peace requires that the economically advanced nations assist the less advanced to modernize themselves. Over the long range there can be no security in a world in which a few nations are rich and many are poor.

That was the profound truth set forth in the justly famous Point IV of President Truman's inaugural.

Progress in the developing countries has been uneven. And we cannot afford to shut our eyes to the fact that the world is on the threshold of a food-population crisis.

But many of the developing countries in Asia and Africa have made encouraging progress. In the Western Hemisphere, the great cooperative enterprise, the Alliance for Progress, is meeting its over-all goals and is gaining momentum. And most of the free nations of the Western Pacific are making remarkable progress: not only Japan and Australia but Thailand, Malaysia, and the Republic of China on Taiwan. The Republic of the Philippines has new, dynamic leadership. And, after many discouragements, the Republic of Korea is surging ahead. It is a powerful factor in the security of the Western Pacific not only on the northern rampart but on the southern rampart as well. It has not forgotten that when it was the victim of aggression, others came to its aid. The Republic of Korea's contribution of fighting men in Viet-Nam -- and first-class soldiers they are -- is comparable to ours in ratio to population.

Indonesia has turned a critical corner.

The free nations of the Western Pacific have been taking new initiatives in regional cooperation of many sorts. They are infused with a new confidence. And, as the leaders of many of the countries of that area have said publicly, that confidence springs from the knowledge that aggression will not be allowed to succeed. Those who say that our firm stand in Viet-Nam is not appreciated by governments and peoples in that part of the world are, to say the least, badly informed.

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The organization of peace requires us to get on with the work-a-day affairs of men that need international cooperation. Those unsung activities comprise 80 percent or more of the business of the Department of State. We are active in more than 50 international agencies and take part annually in more than 600 multilateral international conferences. Most of that work goes unnoticed in the general press but it is concerned with problems and arrangements that run from the control of disease to civil aviation, telecommunications, and the peaceful uses of the atom.

We are parties to more than 4,000 treaties and international agreements. Gradually there is growing what has aptly been called the "common law of mankind."

So we continue to move ahead with organizing the peace. And I have no doubt that the people of this great Republic -- as President Truman used to say, "the greatest Republic on which the sun ever shone" -- will continue to do whatever may be necessary to defend and organize peace.

Beneath the crises, the strength of the Free World is growing, both absolutely and in relation to the Communist states. In the competition in production, the Communist states are falling further and further behind. Even more important, Communism is losing the competition in ideas. For it is in the nature of man to want a part in deciding his own affairs and to enjoy certain rights as an individual -- those "blessings of liberty" which we have long cherished and are determined to "secure to ourselves and our posterity."

As President Truman said: "... the basic proposition of the worth and dignity of man is not a sentimental aspiration or a vain hope or a piece of rhetoric. It is the strongest, most creative force now present in this world."

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