

Attached is a copy of today's Zorza column I regard as important in what it says and in the obvious it falls short of saying. Some of the marks I made on it in reading may be visible when I make the copies.

HR does not know of some of the exchanges between JDW and me on some things, like Nixon the Unoriginal, the copier. There are many things he could be copying right now, but one illustration should be fairly easy to recall, the way the military set about boxing everyone in in Southeast Asia. At the time it happened, I may have included it in note to both of you, but the government painted itself into a corner, gratuitously, with Thieu in a dominating position, as the first order of business. There was no need to give him effective veto, but Nixon did, if not the very first thing, close to it. Any sensible person had to read this as the intent to make agreement impossible. Thieu cannot survive any agreement short of capitulation by the others, which is most unlikely. The other side had no choice but to enter negotiations and to assume that possible his inability to accomplish any ends by war might persuade Nixon to negotiate in the hope of reaching what the rational world would conclude he needs, a real settlement. My longtime view is unchanged, anything like peace means economic collapse or something close to it for the US and for Nixon. His concern is not the unemployment the end of military needs for excess manpower means. He may have a slight concern for the unemployment that would result from even reduced war production. He can't stand the idle factories, and the hearts of cities can't be rebuilt in GM and GE factories. No more is there a market, less a need, for civilian-market manufactures. There is already an abundance and foolishnesses have been contrived to create more wasteful, unnecessary products that people do buy. His support come from the segment of the economy that is most benefitted by the warlike conditions. And he believes.

Just as little as war with China and the USSR is now unthinkable, so also is any kind of major disagreement. And, as he looks for markets, where else can he find them? Thus the too-late detente that he and his likes alone prevented for all these years. I think we, today, can less tolerate any backing out of the deals made and in the offing than the relative have-nots, the USSR and China. And he now can't call either the enemy, as he had to take what seems like initiatives and probably isn't with both of them.

If he can get the kind of settlement he wants he can have a continuation of a similar condition in SEAsia, where the basis was created long, long ago and expanded by him. That will always be true, popular revolution being the only think that can undo it and that would be for him no more than a new VietNam. So, while he can justify more with VN staying as it is, that is not indispensable. But he runs into new problems he can probably take care of and thinks he can with the front shifting elsewhere (I also think he can). And there are many things he can't for the immediate future waste as he can in VN, like B52 and all those bombs and all the many components, from raw materials to amchibework and assembly and transportation. It is a big part of the primer of the pump.

JDW noted the obvious embarrassment in Kissinger's "peace it within reach" pronouncement. It wasn't, he knew it wasn't, and little else can explain the embarrassment I also noted in a number of ways, the unctrolability of his little throat-clearing/cough being one of the easiest to see. ~~Of that~~ Of that speech what immediately struck me has been emphasized recently by radion and TV news commentators, his pinning everything on Nixon, something that has not deviated. If K were a real team player, the obvious device was the traditional "we", which included the entire team, specifically Nixon and K. He didn't. His permeating really dominating reference was to the President only. Translated by time and events, there is one thing only ~~XXXX~~ H was saying: the President ruined it. Next, I had it all done but the President ruined it.

I have not fully explored K's options. In my thinking, that is. I watched his eyes as I listened to his cough. I think he still smarts from the belaboring of his former academic colleagues. Let me illustrate with Garrison. There came a point where Judge Crustenberry ruled against Garrison, and the double-banner headline in the States*Item said that the federals again made what he sought impossible. THAT was the place to stop. He didn't, and it has been a disaster. Even the relative lightweights (he had no heavies)

on his staff saw, understood, and failed to persuade him. Kissinger is now in a similar position. He has negotiated a "settlement" that is "peaceful", the other side has announced it for him, Nixon has blocked it, and Henry has the further graceful out, Nixon's own announced need of new blood. For the least sanguine of the academics, Kissinger now has a successful career of doing the impossible and making it seem right and that he was right. Unless he is a completely insensitive man or one who can't live out of the limelight, he will out, immediately or announce it soon and do it when expedient. He has to know the chances are slim that a) the others will negotiate under the unequalled heavy bombing or any such serious pressure, and b) that Nixon can't and won't do anything that appears to be a backing down.

What Zorza fails to say is that the situation he describes was created by Nixon, not without knowing its potential. He has created the present situation and all the jeopardy it holds because he wanted it. I don't think K did or does. Or, ~~Nixon~~ Nixon has copied the past of others and his own to paint himself into a corner.

As he sees things, it is an advantageous condition. He wants more authoritarianism and this also holds means of hastening that. If there is any rupture with the USSR and/or China, he can point to his initiatives in normalizing relations with both and getting away with saying they made the change.

If he forces their hawks into the ascendancy, more military production here, and that also he wants.

If you want a guy to take a swing at you, one of the ways of bringing it to pass is to kick them hard. He has kicked, hard. As he sees it, nobody saw him kick. The papers that saw it haven't reported it so they won't later say we saw him kick first and did not report it.

Why Zorza didn't say the obvious I don't know. But he did spell it out enough for those who think and look. More can be read into his piece, but I haven't time for it now.

HW 12/27/72

Victor Zorza

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Communists Watching Nixon To See If They Trust Him

REPORTS of a Nixon-Kissinger rift have upset the White House, which has denied them publicly. Privately, sources inside the Nixon administration have said that they are worried about "damage to Kissinger's credibility" as a negotiator. "A prime point of concern," according to The Washington Post's Murrey Marder, "is said to be what the North Vietnamese may conclude from these reports."

But the damage to Kissinger's credibility could be far greater than that. It could extend to his dealings with the Russians and the Chinese, and to Mr. Nixon's own grand design for an "era of negotiation" and for the "generation of peace" that was to crown his second term.

The Kremlin as well as Peking have been watching Mr. Nixon's negotiating strategy in order to determine how far they could trust him. If they decide that he has gone back on his own word in the Paris talks, or on Kissinger's, they will be less likely to enter into agreements with the United States which might expose them to similar risks.

THIS COLUMN has sometimes tried to analyze the administration's foreign policy from the standpoint of its foreign adversaries, in the belief that a better understanding of both sides' attitudes may be acquired thereby. When the Paris impasse is viewed from this angle, there is no doubt that powerful elements in all the Communist capitals are now claiming it as proof of gross deception by the White House. The hawks in Moscow and Peking were only narrowly defeated in the infighting that preceded Mr. Nixon's summit visits. But defeats in Communist power struggles are never as conclusive as they seem.

The hawks argued, to judge from the evidence between the lines of the Communist press, that Mr. Nixon was not to be trusted—not just on Vietnam, but on all the other issues which, to them, involve the very survival of the Communist system. The doves, on the other hand, maintained that the Communist concessions on strategic arms limitation, on trade and aid, on political issues, were paid for by American concessions as well as by promises of future benefits. But now the hawks

would claim that Soviet and Chinese agreements with the United States might be similarly broken, and American promises reneged upon, whenever Mr. Nixon decides that a little more pressure, another turn of the screw, might get him better terms than he had originally obtained.

If the administration is really concerned at the damage done to Kissinger's credibility by press speculation, of the kind which appeared in this column last week, the remedy is in its own hands. What the column suggested was that an attempt to look at the Paris breakdown through the eyes of Hanoi would lead the Communists to conclude that the agreement negotiated by Kissinger had been disowned by Mr. Nixon. The fuss now made by administration sources about the effect of such an analysis on Kissinger's credibility suggests that the analysis is correct, even in the administration's own view, in attributing this line of reasoning to the Communists. The administration can only prove the Communist hawks wrong by reverting to a less warlike posture.

THE DAMAGE, which is of the administration's own making, cannot be undone by denouncing press speculation about it as irresponsible. Where a government restricts the amount of publicly available information, for what may sometimes be good reasons of its own, it is the proper function of the press to speculate.

Where major issues of war and peace are concerned, the speculative reconstruction of the other side's thought processes is more necessary than ever, even if it should appear to reflect badly on one's own side's motives. It is an essential part of the search for an understanding of what is happening in the world, and why. American governments have too often neglected this process, but this is no reason why the press should eschew it.

Indeed, in an increasingly interdependent world of Great Powers engaged in the process of secret diplomacy, an insight into the policies of any one government will have to be sought more and more often in the shadows it casts on other countries.