



An ARRB Update

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Joe Backes was on the panel "New Leads in Files and Documents." His presentation on what files are missing from the National Archives was one we felt every researcher must have. We are pleased to print excerpts here.

Missing Documents

There are a few items to bring to your attention. They are all important and I will not have time to go into great detail. I want to talk to you today about missing material that it supposed to be in Archives II having been opened in full by the ARRB, some other Board business, and interesting items in some Secret Service records released in January '96.

First, please read all my analyses of the documents the ARRB has released on the Fair Play web site. In them you should note there is plenty that is not released. There are not only pages and redactions a-plenty in the documents voted to be released, then actually released, and transferred to Archives II, but documents in their entirety that are not available to be copied. No RIF, no ARRB Formal Notice of Determination, no withdrawal sheet, which would be another issue if there was one, nothing.

The Sequestered Collection

Another issue of importance is that the Board is looking at the records referred to as "the segregated collection," or "sequestered collection." These are documents the HSCA gathered from the CIA that deal with the assassination of President Kennedy. At the August 6th open meeting two representatives of the CIA, John Pereira, and Barry Harrelson were placed under oath, something the Board has never done before, to give testimony about the collection. The sequestered collection breaks

down to about 192,000 pages of hard copy and 72 rolls of microfilm, which would be about 163,000 pages. So that's about 355,000 pages of material the Board has to look at document by document. However, the Board doesn't really want to do that because that would take up too much of their time. So they are looking for a way to deal with this problem.

I would urge you to write to the Board and ask for the "Memorandum of Understanding" signed by the Chairman of the Assassination Committee and the Director of Intelligence that explains why these documents were sequestered. It is referred to on page 25 of the August 6th open meeting transcript.

The CIA began its process of reviewing these documents under Director Gates' Historical Review Program. They wrote to Speaker Foley requesting approval to begin declassifying and releasing these records. Foley gave approval.

One of the troubling items in the hard copy are personnel files. The Board wants to set these records aside. There is even the possibility the Board may decide that these records are not assassination records and will not release them, despite the fact the HSCA requested this material from the CIA, looked at them, and asked they be held separately, thus the name "segregated." This was discussed at length at the October 16th open meeting as well. This meeting was at the Board's Washington D.C. office in a small room and was nearly overflowing with staff.

These records were referred to as having "no apparent relevance to the assassination." Jeremy Gunn explained some of these records are "false hits," that is a personnel file was requested but the wrong file was sent; for example the HSCA wanted a file on Bob Smith but a file on a different Bob Smith was sent. On the other hand Ann Goodpasture's personnel file is in here. (See *Oswald and the CIA* by John Newman for information on Ms. Goodpasture.)

Dr. Hall asked how we know that something isn't relevant. This whole discussion with Gunn was done for the public and Dr. Hall stated it that way. (This was fine with me.) Dr. Hall took the position that because an official federal agency requested these files that automatically makes them assassination related. He wondered why the ARRB should be second-guessing the HSCA.

Dr. Nelson then remarked that the Board does not have the time to look into these records, determine relevancy, review document-by-document, word-by-word. This is the crux of the matter with these files.

They appeared to me to be creating a category to place these records in so they can move onto records with which they have no problem.

The staff of the Board saw three possible decisions with these files: 1) they be transferred back to the agency of origin, 2) preserved by the origin agency with Archive supervision or 3) transferred to the Archive but kept separate from the records that are publicly accessible. The staff was urging that decision number one not be adopted.

So I don't think we will be seeing these materials until 2017.

Forgotten Motorcades

There are some Secret Service personnel in Chicago and elsewhere who are lying through their teeth about JFK's November 2, 1963 proposed, later

canceled, trip.

What is most fascinating about all these HSCA documents from this January release is that the ARRB Executive Director, Mr. David Marwell looked at all of them. How can I tell? Well, there is a charge out record document. I have never seen such a document before. Marwell's name is written in, the JFK Assassination Review Board, etc. Mr. Marwell looked at this material on September 19, 1995.


The Secret Service was lying to the HSCA people and being most uncooperative and the HSCA knew it. In regard to Agent Jamison and the Miami trip, in document #180-10074-10394, the HSCA interviewer in a most uncharacteristic move for a federal investigator into the JFK assassination confronts this "memory loss" of Mr. Jamison. "Questioning about the reasons for the deficiencies in his memory elicited various types of admissions. Some admissions represented Jamison's adoption of postures of ignorance, e.g. 'All I know is that he (the President) was in safe and out safe.'" "Mr. Jamison experienced difficulty in recalling detailed information of any kind about conditions of any kind in the Miami office in 1963." The HSCA interviewer kept trying.;

"Under the conditions created by the virtually complete loss of memory on Jamison's part, questioning was developed which invited Jamison to comment on hypothetical protective situations."


Specifically, he was asked to determine whether on November 18, 1963, if he had been exclusively in charge, would he have transported the President from the airport to the speech site at the hotel by helicopter or motorcade? Memorandum before him some written by Jamison himself made it clear the threat on November 18, 1963 was posed by a mobile, unidentified rifleman shooting from a window in a tall building with a high-powered rifle fitted with a scope. Jamison had "no recall" of these facts even though his recollection was refreshed by his own memoranda.

The Chicago Trip

Document # 180-10078-10493:

 On the cancellation of the 11-2-63 Presidential visit to Chicago, "SA Kinney was assigned to drive the Presidential follow-up car for the motorcade. His records show he went to Chicago, prepared for the trip and was awaiting the President's arrival. At the last minute, the trip was canceled. SA Kinney was informed the "Cuban missile crisis" necessitated the cancellation." (The Cuban missile crisis was in October of 1962. So what does this mean?)

Document # 180-10082-10453 is a three page summary dated 02/01/78.


 It is a summary of an interview with James S.

Griffiths. Griffiths stated he started as an agent in August, 1961 in Chicago. At first Griffiths had no recall of a proposed Presidential visit on November 2, 1963. When refreshed about the information of President Kennedy attending a Army-Air Force game at Soldiers' Field, he stated, "Isn't that the one that was canceled at the last moment?"

He stated he was assigned to the airport for that proposed trip. The HSCA interviewers informed him that the work sheet showed he was assigned to the airport and this is where he was when word came of the cancellation of the trip.

Griffiths stated the name of Thomas Vallee was familiar and remembers a case concerning Vallee, but does not remember any of the details. He stated he does not remember anything outstanding regarding a threat to the President for that particular visit. He stated that David Grant was the advance man for the Chicago trip.

There are not only pages and redactions a-plenty in the documents voted to be released, then actually released, and transferred to Archives II but documents in their entirety that are not available to be copied. No RIF, no ARRB Formal Notice of Determination, no withdrawal sheet, which would be another issue if there was one, nothing.

 Document # 180-10087-10191 is a seven page interview summary with Maurice Martineau.


The HSCA asked about threats to JFK in the Chicago area in November, 1963. Martineau visibly stiffened. "I can recall no threat that was significant enough to cause me to recollect it at this time" he said. In contrast to the wealth

of detail which flooded his earlier recollections, his answers became vague and less responsive.

Martineau explained that just prior to a Presidential visit, there would be a meeting of the office agents and detail assignments would be handed out. In the instance of the President's intended visit on November 2, 1963 Martineau did not recall any particular surveillance involving Cuban or Latin types, nor did he recall any all-night interrogation of any suspects in the Chicago office.

("All night interrogation?" What is that about?)

Martineau recalled nothing about the Mosley information until HSCA staff read a portion of a Secret Service memo (q.v.) written by SA Ed Tucker (which Martineau signed as "Approved by") which outlined the SS 1963 interest in Mosley, whom it appears was an informant. He only recalled Mosley was a "police buff, a "James Bond" type who knew where there was a stock of automatic weapons which some Cubans were trying to buy. "They were Chicago bus drivers...I don't know what happened in connection with the information and at no time do I recall talking to the FBI about it."


 Document # 180-10093-10022 is a two page interview summary of Louis Sims.

Mr. Sims entered the Secret Service in April, 1961 and was assigned to the Chicago field office until January, 1964. Sims stated he was attending the Secret Service school at the time of the proposed Presidential visit to Chicago on November 2, 1963.

Sims stated that he could not remember the dates but he recalls that it could have been any time up to a year prior

to the assassination, he was assigned to conduct a surveillance on a subject who was either Puerto Rican or Cuban. He does not remember any specific details other than it involved gun running and appeared to be a very sensitive investigation. He stated the names Echevarria and Manuel Rodriguez were familiar; but he couldn't place them. Sims also stated there may have been a grocery store involved in the surveillance.

Sims stated he had no recall of any threat relative to the Presidential visit to Chicago in April 1963. April? (I thought they were interested in November 2, 1963.)


 **Document # 1870-10099-10491 is an eight page summary report of an interview with SA William Greer.**

Greer had no independent recollection of going to Chicago on November 2, 1963. He claimed his trip book would verify it and he has three books salted away in the attic and it was too much trouble at the time for him to go rooting around in a cold crawl space looking for them. He assured us he would xerox the material we needed and forward it to Washington.

In Chicago, he was scheduled to drive President Kennedy. He recalls the trip was canceled at the last minute, but doesn't recall the particular reason.

The HSCA staff commented, "Like many people we have talked to about the Chicago trip, he confused the reason for JFK's previous trip cancellation, i.e. the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the assassination of President Diem in Viet Nam."

Greer again requested time to look at his "trip book" for verification of his whereabouts on 11/2/63.

 **Document # 180-10104-10331 is a six page summary report of an interview with SA Joseph Noonan.**

Noonan had participated in Presidential Protection duties in connection with the planned visit of President John F. Kennedy to Chicago on November 2, 1963.

Noonan had no direct involvement with the Vallee case. He was aware of the action taken by Agents Tucker and Strong which resulted in Vallee's arrest on 11/2/63 by the Chicago Police.

Noonan was involved in the Mosley case. Noonan explained Mosley came to the attention of the Secret Service about a year or two prior to this incident. He came into the Chicago office and talked to acting SAIC Martineau about a counterfeiting case. Noonan recalls that SA Robert Motto worked undercover and was attempting to make a "buy." The surveillance led them to an alley on the north side of Chicago where a Mack Sennett scene ensued. Noonan said, unknown to him Mosley had a gun on his person. Several agents and Chicago detectives were covering. Noonan was looking in a side window of the garage where the "buy" was being discussed. One of the Chicago police spotted the gun on Mosley and shouted "look out he's got a gun." The police officer fired a shot and all hell broke loose. Noonan said he cocked his pistol and was about to fire when his scarf fluttered in the wind and caught between the trigger and the frame causing a misfire. He said he felt like a fool but was happy he didn't discharge the weapon because he might have shot agent Motto by mistake.

Wait, it gets better.

At about 2 a.m., a woman stuck her head out the window and took their picture with a flash camera. She informed them she knew who they were and was calling the police.

This incident did not sour Noonan on Mosley's status as an informant, but made him aware of Mosley's sense of theatre and he was wary in the subsequent encounter.

At or about the time of the Kennedy assassination in Dallas on 11/22/63, Mosley again approached Martineau with information about some Cubans in Chicago who were looking to buy automatic weapons for use against Castro's Cuba. Asked why the Secret Service was involved in gun-running, Noonan said Mosley had informed them the Cubans had made threats against the safety of the President. "Which President?" he was asked. Specifically, President Johnson (which would put it after 11/22/63). Noonan explained Mosley had told them the Cubans said they were well financed and "if Johnson got in their way in an attempt to invade their homeland, he would be taken care of like Kennedy was," or words to that effect.

Again, SA Robert Motto was pressed into service and used undercover primarily to see if he could get the Cubans to articulate threats against the President. If in the process of making a buy he could audit their threats, then the Secret Service would be on solid jurisdictional grounds.

Noonan said he and other agents were uneasy that the Cubans might have some ties to the Central Intelligence Agency and they called Assistant Chief Paul Paterni in Washington and asked him to check on this possibility. Paterni assured them shortly thereafter it was all right to proceed with their investigation.

A little while later they received a call from Headquarters to drop everything on Mosley and Echevarria and to send all memos, files, and their notebooks to Washington and not to discuss the case with anyone.

Noonan describes circumstance in connection with the Mosley/Echevarria case which closely parallel circumstances writer Edwin Black described in his error-filled article in the 1975 "Chicago Independent" -(q.v) except that Black used the incidents he describes in an amalgam relating to threats against Kennedy in November, 1963.


Noonan was in 1978 in charge of Intelligence operations for the Chicago office.

Document # 180-10104-10481 is a seven page summary of an interview with Gerald Behn.



Chicago

Mr. Behn was unable to recall anything about the President's cancellation of his planned appearance on 11/2/63. He did not remember hearing about either the trip or its political purpose. He did remember SA Dave Grant was the advance agent from the WHD to Chicago for the 11/1/63 trip. Yet, he did remember that Maurice Martineau was the acting SAIC of the Chicago office at the time of the trip. (Someone wrote in a question mark after that.)

 **Document # 180-10105-10305 is a four page interview summary of Charlotte A. Klapowski, an employee of the Chicago Secret Service Field Office.**

She had no recall of the proposed Presidential visit on November 2, 1963 or its cancellation. She had no recall of any threats or arrests relative to the proposed November 2nd visit. She had no recall of any threats during her twenty

years in the Chicago office. She stated she was not privy to this information as a clerk.

She had no recall of the name of Thomas Arthur Vallee or of doing any reports relative, even though we (the HSCA investigators) have them in our possession. (I love that.)

The Dallas Motorcade:

Dallas Document # 180-10071-10165. This is a four page document. It is a summary of an interview of Secret Service Agent John David Ready.

In regard to the Dallas motorcade, Ready stated he was assigned to the right front running board of the presidential follow up car opposite Clint Hill. He stated his job was not to watch the President, but to watch the crowds and buildings. He stated he had no specific recall of making any observation of the TSBD. He thought the first shot was a firecracker thrown from behind them. He said the second and third shots were closer in time than the first and second shots. He heard someone say either, "He's hit," or, "He's shot," but doesn't remember when it was said, relative to the second or third shot.

Ready stated he jumped off of the running board to go to the President's vehicle, but was called back by Agent in Charge Emory Roberts. He had been watching the right side and was not aware of Clint Hill running to the presidential limousine.

After entering the hospital, he was assigned to the door leading to the area where they had taken the President. Ready did not have any recall of the FBI agent making a scene when trying to get into the room where the President was. He was told to ride the follow-up car behind Vice President Johnson to Love Field and as they were getting ready to leave, he heard that the President had died. On arrival at Love field, Vice President Johnson boarded Air Force 1 along with the Vice Presidential detail of Secret Service agents. Agent Ready boarded the back-up plane.

Rose asked Ready if he was aware of a trip ever being canceled because of a threat. He stated he never performed Protective Service for any President or any other White House official who would have allowed a trip to be canceled because of a threat.

Document # 180-10074-10079 is a five page summary of an interview with Thomas Lem Johns.

In November, 1963 Johns was at the LBJ ranch in Perdenales, Texas and was helicoptered with other agents to San Antonio to meet the Vice President's party. They traveled onto Dallas-Ft. Worth with the group. It was Johns' assignment on November 22nd to ride in the follow-up car. He normally rotated each day with Rufus Youngblood to ride in the Vice President's car. The follow-up was hard-topped and the doors opened from the rear. "I was blind on top and couldn't see behind me," Johns said. "I heard two shots. They seemed close together. They were shots, not backfires or firecrackers. Our car was moving very slowly and my door was open, so I jumped out on the street. Before I could begin to move towards the VP's car I heard the third shot. The first two sounded like they were on the side of me toward the grassy knoll but then that's because of the confinement of the backseat and opening to that side plus the fact that people [were] falling to the ground on the grassy

slope made me feel that the shots were from that direction. I never got a fix on the third shot because I was running toward LBJ's car, which was now some distance away from us and picking up speed. I was left on the street with no way to get back in our car. A passing car with White House photographers in it came by and one of them recognized me. He said, 'Hey, there's Lem Johns. Let's give him a ride.' They stopped and picked me up and we drove to the Trade Mart, which was the next stop. I heard from a Dallas police officer that the President had been shot and taken to Parkland hospital. He drove me there on his three wheeler."

When Johns arrived at Parkland Hospital, he talked to Rufus Youngblood who told him to find Kenny O'Donnell and see what was happening with the President. He ran into Emory Roberts, another agent, who told him the President was dead. He eventually brought O'Donnell to see Youngblood and LBJ. "O'Donnell told the Vice President that Kennedy was dead and that they should take Air Force One and go back to Washington." Youngblood told Johns to get transportation for Love Field and round up the Vice President's group. Youngblood apparently gave the same task to other agents, because when Johns got back with the route information, he saw that the others had taken LBJ and left. Johns left for Love Field himself, picking up Cecil Stoughton, the photographer, on the way.

Johns said President Johnson talked to Bobby Kennedy on the phone and was told by Bobby to get sworn in there in Dallas. They then called Federal Judge Sarah Hughes who came and administered the oath. Johns helped remove seats for the coffin to be placed in the rear cabin of Air Force One. After they returned to Washington, Johns remained with the President's detail throughout the funeral.

Document # 180-10074-10396 is an eleven page summary of an interview with Winston G. Lawson. This is a copy of document # 180-10074-10397 with the notable exception of some handwritten corrections in the text.

There is something very odd here. Lawson stated his pre-departure contact with PRS indicated that no reports were available from PRS about any threat subjects developed on the basis of President Kennedy's visit to Texas for the funeral of Representative Sam Rayburn in 1961.

Why would threat subjects be limited to developments from President Kennedy's attendance of Sam Rayburn's funeral? What this says -- in deceptive language -- is that there were no active threat subjects to President Kennedy in the whole state of Texas for two whole years, 1962 and 1963, at least in the Secret Service PRS files, and if there were they were not shared with Lawson. Lawson stated he learned about the October, 1963 attack in Dallas on Adlai Stevenson "only by his own reading."

Lawson recalled he arrived at night in Dallas and was met by a local agent, then went to a local office, where meetings began for the purpose of planning the itinerary in light of manpower available and threat levels. Constant meetings also began with the Dallas Police Department. Initially, however, the SS only paid a courtesy call and avoided making a specific early commitment about plans.

According to Lawson's Warren Commission testimony (IV p. 322), Lawson arrived in Dallas on Tuesday November 12, 1963 at approximately 7:30 PM. He was accompanied by Jack Puterbaugh and Chief Warrant Officer Bales from the

White House Communications Agency.

Mr. Lawson could not identify any person or persons as responsible for the decision to use a motorcade in Dallas, but he "thinks the decision was made in D.C." (This is classic bull meant to confuse and disorient. Lawson knows better.)

When asked whether there was controversy about the selection of the luncheon site he responded that the Secret Service "found what we found at the Fair Grounds, at the Trade Mart, and then phoned back."

Well, what's that supposed to mean?

Lawson characterized the Trade Mart as "newer" as having "many more doors, a guard system, a card system for identifying visitors, and catwalks of the Hyatt House type with open balconies." The interviewer noted Lawson did not describe the features of an alternative site and compare it to the Trade Mart.

In what appears to be a contradiction, Lawson claimed he could not identify any one person or organization as conspicuously preferring or trying to influence the selection of the Trade Mart, yet, on the same page states that Jack Puterbaugh, a civilian political advance man for the Democratic National Committee recommended the Trade Mart.

Puterbaugh accompanied Lawson to Dallas, stayed at the same hotel as Lawson, attended many of the same DPD/SS planning meetings, and was also in charge of the protocol of the motorcade, the arranging of the seating and vehicle sequence for Congressmen and other dignitaries in the motorcade. (This is total crap. Puterbaugh was sent down by Kennedy people to help Bruno but had no power whatsoever. This is a classic whitewash of Connally's manipulations to get the Trade Mart selected for the luncheon.)

Lawson in this interview stated he did not accompany Mr. Sorrels on the tour of the route which they each say they made together on November 14. Second, Mr. Lawson stated he "does not recall" the route traveled by Sorrels included Dealey Plaza, since it was not certain on the 14th the Trade Mart would be the destination.

But here's what Mr. Lawson said in CE 769, p. 2 in volume 17 p. 619, "SAIC Sorrels and I drove one of the proposed routes from the airport to the Trade Mart at the approximate speed probably to be taken during the motorcade, and looked over other security factors along the route."

So Lawson did not tell the truth: (1), he did not drive with Sorrels; (2), he did not drive the motorcade route President Kennedy took on Nov. 22; Lawson said he took "one of the proposed routes." The HSCA did ask him about it, and his own memorandum states he did drive to the Trade Mart on one of the so-called proposed routes with Sorrels. And what were the other proposed routes, and what was the destination of these other routes?

On Nov. 18 the route had been selected, and a tour of the route was taken by Lawson, Sorrels, and DPD Assistant Chiefs Batchelor and Lumpkin. Discussions were on "crowd" control, and an interest in "filling in the gap" of time between the landing of AF-1 at Love Field and the time of the speech, and a "prime concern with things falling from overpasses." Mr. Lawson also went to a private club in the late afternoon of the 18th. Lawson commented that Puterbaugh was in contact with Washington at this time and was (1) "probably ...getting instructions ...from the Democratic Party"

on resolving matters of protocol at the local level; and (2) was "possibly" getting instructions on this matter from Betty Harris (Elizabeth Forsling Harris) who was Puterbaugh's primary local contact.

The discussions were on limiting the crowd by not publicizing the route. Connally did not want JFK to be popular: that would help the liberals whom Connally despised, I believe. The gap that needed to be filled was the result of Connally first offering and later confirming that Texas Christian University would give JFK an honorary degree. Then Connally apparently had it pulled. I doubt if TCU was ever really going to give JFK a degree, although I am certain that Connally said they would to Jerry Bruno. Had this degree ceremony happened, there would be no Dallas motorcade as there would have been no time for it.

Betty Harris was working with Bill Moyers, not Puterbaugh, in getting the route publicized prior to the motorcade. I believe Moyers would not tolerate Connally's conniving.

Stevenson exhibit No. 5053, 21H 562 at p. 570 indicates that a plan to include a DPD squad car in the motorcade behind the Vice President's car was changed by Lawson at a DPD-SS meeting on the 21st. Lawson was asked why there is no mention of this in his preliminary report of November 19. Lawson stated "the DPD could have put it in on their own" and that he could "not recall who took it out". Lawson added "it would have been listed if it had been scheduled", that he is "not sure it was scheduled to be there", and that he "doesn't know who canceled the DPD car because he doesn't know who decided to include it." As for the meeting on November 21, he said that "maybe it (the matter of the squad car) came up."

The Stevenson report also states that Lawson changed a plan to have the JFK motorcycles parallel to the JFK limousine and instead decided to deploy the JFK motorcycles parallel to the rear fender. In this interview Lawson said he had "no recall of changing plans."


Maybe he (Lawson) didn't change them. Maybe somebody else did and falsified the report. But somebody sure did change the placement of the motorcycles and the placement of other vehicles in the motorcade.

Even the HSCA saw through this. A comparison of CE 767 (Lawson's Preliminary Report) and CE 768 (Lawson's Final Report) show "that the intended sequence of vehicles on 11/19/63 was changed." In the actual motorcade of 11/22/63 as described in CE 768, Congressional Car #1 was placed immediately behind the SS Vice-Presidential Follow-Up Car rather than in its original position as the fifth car behind Vice Presidential Follow-Up.

Mr. Lawson was unable to explain the change except to say he is "not sure that 768 is what it (the vehicle sequence) was." He is unsure of the accuracy of his own report!

Another weird sentence: "As for the on site (Love Field) formation of the motorcade, Mr. Lawson said he is not sure whether the deployment of the wire service car and press cars was done by the 'local press man' in charge of press cars 'or by Mr. Lawson.'" (Why is Mr. Lawson referring to himself, in the third person, as Mr. Lawson? Is he hanging out with Bob Dole? Or was someone else's name supposed to be here?)

Lawson was also unable to remember whether the local press man in charge was Felix McKnight, Sam Bloom, or



a White House press man.

So the implication is some unknown person changed the line up of vehicles in the motorcade: it could be one of several people, and no one thought it was odd or a breach of security to do so.

Lawson acknowledged that Lt. Col. George Whitmeyer who was part of the Dallas district U.S. Army Command, whom Lawson said "taught Army Intelligence" and who rode in the pilot car, "wasn't scheduled" to be in the motorcade. Mr. Lawson denied that the presence of Col. Whitmeyer had anything to do with Lawson's prior service in the CIC.

Lawson stated that in 1963 he had nothing to do with the CIC and that he has attended no inactive USAR meetings since March, 1958. Well, did he attend any active meetings?

During the Dallas Advance, Lawson had contact with an Air Force advance team and with Chief Officer Bales of the White House Communications.

Who was in this Air Force advance team and when did Lawson meet with them?

Document # 180-10078-10493 is an eight page summary interview with Samuel A. Kinney. I found this to be an amazing document.

"SA Kinney worked the November 17 Presidential visit to Tampa, Florida, then traveled to San Antonio, Texas, to prepare for the President's first stop in the visit to Texas scheduled for November 21-22. After President Kennedy's departure from San Antonio, Kinney proceeded to Dallas on November 21.

"As follow up car driver, SA Kinney had supervisory responsibility for the follow-up vehicles, two 1956 Cadillacs specially fitted out with running boards and other equipment. He remarked the same car used in Tampa was used in Dallas, but he did not know whether that car was also used in Miami for the visit of November 18."

Kinney stated "there were "many occasions" when problems with the Presidential car required the follow up cars be used as Presidential vehicles. The car in which the President was assassinated was ultimately sent back to the factory (Ford Motor Company) for preservation and display as an historical exhibit.

"SA Kinney stated the SS agent most responsible for security planning was White House Detail Advance Agent Winston G. Lawson. He recalled that Lawson was working with photographs of possible threat subjects, was concerned about a threat poster printed with the slogan 'JFK- Wanted Dead or Alive,' and was 'working around the clock.'

Kinney thought he was responsible for whether or not the bubbletop was used. Kinney was 'of the opinion that if he had put it on at Love Field, it would have been taken off during the motorcade.'

Wonder what he meant by that?

"The follow-up car was interconnected by radio to the Presidential limousine. The radio link was manned by SA Emory Roberts in the front row passenger seat. In addition, four agents rode the running boards, two on each side. In Dallas, Presidential Appointments Secretary Ken O'Donnell and Aide Dave Powers would not have been included in the follow-up car if security planning had been solely the responsibility of SA Kinney. However, since O'Donnell and Powers were stationed well in-board, neither one of them in any way affected the operation of the follow up car.

"SA Kinney stated he was in charge of placing the news media vehicles (Ford convertibles) in sequence behind the follow-up car. SA Kinney volunteered for this duty because it was 'unusual for LBJ to be along' and he felt his assistance might be useful. He was unable to recall any unusual or suspicious events that took place during this process. He recalled he had no conversation with advance agent Lawson about the selection of specific vehicles for placement in the sequence.

"SA Kinney immediately recognized the first sound as that of gunfire, realizing that it was a 'shot from over our right shoulder' which hit the President in the throat. The President, his movement (in Kinney's opinion) affected by the brace he wore, fell toward Jackie, who, 'after catching him, set him back up.' Kinney commented on Mrs. Kennedy's influence on the position of the President by remarking that the SS preferred not to have persons riding in jumpseats with the President. The writer understood this remark to mean that the President might have had room to be pushed to the floor.

"While Jackie was setting him back up, Connally turns rights, then left, then pow, pow. The second shot (hit Connally and) 'left Connally's back open.' The third shot hit the President. As the third shot landed, SA Kinney was able to see 'hair coming up.' At this point he hit the siren on the follow up car.

"Immediately after SA Kinney hit the siren, portside forward running board SA Clinton Hill said 'I'm hitting it' (e.g. announced that he would make a break on foot for the presidential limousine). SA Kinney acknowledged this by lining up the left front side of his follow up car so that this side of the follow up car would offer the shortest, most direct path to the Presidential limousine. SA Kinney stated at no time after Hill left the follow-up car did Kinney himself see Mrs. Kennedy 'come out' (i.e. over the back seat onto the rear of the limousine); 'if she had come out, I'd have hit her.'

"During the period of time beginning when SA Hill reached the Presidential limousine and ending with the acceleration of the Presidential limousine, forward starboard running board SA John Ready announced to SA Kinney and Mr. Roberts that he was "going to go" i.e., to run for the Presidential limousine. Roberts ordered him to 'stay aboard.' Mr. Kinney's analysis of Robert's order was if Roberts had permitted Ready to go, and 'if Ready had done what Hill did, I've got one of them,' i.e., because of the impossibility of swerving away at an angle wide enough to avoid both of them.

"SA Kinney stated that he '(didn't) think they (the people in the Presidential limousine) knew what was happening. They had no control.' He also remarked when Greer (the driver of the Presidential limousine) looked back, his foot must have come off the accelerator." N.B.: On the question of the rate of movement (if any) of the Presidential limousine during the assassination, SA Kinney observed at the time of the first shot, the speed of the motorcade was '3 to 5 miles an hour.'

"SA Kinney indicated that at the moment when the Presidential vehicle began to accelerate, 'it went up to 80-85 m.p.h.,' even though 'I didn't know Parkland from the man in the moon.' Upon arrival at the hospital, he 'pulled in' in such a manner as to 'block off' the Presidential limousine. It was his impression at the time 'the news media didn't see

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what happened (in Dealey Plaza) and did not get a story.'

"At the hospital, SA Roberts, who was in command of Vice Presidential protection, noticed a 'thumbs-down' signal flashed by SA Hill at the arriving Vice Presidential detail. Roberts understood this to mean that President Kennedy was dead, and accordingly he ordered the other agents in the detail to 'surround and protect' the Vice-President and to 'get him to stay back.'

"Since SA Hill and SA Kinney had not been assigned a post at Parkland, they improvised their roles. SA Kinney 'Bailed out and Clint (Hill) went to the left side of the car (presidential), I to the right.' There they found 'Jackie huddled over JFK who was slumped over' and whose 'feet were locked under the jump seat.' SA Hill and SA Kinney were unable 'to get Jackie to let loose of JFK.' The press had not arrived yet. SA Hill then said to Mrs. Kennedy 'Jackie, we got to get him out' and he raised her up. When the President first came into view, SA Kinney believed that he observed the President's 'right eye on his chin.'

"The two agents began to wrap SA Hill's coat around the President. At this point, SA Kinney 'lost control' and for a brief moment ceased assisting in caring for the President: 'Someone else wrapped him up by the feet.' By this time the press had arrived. 'In the vicinity of the Presidential vehicle,' Captain Cecil Stoughton gave orders that there were to be no pictures.

"SA Kinney soon returned to Vice-Presidential duties. 'LBJ was in shock when the SS grabbed him.' As a driver, Kinney concentrated on the condition of his vehicle and on events taking place near it. He recalled that 'someone wanted to wash the (Presidential) car. [I] said, 'no one touch.' A Dallas Police Department Officer and I put the bubble top back on the car and enclosed it by its snaps. Then pictures were taken of the roses, but not of the Presidential limousine. After the buttoning on of the bubble-top, I told Kellerman (SA Roy Kellerman, no. 2 SA in the White House Detail) that I'd take the cars back to Love Field and wait. I asked for two motorcycle escorts. I told Major Nedbal of the Air Force that I was coming and to have the ramp down on the vehicle transport aircraft. We then flew back to D.C.


"Inside the aircraft during flight, the loading sergeant, who had been in the rear compartment where the cars were stored, entered the forward cabin and said, 'I can't stand to be back there.' SA Kinney gave him his seat and returned to the rear compartment. At this point he discovered in the Presidential limousine a skull fragment under the jump seat where Connally had been seated, and a bullet fragment in the front seat between the driver's and passenger's seat. He remarked that the bullet fragment 'Looked like it had hit the windshield frame above the windshield.'

"SA Kinney put on a radio patch to Presidential Physician Admiral Burkley to inform him that he had discovered the skull fragment. Chief Petty Officer Tommy Mills, an aide to Burkley, received the message. SA Kinney then announced that he was going to go directly to the White House non-stop. The Washington Field Office learned of this and sent 6 to 7 Park Police to escort SA Kinney to the White House Garage. In the garage they were met by FBI agents.

"SA Kinney finds the view of conspiracy plausible for two reasons: 'First, the view of the Presidential limousine that presented itself from the vantage point of the alleged sniper's nest is consistent with careful planning. From that vantage point, tracking the target through a scope did not


require a side-to-side movement but required the use of vertical movement in order to track for distance. SA Kinney stated that tracking for distance is much easier than tracking from side to side. He also indicated that the sequencing of the shots — one before the sign, once after — suggested that the sniper was familiar with the scene.'

"Second, SA Kinney reported that on the day of the assassination, SA Stuart Stout of the four-to-twelve shift was driving into Dallas to man a post at the Trade Mart in time for the President's arrival at the Mart. Stout was passed by a car leaving Dallas at a speed of 110 m.p.h. Stout remarked that 'that car must have robbed a bank.' SA William Duncan, who was on the same shift had given notice that it was five minutes away from the Mart. Duncan's story places the appearance of the speeding car at approximately 12:30 P.M."

 **Document # 180-10082-10452 is a four page summary dated 1/30/78. It is an interview with Glenn Bennett.** Bennett stated he was detailed from PRS to the White House detail for the Dallas trip. This was because there was a manpower pull for the Dallas trip.

Bennett then gives his impression of the assassination. "He remembers hearing what he hoped was a firecracker. He then heard another noise and saw what appeared to be a nick in the back of President Kennedy's coat below the shoulder. He thought the President had been hit in the back. Bennett stated that he does not recall any agents reacting before the third shot. He believes Agent Ready started to react but was stopped by Emory Roberts, because the limousine had accelerated and Ready might have been injured."

Bennett helped unload the coffin and place it on the plane. He said he came back to the White House via helicopter.

 **Document # 180-10082-10454 is a six page summary dated 01/31/78. It is a summary of an interview with William "Tim" McIntyre.**


Mr. McIntyre was assigned to Presidential protection on the 8-4 shift for the Dallas trip. He stated his function on presidential protection was to be alert for any kind of trouble such as missile or objects being thrown, people running to the President's car and also ramming incidents.

McIntyre's assignment was the left rear running board of the Presidential running board of the Presidential limousine, behind Clint Hill.

McIntyre heard the first report, which he described as "very loud." He said he had no doubt that it was a shot. There was a pause and then two more shots in succession.

McIntyre remembers an FBI agent over reacting at Parkland Hospital, trying to get into the operating room. McIntyre stated he has no recall of the Agent's Commission (ID) books being called in and new ones being issued.

McIntyre, when asked if any Secret Service men had stayed behind in Dealey Plaza, he stated he had heard Agent Lem Johns, assigned to the Vice President, had left his car and was left behind, but made his way to Parkland Hospital.

 **Document # 1870-10099-10491 is an eight page summary report of an interview with SA William Greer.**

There is then an interesting deletion of a document supposed to be open in full, "In regard to the Miami

trip of November 18, 1963 Greer says he was in Palm Beach with the President and went to _____, then to Miami." (That's exactly how it appears. Whatever was after the word "to" has been whited out. It is a four or five letter word, a name of a place judging by the sentence.)

Greer said SS 100 X, the President's car, was specially designed for the Chief Executive. It had a seat in back which could elevate 8 1/2" to 9".

Greer does not know if it was elevated in Dallas.

On November 22, 1963, William Greer got up around 6:00 a.m. having gotten to bed at midnight on the 21st. He had breakfast and went down to the place where the cars were being guarded. SS 100X was enroute to Dallas by plane so in Ft. Worth he drove a leased Lincoln. There was talk about putting the bubbletop on. (N.B. We have excellent pictures of the bubbletop, both in sections and on the President's vehicle which we obtained from former SA Sam Kinney in Palm Springs, Florida.) But it was decided that since the weather was improving, not to do so. Greer says Kenny O'Donnell made the final decision. He reminded us too that the trip was political and the President loved exposure to crowds.

Greer recalled he flew from Ft. Worth to Dallas in Air Force 1 with the President's party. After the arrival at Dallas' Love Field he readied the car for the motorcade. Agent Roy Kellerman, who was Assistant Special Agent in charge of the White House Detail, rode in the front seat with Greer. His function was personal protection of the President and manning the short wave radio, which was set on a channel equivalent to Dallas Police Channel #2. There was no window separating the front and back seats of SS 100X, but Greer said because of the crowd and motorcycle noise he could not hear conversation in the back seat between the Kennedys and the Connallys.

He drove at speeds which ranged from ten to thirty miles an hour, although when he made the turn onto Elm Street from Houston, his speed was slowed to about three to five miles per hour. "We were almost stopped," Greer said. He recalls approaching an overpass on a downhill run. He was attentive to overpasses, especially when people were on them. He vaguely recalls there were people on this overpass and he was concentrating on them when the first shot came. The first shot sounded to him like a backfire. He did not react to it. After the second shot he turned to his right and saw blood on Governor Connally's shirt. At the same moment he heard Kellerman say, "We're hit. Let's get out of here," or words to that effect. He said he immediately accelerated and followed the pilot car to Parkland Hospital. He was unaware Clint Hill had jumped from the follow-up car to his vehicle. He says he doesn't even recall looking in the mirror until they got to the hospital. Kellerman was talking on the radio to the squad car and others.

At this point, Greer got out and assisted Kellerman and others in removing Governor Connally and President Kennedy to stretchers into Parkland Emergency. [The document says "Agent Eliot Hill," this must be an error of some kind. Surely they are talking of Clint Hill. I will again correct it.] Agent Clint Hill had covered the President's head with his coat so Greer did not see the massive head wound nor the one in the throat. He guarded the door of the emergency room. He recalls embracing Mrs. Kennedy and saying something about wishing he could have been more evasive or avoided the tragedy. She reassured him with some kind

words. It was an emotional scene.

Asked if he noticed the Texas School Book Depository, Greer said he watched people, not buildings. He would note, for example, a person on the street with his hand in his pocket. When they got to Houston from Main Street, he felt relieved. He felt they were in the clear, the crowds were thinning and while he didn't relax, he did begin to feel relieved just before the shots came. Greer does not recall the third and final shot. He heard nothing from the back of the car; his mind shut it out and he concentrated on driving at a high rate of speed to Parkland Hospital. He had to weave in and out of other freeway traffic on the way.

At Parkland he recalls his function was to guard the Emergency Room and keep intruders out. Some press were putting on white coats and trying to get in. Greer does not recall the incident about an unidentified FBI agent trying to get into the emergency room. He said this might have occurred when he was temporarily relieved.

When the doctors pronounced President Kennedy dead, Greer was handed the President's clothing, wallet, and watch, which he took back to Washington. He directed agent Rybka at Andrews Air Force Base to put the shopping bag in his locker at the White House. A few days later he returned Kennedy's watch and wallet to Ken O'Donnell.

Mrs. Kennedy asked Greer and Kellerman if they would drive the ambulance to Bethesda Naval Hospital for the autopsy.

Greer recalls going into the autopsy with Kellerman. He described the scene for the writers (of this document), but was not aware of the identities of all of the people there. He did remember Dr. Burkley and General McHugh. He remembers the two FBI agents Sibert and O'Neill and their acquisition of the fragments from President Kennedy's head.

Greer recalls Kellerman going to a telephone and talking to someone about a bullet found in Dallas. The doctors turned Kennedy over and found the bullet hole in his shoulder. He indicated a point on his right shoulder which approximated the spot. He said one of the doctors inserted a metal probe in Kennedy's back, which only went in a short way.

Greer says he asked the doctor if the bullet in [the] back could have worked itself out during heart massage. The doctors continued to take X-rays, looking for lead, but they couldn't find where the bullet went.

Greer said after the autopsy he and Kellerman drove the body back to the White House.

Greer later talked to Governor Connally, who incidentally thanked him for saving his life. Connally told Greer he distinctly recalled three shots (Greer says he never heard the third shot) and Connally further stated that he was shot with a separate bullet from President Kennedy.

Greer went home at 4:00 a.m. on November 23rd. He was asleep at 8:00 a.m. when the White House called. They wanted the St. Christopher medal which was in President Kennedy's wallet now in Greer's possession to place in the coffin. He dressed and went to the White House and gave the medal and wallet to Kenny O'Donnell. He attended a brief family service. He returned home to get more rest because he was scheduled to drive President Johnson. He drove Johnson to the Capitol and on the following day to the funeral.

Greer saw Gerald Behn, head of the White House Detail, and submitted a signed copy of a report on his activities

in Dallas on 11/22/63 to the White House Detail.

Greer was asked why Behn did not make the trip. He said he didn't know why. It was never discussed in his presence.

Belford V. Lawson (interviewer) wrote an addendum, "I distinctly remember reacting with shock and surprise when Mr. Greer stated to both Mr. Kelly and myself that, in the case of the President's visit to Dallas on November 22, 1963, he had no prior knowledge whatsoever of the path of the motorcade route or of any conditions on and surrounding the route that might affect his driving. He simply entered the Presidential limousine and followed the car in front of him."

Document # 180-10104-10481 is a seven page summary of an interview with Gerald Behn.

Dallas Mr. Behn recalled controversy over alternative speech sites arising between (1) Jerry Bruno, the President's civilian political advance man, (2) Winston Lawson, the WHD advance agent in Dallas, and (3) Ken O'Donnell, White House Appointments Secretary.

(As we should all know, the conflict was not among these people, but these people versus John Connally.)

Behn was unable to recall discussing the selection of the speech site during an 11/5 meeting with Bruno. He was able to recall Bruno had been in Texas for two or three weeks before the trip plans were resolved. Behn's recollection was not refreshed by the information that Bruno preferred the Women's Building because it was easier than the Trade Mart to secure against acts of harassment directed against the President and also because its larger size permitted the admission of a diverse democratic Kennedy following. (Note that Bruno has written in his book Advance Man that he had at one time obtained Behn's assent to the selection of the speech site.)

However, Mr. Behn did recall he discussed speech site selection with Lawson who ventured the opinion that in matters of security there would not be much difference between the Women's Building and the Mart. Mr. Behn said he reported Lawson's opinion to Mr. O'Donnell.

According to Mr. Behn, Ken O'Donnell was the person who made the final decision to go to the Mart. This decision came after a long period of uncertainty about whether to make the trip at all, given the political conflicts of Texas between liberal and conservative Democrats. Mr. Behn was unable to recall that the White House sent Bill Moyers to Texas to work on the problem. Behn did recall that O'Donnell

announced a decision favoring the Mart. Behn stated the announcement was made between the 5th and 9th of November. Behn concluded by saying Lawson went down to Dallas 3 or 4 days after O'Donnell made the announcement. It is not clear as yet whether Lawson was told to go to the Mart prior to departing for Dallas.

The Assassination

Mr. Behn was in Washington at the time of the assassination. He described the communication system linking Washington with Dallas as follows:

WHD-HQ was in touch with the ongoing motorcade through the Dallas switchboard of the Signal Corps, whose warrant officers carried the necessary codes. Any message from WHD-HQ to the motorcade per se had to be relayed through the Corps switchboard; however, the motorcade agents were able directly to contact WHD-HQ.

After the shooting, SA Roy Kellerman called from a telephone at Parkland Hospital and stated "JFK was shot" and that "it didn't look too good." The phone connection remained open until after the President left Parkland.

As for the evidence of the crime which was brought back from Dallas, Mr. Behn stated that he was in the chain of custody of CE 399, the bullet found on what was allegedly the Presidential stretcher, by SA Richard Johnsen. Behn received the bullet from Johnsen, then turned it over to the FBI.

On the evening of 11/22/63 Mr. Behn went with President Johnson to Spring Valley and then went home to get some sleep, and returned to Spring Valley on 11/23/63. He did not see Kellerman, Greer, or Hill until far later. Mr. Behn recalled that the film and X-rays of the autopsy were sent over to PRS at the Executive Office Building.

Mr. Behn was not able to recall any disciplinary action taken against any SS agent, nor could he recall an in-house investigation was undertaken by the SS. He acknowledged that the writing of reports filed by each SS agent about his 11/21-2 activities was not normal procedure, but did not remember whether the agents were prompted to get them to accelerate their completion of the reports. He did not remember the Dillon Committee resulted in 1964-65 in any changes in SS operations.

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