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SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 12, 1966

The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's News Conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

The trip from which I returned Saturday evening was very encouraging -- in many ways the most gratifying of the eight trips I have made to the Western Pacific as Secretary of State. From Australia in the south to Japan and Korea in the north, new winds are blowing.

Three fundamental facts stand out.

First, the governments of the free nations of the area are deeply concerned about security and peace. They understand the issues in Southeast Asia. They appreciate what the United States and others are doing to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam to repel North Viet-Nam's aggression by armed attack.

Five members of SEATO have, or soon will have, military forces in Viet-Nam. One nation from outside SEATO, the Republic of Korea, grateful for the help it received when it was defending its own freedom against Communist aggression, has sent to Viet-Nam a full division plus a Marine brigade and a contingent of engineers, and is about to send another full division.

More than thirty nations are providing economic and humanitarian assistance to South Viet-Nam.

The SEATO Ministerial Conference in Canberra found that "the past year has seen serious setbacks for Communist ambitions" but that, nevertheless, "Communist aggression and efforts at subversion remain a major threat . . . ." It described the situation in the Treaty Area as "the most dangerous in the world" and declared that "efforts to meet the Communist challenge there must not fail." It endorsed the 14-point peace program of the United States and "the joint commitment of the Governments of Viet-

Nam

Nam and the United States, as expressed in the Declaration of Honolulu: to defense against aggression, to the work of social revolution, and to the goal of free self-government."

The ANZUS Council Meeting, which followed the SEATO Ministerial Conference, found that "the aggression against South Viet-Nam has in fact been blunted," and that "the presence of approximately one million Vietnamese and allied fighting men in South Viet-Nam in support of the Republic of Viet-Nam assures that the North Vietnamese Communist regime will not succeed in imposing its dictatorship on the people of South Viet-Nam." It "noted that for the fourth time in half a century armed forces of the three members are fighting side by side in the defense of freedom."

The second fundamental fact is that, behind the shield which the United States is helping to provide, the free nations of the Western Pacific are moving ahead economically and socially, several of them with great speed. Australia has surged forward. In Southeast Asia a new spirit is at work. Thailand and Malaysia continue to make impressive gains. Indonesia has turned an important corner, although it still faces very difficult problems. The Philippines have a vigorous and experienced leader in President Marcos, who is bringing fresh energy and new ideas to Philippine economic development.

Further north, the Republic of China on Taiwan continues its remarkable economic and social progress -- which stands in sharp contrast to the failures of the Communist regime on the mainland. I found very stimulating a briefing on the technical assistance which the Republic of China is now rendering to some twenty-five other countries -- mainly in agricultural production.

The new democratic Japan continues its extraordinary economic growth. At its present rate, it may well become, within a very few years,

third

third in rank among industrial nations. Increasingly it is playing a constructive role in the affairs of the Western Pacific and the Free World as a whole.

The Republic of Korea, under President Park, is making very gratifying economic gains. At the same time, it continues to play a large role in defending the security and peace of the Western Pacific.

The third fundamental fact is that the free nations of Asia and the Pacific are moving rapidly toward regional cooperation. The Asian Development Bank promises to be a very important instrument in Asian development. Japan took the initiative in convening a conference on Southeast Asian development. Korea took the initiative in bringing together representatives of ten Western Pacific nations at the recent conference in Seoul at which ASPAC was founded. New cooperative groupings of great promise are in the making in Southeast Asia. These are some of the main examples of increasing regional cooperation. What is more, they are Asian in origin.

Asian communism has lost most of whatever appeal it once had among the free peoples of the area. It has proved itself the enemy of nationalism. It has proved itself unable to compete with the free societies in improving people's living conditions. It is generally regarded today as a reactionary force -- but one which has to be reckoned with because of its militant doctrine and its refusal to cooperate in peaceful processes in Southeast Asia.

But, in spite of the dangers stemming from Communist aggression and threats, the free nations of the Western Pacific look to the future with confidence. They now know that the United States can be relied upon to meet its commitments and that, as the President has made plain, we and our allies have both the will and the means to see things through in Vietnam.

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In my talks with leaders of the Asian and Pacific states during my visit, we had a chance to review in some detail the present situation in Viet-Nam. I found encouragement over the demonstration by South Vietnamese and allied forces that they will not permit a military takeover of South Viet-Nam by Hanoi. There was also a sense of hope that the political processes initiated in South Viet-Nam would produce a broader consensus among all elements, who agree with each other that the effort by Hanoi must be resisted. But all recognized that the struggle is not over and that, as the President put it in his recent Omaha speech:

"No one can tell you how much effort it will take. None can tell you how much sacrifice it will take. No one can tell you how costly it will be."

I found no one who had any indication or belief that the authorities in Hanoi had decided to give up their aggressive ambitions or to come to a conference table to bring about a peaceful settlement. It seems to me, therefore, that our present course is clear -- to support our own men in uniform and their allies and to proceed as rapidly as possible with the political, economic and social measures in Viet-Nam which are required even in the midst of war. The President has emphasized that no one wants peace more than he does. But peace is not here and there is a job to be done.

SECRETARY RUSK: I am ready for your questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you say that the winds of change are also blowing in Peking and in Hanoi?

A Well, we know that there are changes occurring in Mainland China. The exact character and the significance of those changes are not entirely clear. But we do not see those changes resulting in hands extended to other nations in the direction of peace.

Just in the last few hours, the authorities there have blasted a combination of the U. S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists, and the Indian reactionaries, which makes a pretty big basketful.

We hear daily charges that efforts toward peace are a swindle; that this is all a part of a great Munich to try to trap somebody into a surrender, when actually the purposes of these efforts are to get Hanoi to stop shooting at somebody and let peace occur, so that countries out there can live side by side without violence.

As far as Hanoi is concerned, we know that they are having some problems and troubles, that the course upon which they are embarked has not been an easy one for them, and they must now surely understand that the commitment of the South Vietnamese, the United States, and other allies, is such that they cannot expect to have their military victory in South Viet-Nam.

So I would not say that these winds that I am talking about in Free Asia are blowing very freely in Hanoi and Mainland China at this point.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been emphasis in recent days, if not weeks, on the rather cautious optimism that many American officials feel about the war in South Viet-Nam. And now it seems that there is a swing back to the long war, the costly war, the no signs from Hanoi. And a lot of Americans--including myself incidentally--seem a bit confused about how we are doing from day to day. And I wonder if you can explain why this sort of seesaw syndrome in the official actions or reactions.

A Well, I really think I should put that question to you gentlemen.

I mean when we expressed concern about the political disturbances that were called the "resistance movement" up in Hue, and Da Nang, there were some who thought that the whole situation was about to collapse. Well, it wasn't about to collapse.

When someone expresses encouragement over the stellar performance of the military forces in the field, at least during my trip I had the impression that some felt that we were somehow saying that the war was about over.

I had the feeling that there was an over-reaction to this editorial yesterday in Peking about--dubbed the "go it alone" editorial.

I believe that one can be encouraged without believing that the war is over. I think what is needed is a balance, and we, in Government, have our responsibility to try to keep these matters in balance. But this is a responsibility shared by other people in this room as well.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the same point, sir, the recent public opinion polls have showed considerable support for the bombing of the oil depots around Hanoi

and Haiphong, but they, also, indicated that this feeling of encouragement was based on the expectation of a quick end to the war.

Now, I would gather that the concluding portion of your opening statement was addressed to that point.

Could you amplify on this public--on your views about this public expectation--that the bombing is likely to produce an early end to the war?

A Well, I think that any measure which seriously interferes with or makes more difficult the infiltration of men and arms into the South cannot help but be taken into account by the other side when it makes its judgments about its future plans and its future course of action. But we have not seen indications of a change of heart on the other side. We do know that men and arms continue to come South. We do know that those forces are going to have to be engaged. They have been engaged very successfully, and the hopes that the other side might have had a few months ago, that they would have a military success, have, undoubtedly, been seriously blunted, as we stated in the ANZUS communique.

But we are not over the hump yet. We haven't begun to see the end of this thing yet. Because we



haven't seen yet the necessary decisions on the other side to bring this matter to a conclusion.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you say that the bombing of the oil installations, so far, has produced the kind of military gains that you had hoped they would produce?

A Well, it is much too early to try to draw a direct connection between those and the flow of material. Naturally, we will be watching that very closely. But, certainly, POL that is knocked out is not available to move trucks on the same scale as before, and something has got to give somewhere on terms of shortening up on the various tasks undertaken, including the infiltration tasks. But it is much too early to try to make any particular assessment on that particular point.

Q Mr. Secretary, you told us what the "do-it-yourself" editorial didn't mean. What do you think it did mean?

A Well, this was a restatement of a position which has been familiar, particularly to the Chinese Communists since the late '50's. It did not say that there would not be international help. It is usual Chinese Communist doctrine that the main reliance upon any people's revolution, as they put it, must be the people themselves, the peoples directly concerned. But it did not exclude the possibility of outside help. And it did not indicate that in any sense that Hanoi had better sue for peace for lack of outside help.

I just feel that the "go-it-alone" theme did not take sufficiently into account the other things that were said in that editorial, and its known relationship to previous Mao doctrine on that subject.

Q Mr. Secretary, some of the reports of optimism in official quarters that appear in the press have been sparked at least in part by a statement by one of the President's special assistants on TV that the enemy has been tactically defeated in South Viet-Nam. Do

you take issue with that characterization?

A I think that there have been some very important successes in South Viet-Nam, that organized units of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces have been engaged and severely mauled, that their casualties since the first of the year have been very heavy and that base areas have been penetrated and many of them destroyed. Those things obviously are going on.

But in a guerrilla type situation it is not easy to bring these matters to a quick conclusion on the ground because there is always another band and another place to cause difficulty until it's found and fixed and engaged.

So I think there is a big job still ahead and that we shouldn't expect an early change in the situation unless there is some decision on the other side, which has not yet been taken, of which we have no present knowledge.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the--do you feel that from this last statement, do I read that you feel that the war is returning to a guerrilla stage rather than a massive involvement of North Vietnamese

regiments--they have changed their tactics?

A Well, we have not seen organized forces on a large scale who have tried to maintain themselves in sustained combat. There was some indication during the last year's monsoon season that they might have in mind that kind of an operation. I believe some people referred to it as phase three of Mao Tse-tung's strategy. But we have not seen that.

The primary problem still is to find the other fellow, to locate these units. It has not taken the pattern of a great land war in Asia. It is not easy to have that kind of a war against an enemy that is difficult to find. But, nevertheless, the techniques for finding him have improved. He is being engaged more frequently and with greater effect and his losses are running much heavier than they did, say, the second part of last year. So the general technique is still basically that of the guerrilla tactic, the hit-and-run, the hide-and-seek, and not that of a sustained, fixed engagement.

Now, it may be during the present monsoon season we shall see some actions of a large scale by the other side. But General Westmoreland has been trying to

prevent the development of such actions by preventive moves against units as they are located, as a sort of spoiling tactic. And thus far those tactics on our side have worked quite effectively.

Q Mr. Secretary, on several occasions you have called on the Soviet Union to act as a co-chairman and reconvene the Geneva Conference with the British. The only public response has been a toughening of the Soviet position, it seems at least verbally, on Viet-Nam and of course yesterday's decision not to send a track team. I just wonder if there are any encouraging signs privately from the Soviets that they are willing?

A No. I think the public indications of their attitude are consistent with the private indications. We regretted this unfriendly gesture of cancelling certain sports events, partly because it's unnecessary to draw athletes into this kind of a political issue. And there will be a future to be worked on when the Viet-Nam problem is behind us and exchanges of that sort help to build toward this future.

But we also miss another element, and that is some active and serious effort by the Soviet Union to

move this problem toward peace. The communique which resulted from President de Gaulle's visit indicated support for the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The recent declaration of the Warsaw Pact countries called upon the United States to comply with the Geneva Agreements of 1962 and 1954. Prince Sihanouk has asked the two co-chairmen to be of assistance in strengthening the ICC to help protect the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

Now, there are many opportunities here for the co-chairmen to do something to take some step, to grasp a handle and begin to work at this problem. And we would hope that both co-chairmen would find a way to do it. This is a matter, of course, being discussed with them at the present time, I gather by the Prime Minister of India, undoubtedly it will be taken up by the British Prime Minister on his visit. But one needs to do more than just make hostile statements. One needs to address oneself responsibly and directly to the business of how do you make peace. And we would hope that would occur.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I change to another subject? The President previously talked about the

Administration's desire to find some acceptable compromise on the nonproliferation treaty. Does this mean, sir, that the Administration is now preparing to give priority to a nonproliferation treaty over some nuclear hardware sharing with the countries of Western Europe?

A No. I think an approach based on priorities is a wrong approach. Because you have got two quite different things involved here. The one is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are opposed to proliferation. We began to be opposed to it in 1946 when we made the Baruch Proposals that would have eliminated any nuclear power. If one was too many, certainly five are too many and eight or ten or twenty are too many.

Now, there is another question, and that is the nuclear arrangements in NATO which have nothing to do with proliferation. We have never discussed any proposal in NATO which involves adding to the number of nuclear powers or turning these weapons over to any national government that doesn't have them or anything that could be called proliferation.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has mixed these two subjects up. Now, we are continuing to work at this

problem of proliferation because it is important and urgent, and it may be that we can find some language which will help close the difference, provided all parties concentrate on the problem of proliferation and don't try to use the urgent need for a proliferation treaty to accomplish other purposes which have nothing to do with the question of the spreading of nuclear weapons.

So I wouldn't approach it in terms of priorities but we will continue to talk about this matter at Geneva and with our allies and it may be that we can make some progress. Progress is an urgent requirement and it's needed very badly.

Q Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could explain to us how one could reconcile your description of the nature of the war in Viet-Nam on the side of the Communist forces when Secretary McNamara's description of it has become, he said, quasi-conventional?

A Well, I think that we are talking about the scale of the forces involved. I don't intend to get into any argument with either Secretary McNamara or you about particular expressions. But we have not seen,



for example, as much as a two regimental force of the Viet Cong engaged at the same place and the same time for quite a long time. We have never seen a divisional force engaged as such.

So that when you look back to other engagements, back through recent history, I would think that the basic pattern of the struggle is still that of the guerrilla technique. Even though on occasion you may run across a substantial force of two or three thousand men, I don't think that Secretary McNamara and I would argue over that point.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have given us an expose, rather hopefully I think, of the economic and political cooperation in Southeast Asia. Could you also tell us what your views are on the state of NATO at the moment and how you see its prospects and its development in the near future after the withdrawal of France from it?

A Well, I am not sure that I have anything new to say on that, since our recent NATO meeting. I think it is clear that the Fourteen are determined to proceed with NATO and not to permit the withdrawal of French participation in the military arrangements of NATO to cripple it.

Discussions are now going on, as you know, between France and Germany on the one side and the North Atlantic Council on the other and the United States on various aspects of the problems raised by the announcement by President deGaulle of his decisions. Those, I think, will take a little time so that there is nothing very clear yet to be said on those particular subjects.

But I have no doubt that the fourteen members of NATO are determined to go ahead, do what is necessary to keep it together, streamline it, strengthen it ~~if~~ need

be, and not permit it to be set off track by the actions taken by France.

Q Mr. Secretary, in this area we have a problem that is coming up pretty soon on recognition of the Argentine military regime, which took over from an elected government. I wonder if you can give us something of your philosophy on recognition of such a regime?

A Well, we have joined with the other members of the Hemisphere in strongly supporting elected and constitutional governments in this Hemisphere. We did agree at the most recent Foreign Ministers meeting at Rio under Resolution 26, I think it was, that in the event of a takeover of this type that there would be consultation among all the members of the Hemisphere. We are now engaged in that consultation. Certain members of the Hemisphere have already recognized the new regime in Argentina, but we are at the present time continuing to consult and will have to come to our conclusion on that point in the next several days, one way or the other.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to get at both the range and the reason of your word of caution about the statement out of China. Mr. Ball on two occasions last

week led us to believe that we certainly had no serious expectation or sign that the Chinese would do what is commonly called "intervention, either with their air power or on the ground.

A Right.

Q Now, what are you warning us away from -- in other words, in terms of this statement?

A Well, I had the impression quite frankly that the go-it-alone theme in that editorial was emphasized at the expense of those parts which referred to international Communist support for such movements as are present in Viet-Nam and that I had the feeling that too much interpretation was being given that this meant somehow that Peiping would not do anything to help North Viet-Nam.

Now, we don't see indications at the present time of major moves in this direction, but I just think that we ought not to be too confident that this is in any sense cutting the strings between Peiping and Hanoi or leaving Hanoi adrift or anything of that sort.

Q Are you suggesting it doesn't mean less help, but it doesn't necessarily point to more?

A That is correct. I am not making a judgment on what Peiping's actions will be. All I am saying is that it would be, I think, a little risky to base that judgment on this particular editorial.


Q Mr. Secretary, is it conceivable that without a peace treaty we can free South Viet-Nam and, that being the case, could we do it without invasion of North Viet-Nam?

A Oh, I think the attack against South Viet-Nam can be thrown back. I quite frankly don't know whether this matter will come to an end at a conference table or whether it will come to an end de facto, simply by events. It could come to an end either way. But I have no doubt that the military effort to grab South Viet-Nam by force can be thrown back and will be thrown back, so that at some point here, the other side will have to recognize quite clearly that its efforts to grab South Viet-Nam by force has failed and there is no future in it.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

A Thank you.

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