

W P 5/23/73  
OST

# Caulfield: 'I Was Being Asked

# to Do a Very Dangerous Thing'

Following are excerpts from the testimony yesterday of former White House aide John J. Caulfield before the Senate Watergate committee:

In late March, 1969, I received a telephone call from Mr. Ehrlichman who asked if I would visit him in his office a day or two later. I did so and at that meeting he asked if I would be willing to set up a private, security entity in Washington, D.C., for purposes of providing investigative support for the White House . . . I called him the next day with a counter proposal, namely, that I join the White House staff under Mr. Ehrlichman and, besides providing liaison functions with various law enforcement agencies, thereby be available to process any investigative requests from the White House. I mentioned to him that if he agrees with my proposal I would intend to use the services of one Mr. Anthony Ulasewicz, who was a detective with the New York police department nearing retirement.

A few days later I received a call from his office asking if I would come to Washington to discuss the matter and that meeting resulted in my appointment to the White House Staff on April 8, 1969.

My duties at that time consisted of being a White House liaison with a variety of law enforcement agencies in the federal government. Through arrangements worked out with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Herbert Kalmbach and Anthony Ulasewicz, Mr. Ulasewicz retired from the New York City police department and was paid on a monthly basis by the Kalmbach law firm, that employment commencing on July 9, 1969. During the next three years, first on orders from Mr. Ehrlichman and later in some instances, on orders from Mr. John Dean, Mr. Ulasewicz, under my supervision, performed a variety of investigative functions, reporting the results of his findings to the White House through me. . . .

In July of 1970 Mr. John Dean became counsel to the

President and Mr. Ehrlichman was named to the position of presidential assistant for domestic affairs. Thereafter I worked directly for Mr. Dean, but on occasion, Mr. Ehrlichman continued to call upon me directly for investigative work involving the services of Mr. Ulasewicz.

In the spring of 1971, I began to notice that, for some reason, the amount of investigation work handled by Mr. Ulasewicz through me had diminished. Much of the talk around the White House was beginning to center more and more on the 1972 presidential election and I began to examine ways in my mind in which I might become involved. Since I had performed security duties in the 1968 election campaign, and realized some of the security demands of a presidential campaign, I wished to become involved in the security area of the campaign.

. . . I next spoke with Mr. Dean concerning obtaining a position as a personal aide to John Mitchell when he became campaign director. Mr. Dean . . . on Nov. 24, 1971, accompanied me to an interview at Mr. Mitchell's office.

I explained to Mr. Mitchell that what I wanted was a position similar to that occupied by Dwight Chapin in relation to the President and that in addition to handling the kinds of activities that Chapin handled for the President, I could be of value to Mr. Mitchell as a bodyguard. Mr. Mitchell listened to what I had to say but was noncommittal . . . I left his office and walked back to the White House by myself. Mr. Dean remained and as I was walking through Mr. Mitchell's outer

office I noted Mr. Gordon Liddy sitting with Mr. Dean evidently waiting to see Mr. Mitchell.

. . . Ultimately, on the first of March, 1972, I went to the re-election committee to commence my duties

there. It soon became clear to me that Mr. Mitchell regarded me only as a bodyguard, which was not what I had had in mind at all. During March I took two trips with Mr. Mitchell outside of Washington, one brief one to New York City and the other to Key Biscayne, Florida. Since Mr. Mitchell regarded me as his personal bodyguard I carried a revolver in my briefcase.

By the time the trip to Florida occurred in late March, I was already in touch with a friend of mine at the Treasury Department about possible employment there. After being in Florida for approximately two to three days, I received word that my house in Fairfax, Va., had been burglarized and so I flew home to attend to my wife and family. Mr. Fred LaRue had joined us in Florida after our arrival and upon my departure, he asked that I leave my revolver in his possession since Mrs. Mitchell would "feel better" if there were a revolver on the premises. I gave my revolver to him and ultimately received it back in May of 1972 after LaRue had given it to Mr. James McCord for safekeeping upon Mr. LaRue's return from Florida.

Once I returned from Flo-

rida I performed no more duties of any kind for Mr. Mitchell and had formally decided to seek employment at the Treasury Department, which I ultimately obtained. On April 28 I started working for the Treasury Department. . .

In September of 1971 I received a call from Mr. Barry Mountain of the Republican National Committee who informed me that John Ragan was leaving his duties as security officer for the national committee. He asked me if I knew of anyone who would be interested in the position and I said no, but that I would "check around." I subsequently asked Mr. Al Wong, a deputy assistant director of the Secret Service, if he knew of anyone to recommend for such a position. He told me that he could recommend highly a former colleague and retired CIA agent, Mr. James McCord, and gave me his telephone number. I then called Mr. McCord and invited him to my office for an interview. Mr. McCord provided me with a resume

and, as a result of my interview with him, I called Mr. Mountain and arranged for Mr. McCord to see Mr. Mountain. He did so, and was thereafter hired by the Republican National Committee.

"Between our original meeting in September of 1971 and June, 1972, Mr. McCord and I grew to be personal friends even though we did not physically see each other frequently with the exception of the month of March, 1972, when I saw him on a daily basis at the Committee to Re-elect the President. . .

In July of 1972, after his (McCord's) arrest, I had Mr. Ulasewicz call his home and tell him to go to a designated public telephone booth near his house where I would be calling him. I called him at the public telephone and simply asked him if there was anything I could do for him or his family at this time of personal difficulty. No one had asked me to make this call and I was motivated entirely by my own personal concern for his condition and that of his family.

I did not see or hear from Mr. McCord again until I received an anonymous letter

at my home in December of 1972. It was typewritten, a note approximately two paragraphs in length and, to the best of my knowledge said, "Dear Jack—I am sorry to have to tell you this but the White House is bent on having the CIA take the blame for the Watergate. If they continue to pursue this course, every tree in the forest will fall and it will be a scorched earth. Jack, even you will be hurt in the fall-out."

I examined the letter and found that it was post-

marked in Rockville, Md., and thereby believed that the letter was from James McCord because he lived in Rockville. I called Mr. Dean's office and spoke with Mr. Fielding, an assistant to Mr. Dean, and read the letter over the telephone to him. Thereafter I went to Mr. Dean's office and gave him the letter.

In early January of 1973, I was attending a drug conference in San Clemente, California when I received a telephone call in my hotel room from John Dean. He asked that I go outside the hotel and call him back from a public telephone, which I did. He told me that he had a very important message which he wanted me to deliver to James McCord, that Mr. McCord was expecting to hear from me and McCord would understand what the message referred to. He said the message consisted of three things:

1. "A year is a long time;"
2. "Your wife and family will be taken care of;"
3. "You will be rehabilitated with employment when this is all over."

I immediately realized that I was being asked to do a very dangerous thing and I said to Mr. Dean that I did not think it was wise to send me on such a mission since Mr. McCord knew, as many others did, that I had worked closely with Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman at the White House and therefore it might be quickly guessed that any messages I was conveying were probably from one of the two. The reason I raised this question with him was because, frankly, I did not wish to convey the message. Mr. Dean asked if I could think


of any other way to do it and I suggested that perhaps I could get Mr. Ulasewicz to convey the message over the telephone anonymously, stating that the message came from me. Mr. Dean felt this would be alright so I hung up the telephone and called Mr. Ulasewicz in New York. He did not wish to convey the message at first but I convinced him to do it merely as a matter of friendship to me. Mr. Ulasewicz called Mr. McCord's home, and presumably, delivered the same message that Mr. Dean had given to me. He then called me back, in California, and reported that he had delivered the message and that Mr. McCord's attitude had been one of satisfaction. . .

The next day I received another telephone call from Mr. Dean at my hotel in which he said that Mr. McCord wanted to see me as soon as I got back. . .

I called Mr. Ulasewicz and asked him to arrange a meeting with Mr. McCord the following evening when I was to arrive back in Washington. Mr. Ulasewicz called me back and said Mr. McCord had agreed to meet with me at the second overlook on the George Washington Parkway but that, different from Mr. Ulasewicz's last conversation with Mr. McCord, Mr. McCord sounded quite irritated and annoyed. . .

At approximately 7 p.m. (Friday, Jan. 12, 1973) I met with Mr. McCord at the second overlook on the George Washington Parkway. He joined me in my car and as I recall the conversation, I first apologized to him for my delay in getting to see him due to my presence in California and the late arrival of my airplane. I also said I was sorry if he had been irritated by receiving the anonymous calls from my friend.

He said something like, "OK, that's OK Jack." I said, "I guess you received the message then?" Mr. McCord then said words to the effect, "Jack, I am different from all the others. Anybody who knew me at the CIA knows that I always follow my own independent course. I have always followed the rule that if one goes (I took this to mean going to jail) all who are involved must go. People who I am sure are involved are



United Press International

**SUNNY ITALY?—If it's so sunny in Italy, why are there so many umbrellas in Rome's Lost and Found Office?**

sitting outside with their families. I saw a picture in the newspaper of some guy who I am sure was involved sitting with his family. I can take care of my family. I don't need any jobs, I want my freedom.'

I stated that I was only delivering a message and had nothing to do with its formulation or had no control over what was being done. I sympathized with Mr. McCord's situation and made remarks such as, "I can't understand how this all has happened, I'd give anything if I had not recommended you for your two jobs with the Republican Party." I did try to impress upon Mr. McCord that I was simply a messenger and was not too pleased to even be doing that. I did say that the "people" who had asked me to convey the message had always been honorable toward me and that I thought it was a "sincere offer."

He asked me who I was speaking with at the White House and I said I could not reveal any names but that they were from the "highest level of the White House."

He continually said that all he was interested in was his freedom and that he was not pleased that others who he felt had been involved were not suffering the consequences that he was. In the context of demanding his immediate freedom, he said that he knew of a way in which his freedom could be obtained and asked me if I could convey his plan to the people at the White House with whom I was talking.

His plan, simply, was as follows: On two occasions, one in September, 1972, and the other in October, 1972, Mr. McCord told me that he called telephone numbers at foreign embassies in Washington and he stated he was sure these embassies were subjects of national security wiretaps. On both occasions he had stated that he was a man involved in the Watergate scandal and, without giving his name, had inquired as to the possibility of acquiring visas and other traveling papers necessary to travel to these foreign countries.

It was Mr. McCord's theory that if the government searched its wiretap records, it would find records of these two calls. Meanwhile,

Mr. McCord and his attorneys would make a motion in court, aimed at dismissing the case against Mr. McCord because of the use of wiretap evidence by the prosecution. Mr. McCord's idea was that when the U.S. Attorney was told that at least two of Mr. McCord's conversations had been intercepted over a national security wiretap, he would be forced to dismiss the case rather than reveal that the two embassies in question were the subject of national security wiretap.

Mr. McCord was quite adamant in saying that he was sure the government could secure his immediate release "if they wanted to help him" . . . He gave me a note with the dates of the two conversations that he referred to and told me that he knew this kind of thing had been done before, most recently in the Ellsberg case and that he saw no reason why the government could not at least accomplish this for him . . .

At no time in our first meeting do I recall saying anything about the President but I specifically renewed the offer of executive clemency, as indicated above and referred to it as coming from "the highest levels of the White House."

At some point in the conversation Mr. McCord said to me, "Jack, I didn't ask to see you." This puzzled me since my clear understanding from Mr. Dean was that McCord had specifically asked to see me.

In any event, I called Mr. Dean on Friday night, Jan. 12, and reported that Mr. McCord did not seem interested in accepting the offer made in Mr. Dean's original

message to him, that Mr. McCord wanted his immediate freedom and that he, Mr. McCord, felt that he had a way to obtain that freedom. I then mentioned over the telephone, McCord's idea for securing his freedom because of the use of national security wiretaps and said that I wished to discuss this matter directly with Dean.

The following day I saw Mr. Dean in his office in the White House and explained to him Mr. McCord's suggestion for obtaining his freedom, as Mr. McCord had described it to me. Mr. Dean said, "Well, I'll check on

that." He then turned the conversation back to the offer of executive clemency. To the best of my knowledge he said, "Jack, I want you to go back to him (McCord) and tell him that we are checking on these wiretaps but this time impress upon him as fully as you can that this offer of executive clemency is a sincere offer which comes from the very highest levels of the White House." I said, "I have not used anybody's name with him, do you want me to?" He said, "No, I don't want you to do that but tell him that this message comes from the very highest levels." I said, "Do you want me to tell him it comes from the President?" He said words to the effect, "No, don't do that, say that it comes from way up at the top."

At the meeting with Mr. Dean he also impressed upon me that this was a very grave situation which might someday threaten the President, that it had the potential of becoming a national scandal and that many people in the White House were quite concerned over it. Mr. Dean said that none of the other then defendants in the Watergate burglary "were any problem," and that Mr. McCord "was not cooperating with his attorney."

. . . As best as these impressions can be stated, I believed that I was going back to see Mr. McCord to again extend an offer of executive clemency and that by my doing so I was doing a great service for the President of the United States in a very sensitive matter. At no time, either before or after this meeting with Mr. Dean did I ever

speak to any other White House officials about this offer of executive clemency.

I specifically never spoke to the President of the United States and have no knowledge of my own as to whether he personally had endorsed this offer or indeed whether anyone had

ever discussed it with him. Since I had worked extensively for Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehrlichman and had formed an impression that Mr. Dean rarely made decisions on matters of consequence without speaking to Mr. Ehrlichman, my guess was that when Mr. Dean referred to "high White House officials" he at least meant Mr. Ehrlichman. I know that he was in conversation with someone about my contacts with Mr. McCord since, when I was in his office on Jan. 13, he received a telephone call and I heard him say, "I'm receiving a report on that right now" to the party on the other end.

At any rate, I then called Mr. McCord and arranged a meeting with him, again at the second overlook of the George Washington Parkway early in the afternoon on Sunday, Jan. 14. On this occasion we both got out of our cars and walked down a path from the overlook toward the Potomac River.

This meeting lasted only 10 to 15 minutes. I did most of the talking. I told Mr. McCord that the White House was checking into the wiretapping situation and that I had been asked to impress upon him once again that the offer of executive clemency was a sincere and believable offer coming from the very highest levels of the White House. I explained to him that among the reasons why I believed that such a commitment would be kept were that the White House officials with whom I was in contact were extremely concerned about the Watergate burglary developing into a major scandal affecting the President and therefore such a promise would not be given lightly. I told him that the White House officials with whom I was talking were complaining because (. . .) Mr. McCord was the only one of the Watergate burglary defendants who was refusing to cooperate. At no time on this occasion or on any other occasion do I recall telling Mr. McCord to keep silent if called before the grand jury or any congressional committees.

His response to my conversation was that he still wanted his immediate freedom and he felt strongly that if the White House had any interest in helping him secure that freedom that

they could do something about the two telephone calls which he was sure had been intercepted . . .

Later on Sunday I telephoned Mr. Dean to report on my meeting with Mr. McCord. I told him that in my opinion McCord had abso-

lutely no interest in the offer of executive clemency. I told Mr. Dean that Mr. McCord was still adamant in his belief that the White House had the power to have the charges against him dismissed if it would merely pursue the wiretaps which he had mentioned. Mr. Dean said that I should tell him that there wasn't much likelihood that anything would be done about the wiretap situation and, in response to my comments about McCord's refusal to consider executive clemency he said something like, "Well, what the hell does he know anyway?"

Mr. Dean told me to go back to Mr. McCord again and "commiserate" with him but he did not ask me to renew the offer of executive clemency. I guessed that the reason why he wanted me to see Mr. McCord again was simply to maintain a friendly relationship with him in case there was a need for any further conversation with him through me. I probably would have met again with Mr. McCord anyway since I felt badly about his predicament and I had considered him a good friend.

In any event, on Monday, Jan. 15, I called McCord to report that nothing seemed to be happening in regard to the wiretap situation. He became quite angry over the telephone and re-affirmed his belief that if the White House really wanted to help him they could do so by using the method he had suggested and that he knew that Mr. Magruder (who was then going to be a government witness) was going to perjure himself. I also mentioned getting together with him but he said he had no interest in seeing me unless I had something more to talk to him about. He was quite upset so I did not pursue the matter further. . .

Subsequently, I called him and arranged to meet with him again, the exact date of this meeting being unsure in my mind. We again met at the overlook

on the George Washington Parkway, he got into my car and we drove out the Parkway, pursuing a course in the general direction of Warrenton, Va. . .

I gave him my private telephone number at the Treasury Department and told him that if he or his wife ever wanted me to do anything for them, they should feel free to call me. I told McCord that if he or his wife should decide to call me, to simply use the name "Watson" and I would know who it was. Frankly, this was merely a device to save me from any possible embarrassment . . .

I told him there was absolutely no hope, in my opinion, of the White House ever doing anything about the wiretap situation and asked him when he thought he might make a statement. He said that he had not decided that yet, but that he had spoken to his wife and family and that he felt free to make a statement whenever he thought the time was right.

I again asked if there was anything I could do for him. He said one thing that I could do was to see whether bail money could be raised for him pending an appeal in his case. I said I would check into this.

Toward the end of our conversation, realizing that he definitely was going to make a statement on the Watergate burglary at a time of his choosing and that such a statement would in all probability involve allegations against people in the White House and other high administration officials, I gave him what I considered to be a small piece of friendly advice.

I said, words to the effect that, "Jim, I have worked with these people and I know them to be as tough-minded as you and I. When you make your statement don't underestimate them. If I were in your shoes, I would probably be doing the same thing."

I later called Mr. Dean and advised him of Mr. McCord's request for bail funding and he said words to the effect that, "Maybe we can handle that through Alch." Sometime later, Mr. Dean called me and asked me to tell McCord that the bail money presented too many problems and that maybe

problems and that maybe consideration could be given to paying premiums. I later called McCord and reported this. His reaction was, "I am negotiating with a new attorney and maybe he can get it handled." This is the last conversation I have had to date with James McCord . . .

At no time in any conversations with Mr. McCord did I advise, pressure or threaten him in an attempt to make him accept the offer of executive clemency. I viewed my role simply as one of a messenger and while I tried to give both Mr. Dean and Mr. McCord the full flavor of what was going on at both ends of this message transacting process, I actively refrained from injecting myself into the process at either end. I realized at the time of my first conversation in January that I was involved in questionable activity but I felt that it was important for me to carry this message for the good of the President.