

Peace Promises Oversold, Ex-Intelligence Official Says

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In the aftermath of the Moscow summit, a leading analyst of Soviet affairs has expressed concern that the promise of "a generation of peace" is being oversold to the American people as an accomplishment rather than a hope.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, maintains its goals of expanding its economic and political power in the world, he said.

The Soviets, according to Ray S. Cline, the former director of intelligence and research at the State Department, "use the circus and theater of summitry in their own world strategy of peaceful coexistence. Richard Nixon appears to be using it to make domestic political gains.

"The administration is confusing the American people because it is talking about the prolonged reduction of international tension and a generation of peace. In the American view this means an absence of conflict, but in the Soviet view it means only no nuclear war while the 'class struggle' continues economically and politically around the world."

The Soviet Union, Cline said, believes that the "correlation of forces" in the world—especially the weakening of the United States as a result of its internal economic and political problems—will inevitably lead to the victory of Soviet power.

Cline was the chief of the analytical staffs on the Soviet Union and China in the Central Intelligence Agency and later deputy director of the CIA before he went to the State Department.

He is now director of studies at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies.

Cline said the experts in

government are well aware of what is happening and are reporting fully on the Soviet policy and attitudes. Numerous outstanding Sovietologists have been making the same points in scholarly journals, books, and congressional testimony.

"But," Cline said, "I think the cautionary aspects of this experiment in the diplomatic approach toward the Soviet Union—and toward China—may have been submerged in the need for domestic political triumph."

These were strong words coming from Cline, who has refused to let himself be quoted on government policy since he resigned from the State Department nine months ago. At that time it was clear that he was concerned that the problems of Watergate were interfering in the orderly process of conducting foreign policy.

Cline admitted that there was some irony in the fact that Mr. Nixon was now using cooperation with the Soviets, when he had built his early political career in the 1940s and 1950s on Cold War rhetoric and virulent anti-communism.

Summit conferences like the one just completed, Cline said, tend to create an atmosphere of improved relations, but they also create the illusion that the Soviet Union and the United States share the same goals in seeking detente.

Actually, Cline said, what the Soviet Union, in an ef-

fort to obtain Western technology and consumer goods, is seeking, is peaceful coexistence—in Moscow's lexicon the avoidance of war, the support of world revolutionary forces, the shrinking of capitalist resources and the "class struggle."

"Detente," according to Cline, "is defined by most Americans as peace, stability, international cooperation, tolerance and convergence.

"One of the things that bothers me," he said, "is that we've got ourselves pretty well convinced that basic formulations of national purpose don't mean anything. Obviously ideological statements are not simple blueprints for future action, but they mean something."

He said, "This problem has been around a long time. I believe we tend to ignore ideology completely, just as we refused to believe what Hitler said about Germany in the 1930s."

Cline made his rather pessimistic remarks during a lengthy interview in his office in the quiet of a fourth of July weekend.

The paradox, he said, "is that if detente were really to succeed in our sense of the world, of opening meaningful contacts inside Soviet society, the Soviet internal control system would feel so threatened it would destroy those contacts. Therefore our concept of detente can continue only so long as it doesn't succeed."

President Nixon's description of a web of relationships drawing the Soviet Union into a detente that is irreversible, in Cline's view, is thus probably not in the cards.

"The kind of peaceful

coexistence and detente which we do in fact have, a strong mutual interest in avoiding nuclear war, was established not by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger but by Jack Kennedy as a result of the education in international affairs he gave Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962," Cline said.

The basic outlines of present Soviet strategy, Cline said, was decided at that time. A very high Soviet leader came to the United States shortly after that crisis and told an American official that there would never again be a conflict on those unequal terms. The Soviet leaders decided then to have no more missile gaps, on land or sea. It was then that Moscow started investing in its big missile build-up toward a parity of forces with the United States.

"What we've had since, but without the hoopla surrounding detente," Cline said, "is the successful deterrence of nuclear war. Everyone has struggled since then on how to translate this into international cooperation and understanding—our concept of detente as distinct from the Soviet vision of continued, bitter struggle based on class and the need to support world revolutionary forces wherever they are."

At this point Cline pulled out a recent article from the influential Soviet journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* to make his point. It said: "Peaceful coexistence is a specific international

form of class confrontation, linked to the peoples' struggle not only for peace but also for the revolutionary transformation of society, to the strengthening of the socialist community and to mass actions against imperialism."

Said Cline: "Ideology is not congenial to our people . . . but I believe we should be aware that ideology as manipulated by a totalitarian leadership is forced on the people who, in turn, generally tend to accept it because they are not exposed to other ideas."

It is Cline's view that the American people must be

educated about the Soviet perception of what is happening. Cline quoted from a recent monograph by former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler and others.

He noted that after the 1972 Moscow summit meeting Soviet spokesmen said the Soviet Union does not view the U.S. policy of detente as reflecting a change of heart but as a policy forced upon it by what the Soviets call "the social, economic and ultimately, military power of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries."

In the Soviet formulation quoted by Kohler, that power "is compelling American ruling circles to engage in an agonizing reappraisal of values."

The quote continues: "The standard Soviet line has been, and continues to be, that 'the real alignment of forces in the world arena' has shifted against the United States."

Exaggerated hopes from summitry, Cline said, "create an illusion that tends to divide and confuse and produce apathy, not only at home but among our allies."

In Europe, he said, there is "fear that a new Soviet-American relationship will lead to a diminution of the U.S. commitment to NATO, that there will be a withdrawal of U.S. forces and a lessening of economic cooperation, and hence increasing pressure on them to enter into long-term understandings with the Soviet Union which, in time, would neutralize them politically and strategically and, even sooner, provide opportunities for united front governments, getting Communist parties into power through the 'parliamentary road to socialism'."

Cline noted that this almost happened in France and could very likely occur in Italy within the year.

Thus the Soviet Union, Cline said, is using the atmospherics of summitry for its own ends. "Just as the Chinese saw the Peking summit of 1972 in the same terms as a thousand years ago they saw the arrival of delegations from tributary states to bear gifts to the

emperor—first kowtowing nine times—the Russians, with a different psychology, out of their sense of insecurity, take pride that Nixon was coming to seek a modus vivendi with their now powerful state—and that when problems build up in the Middle East they can summon Kissinger to Moscow."

Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev is using summitry for his own purposes. He has, Cline said, "identified himself with

peaceful coexistence of a kind which will permit the gradual growth of what he calls the socialist world, without serious danger of war with the United States, the only adversary the Russians fear."

Cline's concern is, first of all, that the American people be made aware of what is going on. "There is a need for what these days we call 'consciousness raising,'" he said.

They should be urged, he said, "to focus on the economic and political conflict which continues, and not be misled by diplomatic spectaculars."

The Soviets, he stressed, "have shown no interest in creating any web of relationships because they fear the penetration of Soviet society by hostile Western ideology." Instead, he said, they point to this desire for a "web of relationships" as demonstrating American weakness.

Cline's prescription for dealing with the Soviets entails first of all understanding what we are about. The United States, he said, should remain strong militarily, preserving its deterrent "whatever it costs."

It should trade with the Soviet Union, but on non-concessional terms. He has no objection to granting most-favored-nation status, which would only put the Soviets on a par with other nations. But he thinks credits should be limited only to those deals that would be economically beneficial to the United States.

"We should take care not to export our most advanced technology but to trade the

products of that technology for Soviet raw materials," Cline said.

Finally, "we should make no large, long-term investments in capital unless there is no other opportunity for the development of those same resources," he said. This would mean that we should avoid investments in developing things such as Siberian oil and natural gas because of the uncertainties of long-term access to the products.

"We should offer concessions in limited fields," Cline said, "if and when, through quiet diplomacy, we can make progress in opening Soviet society to foreign contacts, which is, after all, what we have advertised detente diplomacy is all about."