



Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 93^d CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 120

WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1974

No. 13

Senate

WATERGATE QUESTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, since its inception, the Senate Watergate Committee has repeatedly sought a meeting—at the White House—with President Nixon. In all cases, the White House has refused to respond to these requests. In executive session on January 23, 1974, the committee unanimously agreed to submit written questions to the President.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of a letter from Senator LOWELL WEICKER, JR. to Mr. Samuel Dash; a copy of letter from Mr. Dash to Mr. James D. St. Clair, transmitting the questions to the White House; a copy of a letter from Mr. St. Clair to Mr. Dash acknowledging receipt of the questions by the White House; and a copy of the questions that were sent to the White House, all to be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEBRUARY 5, 1974.

Mr. SAMUEL DASH,
Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Dirksen Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SAM: I enclose herewith questions for the President of the United States pursuant to the resolution of our Committee passed on January 23, 1974.

I would appreciate your transmitting same to the White House immediately.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

LOWELL WEICKER, JR.,
U.S. Senator.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C., February 6, 1974.

Hon. JAMES ST. CLAIR,
*Special Counsel to the President,
The White House, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. ST. CLAIR: Enclosed are questions prepared by Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut.

At its meeting on January 23, 1974, the Senate Select Committee unanimously passed a motion approving the submission by any member of the Committee, questions to the President relating to matters covered by Senate Resolution 60. This action was taken as a result of the refusal of the President to meet with the Committee for the purpose of responding to questions on the record.

The Committee believed that specific questions any member of the Committee wished to put to the President for the President's response should be submitted to the President in the interest of fairness prior to the Committee's preparing and filing its report.

Sincerely,

SAMUEL DASH,
Chief Counsel.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 6, 1974.

Mr. SAMUEL DASH,
Chief Counsel, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. DASH: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of February sixth with the enclosure described therein.

This material will be called to the President's attention for such action as he shall determine.

Sincerely,

JAMES D. ST. CLAIR,
Special Counsel to the President.

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY DISCUSSIONS AS EARLY JULY 1972

Question 1: When John Ehrlichman discussed executive clemency with you¹ in July 1972,² prior to any indictment, trial, or conviction, why didn't you ask how such a matter could possibly relate to what was being called a "third rate burglary?"³

FOOTNOTES

¹ The Presidential Statement of August 15, 1973, confirms that there was such a discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman in July 1972:

"Indeed, I made my view clear to Mr. Ehrlichman in July 1972, that under no circumstances could Executive clemency be considered for those who participated in the Watergate break-in." (p. 3).

² Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony is a little more explicit:

"Mr. DASH. Did you at any time meet with the President and discuss Executive clemency?"

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. DASH. When?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. In July 1972.

We had a long walk on the beach on that particular day and we talked about a lot of subjects and this was one of the subjects we talked about." (Committee transcript p. 2848-2849)."

Mr. Ehrlichman's identification of the beach would place the date of this conversation on July 8, 1972. A reference to his logs shows that to be the only beach conversation in July 1972:

July 8, 1972

12:45-2:05 p.m., President met with Ehrlichman; President and Ehrlichman to patio adjacent office.

2:14-2:29 p.m., President motored to Red Beach with Mr. Ehrlichman.

4:41-5:03 p.m., President met with Mr. Ehrlichman. San Clemente Red Beach to San Clemente Residence (Ehrlichman logs).

There would be no tapes of such a conversation. Nevertheless, Mr. Ehrlichman's explanation for raising the subject is interesting:

"Mr. EHRlichman. Because it seemed to me as an organizational proposition that sooner or later somebody was going to raise this issue and I thought it would be a very good idea to talk it through with the President before it came up in any specific context, and find out exactly where we stood." (Committee transcript p. 2848).

It is hard to imagine what "organizational proposition" is being referred to, or why sooner or later somebody was inevitably going to raise the issue . . . unless somebody would know they had the White House in a vulnerable position.

It is interesting to note the President's statements contradict Ehrlichman on all points. First, the President has said "it was, on occasion, suggested as a result of news reports that clemency might become a factor," (Press Conference, November 17, 1973, p. 6, emphasis added). Mr. Ehrlichman's version of the reasons for their discussion makes no mention of news report problems. The President claims to have discussed clemency offers only in July 1972. Research uncovers no news report that clemency might be a factor, as of July 1972. The President's statement also contradicts Mr. Ehrlichman by implying that clemency was "suggested."

³ As of July 8, 1972, the most notable comment direct from the White House was Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler's statement of June 20, 1972:

"I'm not going to comment from the White House on a third-rate burglary attempt."

REQUESTS FOR FBI REPORTS DURING THE FBI INVESTIGATION

Question 2: On August 29, 1972, you stated: ". . . within our own staff, *under my direction*, counsel to the President, Mr. Dean, has conducted a complete investigation. . . ." (Italics added)

On March 2, 1973, you stated: "I will simply say with regard to the Watergate case what I have said previously, that the investigation conducted by Mr. Dean, the White House counsel, in which, incidentally, he had access to the FBI records on this particular matter *because I directed him* to conduct this investigation. . . ." (Italics added)

On April 5, 1973, you stated: "Because I asked my counsel, John Dean, to conduct a thorough investigation of alleged involvement in the Watergate episode, Director Gray was asked to make FBI reports available to Mr. Dean." (Italics added)

On October 19, 1973, one of the overt acts of the conspiracy to which John Dean pleaded guilty was: ⁴ "4. In or about July and October, 1972, John W. Dean, III requested L. Patrick Gray, acting Director of the FBI, to provide him with reports of information obtained during the FBI investigation."

In light of your August 29, 1972, March 2, 1973, and April 5, 1973, statements that you directed the Dean investigation, what is the

difference in your measure of responsibility from that of John Dean?

⁴ This was a plea to an Information, instead of by indictment made on October 19, 1973, as to a Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice and Defraud the United States of America. (U.S. v. Dean, D.D.C., No. 886-73).

UNETHICAL CONDUCT IN THE HANDLING OF THE DEMOCRAT'S CIVIL SUIT

Question 3: When you were told on September 15, 1972,⁵ about private contacts between CRP lawyers and the judge in the Democrat's civil lawsuit,⁶ what steps did you take to ascertain the truth of such highly unethical conduct?⁷

⁵ The Democratic Party had brought a \$1 million civil suit against the Watergate defendants and other election officials, charging a conspiracy to commit political espionage. As of September 15, there was great concern that depositions and/or a trial before the election might be very damaging to the President and the Re-election Committee.

⁶ John Dean's testimony as to what he told the President on September 15, 1972, indicates a clear explanation of ex parte contacts (unethical, out-of-court meetings) with the Judge:

"The President then asked me about the civil cases that had been filed by the Democratic National Committee and the Common Cause case and about the counter suits that we had filed. I told him that the lawyers at the Re-election Committee were handling these cases and that they did not see the Common Cause suit as any real problem before the election because they thought they could keep it tied up in discovery proceedings. I then told the President that the lawyers at the Re-election Committee were very hopeful of slowing down the civil suit filed by the Democratic National Committee because they had been making ex parte contacts with the judge handling the case and the judge was very understanding and trying to accommodate their problems. The President was pleased to hear this and responded to the effect that, "Well, that's helpful." (Committee Transcript p. 958).

Testimony by Mr. Haldeman, who had listened to the September 15 tape before testifying, confirmed that the matter had been discussed:

"There was some discussion about Judge Richey hearing the civil case and a comment that he would keep Roemer McPhee (the Committee lawyer) abreast of what was happening." (Committee Transcript p. 2889).

⁷ Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 7-35 states:

"All litigants and lawyers should have access to tribunals on an equal basis. Generally, in adversary proceedings a lawyer should not communicate with a judge relative to a matter pending before, or which is to be brought before, a tribunal over which he presides. . . ."

A lawyer is entitled only to being informed about the status of the case in open court, formal in-chambers proceedings, or inquiries to the clerk. Clearly such routine proceedings, which are the only proper ways of discussing the progress of a case, would never merit the characterization of being kept "abreast of what was happening." That implies an initiative by the Judge and/or a type of unilateral briefing—a Judge doesn't keep a lawyer abreast of what is happening;

irrelevant
w.w.
d.p.

rather, a lawyer keeps his client abreast of what is happening.

On August 24, 1972, the Judge pressed for a rapid resolution: "I think there is . . . a suggestion implicit in all of this that if something is not done by the courts to rapidly bring this situation to a head one way or the other, by way of a settlement or trial that the integrity of the courts may become subject to question. . . ." (The Evening Star and Daily News, p. A-1, August 24, 1972).

On September 12, 1972, the Judge ordered a halt to further depositions: "United States District Court Judge Charles Richey today ordered a halt in the taking of depositions in the Democrats' 1 million "Watergate caper" civil suit until September 20, when he promised to rule on all motions in the case." (The Chicago Tribune, p. 11, September 13, 1972).

On September 22, 1972, the case and depositions were suspended until after the Watergate criminal trial could take place: "Federal District Judge Charles R. Richey gave up his efforts yesterday to bring civil suits in the Watergate case to trial before the November 7 election.

Mr. Califano (lawyer for the Democrats) lavished praise on Judge Richey for an "absolutely extraordinary attempt" to try the case before the election." (The Baltimore Sun, p. A-7, September 22, 1972).

DENIALS OF NEWS REPORTS ABOUT SEGRETTI'S ACTIVITIES

See file

Question 4: News reports of Mr. Segretti's activities in mid-October 1972 were called "hearsay, character assassination, inuendo or guilt by association."⁸ Even though your press staff of Ziegler, Buchanan, and Moore⁹ knew those news reports were substantially correct—were they covering up the truth on your instructions, or on their own initiatives?

⁸This comment was made by Press Secretary Ziegler on October 16, 1972.

⁹Mr. Dean, who had interviewed Mr. Segretti and had helped White House officials prepare for FBI interviews on Segretti, testified as follows:

"On Friday, the 13th, I had left Washington to go to Florida to spend several weeks on a honeymoon, but was abruptly called back to Washington on Sunday, October 15, because of the cascading leaked stories regarding Segretti. When I returned, I went to the White House where a meeting was in session in the Roosevelt room. In attendance at the meeting were Ehrlichman, Ziegler, Buchanan, Moore, and Chapin. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Ziegler for his press briefings on the Segretti-related stories. For a reason that I cannot explain, a secretary to Mr. Chapin was present and taking notes during parts of the discussions and hypothetical questioning and answering of Mr. Ziegler. I believe this is one of the rare occasions where the preparation of a Ziegler briefing was actually recorded and I have submitted to the committee a copy of the notes recording parts of that session." (Committee Transcript, p. 965).

With respect to the October 15th briefing, Mr. Moore testified:

"Senator WEICKER. You have indicated it was obviously necessary to go into some of the background of these matters, is that correct?"

Mr. MOORE. Right.

Senator WEICKER. Did you have occasion to talk to either Mr. Chapin or Mr. Segretti?

Mr. MOORE. I have never met or talked to Mr. Segretti.

Senator WEICKER. I see, and Mr. Chapin?

Mr. MOORE. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. And specifically about these matters?

Mr. MOORE. Oh yes.

Senator WEICKER. So it is fair to say that insofar as the Segretti aspect of what confronts this Committee, you are knowledgeable to some extent in October 1972, is that not correct?

Mr. MOORE. Knowledgeable from the standpoint of White House connection, not Segretti's operations." (Committee Transcript p. 2031).

THE CLAIM THAT A NEW INVESTIGATION WAS BEGUN ON MARCH 21, 1973

Question 5: You claim that on March 21, 1973, you "personally ordered those conducting the investigation to get all the facts and report them directly to me,"¹⁰ and yet nobody has testified to receiving such an order¹¹—has somebody committed perjury?

¹⁰Address by the President, April 30, 1973: " * * * As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter, and I personally ordered those conducting the investigation to get all the facts and to report them directly to me, right here in this office."

¹¹Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman, and Mr. Ehrlichman who were not asked directly about receiving such an order, did not testify that they were ordered to conduct an investigation on March 21, 1973. Among those who were "conducting the investigation", Mr. Gray (p. 3489-3490), Mr. Kleindienst (p. 3596-3597), and Mr. Petersen (p. 3652) all denied receiving such an order.

As to the possibility that Mr. Dean was given the assignment to get all the facts, Mr. Haldeman's testimony indicates that the only assignment Dean was given was to prepare a report for the public:

"So, as I recall, Dean was told at that meeting on the afternoon of March 22, to prepare a full written report for public release. . . ." (Committee Transcript p. 2900).

This is even more interesting in light of a later comment by Mr. Haldeman:

"By the 30th, Dean had not delivered any report and he said he had not been able to write one; and the President stopped dealing with Dean. In effect, he had stopped dealing with him after the 23rd." (Committee Transcript p. 2902).

In a statement during the August 22, 1973, Press Conference, the President stated that: "I gave the responsibility to Mr. Ehrlichman on the 29th of March to continue the investigation." That appears to be the first personal order for an individual to conduct an investigation, although it was not directed to someone who was "conducting the investigation."

Mr. Haldeman's conclusion that "in effect, (the President) had stopped dealing with (John Dean) after the 23rd," is particularly interesting in light of the President's own statement of August 23, 1973, that "on March 23, I sent Mr. Dean to Camp David, where he was instructed to write a complete report."

Mr. Dean's report could hardly be called an investigation, according to Mr. Haldeman's testimony of the March 22 discussion: "in

order to avoid the problem that had been discussed earlier of the committee hearings resulting in the facts coming out piecemeal, one witness at a time, and being the subject of a major news story, there should first be a complete report put out by the White House prepared by Dean covering all of the facts so that what all of us would say would already be known in one place. . . ." (Committee Transcript p. 2900).

Committee. We never got that far, but at least that is an indication of the extent of my own investigation." (Press Conference, August 22, 1973).

¹⁵ The President has stated: "I met at great length with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Mitchell on the 22nd. I discussed the whole matter with them." (Press Conference, August 22, 1973).

¹⁶ Mr. Mitchell:

"Mr. DASH. At that meeting was there any discussion by the President, by you or by Mr. Dean, concerning the Watergate, either cover-up or who may be involved in indictment or anything like that on the 22nd? Mr. Mitchell: Noe whatsoever." (Committee Transcript p. 1638).

Mr. Ehrlichman:

"Senator GURNEY. . . then there is another meeting between the three of you and Mitchell, and then you join the President, which, of course, is the next day. (March 22, 1973) Did not the President say at any of these meetings, "Now, listen fellows, here I have heard all about this from John Dean, what gives here, what are we going to do now, what plans do you have, who is going to get this out? We have got to do it." No discussion of that?

Mr. EHRlichman. Senator, I have great difficulty in believing that the President was told what Mr. Dean says he was told because of the President's approach to this, which I saw in these two meetings." (Committee Transcript p. 2746).

Mr. Haldeman:

"The next step was the meeting of Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Dean, and myself the next day (March 22, 1973) with the President.

The four of us met in the morning in my office and had some discussion of Dean's report to the President, although not in any detail. Most of the discussion was regarding approaches to dealing with the situation rather than a review of the facts of the situation.

* * * * *

We met in the afternoon in the EOB office with the President and that, too, was a discussion of how to handle the situation rather than any further exploration of the facts." (Committee Transcript p. 2989-2900).

Mr. Dean:

"The meeting was almost exclusively on the subject of how the White House should posture itself vis-a-vis the Ervin Committee hearings. There was absolutely no indication of any changed attitude and it was like one of many, many meetings I had been in before, in which the talk was to strategies for dealing with the hearings rather than any effort to get the truth out as to what had happened both before June 17 and after June 17." (Committee Transcript p. 1002).

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED
MARCH 21, 1973

Question 8: When you learned of Watergate crimes on March 21st, the law required you to turn this evidence over "as soon as possible" to "a judge or person of civil authority,"¹⁷ not Mr. Dean or Mr. Ehrlichman—which judge or law enforcement official did you contact?¹⁸

¹⁷ Title 18, United States Code, section 4, requires:

4. Misprison of felony.

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court

CONDUCT AS TO JOHN DEAN AFTER MARCH 21, 1972

Question 6: When John Dean told you on March 21st that he was involved in possible crimes, why, the very next day, did you discuss his being given a position of trust as liaison with the Senate Watergate committee?¹²

¹² John Dean, in testifying about the March 22, 1972, meeting with the President, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Haldeman, related the following discussion:

"At that point the President turned to me and said 'John, I think that you ought to go up and discuss with Senator Ervin the parameters of executive privilege' and I said to the President, 'I thought that would be very unwise . . .'" (Committee Transcript p. 1549).

Mr. Mitchell confirms that the subject was discussed: "There was also the discussion; as I said, of having somebody provide liaison with the committee up here. Dean was discussed and apparently rejected, and then Ehrlichman, and, as I think the record will show, and I think I can bear out Mr. Dean's recollection of it, the President called Mr. Kleindienst on the subject matter while we were there." (Committee Transcript p. 1888).

FOLLOW-UP TO THE MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING

Question 7: You heard what you have termed "serious charges,"¹³ on March 21st. When you met as part of your "investigation"¹⁴ with Messrs. Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Dean the next day to "discuss the whole matter,"¹⁵ why didn't you seek refutation or corroboration of those charges?¹⁶

¹³ The topics of the March 21, 1973 meeting with John Dean have not only been termed "serious charges," but also "troubling" allegations, and "disturbing information:"

"On March 21st, as a result of serious charges which came to my attention . . ." (Statement by the President, April 17, 1973).

"These allegations were very troubling, and they gave a new dimension to the Watergate matter . . ." (Statement by the President, August 15, 1973).

"When I received this disturbing information on March 21st . . ." (Statement by the President, August 15, 1973).

¹⁴ On August 22, 1973, the President stated that the meeting on March 22, 1973, was an indication of the extent of his own investigation:

"I met at great length with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Mitchell on the 22nd. I discussed the whole matter with them. I kept pressing for the view that I had throughout, that we must get this story out, get the truth out, whatever and whoever it is going to hurt, and it was there that Mr. Mitchell suggested that all the individuals involved in the White House appear in Executive Session before the Ervin

of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than \$500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

18 Mr. Kleindienst, the nation's top law enforcement official, has testified as follows:

"Senator ERVIN. You stated, as I understand your testimony, that the President indicated by his conversation, when you reported what you knew about the Watergate affair to him . . . (on April 15, 1973) that he was ignorant about the Watergate affair?"

Mr. KLEINDIENST. I would gather from my meeting with the President that he had no such knowledge until immediately prior to my meeting, Mr. Chairman." (Committee Transcript P. 3579-3580).

Mr. Petersen, the chief Prosecutor, has testified:

"Mr. DASH. Was it at that time that you and Mr. Kleindienst gave a complete briefing. (April 15, 1973)

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. To the President?

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Can you tell the Committee what the reaction of the President was at that time?

Mr. PETERSEN. Well, I guess the reaction of the President was one of concern when I remember remarking to Mr. Kleindienst how I admired his calm." (Committee Transcript p. 3628)

DISCLOSURE OF THE ELLSBERG BREAK-IN

Question 9: When you learned of the Ellsberg break-in crimes on March 17, 1973, the law clearly required you to inform a judge or law enforcement official "as soon as possible"—under what authority did you withhold that information from appropriate officials until after April 17, 1973? 19

19 Mr. Petersen has testified as follows:

"Mr. DASH. On April 16, did you receive a memorandum from Mr. Silbert concerning the Ellsberg psychiatrist's break-in?"

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. DASH. Was that the first time you learned of that break-in?

Mr. PETERSEN. To be precise I ought to correct that. The memorandum was dated April 16. I think I received it on the 17th, Mr. Dash.

I advised the President of that and kind of in response to his, well, what's new, and I told him that we had received this information.

Mr. DASH. Did he indicate that he knew anything about that break-in when you told him about it?

Mr. PETERSEN. No; he did not." (Committee Transcript p. 3630-3631).

Mr. Kleindienst has testified as follows:

"Mr. DORSEN. When did you first learn . . . that White House employees burglarized the office of the psychiatrist of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg?"

Mr. KLEINDIENST. I learned that amazing bit of information some time in the morning of Wednesday, April 25, 1973." (Committee Transcript p. 3574).

It is important to note that the break-in at issue constituted a number of possible crimes, completely aside from whether it produced material that could improperly influence the trial of Dr. Ellsberg. For example, there is a possible illegal (and unauthorized, according to the President) breaking and en-

tering, a conspiracy to interfere with the civil rights of a citizen, as well as a number of other possible conspiracies

FAILURE TO REMOVE THE FBI DIRECTOR WHO HAD BURNED HUNT'S FILES

Question 10: Why didn't you ask for acting FBI Director's Gray's resignation, when testimony indicates that as early as March 1973 you no longer supported his nomination, 20 and by April 15th you knew from Justice Department officials 21 and a phone call to Mr. Gray 22 at which you were present that he had destroyed evidence from Mr. Hunt's safe?

20 The transcript of a phone call on March 7 or 8, 1973, referring to the Gray nomination hearings that were experiencing difficulty in the Senate, reads as follows:

"EHRlichman. Well, I think we ought to let him hang there. Let him twist slowly, slowly in the wind.

DEAN. That's right. I was in with the boss this morning and that's exactly where he was coming out. He said I'm not sure that Gray is smart enough to run the Bureau the way he's handling himself." (Committee Transcript p. 2787).

21 Mr. Ehrlichman has testified as follows:

"Senator WECKER. What was the purpose of your phone call on April 15 to Mr. Gray?"

Mr. EHRlichman. I explained it was the result of the President's conversation that day with the Attorney General and Mr. Petersen, in which the question of these documents came up . . .

Senator WECKER. In other words, the enforcement agencies had been working prior to April 15?

Mr. EHRlichman. Oh sure. . . . we were operating with what the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General had told the President, which the President recalled of the conversation and was imparting to me." (Committee Transcript, p. 2678).

22 Mr. Ehrlichman has also testified:

"Senator WECKER. After you received the word from Mr. Gray, which I believe was on April the 15th, did you transmit that information to the President?"

Mr. EHRlichman. Yes, sir.

Senator WECKER. On what day was that?

Mr. EHRlichman. He was sitting right there." (Committee Transcript, p. 2676).

REASONS FOR INATTENTION TO WATERGATE CRIMES

Question 11: How do you explain your repeated statements that one reason you knew nothing about Watergate or its cover-up was that you were busy with affairs of state 23— with prominent mention of Russia, China, and Vietnam—and yet your daily logs for June and July 1972 show literally hundreds of meetings with principal Watergate figures, while only minutes were spent with individuals such as Dr. Kissinger. 24

23 Address by the President, April 30, 1973:

" . . . Looking back at the history of this case two questions arise:

How could it have happened?

Who is to blame?

Political commentators have correctly observed that during my 27 years in politics I have always previously insisted on running my own campaigns for office.

But 1972 presented a very different situation. In both domestic and foreign policy, 1972 was a year of crucially important deci-

sions, of intense negotiations, of vital new directions, particularly in working toward the goal which has been my overriding concern throughout my political career—the goal of bringing peace to America and peace to the world.”

Press Conference, November 17, 1973:

“I could stand here before this audience and make all kinds of excuses, and most of you would probably understand because you are busy also. Seventy-two was a very busy year for me. It was a year when we had the visit to China, it was a year when we had the visit to Moscow and the first limited nuclear ban on defensive weapons you recall as well as some other very significant events.

It was a year too, when we had the very difficult decisions on May 8, the bombing and mining of Haiphong and then the negotiations and then in December, of course, the very, very difficult—perhaps the most difficult—decision I made of the December bombing, which did lead to the breakthrough and the uneasy peace, but it is peace with all the Americans home.

Now, during that period of time, frankly, I didn't manage the campaign. I didn't run the campaign. People around me didn't bring things to me that they probably should have because I was frankly just too busy trying to do the nation's business to run the politics.”

²⁴ The following schedule indicates meeting with principal advisors only:

MEETINGS WITH NIXON

June 20, 1972:

10:25-11:20, Ehrlichman.
11:26-12:45, Haldeman.
2:20-3:30, Colson.
4:35-5:25, Haldeman.

June 21, 1972:

9:30-10:38, Haldeman.
10:12-10:16, Butterfield.
10:13-10:38, Colson.
1:24-3:11, Haldeman.
2:12-3:11, Ziegler.
4:00-5:15, Colson.

June 22, 1972:

9:40-11:25, Haldeman.
10:20-10:21, Strachan.
11:10-11:11, Kehrl.
3:44-4:04, Haldeman, Ziegler.
4:03-4:06, Butterfield.
4:36-5:30, Haldeman.
5:02-5:17, Ziegler.
5:04-5:20, Colson.
5:14-5:19, Butterfield.

June 23, 1972:

10:04-10:39, Haldeman.
10:33-10:39, Ziegler.
1:04-1:13, Haldeman.
2:20-2:45, Haldeman.
2:40-2:43, Ziegler.

June 24, 1972:

2:29-4:35, Haldeman.

June 25, 1972

12:00-1:40, Haldeman.

June 26, 1972

9:50-10:00, Woods.
9:50-10:45, Haldeman.
10:59-11:06, Ehrlichman.
12:08-12:18, Haldeman.
12:11-12:12, Ziegler.
12:35-1:25, Haldeman.
2:25-3:00, Haldeman.

June 27, 1972

9:37-9:42, Ziegler.
9:40-9:58, Haldeman.

9:58-10:06, Ehrlichman.
12:03-1:50, Haldeman.
12:06-12:10, Butterfield.
12:56-1:12, Kissinger.
1:26-1:27, Ziegler.
1:27-1:29, Woods.
1:41-1:43, Ziegler.
3:35-4:40, Haldeman.
3:40-4:40, Colson.

June 28, 1972

11:16-1:55, Haldeman.
11:18-12:50, Colson.
2:30-3:09, Ehrlichman.

June 29, 1972

2:40-3:50, Haldeman.
2:50-2:52, Butterfield.
3:00-3:20, Kissinger.

June 30, 1972

8:06-8:50, Haldeman.
12:17-12:44, Haldeman.
12:21-12:44, Colson.
12:55-2:10, Haldeman.
12:55-2:10, Mitchell.
3:24-4:06, Kleindienst.
3:24-4:22, Haldeman.
4:30-5:52, MacGregor.
4:48-6:16, Haldeman.

July 1, 1972

8:50-10:05, Colson.
9:05-9:10, Butterfield.
9:45-10:04, Haldeman.
9:47-9:59, Hoopes.

12:16-1:04, Haldeman.
12:31-12:37, Woods.
12:53-1:00, Ziegler.
4:55-6:16, Haldeman.

July 6, 1972

8:41-9:08, Ehrlichman.
8:58-8:59, Butterfield.
10:11-12:05, Ehrlichman.
10:18-10:22, Kissinger.
10:40-12:05, Malek.
10:40-12:06, Haldeman.
10:40-12:06, MacGregor.
10:44-11:01, Timmons.
11:00-11:01, Ziegler.
12:39-2:36, Ehrlichman, Haldeman.
1:33-1:38, Ziegler.
1:37-2:23, Woods.

July 7, 1972

8:22-9:35, Ehrlichman.
8:35-8:37, Butterfield.
9:08-9:10, Butterfield.
9:38-10:27, Ehrlichman.
10:30-10:50, Ehrlichman.
10:38-10:40, Ziegler.

July 8, 1972

12:45-2:05, Ehrlichman.

July 10, 1972

10:30-10:35, Ehrlichman.
11:05-12:12, Ehrlichman.

July 13, 1972

9:07-9:14, Butterfield.
9:10-11:05, Haldeman.
10:50-10:51, Butterfield.
10:59-11:41, Kissinger.
11:15-12:45, Haldeman.
12:50-12:51, Haldeman.
1:15-2:12, Haldeman.
6:30-7:01, Connally, Haldeman (dinner).

July 14, 1972

9:24-9:33, Ehrlichman.
2:56-3:30, Haldeman.

July 16, 1972

7:05-9:17, Ehrlichman, Haig, Kissinger, Ziegler (dinner).

July 17, 1972

11:08-11:09, Ehrlichman.
11:10-11:31, Ehrlichman.
1:19-2:10, Colson.
1:45-1:55, Ziegler.
5:11-6:50, Colson (reception, dinner,
walk).

July 18, 1972

10:20-10:35, Haldeman.
1:00-2:05, Colson.

July 19, 1972

9:45-9:50, Butterfield.
9:48-11:33, Haldeman.
11:13-11:17, Ziegler.
12:44-1:51, Ehrlichman.
2:00-2:25, Colson.
2:40-3:45, Colson.
3:27-5:53, Haldeman.

July 20, 1972

8:42-8:59, Haldeman.
9:33-9:45, Butterfield.
9:39-10:38, Colson.
10:34-10:36, Butterfield.
2:05-2:47, Woods.

2:46-5:30, Haldeman.
4:27-5:30, Colson.
4:55-5:25, Kissinger.
5:40-6:15, Ehrlichman.

July 21, 1972

10:11-10:14, Butterfield.
10:13-10:16, Haldeman.
10:45-11:35, MacGregor.
10:45-11:39, Dole.
10:45-11:39, Haldeman.
11:43-12:07, Schultz.
11:43-1:02, Haldeman.
2:01-3:11, Mitchell.
2:02-2:36, Haldeman.
2:04-3:11, Agnew.
2:37-3:11, Haldeman.
4:20-4:59, Kissinger.