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THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMUNIST WORLDS

An Address by
EUGENE V. ROSTOW
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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EUGENE V. ROSTOW
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
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I PROPOSE TONIGHT to discuss a central source of international tension: our relationship with the Communist worlds.

The negotiations to settle the war in Viet-Nam could be a turning point—and a turning point for the better—in the relations between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and the Communist worlds on the other. This is an underlying goal Ambassadors [W. Averell] Harriman and [Cyrus R.] Vance are seeking in Paris.

Obviously, this is not the time to discuss the negotiating problems they confront. I thought, however, that it might be useful to review the history of our relations with the Communist countries since the war and, against that background, to attempt a few cautious hypotheses about the future.

You will notice that I used the phrase "Communist worlds," in the plural. Even the State Department has noticed that there has been trouble in paradise and that the Communist monolith has joined the mastodon. We have long since abandoned that comfortable old phrase, "the Sino-Soviet bloc," in our departmental jargon; indeed, if I may be pardoned a little institutional pride, we were among the first to notice its irrelevance.

But we cannot take the next step, so dear to some of my utopian colleagues in the universities, and conclude that communism itself has evaporated, leaving nothing behind but an echo and the reflex responses of the more doctrinaire anti-

Communists. Such a view would be unfair to the sincere and devoted men who direct Communist movements and parties throughout the world. We must respect their convictions and their efforts to realize the aims of their prophets.

The Communist movement has been rich in sectarianism, and new heresies attest the depth and intensity of the beliefs which sustain Communist programs. But certain basic drives remain. The significance of these drives in the policy of the different Communist governments varies. Some seem to put the emphasis on "socialism in one country," to recall an earlier slogan. Others are genuinely interested in promoting world revolution or, more recently, something that seems to resemble a state of anarchy in which they could hope to seize power.

Communism is not a force of constant intensity in world affairs. But it is nonetheless a force. The interplay between ideology and nationalism is one of the crucial factors in the history of the last half century, most particularly in the process which has required the United States to take a major and continuing interest in world politics. As Secretary Rusk has remarked, the periodic tensions in our relations with the Soviet Union have not been about polar bears in the Arctic, nor about abstract issues of political theory, but about Berlin, and Korea, and many other problems of politics and security.

The Postwar Balance of Power

At the end of the war, in 1945, we confronted a problem totally new to our national experience. Until 1914 our basic security was protected without execution on our part by the efforts of the European nations, who conducted a reasonably harmonious system of world order. It may not have been altogether a just order. It certainly was not always a pro-

gressive order. But it was a system of order, a fact to which some look back rather wistfully at the moment.

The central animating principle of that system—the concert of Europe—began to disintegrate in 1914. By 1945 it was in ruins. We looked around us and discovered that the map of world politics was entirely changed. Communist power was reaching out from its bases in the Soviet Union, and later from China. The nations of Western Europe were withdrawing from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East to be succeeded by a large number of weak and vulnerable new nations, each seeking to create institutions of modern society and government and to join the mainstream of modern progress. Some were interested as well in aggrandizement and revenge for what they regarded as old wrongs.

To our astonishment, we were forced to see ourselves as one of the two superpowers in a new order of world politics beyond the control of the European nations acting alone.

We and the Russians emerged from the war as world powers on a new scale: both huge countries of advanced technology, both with large military establishments and potential. Despite the enormous losses and the destruction of the war for the Soviet people, their army was intact and was by far the largest in Europe. It stood, not on the Soviet frontiers of 1939, nor on those of the old Russian Empire, but on the Elbe and in the ancient cities of Prague and Budapest—capitals of the Western, Latin world for 1,000 years. In the Far East, fulfilling old Russian dreams, it had established itself in Manchuria and Korea.

It was not easy for America to accept the reality that in our world of sovereign states, peace is a function of power. Indeed it is still difficult for us to believe that these problems are ours and that in a contracting, nuclear world we of all

people have to be concerned with political and military issues all around the globe. We had always scorned the idea of the balance of power as a foreign and essentially a monarchical and undemocratic principle. Now we had suddenly to embrace the concept as a goal of national policy, to acknowledge our past error, and to shoulder the obligation of organizing and maintaining a balance of power in the interest of our own security.

Disappointment of Postwar Hopes

Not unnaturally, our initial responses to the postwar pattern of world politics reflected special aspects of our own historical experience.

We wanted first to make amends to President Wilson—to atone for our failure to join the League of Nations—by directing our support and our hopes for the future to the new United Nations Organization.

We wanted also to continue our wartime association with the Russian people and with the Soviet Union. We had fresh memories of wartime comradeship in arms, of hands across the Elbe, of the Soviet contribution to the victory over Hitler. We recalled other ties and similarities between our two peoples: the traits of generosity, of spontaneity and frankness which both peoples like to call their own. We recalled, too, that both peoples had undergone the invigorating experience of everything conjured up by the idea of "the frontier": The great westward expansion of our own country paralleled the eastward expansion of the Russian people. We appreciated Russian literature, music, and theatre; and the Russians found much to admire in the works of many American writers.

There was also, let us not forget, much genuine sympathy in the United States for the March Revolution of 1917 and for the ideals which it proclaimed. There was more than a little initial sympathy for the October Revolution as well. It is always a mistake to think of America as a reactionary country. Our own revolutionary tradition plays a powerful part in our outlook. Our first sympathies invariably are for governments and social movements that march under the banner of progress.

And finally, we had a practical awareness of the importance of the Soviet Union and respect for its power. We had begun to understand that the future of world peace would depend on the relationship established by the two giants and that a unique kind of "special relationship," a unique mutual responsibility, bound the two nations together. American public opinion has always favored a fair understanding with the Soviet Union.

We were—and are—opposed to communism and concerned about its spread. But during the war and in its aftermath many of us were inclined to somewhat sentimental illusions on the subject. Sir Denis Brogan described such thinking in his book "Is Innocence Enough?"—published in England in 1941 but not issued here, in deference to our warm feelings of the time towards the Soviet Union. We demobilized hastily at the end of the war. The idea of using the threat of force, or of our atomic monopoly, to press for Soviet fulfillment of its agreements at Yalta and Potsdam was literally unthinkable.

The finest quality of our culture required us to test the possibility that the Soviet Union might wish to cooperate with us in building a durable peace after the war. Perhaps Sir Denis would say we were somewhat innocent in doing what

we did. Yet, even after 20 difficult years of dealing with the Soviets, we should not be altogether ashamed of our innocence. For innocence, after all, is the yeast of hope as often as it is the source of folly.

It was not surprising, therefore, that in 1945 many Americans envisioned a peaceful future based upon the new United Nations Organization and on Soviet-American cooperation within it.

These hopes were soon disappointed. Plans for the quadripartite administration of Germany came to nothing within a year of the fall of the Reich. The Soviets demanded a completely free hand in their zone of occupation and yet blocked plans for Germany as a whole. In violation of their agreements at Yalta and Potsdam, they refused to allow free elections in Eastern Europe and imposed minority governments in Poland, then elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and finally in Czechoslovakia. They supported a Communist-inspired civil war in Greece. There were threats to Turkey and Iran.

U.S. Reexamines Its Policies

These alarm bells put us on our guard against an expansionist policy which threatened the possibility of peace and stability of the world. The hopes of the wartime and early postwar years faded, but they did not die.

We tempered our oversanguine views of the Soviet Union. We recalled the less idyllic passages in Russian history. Through the centuries, Russia, without natural frontiers, has been open to invasions from every direction. That fact of its history, so different from our own experience, has given rise to deep-seated fears and suspicions which color the Russian view of the outside world.

As a corollary to this experience, we came also to accept a more realistic view of the United Nations. The United Nations is not designed to function as a peacekeeping body when the great powers disagree. The special competence of the Security Council, and the veto, are the cornerstones of its structure. But the law of the charter is not suspended when the Security Council is paralyzed by a veto. The obligation to uphold the charter remains, to be carried out by nations and groups of nations through older procedures of alliance and diplomacy. The United Nations, we discovered, did not offer a fully effective way to solve old problems of power by invoking a new system of law.

We were forced as well to reexamine our thinking about communism, to recall that it is not simply an idealistic dream and a program for one country but a serious commitment to action on a worldwide scale.

The resulting process of study has given rise to more books, speeches, and articles than any of us could read in a lifetime. This has been the case not simply because we are prolix—although we are indeed prolix—but because changes within the Communist world, or worlds, have necessitated frequent reassessments—in the State Department no less than in the universities and institutes of research.

Ideology and Traditional Nationalism

What is the communism we have to take into account in our foreign policy? Is it a recognizable doctrine or policy, or a related family of doctrines, or an altogether misleading word whose use to identify a number of different tendencies imposes a false unity on phenomena of protest which have no

relationship to each other? What connection is there between modern communism and the classic textbook definitions?

When we talk of Communists, do we mean only disciplined members of the several Communist parties? Or should the word be applied also to what the French call the *enragés*, men and women in the old anarchist tradition, who are interested primarily in violence and destruction for their own sakes and often not even for the sake of utopia? How does the idea of communism apply to the vast array of sects and schisms the Communists have produced?

Some of you may recall the musical comedy of the thirties in which Victor Moore played the role of an American Ambassador about to depart for Moscow. He professed ignorance about the nature of communism. "It's easy," his briefers told him. "All you have to remember is that Trotskyism isn't Leninism, Leninism isn't Stalinism, Stalinism isn't Socialism, and Socialism isn't Communism." Victor remained confused. Are we less confused today—confronted with Titoism, Castroism, Maoism, revisionism, adventurism, dogmatism, and other heresies as well?

Some react to this array by concluding that ideology is irrelevant, like the glittering coinage of Samuel Butler's musical banks. They continue to see the states of the Communist world essentially as successors to the 19th century kingdoms and empires which once occupied the same areas.

On the other hand, we know that the appeal of Communist ideology has driven men and women to commit acts of espionage against their own countries; that ideology has been a useful tool of the well-orchestrated worldwide propaganda campaigns with which we have all become familiar, and often the source, as well, of organized efforts to sustain levels of violence and unrest intended to undermine the ties

binding together societies under attack. It is Communist ideology which stimulates and attempts to justify the strategy of the "war of national liberation" so brilliantly exemplified by the struggle in Viet-Nam today. Some people, therefore, tend to see communism exclusively as an ideological movement or a set of competing but complementary ideological movements which have completely, or nearly completely, submerged the separate national interests of states controlled by Communist parties.

Clearly, the realities and the conclusions we must draw from them lie somewhere between these two extremes. The policies of the states controlled by Communist parties contain elements of both ideology and traditional national interests, in different combinations—in combinations, that is, which are differently proportioned in different countries and at different times. We might say, simply, that a Communist state, while resembling any nation-state in many respects, is also one under the control of a Communist party—a party which remains linked, at one remove or another, to other Communist parties around the world—and is required to conform to certain standards in consequence. Nationalism and internationalism are both relevant themes in its policies, but in changing patterns. After all, for all their rivalry, both the Soviet Union and Communist China are now sending military supplies to North Viet-Nam. So are many of the states of Eastern Europe. Aid to North Viet-Nam by the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe is a phenomenon of ideology. It cannot readily be explained in terms of Soviet or East European national interests. For reasons which are similar, but not altogether parallel, the Soviet Union is also weakening the prospects for peace in the Middle East by its arms supply policies.

U.S. Response to Threat of Aggression

How then, are we to react to states in which both traditional nationalism and ideology combine, each with influences for good and evil?

We have had to realize on the one hand that 19th century norms of foreign policy and international law, which ignored ideology, could not alone describe or govern the behavior of the Communist states. These norms do not fit a situation of endless thrusts of many kinds and at many levels, a situation characterized by vituperation, subversion, fear, and uncertainty—of the whole process we have called the cold war, which has turned the world into armed camps. There has never been a time in history when men have devoted so large a share of their national incomes to armaments.

On the other hand, we ourselves rejected from the outset the notion that our own foreign policy should be an ideological crusade against communism as such. What President Truman established, and his three successors have pursued, was a policy not based on ideological opposition to communism but directed toward the preservation of our own national interests in a balance of power—a new system of peace built out of the ruins of the old, a system through which we and our allies could achieve equilibrium and *détente* between the Communist and non-Communist states. For 20 years, neither our words nor our policies have shown a trace of the illusion that America is omnipotent. No responsible person has imagined that we could impose an imperial *pax Americana* on the world. No one has dreamed of undoing the Soviet Revolution or of conquering China. What we have sought, and used limited power to achieve, is the acceptance by the Communist nations of a rule of order—an organized and accepted pattern of peace. Only such a stabilized system of peace could permit us and other free nations to pursue policies of social and economic progress.

As a first corollary to this basic premise, we recognized that attempts to upset this general equilibrium by force—that is to say, by acts of aggression—could not be tolerated.

In recent years, the problem of aggression has taken on new dimensions and new and indirect forms. It has relied on seapower and airpower more than on the glacial outward thrust of landpower. In the Middle East, in Cuba, and in other areas of tension and potential tension, we have sought to meet new thrusts in terms of the same principle. We believe in the freedom of the seas for all nations and have made no effort to restrict any nation's freedom to enjoy maritime rights assured by international law. But we have continued to insist on the basic idea of the Truman doctrine, thus far with considerable success.

It was against the threat of aggression that our double-edged policy of containment—of military security and economic and social progress—was directed. Its archetypes were the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan. These two ideas have also been fundamental to the evolution of other programs for regional cooperation in many parts of the world, programs involving economic and cultural cooperation as well as security. Their goal is to provide the bone structure of a new system of peace, a realm ample enough and dynamic enough to accommodate the changing policies of many free peoples without losing the discipline of peace. In such systems of regional cooperation, as they develop, we could hope to take a declining part—save for the ultimate problem of nuclear deterrence—as other nations take on a larger share of the common responsibility.

Progress in Areas of Accord

But those who see the history of the postwar years as only a history of cold war, of containment, and of economic and social development behind the shield of containment miss the point.

Because our first innocent hopes for collaboration with the Soviet Union were frustrated does not mean that the United States abandoned its desire to find, with its allies, a basis for peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition. The history of the postwar world is not only one of tracing the consequences of Soviet actions clanging shut many gates to collaboration; it is a history of our persistent efforts to keep them open.

The Marshall Plan, as you will recall, was offered to the Soviet Union and to Eastern Europe as well as to Western Europe. And at a time when we still had a nuclear monopoly, we offered the Baruch plan for the international control of all nuclear energy.

We did of course resist Communist efforts to extend what Churchill first called the Iron Curtain. But we did not attempt to intervene on the other side of that line—either in East Germany in 1953 or in Hungary in 1956. Today, although we are determined to resist aggression in South Viet-Nam, we have no designs against the political system which exists in North Viet-Nam.

We have never forgotten that the United States and the Soviet Union are more and more closely linked in a marriage not of convenience but of necessity, a relationship which dominates their ideological antipathies and their occasional conflicts of interest as national states.

In the thrusts and responses of the last 20 years, we can hope that the governors of the Soviet Union have come to understand that the restrained and limited policies of the United States are hardly those of "aggressive imperialism" regularly described in Communist oratory, but something far more tractable and conciliatory and far less threatening. The two countries know that their shared trusteeship of ultimate military power has been and remains the ultimate guarantee of general peace.

The nonproliferation treaty, which both countries have submitted to the United Nations, is a direct result of the implacable nuclear imperative which unites the two nations. It is, thus far, the most promising child of that marriage of necessity I referred to earlier.

No one of our recent Presidents has been more conscious of these facts than President Johnson. He views our relations with the Soviet Union, and indeed with mainland China, as the dominant problems of our foreign policy and the context in which most local conflicts must be examined. If he is forced by reality to confront many threats not yet contained, he also sees the achievement of a fair *détente* as the only course offering real promise for the future.

The Key to Our Policy

President Johnson summed up our policy in these terms in his speech of August 26, 1966:

> . . . at the heart of our concern in the years ahead must be our relationship with the Soviet Union. Both of us possess unimaginable power; our responsibility to the world is heavier than that ever borne by any two nations at any other time in history. Our common interests demand that both of us exercise that responsibility and that we exercise it wisely in the years ahead.

> Since 1945, we have opposed Communist efforts to bring about a Communist-dominated world. We did so because our convictions and our interests demanded it; and we shall continue to do so.
>
> But we have never sought war or the destruction of the Soviet Union; indeed, we have sought instead to increase our knowledge and our understanding of the Russian people, with whom we share a common feeling for life, a love of song and story, and a sense of the land's vast promises.
>
> Our compelling task is this: to search for every possible area of agreement that might conceivably enlarge, no matter how slightly or how slowly, the prospect for cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the benefits of such cooperation, the whole world would share and so, I think, would both nations.

This statement is the key to understanding the pattern of our relationships with the Communist worlds today. It may add to this understanding to delineate some of the guidelines we try to follow in reconciling these sometimes conflicting goals.

The first, and most important, is that we have used force only in conformity with international law and only to require compliance with it. As a state we respect the same basic rule for international society which necessarily governs the domestic life of the citizen in a society governed by law; namely, the moral duty of obedience to the law. This principle is the essence of the social contract for all societies of law—societies, that is, where the citizen—or the state, in the case of international law—can participate in the making of law. The society of nations cannot tolerate the persistent defiance of this principle, any more than a domestic community can.

Secondly, we try to avoid open and direct confrontations between the great powers.

When tests do arise, we show both firmness and measure.

We endeavor to maintain an atmosphere of courtesy, believing that neither side is served by hostile propaganda efforts—through demonstrations, speeches, or broadcasts.

We will not be needlessly provoked.

We continue to seek new initiatives for peace, new paths which all can travel together.

And lastly, we have consistently refused to sacrifice progress in areas of accord because of problems in areas of conflict. Despite the recurring provocations of recent years, we have, for example, concluded the limited test ban treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, the 1966 Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and the "hot line" agreements. We are reaching accord on a civil aviation agreement which will provide direct air service between the Soviet Union and the United States; we are pleased with the recent ratification of our consular agreement by the Soviet Union. We are continuing to join with the Soviets in working for the United Nations' adoption and universal acceptance of the treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. And we have repeatedly urged them to take responsibility for peace in the Middle East, in Viet-Nam, and with respect to Castro and North Korea.

Defense and Conciliation in Asia

The same principles of equilibrium and of search for accord apply in our relations with Asian Communists. Today, eyes are fixed on Viet-Nam. Although the style of fighting in Viet-Nam is different from that in Korea, the principle at stake is the same. In both cases, we fought not to defeat Communist ideology, but to protect our national interest in stability and equilibrium.

Why were these actions necessary?

The issue in Viet-Nam has never been more clearly put than in a recent speech by President Bourguiba of Tunisia, who is one of the most realistic and perceptive statesmen in the world today:

> . . . the problem of Viet-Nam . . . is a serious problem, involving the equilibrium of the world . . . An analysis of the events leads to the conclusion that the struggle in Viet-Nam is taking place between America and China behind the scenes . . . For Mao Tse-tung the object is to prove that the United States can be brought to capitulation . . . Things are far from simple, and what is called "imperialism" often is only a matter of opinion. To humanity's misfortune, it happens that peace is founded on the balance of power . . . I am not seeking to spare anyone or to please any nation when I say that the world would be in danger the day that, in response to a trend of public opinion, America decided to go back to her former isolationism . . . China would seize control of all the countries in the region and would wrest leadership of the Communist world from Moscow. And that would be the end of world peace . . . Hence the conflict we are witnessing has a scope and significance that goes beyond Viet-Nam.

The continuance of the war, President Bourguiba contends, threatens the *modus vivendi* on which the chance of peace turns. "One can imagine," he writes, "the mortal danger to which the world would be exposed if East Germany or West Germany were to attempt to achieve, for its own benefit, the unification of the country, as in Viet-Nam." After each Soviet attempt since the war to extend its sphere of influence, he points out, the Soviets returned to the demarcation line of their sphere of influence. No solution in Viet-Nam other than a like return to the *status quo ante* is conceivable, President Bourguiba argues, without threatening "the balance of the world."

As in Europe, United States policies in Asia are directed not only to defense but to conciliation as well. President Johnson

proposed 3 years ago that the U.S. would be prepared to provide $1 billion toward a new program of development in Southeast Asia, including North Viet-Nam, in an environment of peace. This continues to be our policy. We are convinced that communism need not be the wave of the future in Asia. And we are prepared, and we are convinced the free countries of Asia are prepared, to see this challenge tested in practice through peaceful competition and diversity.

Overtures to Communist China

Thus far the leaders of Communist China, the paramount Asian Communist state today, have feared and rejected diversity and the competition of ideas. Wary of contact and exchange, they have sought to seal mainland China from all outside influences while trumpeting the revealed truth of their own system throughout the world.

We would see an end to this isolationist, exclusivist attitude in Asia, as it has gradually been changing in Europe. In recent years we have proposed numerous ways by which we and the people of mainland China might begin to ease the tensions which exist between our two countries.

We have made clear our willingness to welcome Chinese scientists, scholars, and journalists to the United States and have encouraged our own academics to establish contacts with their counterparts on the mainland of China. To facilitate these contacts, we have eased restrictions on travel to Communist China. Few applications for the validation of passports for travel to Communist China have been refused in recent years. In the commercial field, we have expressed our willingness to consider the sale of foodstuffs and certain pharmaceuticals to the Chinese. We have taken other steps as well.

These initiatives on our part have all been vehemently rejected. It is our hope, however, that one day the barriers which the Chinese have guarded with such fierce determination will begin to crumble on their side, just as we have ourselves pushed aside barriers which once existed in our policy. This should begin to happen not only in Communist China but elsewhere in Communist Asia if we achieve a stable and just peace in Viet-Nam.

These, then, are the Communist worlds and a brief sketch of our policies toward them. Communist ambitions have been the occasion but not the cause for the burdens of our foreign policy since 1945. The cause of the profound change in our foreign policy, as I have tried to show earlier, is the change in the map of world politics since 1914.

A society like that of the United States can only be safe in a reasonably stable world—a world of wide horizons, tolerant of freedom and generally obedient to law. Obviously, the society of nations cannot tolerate prolonged conditions of general anarchy any more than a nation can tolerate such conditions in its domestic life.

What we seek, therefore—in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Asia—is a common acceptance of the premise of peace, and of the idea of *détente*, the kind of world in which each country could pursue its own goals and indeed its own revolution, if revolution be needed, without outside provocation or interference. The stability we seek is not one of Metternich's rigid enforcement of the *status quo*, but freedom for every people to undertake the kind of social change they feel best suits them. Our approach, in the end, is national, pluralistic, and pragmatic—not ideological and not universalistic. The means it employs rest on a realistic understanding of the limits of our power. It is a policy of peace, and only of peace.

Competing Elements of Communist Policy

I suspect that the attitudes of Communist leaders towards their problems of foreign policy are more complex than our own.

Fifty years after the October Revolution, despite doctrinal arguments and brutal purges, many of them remain "true believers," engaged to varying degrees in the fortunes of Communist movements in other countries.

At the same time, 50 years after Brest Litovsk, where Lenin firmly attached communism to a Russian national base, nationalism and national interests also constitute a strong influence in every Communist country and limit the extent of its commitment to foreign adventures in behalf of ideology.

The policies of every Communist party reflect patterns of contrasting emphasis on these two themes. In no country, however nationalist or however orthodox, is policy either entirely national or entirely ideological.

We might note another set of competing impulses within the Communist worlds: the appeal of humanism on the one hand and of hierarchical despotism on the other. The clash of these themes is particularly strong in the Soviet Union and, in different combinations, within Eastern Europe. The conflict of the Slavophiles and the Westernizers is as old as Russia itself. One can contrast Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, Chekhov and Dostoyevsky, Alexander II and Stalin, and hundreds more. Suffice it to say that in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union, many Communist leaders are also children of the enlightenment and participants in the common humanistic culture of the Western World. They have not forgotten their alliance in two World Wars with the United States, France, and Britain, and other deep ties as well.

Yet the tradition of absolutism and the quest for power remain strong. One can only wonder what combination of Communist zeal and nationalist impulse has caused the Soviet Union to continue its arms shipments and other political activities in the Middle East.

Further east, the walls of inaccessibility, the spirit of destruction for its own sake, seem much stronger. The old friendly ties between thousands of Americans and Chinese from the mainland are in suspense. Their influence on the course of events is invisible. Ho Chi Minh's consistent intolerance of any Vietnamese nationalism other than his own, and his willingness to subject his country to agony and destruction for ideology's sake and for the sake of naked power, are in marked contrast to the spirit of peaceful coexistence some other Communists seem to show towards people who think in ways different from their own.

And finally, the mysterious fire of aggression, the ancient impulse of conquest, which has flared up from time to time in the history of many nations, has made its separate contribution to the course of events during the last 20 years.

In the face of these dualisms, these varying elements of hope and danger, our policy remains one of patient restraint and of endless quest for conciliation.

The talks in Paris may be long and often acrimonious. The North Vietnamese are pursuing their strategy of "fight and negotiate" with a vengeance. Yet our civil air negotiations with the Soviets and our joint efforts for a nonproliferation treaty have continued. Nor have we ceased our attempts at opening a dialog with mainland China—as evidenced by our recent offer to admit Chinese newsmen to cover our electoral campaign. We shall continue steadily to build the strength of

our evolving regional alliances in Europe and in Asia, and to encourage our colleagues in these ventures to join with us in the many works of peace.

No Prudent Alternative

In the end, we must ask ourselves, will this policy work? Will it avoid general war and persuade the Communists of various sects to accept the rule of live-and-let-live? Will that be the synthesis to emerge from the thesis and antithesis of the last 20 years, the thrust and the parry, the ideological debate, the interplay of our ideas and of theirs?

No one can be certain. At least I cannot be certain.

But I can see no prudent alternative to the policy the nation has followed under four Presidents since 1945. It is not a dramatic nor a glamorous policy. It requires patient, mature thought and action in meeting present and future tests of will. It does not offer instant peace. It rejects the notion of an ideological crusade against communism, as well as the naive belief that the Communist systems would not threaten our security if we withdrew from the world stage. It therefore rejects the proposals of those who would lead us like lemmings into the isolationist policy of the twenties—now, as then, the surest prescription of war.

The burden of sustained domestic and international tensions has produced extraordinary explosions of human feelings in recent years, and particularly in this year. Those explosions are remarkable events—signals of serious protest at a time when Western societies, at least, have never been more successful and more earnestly committed to fulfilling their ideals of social justice. Historians may look back on 1968 as they

do on 1848: as a year in which the deepest wishes of mankind were made manifest. We should recall that one of the greatest of modern historians has called 1848 the Revolution of the Intellectuals.

All over the world there are visible and sometimes violent manifestations of human stress and concern over the trend of events. In most cases, these manifestations express and reflect the yearnings of generous and idealistic spirits. In some, they betray feelings of hostility, bitterness, frustration, and the desire for revenge. In many countries, the demonstrators seek liberty and social advance. Occasionally, they manifest man's universal taste for violence and his instinct of destruction for its own sake, normally but not always kept in check by the texture of his social system.

Of course, hostile forces seek to exploit these feelings, and to turn their manifestation into revolutionary channels; that is, into channels seeking a truly revolutionary transfer of power and not simply the acceleration of agreed programs of social change. And, of course, governments have to intervene finally to preserve public order.

But responsible men everywhere would ignore the yearnings behind these events at their peril. One theme in most—but not all—of the demonstrations is a passionate desire for peace, for an end of the cold war and of the tensions and threats of the years since 1945. Here the moral of protest is one we can hope the serious men who direct Communist parties everywhere will examine with the utmost care. For if the high-minded and idealistic youth who protest in behalf of peace conclude that certain Communist states are ultimately responsible for the tensions which prevent peace, the impact of that conclusion on opinion and on policy could become difficult to control.

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