

THE MINORITY OF ONE

INDEPENDENT MONTHLY FOR AN AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE — DEDICATED TO THE ERADICATION OF ALL RESTRICTIONS ON THOUGHT

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Phu Loi, S. Vietnam, August 26, 1966: Soldiers of the U.S. First Infantry Division attempt to identify the bodies of their comrades killed when U.S. planes strafed them and burned them with napalm. —UPI Photo

"There was truth and there was untruth, and if you cling to the truth even against the whole world, you were not mad"

—George Orwell

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Published monthly except during July and August when published bi-monthly by The Minority of One, Inc., 185 Pennington Avenue P.O. Box 544 Passaic, N.J., U.S.A. 07055 Telephone No.: 201/778-1539 Cable address: TEMO, Passaic, N.J.

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SUBSCRIPTION RATES:

U.S.A.	1 yr. \$7.00	2 yrs. \$12.00	3 yrs. \$18.00
Foreign	\$8.00	\$15.00	\$20.00
Gift subscriptions and students—			
\$5.00 per year (Foreign—\$6.00)			
Air Mail subscriptions: to Latin America and Europe			—\$14 per year;
to Africa			
Asia and Australia			—\$17 per year.

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Second-class postage paid at Passaic, N.J., & other mailing offices. This issue's deadline was September 8, 1986.




The Dangerous "Acts of Common Endeavor"

No post-World War II international issue was more important than that of a total ban of nuclear tests and an agreement against the proliferation of A-weapons. In the absence of such accords the world lives in that total danger which heretofore existed only in cosmic cataclysms. One might therefore assume that the now-widening American-Soviet consensus in that area is a desirable development. Unfortunately, this is not at all the case, for a nuclear accord among some nuclear powers must by no means be confused with a nuclear accord among all of them. The former may even lead to outright disaster. This would be the case if a nuclear treaty between two, or more, powers were directed against another nuclear power. An anti-proliferation treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union while the Vietnam war continues to be escalated and while American threats against China are becoming ever more ominous, would encourage, not discourage, war, probably nuclear war.

With West Germany already possessing hundreds of nuclear-armed missiles and warplanes, and with the United States accepting the alleged "honor of the ally" as sufficient assurance that "custody of all such warheads remains with the United States" (see Presidential Assistant Bill Moyers' statement in *The New York Times* of November 23, 1965), there is little the Soviet Union can still hope to prevent through a non-proliferation treaty. Even while the United States is, for the first time, quite anxious to conclude such a treaty it seems determined not to relent on its condition that the treaty not preclude her joint nuclear force with her allies (read West Germany). American apprehension that West Germany, if denied the fulfillment of the next stage in her nuclear ambitions, might closely align herself with Gaullist France makes this an unnegotiable U.S. premise.

Since Soviet approval of this condition would constitute a *de facto* acquiescence in the nuclear arming of West Germany (a process that is neither reversed nor stopped by

—Euse I. Merlano, La Verdad, Buenos Aires



Soviet opposition anyhow), what is there for the United States to lure the Soviets with? Why should the Russians enter into an agreement that would make little difference to them, and the mere signing of which would at this time be a propaganda liability in the Communist world? The only conceivable lure would be either secret provisions, or a separate secret agreement, obliging the United States to limit the range and quantity of nuclear missiles in West German hands. This seems to be the only concrete concession that is still achievable by the Soviets.

The small cutback of American troops that is already taking place in Europe and substantial cutbacks such as advocated by Senator Mike Mansfield, the Senate Majority Leader, and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, are undoubtedly viewed by the Soviets as steps deserving significant concessions on their part. Sino-Soviet hostility has much to do with the understandable Soviet preference that U. S. troops be deployed en masse in South Asia rather than in Europe. The question that arises is how much is the Soviet Union ready to pay for a more desirable deployment of U.S. forces. While the might console herself with the fact that the price was so far paid by other countries, whether Vietnam, Cambodia or China, this consolation is a mixture of fact and delusion.

One delusion is that Soviet security necessarily increases as the number of U.S. troops in Europe is lowered. In point of fact, the pullout of U.S. troops is an invitation for an increase in West German armed forces. Symptomatically, President Johnson even while pretending that he was rejecting Mansfield and the other Senators' suggestion of a substantial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, nonetheless virtually confirmed this to be an area of American-Soviet negotiations.

In time, Mr. Johnson commented, reductions of Soviet troops in East Germany or new military technology may permit the transfer of some of the 450,000 to 500,000 American troops. But in any case, he added, that is a decision to be reached only in consultation with the North Atlantic allies. (*The New York Times*, September 6, 1966).

"Collaboration with the North Atlantic allies" could within this context only mean that West German consent to a substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Europe would be obtained by encouraging a substantial increase in West German forces.

The Soviets would also be wise to consider that at some point in the foreseeable future the United States, regardless of any secret promises it might make to the USSR, may well lose effective control over the range and quantity of missiles in the West German arsenal.

More delusive is the calculation that the Soviets, by letting the United States rape the rest of the world with impunity, are buying their own security. The Soviet Union was alone among the big powers of the nineteen thirties that entertained no such delusion with regard to Hitler's Germany; there would be irony, tragedy and ultimate decline if now she deensitized herself with that kind of a delusion. The Germans sang "tomorrow we will own the world"; Johnson, Rusk and McNamara proclaim their world-wide "tr-

sponsibilities" in most serious statements of America's immediate foreign policy.

Despite Vietnam

The reasons for the American government's sudden interest in a non-proliferation treaty have little to do with control of nuclear weapons as such. With the emergence of two additional non-subservient nuclear powers, France and China, the worst of proliferation has already occurred. Why then should the United States now be more interested in non-proliferation than it had been all these years when an international accord might have prevented the French and/or Chinese acquisition of atomic weapons?

The answer to this was given by President Johnson in his speech at Idaho Falls on August 26, 1966:

While differing principles and differing values may always divide us (the United States and the Soviet Union), they must not deter us from rational acts of common endeavor.

The President was not merely paraphrasing the doctrine of coexistence, but had something very specific in mind. His aides said that the President was convinced that such a [non-proliferation] treaty could be achieved, particularly if the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the American right wing, on the other, would agree not to let their strong sympathies on Vietnam impede broad-based efforts for world peace. (*Op. cit.*, August 27)

The President himself made quite clear that more than in obtaining a non-proliferation treaty as such he was interested in selling the Vietnam war to the Russians.

Our objective there is local and limited. . . . These objectives can be attained within the borders of South Vietnam. They do not threaten the vital interests of the Soviet Union or the territory of any of her friends. (*Ibid.*)


Since neither the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam nor the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are about to receive nuclear weapons, the only reason that could have caused Mr. Johnson to link the anti-proliferation negotiations with the Vietnam war is his desire to gain from the Russians a *caveat blankete* for further war escalation. Since thus far Mr. Johnson has had no real reaction to the present scale of U.S. warfare in Southeast Asia, his sudden solicitude must be caused by his knowledge of things yet to come.

Contrary to Johnson's words, the American objectives in Southeast Asia cannot be obtained within the borders of South Vietnam; already the war involves U.S. military operations in North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Certainly, Mr. Johnson was not promising a de-escalation that would shrink the present war theatre; but he was providing the Soviets with a rationale for acquiescing in future U.S. actions in the region, as they have acquiesced in past and present actions. There would be no declared new war and thus no need for the Soviets to articulate a new reaction. The United States, pursuing its business as usual, will "merely" proceed to "pactify" and occupy Southeast Asia, and in the process "punish" the "real aggressor," China, from the air; and, as for the Soviets, well, in reaction to all of this they, too, can conduct their business as usual by continuing to counter-

supply protests, interpreted with a few symbolic weapons and perhaps even another photograph or two of Vietnamese pilots training in a Soviet air academy.

Beginnings of an Alliance?

What Mr. Johnson is really seeking is the beginning of an American-Soviet defense arrangement which would give the United States a free hand not only *vis-a-vis* Southeast Asia but also *vis-a-vis* China. If in fact the Soviet Union stood at this time sign a non-proliferation and/or arms-control treaty with the United States, more important than any integral provisions would be the implication that in the worsening American-Chinese-Soviet imbroglio the United States and the Soviet Union are beginning to



—Simpfendorfer, Mexico City

act as (passive) military allies. Far from contributing to world peace, American-Soviet "acts of common endeavor" while the Vietnam war is on, would greatly encourage further war escalation by the United States. It would in effect offer no less than Soviet blessings to a U.S. attack on China. This is precisely what Mr. Johnson is seeking.

What the Soviet Union would in effect be accepting if she at this time made any treaty of a military nature with the United States is inherent in the trend of American international actions and doctrines. According to authoritative disclosures, additional hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops will soon intrude into Vietnam. Their very numbers testify to their serving ultimate ends other than those officially proclaimed. Then there has lately been a profusion of official explanations that U.S. "commitments" are global and subject to no nation's invitation or approval. Secretary of State Rusk, for instance, recently stated before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee that the United States might have to use its armed forces in "nondefensive defense" against armed aggression "even in the absence of clear-cut American defense treaty ties with the nation attacked." (*Op. cit.*, August 26)

Considering what such words as "aggression" and "defense" mean to Mr. Rusk, this amounts to no less than a Doctrine of Global Intervention, or *Pax Americana*. Mr. Johnson himself confirmed this doctrine when, in a speech at the University of Denver, he said that

the defense of political freedom everywhere was the guiding principle of his foreign policy. (*Op. cit.*, August 27)

Four days later, at the convention of the American Legion, he admitted that which all U.S. officials have been denying ever since 1917, namely, that there was no necessary connection between American interventions and the "Communist threat." Said Johnson:

Indeed we know now that so interwoven is our destiny with the world's destiny, so intricate are the bonds between us and every continent, that our responsibilities would be just as real in the absence of the Communist threat. (*Op. cit.*, August 31)

It was no coincidence that in this very speech, the President made clear that the principal target of implacable American "responsibility" is China.

Such is the world for whose prevalence the Soviet Union is called upon to free American energies. The Russians are to decide from all pressures in order that the United States can fully concentrate on bringing it about.

Is She Saying "Yes"?

The Soviet response to President Johnson's invitation to "acts of common endeavor," or at least a part of the Soviet response, came in a *Pravda* editorial. It denied the possibility of American-Soviet cooperation growing irrelevant of the Vietnam war. It confined itself to a general characterization of prospects without specifically discussing non-proliferation or disarmament negotiations.

Certainly, this much the Soviets had to say, whatever else may be true about their response. In no case would they publicly confirm that indeed Soviet-American cooperation can be expanded, particularly in the area of defense, *despite* Vietnam. Alas, the Soviet denial confronts us with a situation which is not altogether unlike a husband's denial of an illicit affair even while confronted with compromising hotel photographs. Mr. Johnson could point to all too many details of the illicit affair for any denial to be convincing.

He said Arthur J. Goldberg, United States representative at the United Nations, had informed him that "much of the substance of the treaty" had been resolved before the negotiations were recessed Aug. 4. He added that the Soviet Union had joined the United States in asking other nations involved to resume the talks Sept. 12. (*Op. cit.*, August 27)

Even if the Soviet Union should, because of the Vietnam situation, refuse to sign a non-proliferation treaty at this time, the very fact of promising negotiations going on at this time confirms President Johnson's conclusion that

The conflict in Southeast Asia . . . "does not stop us from finding new ways of dealing with one another." (*Ibid.*)

If the Soviets sincerely wish to have any inhibiting effect on U.S. belligerence, they must not only say that that belligerence is in the way of Soviet-American rapprochement but prove beyond anyone's possible misconception that their deeds match their words. At the very minimum they should suspend all negotiations whether for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty or a disarmament (or arms control) accord, and they should make the resumption of negotiations

(publicly and privately) conditional on the end of U.S. belligerence in Southeast Asia.

In taking such a position the Soviet Union would not compromise the interests of peace, for the simple reason that a Soviet-American relaxation of tensions in the face of escalating combat in another part of the world merely secures the aggressor's rear. Formal agreement or not, the very fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. forces in Vietnam knows cordial negotiations with the Soviets to be in progress is necessarily heeded when he weighs the risks of further escalation.

The fact of Soviet-American negotiations despite Vietnam is here for all to see. Unless the Soviets will make clear beyond anyone's possible miscalculation at which point they would add to America's risks in menacing China, the impression is unavoidable that they do not intend to add to those risks. In such a case, even without a formal, or public, treaty, the Soviet Union would in effect be responding affirmatively to Johnson's invitation. She would in effect be acquiescing in whatever the American designs on Asia. She would, in fact, act as that kind of a (passive) military ally against China which President Johnson invited her to be.

If this is a misreading of Soviet intentions, then it is high time it be corrected. Once American bombs start falling on China it will be too late for the Soviets to protest against them, and also too hypocritical. If we are imputing to the Soviets incorrect considerations and policies, they certainly are responsible for international behavior that makes such imputations possible.

One thing is certain: continued ambiguity about Soviet intentions cannot be accidental. The absence of resolute, meaningful, and effective Soviet opposition to America's assaults in Asia is not possibly due to a lack of means for conveying intentions: it can only be due to a lack of opposition.

U Thant's Farewell Contribution

More than anything else, U Thant's decision not to make himself available for another term as Secretary-General of the United Nations is a protest against the meretricious implacability of the American declamations of the people of Vietnam. As on previous occasions so in his farewell statement he has decried U. S. Vietnam policy with a directness that is amazing for someone holding his office. Nor was this his only challenge. When he professed "dissatisfaction with the fact that the organization has not yet achieved universality of membership," it escaped no one that he was criticizing the United States for blocking China. But in addition to specific criticism, Mr. Thant found himself in all-out philosophical conflict with the

general world view that underlies American international behavior:


In my view the tragic error is being repeated of relying on force and military means in a desperate pursuit of peace.

Exceptionally important as is Mr. Thant's protest, his refusal to continue in his office is more than a protest. It is a positive contribution to all of mankind. Diplomatic pragmatists have pointed out that precisely because "the world situation appears . . . to be extremely serious," to quote his own assessment, he should stay on and not "lose any chance of influencing events through the great prestige and respect he enjoys" (to quote the editors of *The New York Times*, Sept. 2). We believe that Mr. Thant is "influencing events" by upholding a moral principle much more than he would by compromising it. By stepping down in a situation he feels unable to render morally acceptable, he is teaching humanity that right is still right, and that one should not accommodate oneself to those whose power and immorality suffice to brutalize the world.

U Thant's farewell lesson is that even when persevered in wrong does not become right, and that morality is incompatible with opportunistic "realism" which so often causes American political figures to set arbitrary limits to their own possible disension from those who call the tune in America. Opportunistic rationalizers render themselves incapable of moral outrage and with thus crippled personalities forever continue to be self-serving in the name of allegedly saving something rather than nothing. They are the Stevensons, Humphreys and Goldbergs who, often against their own judgments, participate in outrageous international crimes.

U Thant could not do that and he deserves the thanks of all humanity for proving so prominent an example of moral behavior. In an era when so much of world politics is influenced by bribes in dollars, CIA cloak-and-dagger activities, or the fear of them, no act could be more positive.

Mr. Thant's candor had not been reserved for his act of parting from his office. On the contrary, he has many times spoken out in ways displeasing to powerful individual members of the United Nations, particularly to *Phnompenh, Cambodia: President de Gaulle and Prince Sihanouk.*



the United States. He has practiced this candor with a degree deemed by many surprising in a man of his position. Also other characteristics of his parting statement are faithful reflections of his personality. His modesty is convincing precisely because it is not of the studied, public-relations variety. As the son of a people that has known colonial oppression, Mr. Thant has deep sympathy for the underprivileged of the world. His high office has never gone to his head—he remains that true servant of humanity he has been long before attaining international prominence. He is the product not only of his own great intelligence but of the spirit-strengthening culture into which he was born. It took all of these personal and ethnic virtues for him to decide, despite all temptations and pressures, that the first thing he owes humanity is to remain a moral human being.

We regret deeply the need for him to step down. But with great admiration do we applaud his moral decision. Of all his many titles, past and present positions, he has earned most thoroughly that title which it is most difficult for anyone to justify—that of a decent human being.

De Gaulle Understands . . .

President de Gaulle has certainly heard all the Vietnam fiction that has been emanating from the Washington lie factories ever since April 7, 1965, when Lyndon Johnson renounced his unchanged policy from one of opposing negotiations to one of favoring them. That the French leader has, during his visit in Phnompenh, elevated his past criticisms of the U.S. position to the status of official policy recommendations did not happen due to an unawareness of Washington's claims, but because of them. The simple

—UPI Photo

truth is that de Gaulle, like most of humanity, does not believe U.S. rationalizations. He, like most of humanity, believes, however, in the correctness of one formulation: Johnson offered while responding to President de Gaulle in Lancaster, Ohio, on September 5, 1966. Said Mr. Johnson:

We cannot walk away from the simple fact that the peace and security of many nations are threatened if aggression of the world, if what treaties are broken and if men and arms are moved illegally across international boundaries to conquer small nations. Precisely. And that is why not only de Gaulle but so many others would do much to discourage future U.S. aggression by seeing the present one fail in Vietnam.

A U.S. government official lectured President de Gaulle:

fairness should have led him to note North Vietnam's refusal to negotiate as the principal difficulty. (*The New York Times*, Sept. 3.) Which lecture is equivalent to a verdict the Nuremberg war criminals would have passed on themselves if given the opportunity; and which lecture, however, is quite consistent with an old tradition of the U.S. government of claiming to be the only just and unbiased judge of any conflict in which it is engaged.

To most people other than the U.S. government President de Gaulle's now clear-cut alignment against the U.S. role in Vietnam will be a source of great encouragement. His fortitude and sense of justice cause de Gaulle to be accepted by ever growing portions of humanity, regardless of national boundaries, as a leader they can identify with in many areas of thought and activity.

Tuna Fish and a Cambodian Village

Because the housewives of a certain nation were using only pink tuna, the entrepreneur who had bought a huge shipment of white tuna was stuck with it, unable to unload the merchandise. Came an advertising wizard and in return for equal partnership offered to sell every last bit of the unmarketable canned fish. He merely had labels printed with the legend, "White tuna, does not get pink in the can." The merchandise was sold in no time, and as for the advertising man, in his nation no one took him for the scoundrel he was, but for a business genius. So much so that the story became one of the classic boasts in the annals of American advertising.

Somehow this story came to mind because of the way in which the United States undertook to extricate itself from an international embarrassment that resulted from air raids on Cambodian hamlets on August 2, 1966. While members of the International Control Commission and other diplomats were in Thlok Trach to investi-

gate a Cambodian charge that that village had on July 31 been strafed by American aircraft, with lives lost in the process, the place came again under U.S. aerial attack. The investigating diplomats were forced to take cover.

Since this substantiated the frequent Cambodian complaints of American attacks, a special gimmick was needed to counter the eyewitness testimony by Canadian, Indian and Polish representatives. We do not know who the advertising man was who devised the solution but we strongly suspect that it was the same wizard who got Americans to eat white tuna because it does not get pink in the can.

His expedient was again ingenious. A U.S. spokesman addressing newspapermen in Saigon used a blackboard to draw a map showing Thlok Trach to be inside South Vietnam. The implication was that the United States had a "right" to attack the village. As could be expected, the Cambodians reacted vehemently to this addition of injury to injury and Prince Norodom Sihanouk cancelled a planned visit to Phnompenh by W. Averell Harriman, President Johnson's special envoy. A few days later, the State Department's permanent spokesman "corrected" the record, now acknowledging that Thlok Trach "is under the administration of the Royal Government of Cambodia" and voting deep regret for "any loss of Cambodian life and property and any intrusion into Cambodian territory which may have occurred."

The tuna-like chicanery this time consisted of the U.S. government's pretended confusion in political geography. Of course, it never really had a doubt that the attacked village was a Cambodian village, but it would appear as having been momentarily misinformed rather than as deliberately injuring Cambodian sovereignty. The cynicism goes even beyond that. The U.S. officials in charge could not have assumed, even for a moment, that the members of the International Control Commission and intelligent people anywhere would not see through the pretense. But the pretense was nonetheless staged in order to put the international diplomats on the spot: they in turn had the choice of pretending to believe the Americans or of calling the U.S. government a bunch of cynical liars. Now, which Canadian or Indian diplomat was going to call the U.S. government any such thing?

As with the tuna, the trick worked. The international diplomats were maneuvered into partial silence. As for Cambodia and her Chief of State, well, why worry about a small nation that does not even have respectable negotiations of nuclear weapons?

With this as immediate background, Cambodia could not have deserved more the consolation and encouragement she must have derived from the official state visit by President de Gaulle. The respect and admiration the President manifested for Cambodia's integrity have been amply earned by her. The visit was also a contribution to Cambodia's security. It was certainly no accident that the French President made the visit at a time when the host country is ominously threatened and menaced by the United

States. In paying tribute to Cambodian General de Gaulle was speaking for all those hundreds of millions of humanity who still allocate their respect and admiration not to the mighty but to the just.

Why They Kill Civilians

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, when he repeatedly expresses concern that so many civilians are being killed by his troops. There is every reason to assume that the General would not want to kill more people than is necessary to bring about an American victory. But certainly he would not trade victory for any humanitarian concern.

General Westmoreland speaks of hundreds of civilian casualties, but a military spokesman in Saigon admitted on August 24 that the "incidents" have reached "epic proportions." From Saigon an American correspondent reported:

The known incidents do not reflect the full problem of civilian casualties by any means. . . . It is believed that much larger numbers of civilians are hurt every month in incidents that never draw public attention. (Charles Mohr in *The New York Times* of August 28.) The situation was described more precisely in a *New York Times* editorial:

Most of South Vietnam's refugees, who now total more than a million, apparently have fled allied firepower rather than Vietcong depredations. Almost every provincial hospital is crowded with civilian wounded, a majority of whom evidently are victims of American air power and South Vietnamese artillery. (August 21.)

Since "the bomb tonnage now being dropped on Vietnam each week is larger than dropped on Germany at the peak of World War II" (*ibid.*), masses of civilian casualties are unavoidable. An American pilot's description of an area after U.S. bombings—this area in North Vietnam—gives some idea of the survival prospects of any civilians:

The southern panhandle region of North Vietnam, the narrow strip between Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin, looks like a moon valley, an American fighter-bomber pilot with long experience said. There are huge craters and few signs of life. . . . (*Op. cit.*, August 7.) It needs to be noted what it is that often differentiates regretted "incidents" from

"normal" operations that cause no pang of conscience. One recent "incident" occurred on August 11 when American planes raked a U.S. Coast Guard cutter with machine-gun and rocket fire, causing American casualties. Had the attacked ship been a North Vietnamese trawler trawled and the casualties Vietnamese civilians, there would be official U.S. jubilation, not regrets. Another "incident" resulted in casualties among U.S. troops when, on August 26, they had napalm dropped on them by American planes—something Vietnamese fighters and civilians

alike continuously have done to them. Typically.

During an operation to protect rice harvests in Phuyen Province earlier this year, scores of human beings were burned by American and South Korean troops and at times a line of smoke stretched across the horizon. (Op. cit., August 17)

These burnings were not regretted.

There is unsurmountable difficulty in confining the Vietnam war to military combat. No matter how much the U.S. forces may wish so to limit their operations, they simply cannot do this without giving up the ambition of victory. For in Vietnam the U.S. forces are fighting a people, a whole people. It is the people that wants neither the American "protectors" nor their Saigon stooges. Either American troops kill as many Vietnamese as is necessary in order that the survivors stop their opposition, or they stop "pacifying" the tragic country. That is why with reference to the current talk of precautionary methods against the killing of civilians it can be reported from Saigon:

critics doubt the value of an official policy that is widely ignored—such as the policy against the burning of civilian houses on military sweeps. (Ibid)

That is also why neither Westmoreland's headquarters nor the Remington find it possible to issue restrictions binding on their troops.

After some consideration, Washington has decided to issue no directives putting specific restrictions on the use of air sorties in the South.

Some officials had suggested that air raids that did not involve support for tactical ground action might be barred. Bombing villages because they were dominated by the VC—going or because fire might have been directed from them against passing United States planes caused heavy casualties and was of insignificant military value, the officials said. (Op. cit., August 28)

Whatever restrictions are issued, military commanders retain the "ultimate discretion to depart from . . ." Nor could it be otherwise. It is either defeating the Vietnamese or leaving them alive; you cannot have both.

That the United States abides by no humanitarian restriction whatever is most tragically shown in the official U.S. attitude towards private European efforts to save some of the children among Vietnam's war victims. The Swiss organization *Terre des Hommes*

has undertaken to hospitalize children burned by napalm in various countries of Europe. The organization has already succeeded in making 400 beds available, itself assuming the hospitalization cost. The rescued children would be from among the many thousands who now have their wounds untreated, suffer in inhumanly overcrowded Vietnamese hospitals that offer them neither medical personnel nor required surgery and/or medicines, or who die without any care in their villages.

Since *Terre des Hommes* is a purely humanitarian organization to which no one has ever imputed any political motivation, one would expect the U.S. authorities to offer their full cooperation. Such cooperation is essential for without the U.S. providing aerial transportation the children could not get to the European hospitals. The United States, however, is determined, for reasons of propaganda, not to let Europe see many



—UPI Photos



—UPI Photos

hundreds of its young napalm victims. Accordingly, the White House has informed *Terre des Hommes* that "neither U.S. aircraft nor U.S. funds are available in support of the activities which you plan to undertake in Europe."


When a nation reaches a point at which its interests are contrary to the hospitalization of wounded and burned children, it could not be more obvious that it has become an enemy of humanity.

For many years the U.S. troops and their indigenous hirelings have tried to reconcile their military policy with their own public relations interests. The main reason for their lack of success is not inherent personal cruelty—although war makes people brutal and this war makes them especially brutal—but because all attempts to induce the Vietnamese into voluntary submission have failed. That is why so long as the United States will deny self-determination to the Vietnamese, it will have to keep killing them, rebels and civilians alike—the two being equally integral parts of their nation.

Middle East Danger Spot

The situation on the Syrian-Israeli border poses the kind of danger against which prophylactic international action must be taken, lest it erupt into more serious hostilities in which the further danger of a big-power confrontation would be inherent. If anything constructive is to be done to avert these dangers, a degree of objectivity is called for that would enable both the United States and the Soviet Union to consider the problems involved on merit instead of their present automatic support for their respective regional allies' positions. Just because Syria happens at this time to have a government that is friendlier to the USSR than the government of Israel, does not turn *fedayeen* terror into acts of virtue. Nor does deliberate diversion of the Jordan's waters become an act of progress and construction when its principal aim is mischief *vis-à-vis* Israel.

However critical one may be of Israel's foreign policy—which, incidentally, has lately shown some, if all too timid, beginnings of greater balance—one cannot single out that state for preaching that it alone must not protect its vital interests. As long as Syrians, or any other of her neighbors, continue to consider Israel and anything Israeli to be fair game upon which any act of violence may be perpetrated, one may find the Israeli responses distasteful, indirect or exaggerated, but one can hardly recommend to Israel to abstain from responding altogether. It is high time for the Soviet Union, which has traditionally abided by norms of legality on its borders, to acquaint her supporters in the Middle East with these facts and laws of life.



Israel patrol launch guards a brawler on Lake Kinneret.

—Newspix Ltd.

Israel itself can do much to cause not only the Soviet Union but also many African and Asian nations to adopt more objective standards of judgment. First and foremost, she must show herself in international forums to be a more genuine, consistent and reliable friend of those who struggle against the old and new forms of colonial domination. Vietnam is the place to start from. The official support which France—Israel's long-time friend—now proclaims for the aspirations of Vietnam's patriots should be one of the reasons for Israel to manifest quite boldly that the sentiments of her population can mold her foreign policy even more than the U.S. Department of State. Unfortunately, this is by no means always the case.

Right now Israel has an opportunity of taking some mid-clichés in integrity merely by not letting the U.S. spy agencies inspect the MIG-21 which a distraught Iraqi pilot landed on her territory. If there is still time to appeal, Israel would be well advised in this case to exercise more integrity than she displayed when once before asked for a "favor" by U.S. authorities—in the case of the late Dr. Robert Soblen. In 1962, U.S. intelligence does not stand to gain as much as Israel stands to lose, not in the least in the U.S. authorities' respect for her independence. Israel must realize that her welfare and security largely depend not merely on her ability to retain the friendship of the United States, but also to recruit new friends among the socialist countries as well as among the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa.

Patience and Patients in Peking

Although it may well be true that no leader has in this century done for his nation as much as Mao Tse-tung has done for China, the almost god-like adulation of him that is encouraged by the Chinese Communists is outright repugnant and contemptible. So is the phenomenon of excited gangs of youngsters roaming the streets of Peking and other cities to enforce, through persuasion, ridicule

or violence, complete cultural conformity. This is a particularly vulgar kind of McCarthyism, one that literally operates in the gutter.

The task of consolidating a nation as regionally diversified as the Chinese is as difficult as growing dangers from abroad make it necessary. But this does not make the particular forms of the consolidation acceptable. Whatever social experience China is accumulating that might be applicable in other nations as well, its current Cultural Revolution is least of all a part of it. On the contrary, there can be no doubt at all that much of what is worthwhile in the Chinese system and that should be emulated by other nations in need of social change, will be obscured by the current totalitarian excesses and rejected because of them.

But to say this is not in any way to endorse the hostility the United States is fanning against China. It is not to reject the revolution of which the present totalitarian excesses are a part. Indeed, when it comes to this kind of revolution, no matter what excesses occur in its path, one must not transfer one's loyalty to those against whom the revolution was made in the first place. Those who are quite properly appalled by the violence and other excesses of social revolutionaries should realize that these revolutionaries are merely frustrated reformers. They have not frustrated themselves, nor have their ideas frustrated them; their social program is frustrated by its enemies. Only when needed reform cannot be petitioned into existence is revolution born; and what characteristics it acquires depends on those who oppose it as much as on those who make it.

The world-wide dialogue between America and social revolutionaries is not a dialogue between pacifists and non-pacifists; the contest is on the very admissibility of radical social change. It is only because the United States precludes such change by whatever means it would be accomplished that the change becomes contingent on violence. The United States is determined to use at least as much violence to defend the *status quo* in many parts of the world as revolutionaries are ready to change it. The violent methods of social revolutionaries are not inherent in their philosophies; they are that resort, steps of desperation. They are an externally caused perversion of the revolutionaries' humanitarian aspirations, not a fulfillment of inherent cruelty.

There would not have been a revolution



Peking: Red Guards

—UPI Photo

in Russia in 1917, if the needed social reforms could have been petitioned into existence. And when the two successive revolutions came, they need not have taken a violent course had it not been for an externally imposed need to defend them.

When the Russian revolution prevailed despite foreign attempts to squelch it, it was not left alone to concentrate on its social program. Having failed to destroy the revolution, the interventionist powers did all they could to prevent it. Western theoreticians have often openly argued that the arms race was necessary not for actual defense but to dislodge the Soviet economy. The revolutionaries could not be allowed to achieve their socio-economic potential; their energies had to be diverted.

Not only the arms race but a diversified system of harassment was employed covering diplomacy, economics, culture and every other aspect of international life. Militarism endangered, economically boycotted, culturally ignored, with spies and saboteurs penetrating every available pore, the Russian revolution not only could not concentrate on the social reforms for which it had been made, but was bound to develop symptoms of paranoia. Stalin's labor camps, terror and police methods were not freely chosen methods of public administration but reactions to unrelenting pressures from abroad.

Soviet paranoia has been overcome not because of the death of any one man, although there was one man who had personified it and who is now dead. It was the newly won sense of security that came with the defeat of Germany and was bolstered by the acquisition of nuclear weapons that enabled the Russians to become calm and less self-conscious.

These truths also apply to the Chinese revolution. Reprehensible as is the present cult of the leader in China and repugnant as are the many manifestations of xenophobia, what else can one expect of a country under virtual siege? Indeed, if one considers the duration and the many ways of China's harassment, one cannot explain the mildness of her neurotic responses without paying due attention to the self-restraint and patience that are universally known to be Chinese traits.

None of which makes xenophobia or paranoia desirable. If, however, we should turn our back on anyone who is driven neurotic, then we become the allies of his unconscionable persecutors. If all revolutions should be deserted which the United States has the power to prevent or frighten into paranoia, then we may as well give up all thought of basic social change and embrace that static

Society which the American military establishment hopes to ensure for the benefit of its ultimate order-givers. Beyond any of its undesirable aspects, the Chinese revolution stands for the very right of people to social change. It and similar revolutions have varying proportions of the desirable and the undesirable. But the one wholly undesirable force is that which would keep the world still and immobile for the exploiters.

Hendrik Verwoerd†

We are not in mourning.

The German Generals Won

A few old-Nazi generals of the West German armed forces have resigned because of feuds they had with their civilian superiors. Their misgivings ranged from the right to trade union membership on the part of civilian employees of the *Bundeswehr* to safety procedures involving the U.S.-made *Starfighter* warplanes, an alarming proportion of which ended up in crashes. But beneath the specific issues in dispute looms the general question of civilian subordination of the West German military. With a military establishment in Europe second only to that of the Soviet Union, and flattered by the United States into considering themselves the continental "bulwark against aggression," what is more natural than for military commanders—so many of whom had served Hitler and had been indicted by allied courts as war criminals—to gain in arrogance? They are asserting themselves even politically, precisely as officers of other nations do whenever allowed to play an undue role in their own countries' lives. Except more so, for after all they have a Prussian and Nazi tradition behind them. And they have an ideology, which even if purged of many of Hitler's teachings, retains his pathological hatred of and appetite for East Europe.


Although the men who challenged the West German Defense Minister had to step down, their demands have been accepted and the power of their successors has been enhanced. It is quite predictable that this enhancement of the military versus civilian authority in West Germany will further accelerate as its armed forces are encouraged by the United States to grow in replacement of G.I.'s detoured to Southeast Asia.

Another encouragement of the traditional arrogance of the German military derives from the ever greater quantities and sophistication of the weapons at their disposal. Many of these weapons had not originated in any defense plant but rather in those high-pressure sales promotions which are administered by Secretary McNamara for the improvement of the United States balance of payments. West Germany is literally forced by the Pentagon to purchase expensive weapons systems from American manufacturers. One such transaction involved the *Starfighter*, which has so far cost the lives of 36 German pilots. The total price for the rise of West German armed forces and their weapons will be enormously higher and it is not yet certain which nation or nations will have to pay it; it sends a cold chill down one's spine as the German goose-step is transformed from a gory reminiscence into a gory prospect.

Black Power Is Not Black

The violent racist counter-demonstrations in Chicago and Cicero, Illinois, give the lie to the liberal myth that American racism is a regional phenomenon of the South. Not only is this an exploded myth, but many of the myth-makers themselves are not free from the sickness of racism.

The mentality of the bigot is like an assemblage of ever smaller circles. If the outer circle represents the matter race attitudes that Americans—Southerners, Northerners, conservatives and liberals alike—display toward other nations, then each of the smaller circles represents ever more articulate prejudices toward ever more immediately available prospective victims. The militaristic Messianism that causes this nation to assume "global responsibilities" is merely an extension of whatever accounts for homegrown racism. All too often the liberal's civil rights activities, especially in behalf of Negroes, are no proof of his own complete freedom from bigotry but something of a "humanitarian" compensation for the arrogance, in-



Plan of concentration camp Wolsztyn, now President of West Germany.

Justices and inhumanities he supports abroad.

A position paper, written by members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, that serves as the basis for their organization's "black power" philosophy, shows the authors to be fully aware of these interrelationships. When facing white America, they say:

we view in reality 180 million racists. . . .
(*The New York Times*, August 5, 1966.)

And when facing their white "friends," they add:

So far, we have found that most white radicals have sought to escape the horrible reality of America by going into the black community and attempting to organize black people while neglecting their own people's tract communities.

We have the whites in the movement corresponding to the white civil servants and missionaries in the colonial countries who have worked with the colonial people for a long period of time and have developed a paternalistic attitude toward them. (*Ibid.*)

This deserved belittlement of men who tried "to be good" to them is done by the authors not out of blinding bitterness but out of a penetrating understanding of the nature of the American society. They do not want to join the club, but justifiably disclaim co-responsibility for America's internal character and external role:

We are not, after all, the ones who are responsible for a genocidal war in Vietnam; we are not the ones who are responsible for neo-colonialism in Africa and Latin America; we are not the ones who held a people in animalistic bondage for 400 years. We reject the American dream as defined by white people and must construct an American reality by Afro-Americans. (*Ibid.*)

Yes, indeed, all too many American social critics would have us believe that that in this country which warrants opposition is merely a marginal exception, a weak point in an essentially and historically healthy body. Nonsense! America is what she is as a logical consequence of herself. If other peoples are divided into those who fear us and therefore submit to our will and those who fear us and therefore hate us—this is not in spite of what we are but because of it. And what we are is not at all divorced from what we, or the generations that preceded us, were.

The authors of the position paper say: In this country and in the West, racism has functioned as a type of white nationalism when dealing with black people. (*Ibid.*)

How true! And how much of the "inexplicable" restlessness in the ghettos is explained when the authors add:

—JUN PEARSON

Chicago, USA, 1966.



The broad masses of black people react to American society in the same manner as colonial peoples react to the West in Africa, and Latin America, and have the same relationship—that of the colonized toward the colonizer. (*Ibid.*)

If such is "black power," then above anything else it is the power to understand the mechanics of the American society and a resolution not to partake of a robbers' feast, but to pursue the imposition of long-forgotten morality upon the nation. Call such power whatever, it still remains the power of insight and enlightenment. The dreamers of a decent society can respond with full dignity to "black power's" invitation: Whites are the ones who must try to raise themselves to our humanistic level. (*Ibid.*)

HUAC Is Not Alone

That there is little likelihood for the inquisitorial Pool bill to pass both Houses of Congress does not erase the fact that a committee of the House of Representatives has approved it and that many Representatives are bound to vote for it in deference to their electorates. Essentially, the bill would outlaw and punish opposition to the government's war and policy in Vietnam. Even without it, the freedom to meaningfully oppose the government on this score is severely circumscribed, as Administration spokesmen repeatedly pointed out in arguing against the bill.

With or without the proposed new piece of legislation, there is complete consensus between the Administration and extreme advocates of open repression: that effective opposition may not be tolerated. Agreed on that "principle," they are divided on whether to tolerate channels of mild opposition such as can be easily eschewed. The Administration, true to its "liberal" premises, proceeds from the assumption that some stream-letting valves are less effective for the ends of those using them than for its own purposes of upholding a democratic image and sidetracking opposition from potentially dangerous avenues. As for sincere adherence to democratic principles, no one should be deceived into assuming that the Administration would hesitate to resort to anything, including any degree of repression, that would be needed to uphold its foreign adventures.

The hearing a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities held on the proposed legislation occasioned a display of Congressional hoodlumism—a designation fully justified by paid Committee goons eager to rough up anyone who would play another role than that assigned to him in the Committee's scenario. That even an attorney, while arguing in behalf of a witness, was not spared such treatment is a reminder that HUAC has stooped to that level of political operation which one used to associate with the Nazi Party's notorious SA.

The Old Fixer

Just because a man somehow gets himself to reside in the White House does not mean that he need or can forget all about his former profession. He may even have ample opportunity to practice it. Especially when his occupational background is that of one of Washington's most notorious fixers in the city's long history of corruption. Or was anyone so naive as to assume that having dumped his chief-of-staff, Bobby Baker, and such other of his staff members as a few prositutes, Lyndon Johnson would know how to be a straight, honest man even in the unlikely event of wanting to?

Nothing could be more consistent than for the old hustler from Texas to form in Washington a President's Club as an institutionalized channel for trading campaign "contributions" for government contracts. Which is merely a miniature replica of the club he and Bobby Baker had maintained in the Senate. In the new version, ordinary club membership is available at a measly \$1,000 but access to its *sanctum sanctorum* at \$110,000. According to Clifton Carter, the recently resigned executive director of the Democratic National Committee, the members of Johnson's new Congress "are assured of a direct relationship with President Johnson. Members who want to talk to the President, the Vice President or one of their assistants have only to contact my office. Members will immediately be put in contact with whomever they want to reach."

That a so-called \$1,000 or even \$10,000 is a good investment was shown in a number of cases. Even in the case of the President's old-time friend, George R. Brown, whose Club "contribution" of \$25,000 "concluded" with the award to him of a contract for Project Mohole, the investment would have more than justified itself had it not been that Congress suddenly abandoned this plan for drilling below the crust of the earth. Other Club-member entrepreneurs had better luck. A mere \$10,000 from the top executive of the Amheuser-Busch brewery "concluded" with the withdrawal of a pending anti-trust suit against that firm. A \$1.3-million contract in the anti-poverty program "happened" to coincide with a \$3,000 Club "contribution" from the contractor firm's Washington manager. With all these people who were not born yesterday we can be certain that the economics of membership is very, very sound.

As for LBJ, well, he is at it again. You just cannot make a fur collar out of a pig's tail.

From Accumulation to Destruction

by Scott Nearing

Many social changes separate the peddlers who plodded the highways, pack on back, from the monster supermarkets, gigantic mail order houses and colossus national advertisers of 1960. Peddlers, hucksters and modern merchants have one thing in common: they "make money" by selling goods produced by somebody else. Today's peddler is a businessman. Instead of "making money" he "piles up profits." The results are much the same, except that with the passage of time and the revolution of science and technology businesses become more and more competitive, and more and more profits are made.


Making money in the past left only scattering disjointed records. In recent years corporate profits have been recorded year after year. Back in the prosperity year of 1929 corporate profits in the U.S.A. were \$10 billion. Four years later, after the depression, they were \$1 billion. Since then they have climbed, irregularly, to their imposing 1965 total of \$75 billion, before taxes, and \$45 billion after taxes were paid. Corporate profits, before taxes, in the five years ending with 1965 have totalled \$304 billion.

Profits in the billions are potent social forces that shape the lives of peoples and guide the destiny of nations. To what end? Profiteers have one embracing purpose—to increase profits. Urged on by insatiable greed they scheme and struggle for more, more, more.

Small enterprisers in the old days might satisfy themselves by eating well, by decking out their women-folk and their homes with flippery and finery, and buying a yacht and a fine home or two. But profits of millions and billions in the hands of corporate directors and executives are too large for personal consumption. They are a major economic and social force that demands a large-scale outlet.

Business profits are used at home to open mines, build factories and construct cities. But since businessmen are profiteers first and nationalists only incidentally, they tend to invest their profits where the interest rate is highest and the security greatest. This leads them beyond their own frontiers.

Business history in the United States shows how this principle works. From 1815 to the 1890's United States business invested chiefly at home "winning the west" and spanning



the continent with railroads, exploiting its timber, coal, iron, oil. In the 1890's the domestic demands for investment had been met and there was a surplus of investable funds. U.S.A. business therefore turned to Latin America, Canada, Asia and, later on, to Europe.

North Americans did not invent the game of exporting capital. Italian, Dutch, French, British, German and Japanese business enterprises had scoured the planet searching for markets, for raw materials, for food, and for cheap labor power.

In the course of their search they had conquered, occupied and populated colonies, organized the African slave trade, and fought for centuries to determine whether

Canada should belong to Britain or France; whether Portugal, Spain, Holland, France or Britain should monopolize profit-making in India, Indonesia and China.

Nation-building and empire-building had gone on side by side. After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the British were top-dog among the Great Powers. From 1815 to 1914 Britannia ruled the seas and British businessmen heaped up millions of profits in pound sterling. They had won their supremacy in world trade, investment and colonial domain by developing and impressive production apparatus at home, by a network of consular and naval stations that gridded the globe, by shrewd business practices, by far-sighted diplomatic deals. Most of

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all, they had defeated their Spanish, Dutch and French rivals in bloody battles on land and sea in wars that lasted for decades.



Independent peoples in the Americas, Asia and Africa do not yield their land, accept slavery or forced labor, and wear the yoke of foreign empire builders without bitter resistance. Even after the yoke has been firmly fastened around their necks, they resist and rebel in their struggle for independence.

Empire building is a bloody business, and empire building has been the leading pre-occupation of the great powers since the voyages and discoveries of Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Dutch, French and British adventurers that began around 1450.

The United States entered the empire

Twenty-two years later, by entering the War of 1898-45 in December 1941, the United States again broke a ruinous stalemate in the struggle among the European empires and emerged, in 1945, armed with a monopoly of the atom bomb and at the summit of planet-wide power.

By building a production apparatus in North America, by dominating the sea and the air, by husbanding its strength until its rivals were bled white, the Washington government had survived the bloody struggles of 1914-18 and 1939-45 as *The World Power*. The survival struggle that preceded this victory had cost tens of millions of lives, devastated and destroyed entire countries. Empire building was proving a bloody business.



building competition late in the game—after the Americas had been conquered and colonized, after Africa had been partitioned and while Asia was being carved by the European powers into colonies, dependencies and spheres of influence.

United States interests began to take an active part in the planet-wide struggle for wealth and power only after the Spanish-American War of 1898. It was not until the War of 1914-18 had weakened the chief European powers beyond repair that the United States, in April 1917, entered the war, broke the stalemate between the Allies and the Central Powers, and took its place at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 as the arbiter of Great Power destiny.

The heaped-up profits of a maturing private-enterprise economy made the path to empire easy and, in a real sense, inevitable. It was "manifest destiny" that put the straining American eagle atop the world.

Two great forces are present in every human society as they are present throughout nature. On one side are the builders. Building up and tearing down are the two chief pre-occupations of mankind. Building is slow. Tearing down, with the aid of science and technology, has become astonishingly rapid and incredibly bloody and destructive. As war was mechanized in the 1930's, this truth grew more evident. It was underscored by the release of atomic energy.

At some point in the history of every Great Power, the painful task of building is laid aside, plowshares are beaten into swords and the entire people, with minor exceptions, rushes into an orgy of tearing down. It is only a few decades since the total of U.S.A. federal spending for the first time exceeded the billion dollar mark. Last week Congress passed an appropriation bill of 58 billion dollars for "defense" (in other words, for destruction).

This change from building to destroying is not peculiar to the United States. Each of the Great Powers has an entire department of government devoted to the science and art of destruction. Usually, as in the United States, the Murder Machine called "Defense Department" has more money to spend than any other branch of government. Government-financed research hires the best brains to design and build ever more destructive weapons. At the same time top administrators are directed to plan and prepare for the next orgy of murder and destruction. To make assurance doubly sure, millions of men and some women are put on a permanent government payroll and trained in the art and science of wholesale destruction and murder. In a word, they become professional mass destroyers and killers, and war profiteers in their own right.

This Murder Machine is not only the best financed branch of government, but it is recognized and proclaimed as the chief pillar upholding the edifice of peace, freedom and civilization.


From the itinerant peddler to the small businessman with coppers in his till, to the corporate directors and executives of 1966, men have travelled a straight road from production to accumulation and from accumulation to destruction. The road is clearly marked by historic milestones. History reports the chief episodes in its course and its general direction. The United States Oligarchy (business, the military, the politicians, and the shapers of public opinion) are travelling this oft-trodden road in Cuba, Santo Domingo, Korea and Vietnam as carelessly as though they were about to attend a football game or watch a television show.

With straight and pious faces they talk about the big profits to be made from war contracts, and insist that war business is good business. They yearn for "a real good war" to revive the economy when it is stagnant. Each year they make and ship abroad millions of dollars worth of the most up-to-date and most deadly weapons which they may not be using themselves. In a war-waging society, they write and warn of the menace of peace and denounce peace talk as treason.

With such a background, no wonder the planet in the closing months of 1966 is a bloody mess. Big profits are made from killing men, women and children. The dollar bills that by the million go into the pockets and tills of businessmen, contractors and munition makers are stained red with the blood of their brother men. Big business is bloody business.

Fernando Belaunde Terry: The Frustrations of a Social Democrat

by Robert Carl Hirschfield



Inca descendants in Peru's mountain region.

—John Jablow Photo

His campaign for the Peruvian presidency had been a bold and vigorous one. In speech after speech the wealthy architect called for a sweeping agrarian reform law, the nationalization of Peru's oil, and the establishment of meaningful democratic rule in the republic. When, in June of 1963, Fernando Belaunde Terry was elected President, Social Democrats in both North and South America hailed his victory as a significant step forward for the democratic left in Latin America. In Belaunde they saw a Peruvian Benetton, an individual capable of altering his country's archaic social structure drastically but democratically. Armed only with the bladeless pocket knife that constitutes executive power in Peru, he was expected to cut the army-butressed oligarchy down to size. It was a ludicrous notion—dangerously, tragically ludicrous. Reality was slapped sharply in the face by the Social Democrats, and the Peruvian people are the ones who are smirking.

1963 was the year of cataclysmic peasant upheavals in the Cuzco region. Peasants by the thousands were affiliating themselves

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with the nascent peasant federation under the charismatic leadership of the soon-to-be-incarcerated Hugo Blanco. In ever growing numbers they were invading the estates of their masters and seizing control of them for as long as they could fight off the contingents of *Guardia Civil* sent to disperse them. Clashes between peasants and Guardia were invariably sharp and bloody, with the arms superiority of the latter generally prevailing over the revolutionary fervor of the former. Had the peasants possessed more than a mere handful of antiquated rifles Belaunde might well have been faced with a full-blown revolution upon taking office. As it was, a rural crisis of grave proportions confronted the well-intentioned new President of Peru.

With understandable alacrity Belaunde began work on an agrarian reform law. In parliament, where the Aprista-Odriska coalition held a majority, there was endless wrangling between that faction and the President's Action Popular Party, with one side accusing the other of obstructing the law's passage and being in the service of the oligarchy. It was thus not until mid-1964 that an agrarian reform law was passed, empowering the government to buy up and distribute among the peasants all land not being cultivated or utilized properly. To no one's surprise little land has since been

bought up and distributed by the government, and Peru's latifundistas remain as powerful as ever.

Like all his predecessors, President Belaunde has treated the peasants shabbily. First he showed them his benign election face and showered them with promises, then he left them to their misery. If today they no longer invade their masters' estates it is not because they have been placated by Belaunde, but because they have been suppressed by him. Under Belaunde, as under the military junta before him, peasants who attempted land invasions are beaten, jailed, or killed by the *Guardia Civil*. The worst of the peasant massacres occurred in Sicuani in the early days of 1964. There, in the insurgent *departamento* of Cuzco, police opened fire into a gathering of peaceful protesters, killing seventeen peasants, many of them women. This massacre, along with the bloody dismantlement of the peasant federation, brought an end to the land invasions and to Belaunde's democratic pretensions as well.

As far as oil nationalization is concerned the President has handled the issue even more ineffectually than land reform. Whereas at least a token amount of land has been parcelled out to peasants, not a drop of oil has been nationalized. To be sure, this is not entirely Belaunde's fault. From the start the Aprista-Odriska bloc has opposed the oil nationalization bill and prevented its passage in parliament. What is more, this roadblock has been solidified by the usual battery of reactionary generals. Belaunde is at fault, however, in his failure to take this issue directly to the Peruvian people and have them decide on it. This can be done in the form of a plebiscite, which Belaunde warned he would hold if the parliament continued to block the bill's passage. That in fact he refuses to resort to this measure indicates that the President will go only so far in his attempt to nationalize Peru's oil. He will not allow the issue to jeopardize his job.

Belaunde's inability to carry out the most fundamental structural reforms has resulted in the inevitable: the initiation of a guerrilla warfare campaign against the government and the feudal and foreign interests it represents. The campaign began in May 1965 when the late Luis De La Puente Uceda, head of the M. I. R. (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*), established the first guerrilla front in the *departemento* of Junin in the Peruvian highlands. Starting

The Lie Detector

THE LIAIR'S ABSENTMINDEDNESS IS A BLESSING: IT OFTEN LEADS US TO THE TRUTH

first with sporadic acts of sabotage, raids on *haciendas* (large estates), and hit and run clashes with the *Guardia Civil*, the guerrillas were soon launching operations on a far larger scale. In late July they ambushed and all but wiped out a Guardia patrol in the Pucura zone of Junin. The Pucura massacre compelled Belandere to replace *Guardia Civil* units with government troops. But even this failed to stem the rising revolutionary tide, and a second guerrilla front was subsequently set up in Quilbamba.

The outbreak of the Peruvian revolution hit the Belandere government with a political crisis as grave as it was far-reaching. De La Puente's revolution and socialist program provided the Peruvian people with a definite alternative to Belandere, to the oligarchy, and to the big American corporations. The question of how the insurrection should be dealt with vexed the Peruvian government. To the surprise of no one the military took it upon itself to provide the answer. In collaboration with the Apristas and Oldristas, Peru's hard line generals devised a plan of action that entailed large scale ground operations against rebel positions, napalm air strikes, and the promulgation of *la pena de muerte*—the death penalty—for terrorist activities. The severity of these measures appalled Belandere, who strongly indicated he would oppose them. Consequently, the President came within a hair's-breadth of losing his political life. Once again it appeared that the military would intervene and take power. Numerous generals charged that Belandere was soft on Communism and in sympathy with the guerrillas. The impending coup was averted only by the President's complete acquiescence in the military's brutal measures.

Despite this ignominious surrender to the military, President Belandere continues to mouth meaningless platitudes about democracy, progress and reform. And Social Democrats continue to regard him as a hemispheric leader dedicated to social change. To substantiate this claim they point to his agrarian reform programs, to his attempts to nationalize the oil, and to his nicely phrased ideas on social justice. Conveniently, they absolve him of the peasant massacres in Cuzco, the napalm bombing of guerrilla zones, and the brutal repression of strikes and anti-government disorders. This, say the social democrats, must be blamed on the military, not Belandere.

The blatant cynicism of their logic is fascinating. The social democrats fully realize the impossibility of altering the social structure of Peru through parliamentary means, yet they tirelessly go through the motions of seeking such an alteration. In effect, all they are asking Belandere is that he, too, go through these motions. Little else is expected of him, nothing more required.

If Belandere is anything, he is a pompous puppet performing on the stage of Peruvian history. Like the puppets that have preceded him, he has performed poorly and is being brusquely pushed from the center of the stage. Replacing him there is a performer of far greater power and consequence—the Peruvian Revolution.

GOLDBERG GRADUATES THANT'S HONESTY AND AGREES WITH HIM ALL THE WAY

From a news item in *The New York Times* of September 2, 1966:

"Arthur J. Goldberg . . . expressed profound regret at Mr. Thant's decision and praised his service.

"The United States Government, Ambassador Goldberg said, has complete confidence in Mr. Thant . . .

"The United States Mission understands the many frustrations of the Secretary General, Mr. Goldberg said, and shares his full faith in the United Nations.

"The American statement included a long passage emphasizing that the United States wished to end the Vietnam war and that it shared Mr. Thant's view . . .

"Mr. Goldberg said . . . I think U Thant is an honest man."

DESTROYING "ENEMY STRUCTURES"

From a Saigon news dispatch in *The New York Times* of August 9:

"Yesterday, Air Force and Marine planes flew 406 sorties in South Vietnam . . . The planes were credited by a military spokesman with having destroyed or damaged 473 'enemy structures' . . ."

THE DEMOCRACY OF KY'S ELECTION

General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. troops in Vietnam, during a joint press conference with President Johnson on August 14, 1966:

"We do feel that the election has high prospect of being successful. We do feel there will be a number of voters going to the polls. There is every indication that the armed forces of Vietnam will attempt to provide security to get these voters to the polls. Nevertheless, we do anticipate that the Vietcong will do all within their power to disrupt this democratic process."

President Johnson in a speech at the University of Denver on August 26, 1966:

"In Vietnam we are on the side of fair and orderly elections that give, in the troubled land, the widest possible expression to the will of the people. We have already made it amply clear that what is freely and fairly expressed by that will, the United States will accept."

GOLDBERG'S "IRONIC SOMETHING"

From "The News of the Week in Review" in *The New York Times* of September 4:

"The American representative, Arthur J. Goldberg, said the Johnson Administration had complete confidence in Mr. Thant, deeply regretted his decision, and hoped he would reconsider.

"Mr. Thant may have found something ironic in Mr. Goldberg's statement. For it is very clear that Mr. Thant's despair over the war in Vietnam, and his inability to get the United States to follow his three points for peace, contributed very importantly to his decision to forgo another term. The three points were an end to United States bombings of North Vietnam, a ceasefire, and consultation including all the combatants—the Vietcong as well as North Vietnam."

THE STRUCTURES ARE CIVILIAN HOUSES

Continuation of the same dispatch:

"According to some American advisers to Vietnamese military units, 'enemy structures' sometimes includes civilian houses. Once destroyed, they are listed as 'enemy structures' . . ."

WHAT THE "ELECTION" IS NOT

From a Saigon dispatch in *The New York Times* of August 15:

"This election, a Western diplomat said the other day, is more a diplomatic exercise than a political event."

"The comment seemed just . . . In fact, the South Vietnamese appear to be bored by the whole thing . . .

"It is important to realize what the election is not. It is not a test between the Vietcong and the non-Communist nationalists, for the Vietcong have been excluded, as far as possible, from the candidate and voter lists. It is not a referendum on the American presence here, even by implication. It is not an election for a national legislature . . .

"Under one plan that has powerful support within the junta, a large turnout would not be left to chance. Citizens whose voting cards had not been punched at the polls would be denied certain privileges, possibly including the right to government rice doles. Few Vietnamese would fail to cast their ballot under that threat."

THE U.S. FOR DE-ESCALATION

From a news dispatch in *The New York Times* of August 28:

"Secretary of State Dean Rusk told U Thant today that the United States wanted to de-escalate the Vietnam war . . .


"Mr. Rusk visited the Secretary General and said later that he had assured Mr. Thant of the interest of the United States in scaling down the war."

RISK FOR "COMPLETE VICTORY"

From a dispatch immediately following the preceding one in the same *Times* issue:

"Secretary Rusk warned in a speech here yesterday that a premature American pull-out from South Vietnam would 'surely' lead to World War III.

"Any withdrawal before complete victory over Communist aggression would be as fatal as were attempts to appease the Axis powers in the nineteen-thirties . . ."



Hong Kong—British or U.S. colony? U.S. warships in harbor.

—UPI Photo

Recently, China amended her public evaluation of Hong Kong's role within the politico-strategic network of her enemies. A note to London and a statement by Premier Chou En-lai have added the allegations that the Colony now serves as a U.S. operational base for the Vietnam War and that Britain had offered the USA strategic facilities in Hong Kong aimed at China herself to an earlier official statement of January 22, 1957. This avowed that Hong Kong government's policy was one of "shielding and covering at the activities of the Kuomintang agents from Taiwan," while consistently "attempting to whitewash the serious crimes committed and to shrink responsibility."

On the other hand, Western news media have been (and are) plugging reports inspired and encouraged by authority stressing the comec-like rise of Hong Kong's usefulness to China, yielding unprecedented currency profits to her and tending to oust Russia as China's leading customer. (In fact, Chinese exports to Hong Kong are becoming more difficult.)

It appears that Peking is now in the process of subjecting the entire Hong Kong complex to agonizing reappraisal. Is Hong Kong's development as a vital link in the chain of enemy enrichment outbalancing the economic and other advantages which China—perhaps increasingly—derives from

the fact of the continued British presence? Does Britain in fact still adhere to the unwritten agreement that the political *status quo* be maintained for the time being? Is British political power over Hong Kong being whittled away in favor of her dominant ally, the USA? Are the London and Hong Kong administrations slowly becoming mere executive organs of the fronts for essentially U.S. interests and policies? Peking comments branding Mr. Wilson as America's running dog in Asia clearly indicate the trend of current Chinese thinking. In its evaluation of the April riots in Kowloon Peking steps gingerly: not one word was sent out by Hsinhua.

Pragmatic and methodical to a degree, China is reviewing the actual situation on Hong Kong's ground. No observer would claim to be familiar with the actual reports sent to Peking by China's semi-official men in the Colony, nor to be fully conversant with U.S. Intelligence files on Chinese Communist activities in Hong Kong. The following is an approximation of China's idea of her enemies' overt and covert activities in the Colony, and of her opponents' view on the "Red network." Readers should keep firmly in mind that Hong Kong's parapolitical world is a jungle without front-lines but with many overlapping areas. Many of its growths neither know nor care which side they may serve as long as they are satisfactorily watered and fertilized. Neither side

can be sure of the loyalty of all the echelons of the forces it imagines to command and is certain to pay.

The Chinese do not—as may appear from a necessarily oversimplified *previs*—dogmatically equate British or even KMT agencies with formations of the U.S. government. The interrelations of various political, economic, military, religious, educational and other bodies are forever kaleidoscopically changing. The Chinese do not lack the subtlety to realize and follow them.

The basis of the anti-Communist network has remained essentially unchanged since 1949 when Triads (originally a pro-Wing anti-Manchu underground movement which had come to dominate all local organized crime) were virtually identical with the KMT politico-military network in the Colony. The Triad-KMT network controlled and still controls the bulk of over sixty local trade unions affiliated to or relying upon the Hong Kong & Kowloon TUC (linked to Brussels and the ILO), has close connections with the more recently developed Kaifong (29 district welfare organizations) movement and the Hong Kong United Association (UNUA) as well as the latter's (only potentially significant) offshoots: The HK Democratic Self-Government, Democratic Socialist, and Labor Parties. KMT Triad threads lead into the UNUA's trials at their Chinese levels: The HK Civic Association and the HK Reform Club (which share the elected seats on the important Urban Council), and into most of the 33 Government Departments (especially those for Health, Chinese Affairs, Education, Resettlement, Social Welfare and Labor). Triad hold on the Police has certainly diminished (Leftist observers admit) but Triad influence is still assumed to be effective in Masonry Lodges, some of which were once identical with Triads. KMT-Triad groups are strong in so-called Kaifong neighborhood organizations, in most businessmen's associations and clubs dominated by the Shanghai and Chiu-Chow communities and in most Chinese publishing houses. Leftists claim that certain Resettlement areas are virtually encampment remnants of KMT armed forces. Triad-KMT financial power is considerable and generally held to be derived from internal organized crime (especially the retailing of narcotics) and from U.S. sources (including those of missionary, philanthropic and educational nature). All Chinese Christian bodies, most youth organizations (some directly developed

This article first appeared in *Eastern World*, a monthly published in London.

from the long officially tolerated KMT Youth Corp), and most higher Chinese institutes of learning are considered to be dominated by KMT circles, largely by the use of lavishly U.S. funds.

While the Triad-KMT aim at the local and mainland Chinese, U.S. agencies in Hong Kong (according to Lettists) have global as well as regional and local targets. The U.S. government is believed to have shifted the center of regional political and propagandist activities as well as of defense communications from Taiwan to Hong Kong. Lettists are certain that the functions of the legendary, U.S. Naval Auxiliary Communications Center (credited with directing and supplying KMT incursions into the Mainland) in Taipei have, over the last fifteen months or so, been taken over by covert booteses disguised as U.S. consular departments. Radio communications are U.S. Navy-based. Also the main tasks of the tremendous USIS and related organizations in Taipei are now vested in their parallel numbers in Hong Kong. The financing and general direction of anti-Communist information, propaganda and entertainment media throughout Southeast Asia (including Hong Kong) as well as the manipulation of global public opinion by means of the Western press battalions are stationed in or passing through Hong Kong. Lettists point to the strongly American-dominated Foreign Correspondents' Club (FCC) on which Government House, Government Information Services and other agencies of Hong Kong government indubitably rely in various ways.

Up to 85 per cent of U.S. diplomatic consular and press personnel are thought to be CIA.

Leftist observers maintain that U.S. agencies finance or subsidize at least 28 local newspapers and 38 periodicals (all listed in KMT government publications in Taipei) and aid the distribution in Hong Kong of many others produced in Taiwan and elsewhere. They also think that U.S. government missions in Hong Kong control activities sovelely undertaken by agencies of the KMT authorities in Taipei, such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC, logistically supported by Taiwan Garrison Command), the Federation of Overseas Chinese Associations (FOCA), the Free China Relief Organization (FCRO), Asian People's Anti-Communist League RoC Chapter (APACL-RoC), etc. These and other bodies have offices in Hong Kong, run radio stations (from Taiwan), newsletters, training institutes, and various "Mainland Services." Official KMT yearbooks published in Taipei and KMT sources in Hong Kong claim that these and other organizations are largely responsible for alleged guerrilla risings, acts of sabotage and internal subversion by the Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps, Youth's Anti-Communist and National Salvation Group, Anti-Communist People's National Salvation Army, Democratic Youth Alliance, Patriotic Party, Chinese Revolutionary Labor Party, etc. in Kwangtung, Hunan, Yunnan and elsewhere. Lettists accept KMT claims that OCAC and FOCA hold commanding positions within Hong Kong's new Chinese University and

250 Chinese and Anglo-Chinese grammar, middle and technical schools, where recruitment takes place for KMT organizations and paramilitary bodies. Also under U.S. aegis (Lettists aver) are the RoC (Republic of China) Fellowship of MRA (Moral Rearrangement) and UNA-RoC which have founded subsidiaries in the British Colony. MRA-RoC and UNA-RoC are coordinated with OCAC, FOCA, FRCO, APAL, etc. by their highest functionaries (General Ho Ying-Chih, Chairman of UNA-RoC and MRA-RoC heads the RoC President's Strategy Advisory Commission, and his colleague General Chiang Chum is Secretary-General of the RoC President's Office and Senior Adviser to the RoC President) who are "the Pengtong's Own Men" in Taipei: General Ho has not only served as RoC Defense Minister but forged his U.S. links as Chief of the RoC Military Mission in Washington. Generals Ho and Chang are under the immediate command of General Peng Meng-chi, Chief of the General Staff. Thus (Lettists claim) Hong Kong's Rightists bodies and groups are actually under KMT military command, though in practice controlled if not directed by local U.S. booteses. Several youths convicted by the Hong Kong courts after the Kowloon riots were UNA-connected.

The Hong Kong telephone directory lists a Bureau of Transport and Warehousing of the Chinese National Government Ministry of Communications (while Taipei's Government Information Organization—RoC-GIO—appears under the names of its subsidiary news and radio services). The Voice of America—a section of USA—has offices and a studio in Hong Kong's Rediffusion House. Some VOA products go out over Hong Kong's radio networks (most are, of course, exported).

USIS produces and subsidizes a number of digests, newsletters and other material primarily aimed at resident and visiting journalists, and also supplied to research bodies, specialized reviews, lecturers in the USA and elsewhere. The best go out under the imprint of a Catholic research institute (which even has paying subscribers) and local universities. A gargantuan monitoring and translation service, under USIS, pours out enormous quantities of often expertly selected, arranged and angled news and background material, eagerly received by Pekingologists, big-name columnists and other slingers of world opinion.

A fertile local film industry, a number of travel agencies, and the majority of local Chinese banks (the biggest of which became a subsidiary of the leading British-owned bank last year) are included in the Lettist image of the U.S.-KMT network in Hong Kong. Several of their prominent functionaries are well-known for their intimate associations with pro-Peking circles.

That all Western-based and Western-financed missionary and charity organizations are regarded by Lettists as essentially concerned with subversion and espionage goes almost without saying, and their listing appears superfluous.

Compared with the bewildering proliferation and competitiveness of U.S.-endowed anti-Communist networks, the pattern of

comparable pro-Peking activities in Hong Kong seems uninspiring and uncomplicated. But they should not be underrated.

While organized labor was overwhelmingly pro-KMT only a few years ago, the position is reversed now. The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, loyal to the paternal All-China Federation of TUs and through it linked to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), has now more affiliated unions (about 60) than the KMT-controlled Hong Kong and Kowloon TUC but their membership is far greater. The Federation runs its own chain of clinics, libraries, clubs and other welfare organizations.

The official People's government body in Hong Kong is the Hsinhua News Agency which operates directly under the Peking State Council (Inner Cabinet consisting of Premier and Vice-Premiers). Linked to it are a small number of news agencies (not more than half a dozen, all Chinese language), and a larger number of periodicals (including two monthlies published in England), as well as a firm of film distributors, four large cinemas, and a powerful chain of bookshops. It is estimated that the majority of Hong Kong's primary schools use textbooks printed in China. The Hsinhua network operated closely, until last autumn, with the Antara agency of Indonesia. It conducted the local end of China's first, and not too successful attempt (Ex-Acting President Li Tsung-jen's Press Conference in Peking) to make a dent in the overwhelming U.S. domination of the overseas press corps in Hong Kong.

A Hong Kong KMT delegate to the last APACL (Asian People's Anti-Communist League) meeting (in Manila, early September 1965) stated that the Bank of China (and a dozen import-export corporations) control thirty department stores and forty banks in the British Colony. He might have added a number of travel agencies, dominated by the official China Travel Service (which represents the Chinese visa authorities).

It has been known for many years that Chinese private bankers and other leading businessmen in Hong Kong have channelled huge investment funds originated from overseas Chinese sources (and their American and other associates) into China. Early this year a reverse traffic opened: Hong Kong now serves as a channel for mainland funds placed in Taiwan for investment there. Taipei investment policies and a degree of jitteriness in Hong Kong are responsible. "Commitment" investment in Taiwan is still small but glaringly symptomatic. The number of "Red" department stores is now 85. One of the largest burned down in March.

The chain of pro-Peking bookshops (co-ordinated by the importers, "Peace Book Company") which handles press products as well as books proper, is linked to a number of local cultural and literary circles, as well as youth clubs. Some KMT sources see a link to the mainland's Communist Youth League.

The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce acts as the local elective body for the National People's Congress in Peking. (Hong Kong sends eight members. At the last elections, a year ago, a ninth Hong Kong resi-

dent went to Peking representing the Chinese community in Jakarta where he had served as Hishihua correspondent. None of these men are industrial workers, farmers or fishermen.)

A large proportion of the Hong Kong community have ties with the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce in Peking. Also the All-China Students' Federation (which has its own press) and the All-China Democratic Women's Organization have their effective (if not official) branches in the Colony. Many teachers—serving on pro-KMT, government-run and the few "progressive" schools—keep contact with the All-China Association for the Dissemination of Scientific and Technical Knowledge, and the All-China Federations of Scientific Societies, and of Literary and Art Circles. Numerous group excursions into China are organized and financed by these bodies. Similar links

with Hong Kong are maintained by the All-China Athletic Federation (which sponsored the recent controversial China tour by a Hong Kong football team including players who had been internationalists for Taiwan).

U.S. sources and some local police officers are convinced that tip-offs of KMT arm dumps, commando landings, etc. are supplied to the Hong Kong authorities of the Peking Ministry of Public Security and the Chinese Liberation Army General Political Department operating in Hong Kong. Undoubtedly, all U.S. and U.S.-KMT activities are an open book to the men in Peking.

Most pro-Peking intellectuals, teachers, editors, bankers, and businessmen in Hong Kong are ex-KMT. They maintain closest social and family contacts with those still in the KMT-U.S. network. Potential defectors from the KMT-U.S. ranks are often told to remain overt members of Rightist organiza-

tions. There is little militancy in either Leftists or Rightists. The latter are generally disillusioned, the former cocksure. Leftist progress in Hong Kong has been steady over many years but seems to have accelerated considerably over the last year or so.

China supplies all the propaganda Hong Kong Leftists need. It is largely the injection of U.S. dollars which keeps Rightist activities alive which seem more inspired by business interest than by conviction. As far as there is a Chinese Rightist community in Hong Kong, America's stock appears to have risen and Britain's slumped. Clearly, Rightist Chinese sources in Hong Kong provide Peking with much of the supposed evidence that Britain is slowly yielding Hong Kong to the U.S.A. both politically and strategically. Chinese suspicions in that direction are political fact, not a propagandist pose or diplomatic gambit.

U.S.-Ian Smith: What Kind of an Affair?

by Lynn Palma

The seizure of American diplomacy, prophing its fulcrum upon Rhodesia, continues haphazardly to manipulate the levers of U.S. business interests on the one side and American-style ideals on the other. Inside the United States Ian Smith's outlaw government has at least been somewhat controversial. Internationally, the United States, like other "democratic" nations, purports to pursue a policy designed to bring Rhodesia's government tumbling down, in some spectacular if indefinable manner. Steps supposed to lead in this direction include the imposition of economic sanctions and the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition. However, the U.S. government's ostentatious display of disapproval of the *apartheid* regime does not inhibit its policy of permitting American business to remain on the best of terms with the *apartheid* economy.


When Ian Smith declared Rhodesia's independence from Britain, the U.S. government demonstratively recalled its ambassador from Salisbury. Few then took issue with the decision to allow many of our consular personnel to remain in that country indefinitely. What they did not realize, however, was that among the remaining Americans were approximately 1800 experts in petrochemistry and mining.

It is widely held that the most effective single measure against Smith's regime would be complete discontinuance of Southern Rhodesia's oil supply. The United States has supposedly been cooperating with the British oil embargo. Why, then, are American oil and mining engineers still there in force?

Well, according to *Newsweek*, the U.S. investments in Southern Rhodesia amount to \$600 million. The main task of the U.S. experts is to ensure that these millions continue to produce profits.

In the welter of these contradictions, one could genuinely question whether we are planning to "make the world safe for democracy" or, simply, safe for American markets. The answer is clearly defined in the minds of many of our African critics. Editor Stephen Mihando of the *Dar-es-Salaam News* wrote that U.S. policy is determined by the unwillingness of Mobile Oil, Gallex and Aminhol, to close down their Southern Rhodesian refineries. In a conversation a few days later, Mihando told me that without oil from these sources, Smith's regime might well have collapsed by now.

Supplies from the Cape



These companies find numerous methods for continuing the flow of crude oil to their plants. The greater part comes from the United States via the Union of South Africa. Evidently, these companies sell oil to South Africa, which in turn sells it back to them in Southern Rhodesia. Thus American business menunders through the fissures of official American ideology.

Again, covert support of Smith's coterie by U.S. interests caused the American Committee on Africa to address a special letter to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In it, George Hanser, the Committee's director, declared that the United States was not observing the embargo on trade with Rhodesia. "Our cessation," said Hanser, "is based on the fact that the U.S. government has not introduced any restrictions on the import of chromium ore from Southern Rhodesia, even though chromium makes up almost half of all American imports from that country."

Meanwhile, the African public learned that a Rhodesian information agency had been set up in Washington. When a wave of protests followed, U.S. officials declared that their government was closing the agency down. In fact, however, it continued operating. When the ambassadors of many African countries demanded an explanation from the State Department, they were begrudgingly told that in reality there was no decision to close the agency; the United States merely refused to recognize its head as the official representative of Rhodesia.

Americans can still feign surprise when developing African nations view them as unfriendly, but this can hardly confuse these nations as to who are and who are not their friends.


Marian Palma is a student of political journalism at the University of California. She has written articles from a world study tour that included Africa.

Puerto Rico: A Land Robbed of Itself


by M. S. Armoni

(A two-week collection of bits of information, some impressions, and a few of the visitor's own prejudices.)

Part II



San Juan, Puerto Rico



San Juan, Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is supposed to be a shining example of what happens to a people that entrusts its fate to the United States. It is America's answer to the cry of "Yankee Go Home!" that reverberates throughout Latin America. It is the lure that is relied on to divert people from Castroism, nationalism and all other forms of anti-American rebelliousness. It is supposedly the greatest of all economic miracles. Yet, more Puerto Ricans have left their island in search of employment than remain employed in it. And the number of Puerto Ricans who live in that ultimate misery that qualifies them for U.S. surplus food is as high as the total number of the island's employed (and underemployed).

But despite these frightening statistics, the deprived Puerto Rican society provides U.S. investors not only with economic benefits beyond anything offered them anywhere else, but even with astronomical non-repayable cash gifts. Not only are their enterprises significantly subsidized through prolonged total tax moratoria, give-away land, and plant rentals, public works (such as highways) undertaken to suit their conveniences, and starvation wages, but they may be receiving public monetary gifts exceeding the wages they pay out. The American "investor" uses machinery and equipment 75% of whose cost is financed at nominal rates by the people of Puerto Rico; has working capital 50% of which was similarly obtained; and gets as much as \$1,100—and in some cases still more—in non-repayable cash for every man

he employs. (The total annual wages of such a full-time employee may be as low as \$900.)

Hidden Statistics

So much has been made of Puerto Rico's "economic miracle" that one talking of the island's misery is bound to draw the suspicion of politically-inspired gloom. But no suspicion can obviate the fact that side by side with the huge plant complexes of U.S. investors, highways cutting across the country, and modern bank and hotel buildings in San Juan, there exists another Puerto Rico—the one that is not heard from, that quietly suffers, starves and disintegrates. Such is not the Puerto Rico of the tourist, although on guided tours right in the heart of San Juan, he is bound unsuspectingly to pass within yards of slums of unpeppable equator. But then the media, here no less pervasive than in the United States, can be relied on to divert his attention from the silently suffering part of society.

Two already-cited statistics reveal an otherwise unsuspected scope of deprivation—nearly a third of the labor force is unemployed and nearly a third of the population receives surplus food from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These are stirring statistics which give the lie to boasts of general prosperity. But they are not the statistics one finds in publicly distributed governmental literature.

Conventional employment and unemployment statistics, however, are of little use as measures of the degree to which Puerto Rico's human resources are or are not being utilized.

Many people who want jobs, especially rural women, seasonally unemployed farm workers and young people with little work experience, do not even look for work. They know that there are practically no jobs to be found which they are capable of filling.

This is the educated opinion of H. C. Barton, Jr., Director of the Office of Economic Counsel of the Puerto Rican House of Representatives. It was expressed in a statement before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Labor on January 3, 1966. As against the officially given unemployment rate, that for years has been set around 10%, Mr. Barton determined:

Puerto Rico had a total employment deficiency of 243,000 jobs in April 1960. This amounts to 30% of the calculated size of the labor force. For purposes of measuring underutilization of human resources, this calculated unemployment deficiency for Puerto Rico is comparable to the standard figure of the unemployment used in the United States, which has ranged around 5% during recent years. By comparison, the 30% rate for Puerto Rico means that underutilization of human resources of the island is about six times greater than the U.S. average. It is about double the amount of unemployment expected by the United States in the great depression of the 1930's.

Little surprise that so shocking a document was not saved from official suppression even by the authority and high office of its author. Indeed, to obtain a copy of the Barton report one had to induce a friendly government official to disregard a binding prohibition.

The suppressed document sheds light on many other statistics whose gloom is as

cleverly concealed in propaganda literature on the risk of cancer in a cigarette manufacturer's commercial. We learn, for instance, that the living conditions of those "gainfully" employed are not necessarily much better than those of the unemployed. Nor is the long-range trend of growing rather than diminishing unemployment less worrisome. Says Barton:

A substantial part of existing employment consists of poorly paid, substantial jobs that will disappear with technological advance. About 40,000 are expected to disappear during the next five or ten years in agriculture alone. Moreover, population of labor force age is increasing at a very rapid rate, adding about 300,000 a year to the number of new jobs needed for full utilization of our human resources. (*ibid.*)

The Misery of the "Fortunate"

That deprivation has no bottom and that things can always be worse sadly emerged from the recent boasts, such as they were, of Mrs. Aida Grau de Pagan of the Public Welfare Department of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. On May 13, 1966, at her Department's exhibit in a warehouse at the Isla Verde airport, she proudly disclosed the tragic statistics of her office:

As of June 1965, about 700,000 Puerto Ricans were receiving food from the surplus food program of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These people represent about 118,718 Puerto Rican families, which indicates that 89% of the population of Puerto Rico is aided by this program. (*El Mundo*, San Juan, May 17, 1966.)

In addition to the distribution of food to "qualified" paupers, it was also revealed that 446,466 people receive assistance from the Public Welfare Division, a total that represents 87,650 families. (*ibid.*)

All these are frightening absolute figures when they pertain to a population whose total is merely 2.5 million.

One could go on and on computing equally alarming statistics showing that beneath a propaganda mirage of prosperity the vast majority of Puerto Ricans live in squalor.

Neither unemployment nor public charity constitutes the demarcation line of misery in Puerto Rico. It profusely spills over into the employed sector of the population. In a country where an hourly wage of 45¢ is not unusual, and where the cost of living does not substantially differ from that in the United States, 26% of the 711,000 persons reported "at work" in April 1965 worked less than 35 hours per week.

The unenviable state of most of Puerto Rico's "gainfully" employed was told in another suppressed, if official, statistical analysis. It had been commissioned by the Government of Puerto Rico from an American economist, Herman Miller. Had it not been for unauthorized disclosures in the daily *El Imparcial* (March 17-23, 1966), we would have learned nothing of that study.

Miller went behind the relatively impressive figure of \$2,100 given as the average annual family income at the beginning of our decade. Not satisfied with fictitious averages, he came up with a more precise breakdown:

Only one third of the families have incomes above the average. Two-thirds, about 3000,000 families, have incomes far below that average. If the 448,000 families in Puerto Rico are divided into five groups, the income picture is the following:

The lowest one-fifth receives less than \$400 annually; 2 per cent of the national income. The next highest one-fifth receives between \$400 and \$844 per year; 6 per cent of the national income.

The next highest one-fifth, the one in the middle, receives between \$845 and \$1,682 per year; 12 per cent of the national income. The highest one-fifth receives from \$1,683 to \$3,100 per year; 21 per cent of the national income.

And the highest one-fifth receives more than \$3,101 per year; 59 per cent of the national income.

It should be noted, then, that almost 60 per cent of the national income is distributed among one-fifth of the families, while the one-fifth of the families at the opposite end manage to survive on only 2 per cent of the national income.

Miller found that "the so-called pacific Puerto Rican revolution, far from gaining impetus is losing ground as time goes by." Challenging the Planning Board's official optimism and its projection that by 1970 few, if any, families will have an income of less than \$1,000 per year, Miller wrote:

Present data for 1960 and 1960 suggest that there was very little change in the distribution of income during that period. The portion of income received by heads of families from the lowest economic stratum to the highest was identical in both years. . . . The gap has not been closed between the best-paid and worst-paid workers. . . . Projections based upon the most conservative figures of the 1960 Census demonstrate that by 1970 families with incomes lower than \$1,000 per year will constitute 90 per cent of the total families in Puerto Rico.

Where, then, is the prosperity the American business enterprises are so loudly alleged to have brought to the Puerto Ricans?

Investors' Paradise


With more than 1,100 manufacturing plants established under "Operation Bootstrap" and with hundreds of millions of dollars invested annually in capital goods (in 1965 alone \$714 million), it is paradoxical that a small population of two and a half million cannot support itself. After

all the years of wooing corporate U.S. investment and boasting "miraculous achievements," what accounts for the fact that in 1965 Puerto Rico's external trade showed a huge deficit of \$540 million? Why have close to one million Puerto Ricans left Puerto Rico in recent years to trade their fortunes in the slums of American cities? Why is there so much misery in an island advertised for its happiness?

The answer lies in the fact that Puerto Rico has been turned into the U.S. businessman's Garden of Eden, *lour, festa, orgy*. It is administered strictly and precisely at the convenience and to the advantage and pleasure of American investors. As throughout Latin America, so here too, the overt and covert profits pumped out of the economy exceed anything invested in it, while no indigenous economic development that would compete with North American interests is tolerated. Puerto Rican agriculture, for instance, is victim of American can and jar stuffers who have many ways for making sure that the population would neither eat nor grow its own produce.

Since Puerto Rico is outside the Federal tax system, U.S. investors pay no Federal taxes, neither personal nor corporate. Moreover, under the Industrial Incentive Act of 1965, these investors are also exempt from paying any Commonwealth and municipal taxes for periods of 10, 12 or 17 years, depending on the location of their plants (and with an option of 50% exemption for double the period). As already mentioned, low-interest loans are made available by Puerto Rican government agencies enabling the investor to start with a very small portion of the amount that is made to work for him. In joint ventures of U.S. and Puerto Rican investors such low-interest loans are available up to 75% of the assessed value of machinery and equipment, up to 75% of the assessed value of land and building, and up to 50% of the working capital. A brochure of an agency of the Puerto Rican government lists an "example of a typical financial plan for the joint venture program," whereby a total of \$125,000 in equipment and working capital on the part of a Puerto Rican-U.S. investment unit suffices to

These charts show precisely how Puerto Rico's smaller tax bite leaves a larger slice of profit for you:



—Dept. of Industrial Development, P.R.

operate a \$400,000 under-taking. The actual breakdown is as follows:

A—Machinery and Equipment		\$300,000
75% Mortgage from Government Development Agencies	\$225,000	
25% by principals	75,000	
B—Working Capital		100,000
50% Investment by Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company	50,000	
50% Paid-in capital from principals	50,000	
Total Capital Requirements		<u>\$400,000</u>

limited assistance only, for even they do not have a full picture of the scope of this

Of this amount, the total capital required from the private investors is \$125,000; their profits derive from \$400,000.

Investors who prefer not to erect their own plant buildings can lease from the government multi-purpose factory buildings at annual rentals as low as 50¢ (and up to 95¢) per square foot.

A booklet issued by the Puerto Rican Economic Development Administration lists many other inducements. Some tell in one and the same breath the investor's dream come true and the agony of the local population. Among such incentives is the fact that "in hiring, you could count on from 4 to 10 screened applicants for every job" (screened for the prospective employer by the government's Department of Labor).

Here is another incentive:
In Puerto Rico, unlike in the U.S., minimum wages are set separately for each industry and the true total labor cost stays close to the established minimum rate—within 10 or 12 per cent. (In the U.S., fringes and other hidden costs add up to 30 per cent of the payroll.) Average industrial wage in Puerto Rico as of June 1965 was \$1.22.

Another brochure of the same governmental agency gives the following example:
Say your firm nets \$100,000 before taxes. U.S. profit after Federal Corporate Income Tax would be \$53,500. If you took this as dividends, your own income after taxes would be down to about \$27,500. (Not considering income-splitting or State taxes.) This same corporate profit would remain \$100,000 in Puerto Rico. And all of it can be taken tax-free as dividend income.

This is how manufacturers in Puerto Rico average *five times* as much net profit after taxes as in the rest of the U.S.
The same booklet assures the prospective investor:
Even after your tax holiday, you'll always have a 20% advantage compared with U.S. taxes.

"Gifts" to the Non-Needy

But the most scandalous outrage is perpetrated when the few lucky Puerto Ricans who earn \$1.22 per hour must part with some of their earnings to provide cash gifts to U.S. millionaires. It is not easy to find out particulars about these gifts. Official literature directed to prospective U.S. investors merely hints at the availability of "added financial incentives." Some provides code numbers so that "qualified" persons can obtain more information. Even high officials of *Fomento* (the agency in charge of industrial development) often have only fragmentary information about these giveaways. Those among them who are themselves appalled by the practice and who would want to bring it to public attention can be of

legalized robbery. In a mimeographed *Fomento* brochure, which is not intended for general distribution, we found, however, under the title "Financial Incentives Grants" the following passage:

In the new incentives program, location in any 60 of Puerto Rico's 76 municipalities qualifies your project for generous cash allowances. . . .
The amounts of these grants depend on the number of production workers employed and the labor surplus of the location selected. Grants vary from \$75 to \$1,000 per employee. Plants having 2/3 male labor force qualify for an additional grant of \$100 for each male employed.

In cases of projects deemed especially important, there is room for individual bargaining for still greater grants as "each case is treated individually according to its importance." The grants can be used for a great number of normal business expenses.

One wonders how this system of "gifts" would affect the \$400,000 project for which our investors needed a meager \$125,000. If they employed a hundred people or so, they might qualify for sufficient grants to enable them to be in a \$400,000 business without a penny of their own. What happens from that point on? If they should employ more than one hundred people, would they be paid cash as an incentive for an investment they would own without ever having made?

It is easy to see from these data who gets what and from whom. Virtually the sole local benefit from the U.S. economic dominance is that some tens of thousands of Puerto Rican manufacturing workers are employed at an average hourly wage of \$1.22. The price for this benefit includes all prospects for a real bootstrap operation. For Puerto Rico must not develop its own national economy, protect itself against imports precluding domestic industry or independently engage in foreign trade. It is today's defeated South to the droves of corporate carpathagers.

The decline of Puerto Rican agriculture is one of the sad economic consequences of the Island's political subordination. It will have a lasting detrimental effect not only in economic but also in social and cultural terms. Indeed, the diminution of the indigenous agriculture provides a catalytic factor for ethnic disintegration.

In a single year, employment in agriculture dropped by nearly 10% (from 137,000 in 1964 to 124,000 in 1965). That this drop was not caused by introduction of machinery is shown by the fact that it was accompanied by a crop production drop of 4%. The long-range trend is no different: the total farm value and the total crop production show a steady decline.

A comparison of Puerto Rico and other countries of Latin America may show the former to be relatively better off economically. But this merely proves that none of them, while remaining under U.S. economic domination, has a real opportunity of rising itself by its bootstraps.

A two-week study tour of a country, no matter how intensive, can produce neither a comprehensive nor an authoritative picture of reality. This is especially so in the case of Puerto Rico, which, however small physically, is an intricate, complex land and society. But a two-week study tour can alert one's instincts to processes that might escape the attention of people who live with and in them day-in and day-out. This discernment does not occur without the interference of the observer's prejudices and prejudices. In fact, quick impressions are always at their mercy. Certainly, we brought with us to Puerto Rico our own prejudices and prejudices. Of some we are aware. This observer believes that human equality is meaningless and impossible unless it is granted to the individual in his relationship with other individuals as well as to the society of which he is a member in its relationship with other societies. Nationalism is undoubtedly an unmoderated fragmentation of the world's population. But those who use this truisim merely to deny to others the right to self-determination while they themselves collect peoples and lands into their nationalistic bounty sack are no forerunners of a more enlightened age in the human adventure; they are, in fact, the successors to the robbers, pirates, conquerors and tyrants of all ages. The merit of superior physical force is no merit. It does not become one with the passage of time. Lost never becomes legitimate property. Time does not sanctify the immoral acquisition; not even after 68 years.

These "prejudices" determine for us that the Puerto Ricans, small as their numbers are, are entitled to their own national life no less than the more numerous people of the United States; that they have a right to decide their national destiny neither under duress nor in the presence of foreign troops; that they have an inherent right, and obligation, to use their land and resources to their advantage as a people rather than to the advantage of an intruding power.


Albert Einstein provided a moral-political guideline that is applicable to the Puerto Ricans. While opposed to nationalism and nation-states, he nonetheless favored and worked for the establishment of a Jewish state. He wanted to see it in existence so long, but no longer, as other peoples possessed their states. Until we have One World, the dissolution of ethnic entities by their physical conquerors is group cannibalism rather than universalism.

A warm, joyous, and beautiful people are the Puerto Ricans. One feels happier for having been in their midst. What is there one can wish them from the bottom of one's heart upon leaving their beautiful island?

That the future return to them the mastery of their fate.

Vietnam and the Generals

by Harry Lore



—Defense Department Photo

It has now become apparent to even the most hightighted that the United States has embarked upon a major war in Asia. Victory is the goal of this war—military victory in Vietnam over the guerrillas in the South and the Communist government in the North. Senator Thurmond stated it well when he said on June 30, 1966, "There is no question in my mind but that we ought to win this war . . . We should use such power as is necessary to bring victory to the U.S. forces in Vietnam."

Mr. Lore practices law in Philadelphia. He is a member of the Committee on International and Foreign Law of the Philadelphia Bar Association. Mr. Lore served as an attorney in the legal assistance program of the National Lawyers Guild in Danville, Va.,

What share has the U.S. military had in framing the policy that now has us committed to the war, which, as Senator Hartke said, on February 21, 1966, has us "trapped between the impossible and the intolerable"? There is persuasive evidence that the U.S. military was more than a mere bystander to the decisions which brought about the present situation. While under our Constitutional system the military does not frame policy, the Vietnamese war appears to be an instance where this sound political axiom has been ignored. Clearly, the warnings of the Fulbright Memorandum of 1962 have come to fruition today, and we can now appreciate what the Senator meant when he wrote, "If the military is infected with this

virus of right-wing radicalism, the danger is worthy of attention."

The "infection" has produced what Senator Morse called a "plan for international intervention" by the Military Establishment (*Congressional Record*, May 16, 1966, p. 10172). Leading military figures revealed much of this plan in a series of speeches in 1961 and 1962 which for the most part went unnoticed. Whenever they were about to admit publicly more than was good for the image of the United States, the compromising portions of their speeches were ordered deleted. The deleted statements have nonetheless become available because they were placed in the *Congressional Record* of February 19, 1962 by Senator Thurmond who

was substantiating his accusation that civilian censorship was "muzzling" the U.S. military. These statements offer an insight into the mind of the American military leadership and serve to dispel any lingering illusion about the present motivation of that group.

In a speech that he was scheduled to deliver on September 8, 1961, General George H. Decker, the Army Chief of Staff, cut through the double talk about our presence in Vietnam and, but for prior censorship, would have told his audience:

Today on the other side of the world from Berlin, the officers and men under General McCarry, working on the ground with the government and military forces of South Vietnam, are projecting the will of the American people in a way that cannot be duplicated by any other means.

Admiral George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations in 1961, was aware of the real motivation behind the Vietnam intervention and would have, on October 27, 1961, told a meeting of the Navy League what it was, if only the censor had not deleted the following passage from his speech:

If one of these little places falls into Communist hands that action might be the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back—and as a matter of fact, it did. Hence all of Southeast Asia or the Middle East might go progressively beyond our reach.

Can a clearer statement of imperialist aims be imagined? Yes! Lt. General Arthur G. Trudeau, then the Army's Chief of Research and Development, planned to say, on June 1, 1961, if the censor had not cut it:

We must win this struggle or we lose the world.

Rear Admiral Claude V. Ricketts, in 1960 the Director of the Strategic Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, was prevented by the censor from asking the rhetorical question whether our military power was to be "a dike, massive but inert" or was it to be "part of a farcical and determined prosecution of our national policy." Colonel William P. Yarborough of the Special Warfare Center was stopped by the censor from stating in his speech of June 14, 1961:

We must attack Communist-inspired insurgency in each threatened country before the emergence in such form as to demand more drastic action.

The talk which General Decker was prepared to deliver to the Army War College in June, 1961 was so wild that the censor ruled all of it out of order on the grounds that it would give the Communist press and radio a "field day." The General found certain areas of Southeast Asia disquieting because of what he called a "tendency toward neutralism." After detailing the "psychological impact" of U.S. military forces deployed along the borders of the Soviet Union and China, he took up the probability of their use in "coping with internal aggression." He offered a detailed program for the use of American military forces in rural pacification. His speech ends with the somber—for 1961—pronouncement that "the United States is engaged in war now."

Here then is the military thinking. The Generals are having their day. Already the war has extended beyond the boundaries of Vietnam. Estimates vary as to the number of American troops in Thai-

land—one Senator saying there are 40,000 (*Congressional Record*, June 23, 1966, p. 13433) and the *Air Force Times* of July 13, 1966 claiming that there are "only" 20,000, and, parenthetically protesting over the fact that the men servicing the bombers that raid Hanoi and Hainphong are "outside the combat pay and tax break zones" and thus not eligible for these benefits. (A description which certainly fits Thailand.)

Already the war is costing, according to *Fortune* magazine (April 1966), around \$13 billion a year, with every chance that it will go up to \$21 billion in order that "technologically sophisticated military forces, magnificently equipped to kill and destroy [can be] incidentally employed against meager or elusive targets" and "B-52s operating at a cost of more than \$1,300 per hour per plane [may] fly a ten-hour round trip from Guam to South Vietnam to strike an enemy that has no large installations or encampments visible from the air." Desperate must be the situation when a leading Senator calls for the reactivation of battleships as a solution to the military impasse on the ground and a former Chief of Research and Development of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps suggest the use of "toxic warfare," i.e., poison gas! (Brig. Gen. J. H. Rothschild,

Imperfect Sonnet

The architects of our deaths wear Ely Bar keys,
Go to committee meetings, mow their own lawns,
And on Sundays in little white dappled, pewl
As the century ticks off, the sheep turn grey.
They are easier now to classify and fumigate,
For with computers in and bookkeepers out,
No one is forced to shout or do angry
gan-gans
Where cant is impractical and unhealthy.
And if men talk, their tongues are so still
You can hear the moon shot or a bomb drop.
It is all very quiet—(pause)—yet as
Oscar said
From prison seventy years ago: "... with a
kiss,"
The brave with a sword, man, no longer
swings.

—Lawrence P. Spingarn

The Lie

there are terrible pages in this book
bloodthirsty
oranges on this tree there is swamp
there is plague in these branches a swarm
of venom in this forest, beams of light,
some beams of light,
but pigeons,
what do the pigeons say what carry on their
feet,
we,
who do we say we to, who do we eat,
there are black vines on this mountain,
everywhere we say everywhere,
doing what we say we do and say,
this open book this dictionary speaks
of cults and connoisseurs, of juices,
food we put in our mouths, chew, tells us
common places
arrangements law and order space and
hammers.

Ret., "Propaganda and Toxic War," *Ordnance*, June 1966.)

It is not peaceful settlements but military confrontations that are bound to be sought by a country which is dominated by military leaders who publicly espouse brutal approaches to international issues. It is thus that America, in assuming the role of international policeman against revolution, is turning back the clock to emulate the Congress of Troppau which, following the French Revolution, legitimized intervention for the Holy Alliance. Our militarists are committing the frantic acts of desperation that are the hallmarks of counter-revolution. Fulbright called it the "arrogance of power," but it is worse than arrogance that causes capitalism to be indiscriminately dropped. It is contempt for humanity.

We should ponder these lines which Alfred North Whitehead wrote about the Germans:

When other Western nations perpetrate anything especially disgraceful at least they don't boast of it, but Germany seems to be peculiar in that the more atrocious the act, the more vehement the Germans are in affirming its righteousness.

How much more these lines now apply to America than they ever applied to the Germans!

All the Best Definitions Are Ostinative as Any Child Knows

I understood late one night
just what is meant by a "search-and-destroy"
operation
when I found that our kitchen was being
secretly infiltrated by a good sized army of
cockroaches
I got a pressurized can of potent insecticide
and moved through the kitchen quickly and
systematically
They came out from everywhere by the
hundreds to die but of course none of them
would ever
surrender
When it was over I felt like a victor
holding my empty weapon high in the air
over the heaped
corpses

—Margaret Randall

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—Rudolph von Absle

The unusual history of a singular relationship between a citizen and the State Department began when Lee Harvey Oswald, aged 19 and just released from the Marine Corps, appeared without warning at the American Embassy in Moscow at the end of October 1959. He handed to Consul Richard E. Snyder his passport and a written request to the effect that he wished to renounce his U.S. citizenship and that he affirm his allegiance to the Soviet Union. He informed Snyder that his application for Soviet citizenship was pending before the President and that he had offered Soviet authorities all information on radar operation that he had acquired in the Marine Corps.

Snyder told Oswald that he would have to return to the Embassy on a regular working day to complete the formal act of renunciation. A few days later Oswald sent an angry letter to the Embassy, protesting the frustration of his act of renunciation and reiterating his wish to dissolve his U.S. citizenship. He did not reappear in person to carry out the necessary formalities.

Early in January 1960 Oswald was sent to Minsk. He had been issued a Soviet identification document designating him as a stateless person ("without citizenship"). After little more than a year at Minsk, Oswald wrote to the embassy in February 1961, indicating that he had become disillusioned and now wished to return to the U.S., provided that he received guarantees against prosecution under any circumstances on repatriation.

While his request was under consideration

Sylvia Meagher is emerging as the foremost authority on the Warren Report and its mistakes and exhibits. She is the author of *Dear Subject Under a Stenciled Name*, New York, 1966. Her other contributions on the Kennedy assassination appeared in our previous three issues.

This contribution is part of a chapter from a book-styled manuscript on the assassination. A United States passport prepared in the State Department Passport Office whenever circumstances created the possibility that a prospective applicant would not be on the basis receive an American passport. The records section would prepare a "lookout card" and file it in the passport file. Whoever anyone applied for his passport from any country, the lookout application would be checked against the lookout card for the applicant, was found, appropriate action, including the possible refusal of a passport, was taken. (WR 760).



by the State Department, Oswald met and in April 1961 married Marina Nikolaevna Prusakova. He notified the embassy of his marriage and of his wife's wish to accompany him to the U.S., requesting that the necessary procedures for her entry be set into motion.

The embassy, after interviewing the Oswalds in Moscow in July 1961, recommended that the State Department make a determination that Oswald had not expatriated himself and that Marina Oswald's application for a visa to enter the U.S. should be approved.

The State Department ultimately adjudicated Oswald's legal status and determined that he had not expatriated himself. The Department also took action to approve Marina Oswald's papers, placing strong pressure on the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to reconsider its denial of a visa to Oswald.

When Oswald came to the embassy in July 1961, he told Consul Snyder that he had feared his lesson and was a loyal American; he said that he had never given classified information to the Russians, as he had said the words; the Russians had not

questioned him or asked him for such information and he doubted if he would have completed it if they had.

Marina Oswald, for her part, told the embassy that she had never been a member of Komsomol, membership in which might have disqualified her from receiving a visa. Her denial was later found to be a lie.

At the end of 1961, the Oswalds received exit visas from the Soviet authorities, permitting them to leave the USSR. Oswald now told the embassy that he needed financial assistance for his and his wife's (and later their infant daughter's) travel to the U.S. After futile attempts by Oswald to obtain the needed funds from private sources in the U.S., the State Department authorized the embassy to make a loan to Oswald. He signed a promissory note for \$495 in June 1962; his passport was returned to him, renewed for 90 days and good only for travel to the U.S. The Oswalds departed the Soviet Union en route to Fort Worth, Texas.

One year later, Oswald applied for a new passport at the New Orleans passport office. His application was dated June 24, 1963. His new passport was granted 24 hours later, on June 25, 1963.

The Warren Commission reviewed the transactions between the State Department and Oswald from September 1959 to November 1963 and concluded that the decisions taken by the Department were innocent and proper. The Oswalds were treated just like anyone else. (WR 746).

A review of the testimony and the documents suggests that the Commission's inquiry was incomplete and at times uncritical, and that its conclusions are highly questionable, if not non-existent. There is a consistent pattern of unusual favorable treatment of Oswald by the State Department. Decision after Department decision on Oswald's detector and would-be expatriate, self-declared enemy of his native country, proclaimed discoverer of classified military information, and later self-appointed propagandist for Fidel Castro—removed every obstacle on his path from Minsk to Dallas. The Department's extraordinary and unorthodox decisions on Oswald and the decisions taken by other U.S. official agencies fall into several general categories: (1) repeated failure to prepare a "lookout card" to check Oswald's movement outside the U.S.; (2) renewal of Oswald's passport de-

spite cause for negative action; (3) apparent inaction and indifference to Oswald's possible disclosure of classified military data; and (4) pressure exerted on behalf of Marina Oswald's entry into the U.S. (In referring to measures taken by the State Department and other U.S. agencies as "unusual" or "extraordinary," we speak in the context of Cold War policies and practices, without in any way endorsing the restrictive and punitive actions taken against Americans who held unpopular views but which repeatedly were waived for Oswald's benefit and convenience.)

We will now try to show, by dealing with specific instances, that the record of Oswald's transactions with the State Department is stuffed with anomalies, ambiguities, lacunae, and the plumbly preposterous.

Times Confused and Lost

At the outset, there is some uncertainty about the exact date of Oswald's first contact with the Moscow embassy. Indeed, there is some uncertainty also about his movements immediately before he entered the Soviet Union, via Helsinki, Finland. According to a CIA report, Oswald arrived in Helsinki on October 10, 1959, and remained there until October 13 (CE 2676). The same CIA report indicates that there was no flight leaving London on October 10 that would have arrived at Helsinki in time for Oswald to register at the hotel—as he did—before midnight that day.

The Commission solved the problem by stating arbitrarily that Oswald left London on *October 9, 1959* (WR 690), untroubled by the fact that Oswald's passport contains a stamp of the immigration officer, London Airport, and the words "Embarked 10 Oct 1959" (CE 946; page 7). That is typical of the reported perversion of simple fact in the Warren Report, in the face of contradictory evidence in the accompanying exhibits.

In any case, according to the Warren Report, Oswald appeared at the embassy on Saturday, October 31, 1959, some two weeks after he entered the Soviet Union (WR 717). But a cablegram sent by the naval attaché at the embassy to the Navy Department at Washington refers to a previous embassy despatch dated "26 October" dealing with Oswald's renunciation of U.S. citizenship and his declared intention of furnishing Soviet authorities with information on U.S. radar operation (CE 917).

Curiously enough, General Richard E. Snyder sent a confidential letter on October 28, 1959—essentially three days before Oswald's first visit to the embassy—to General Boeser at the State Department in Washington, in which he requested advice on how to handle an attempted renunciation of American citizenship (CE 914). Snyder testified that the letter "wasn't directed at any particular case" (5H 271). Indeed, if Oswald first contacted the embassy on October 31st, he could not have inspired Snyder's request for advice. Snyder also testified that he had encountered only one case of renunciation of citizenship prior to Oswald's appearance; but that case was already resolved when Snyder wrote his letter of the 28th (5H 279).

If Oswald really came to the embassy

earlier than October 31st, Snyder's confidential letter to Boeser would take on a different hue—as would his effort to discourage or delay Oswald's act of renunciation.

Another ambiguity and perhaps a much more serious one involves Oswald's whereabouts for a period of some six weeks after his visit to the embassy at the end of October 1959 and before his departure for Minsk early in January 1960. According to the Report, Oswald was interviewed at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow by news correspondent Priscilla Johnson on November 16, 1959 and "for the rest of the year, Oswald seldom left his hotel room" (WR 696). The Report indicates elsewhere (WR 730) that the embassy notified the State Department at the end of November 1959 that "Oswald had departed from the Hotel Metropol within the last few days" for an unknown destination (CE 921); but the Commission says that Oswald "probably" did not in fact leave Moscow for Minsk until about January 4, 1960, basing itself on Oswald's diary and on "other records available to the Commission" (WR 730).

But the diary has a single entry dated "Nov 17-Dec 30" rather than daily entries for those six weeks. Apparently Oswald had found time before November 17th to write daily entries, although he was busy with official interviews and sightseeing during that period, but no longer found time to record his meals or his excursions daily during a six-week period of being holed up in his hotel room.

The "other records" to which the Commission refers as providing evidence for Oswald's presence in Moscow until about January 4, 1960 consist of documents from the USSR file on Oswald (CE 985). Those documents merely establish his presence on December 29, 1959 and on January 4 and 5, 1960.

Six weeks of Oswald's life (November 16 to December 29, 1959) therefore remain unaccounted for and wrapped in mystery; and that has been completely glossed over in the Report.

The Cards Would Not Look Out

The peculiar business of the lookout cards which were never prepared brings us closer to the heart of the matter. Oswald's attempt to renounce his citizenship at the end of October 1959 provided the State Department with reasonable grounds for preparing a lookout card, as the Department later acknowledged (WR 751). The card was not prepared, apparently as the result of the exercise of discretion by the responsible officers of the Department. No explanation is offered in the Report.

On two subsequent occasions, however, the preparation of a lookout card was mandatory rather than discretionary, but no card was prepared either time. The first instance was in March 1960. The embassy had lost all contact with Oswald and it was not known whether or not he had expatriated himself by an act of allegiance to the Soviet Union. Because Oswald's status was in doubt, an official of the Passport office in the State Department (Bernice Waterman) made up a "refusal sheet" for Oswald on

March 25, 1960 (CE 929). The automatic consequence should have been the preparation and filing of a lookout card, so that the Department would be alerted in the event that Oswald applied for documentation at a location other than the embassy at Moscow, where he was known. Yet no lookout card was ever "prepared, modified, or removed from the file" according to the Report (WR 751). The reason for the failure has not been determined; the Report merely cites conjectures by the Passport Office that there may have been a clerical error or misunderstanding.

The second occasion for the mandatory and automatic preparation of a lookout card was in June 1962, as a consequence of the advance of \$135 to Oswald for his travel to the U.S. As mentioned earlier, the State Department made that loan after the failure of Oswald's attempts to obtain the needed funds from private sources in the U.S. One of those attempts to secure financial assistance has such peculiar and mysterious features that we will digress for a moment from the subject of lookout cards in order to take a look at the puzzle.

One of the agencies to which Oswald had applied for a grant or loan of money to meet the costs of his repatriation was the International Rescue Committee, Inc., which describes itself as a "strongly anti-Communist organization" (CE 2766). The Committee's program director informed the Warren Commission, in a letter dated May 1, 1964, that the Committee has heard of Oswald in a telephone call from the State Department recommending that assistance should be given Oswald. The letter continues:

A few days later we received a letter from Mrs. Harwell of the Witherspoon County Chapter, Vernon, Texas (Red Cross), dated January 14, 1962, to which, to the best of my recollection were attached copies of a letter from Mrs. Victoria Henry, American Embassy, Moscow, to Lee Henry, American Embassy, Moscow, dated January 9, 1962, and of a letter addressed to the International Rescue Committee, dated January 13, 1961 (sic), and ostensibly written by Oswald. . . . To a layman's eye it would appear that both copies were typed on the same typewriter. I do not know who added the name "Oswald" to the letter from Mrs. Harwell, Executive Secretary, American Red Cross, the Norbury copy. What is most puzzling, although it did not then attract my attention, is that the letter from Oswald, dated January 13th, could have reached the United States by January 14th, and that it reached us via the Red Cross. On about February 9, 1962 we did receive a letter from Mrs. Harwell from Oswald, dated January 26th, which makes no reference to a previous communication from his. . . . (CE 2766) (italics added)

None of the persons who might have thrown light on this astonishing business were questioned about it by the Commission or its servanagencies, the FBI or others. Was it possible that the embassy and the State Department, in their ardor to repatriate Oswald, had gone so far as to write letters in his name? The Warren Report tacitly, and probably inadvertently, seems to acknowledge the fraudulent nature of the January 13th letter supposedly written by Oswald: It states that "between February 6, 1962 and May 1, 1962, Oswald attempted to secure a loan from the Red Cross and the International Rescue Committee" (WR 770).

But it was the State Department, not the

Red Cross or similar agencies, which played "humanitarian" and advanced a substantial sum of money to Oswald. An automatic and mandatory consequence of the loan made to him in June 1962 was the preparation of a lookout card. Lookout cards are prepared routinely in such cases, as protection against default by the borrower, who is not entitled to travel abroad until he has made full repayment.

Again, no lookout card for Oswald was prepared (WR 772); and again, the Commission failed to establish the explicit responsibility for the violation of the rules. The Report merely cites a State Department memorandum which is filled with conjectures about possible administrative or clerical errors which may have produced this second lapse from mandatory procedure (WR 772).

Who Said the State Department Is Restrictive?

The average man may be nonplused by the State Department's perfect record of oversight and error with respect to lookout cards for Oswald, but the Commission takes it in stride. It presents a deadpan account, without editorializing, which is really only a paraphrase of the testimony of the spokesmen for the Department. By way of mitigation of what was rather shocking carelessness and unreliability at best, the Commission points out that even if the lookout cards had been prepared, everything would have happened just the way it did.

The lookout card that should have been prepared in March 1960 (but was not) would have been removed from the file in August 1961, when the Passport Office determined that Oswald had not expatriated himself (CE 939). The lookout card that should have been prepared in June 1962 (but was not) would have been removed from the file when Oswald liquidated his debt to the State Department in January 1963.

That is nice rationalization but it will not do. The real point is that a lookout card for Oswald should have been prepared and returned in the file primarily on the ground that Oswald's presence abroad was not in the interests of the United States. That was the obvious inference to be drawn from his defection and disloyalty when he arrived in the Soviet Union in 1959. That was also the ostensible justification for the Department's loan to Oswald, in the face of his inability to qualify for the loan by "loyalty to the United States Government beyond question" (WR 771).

The State Department had an established procedure for preventing certain categories of persons from traveling abroad, one category being persons whose travel was judged not to be in the interests of the United States. Moreover, the Department's legal adviser, Abram Chayes, testified that other federal agencies had the same privilege.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, requests the addition of several hundred lookout cards each year. Similarly, the National Security Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency each request the addition of cards. In all cases, these requests are compiled with, and the agencies concerned are notified when any of the individuals in question apply for a passport (CE 950, pp 3-4).

In Oswald's case, however, neither the State Department's security branch nor the CIA, FBI, or Office of Naval Intelligence set in motion the procedure under which they would be informed if Oswald planned to leave the U.S. again. Those agencies did not request notification despite the fact that Oswald had affirmed his allegiance to the Soviet Union, had proudly declared himself to be a Marxist, and had even offered classified radar data to the Soviet authorities. Their indifference is all the more bizarre when it is posed against the notorious policy of travel restriction of scientists, scholars, artists, and other Americans suspected of having improper political sympathies. An article in *The New York Times* of October 20, 1963, charged that "for the past 15 years, the (State) department has attempted to deny passports to many Americans on the ground that their travel might be embarrassing." Yet, four months before this charge was published, Oswald applied for a passport (on June 24, 1963) and it was issued to him without a murmur only 24 hours later!

The Department did not withhold or reclaim Oswald's passport, although his presence abroad had already proved "embarrassing." The radical deviation from orthodox practice where Oswald was involved cannot be dismissed as random, inadvertent,

or innocent—it is too consistent and uniform, vertically and horizontally, to be attributed to recurrent clerical error. It is a pattern that makes sense only in the context of a secret arrangement which placed Oswald outside the scope of normal measures of attrition.


Have and Have-Not

Oswald certainly did his best to compensate for the persistent negligence which left him without a lookout card. When he applied in July 1961 for the renewal of his 1959 passport, he was thoughtful enough to indicate on the application form that he had committed an act or acts which might expatriate him or make him ineligible to receive the renewal.

The application form contained a printed statement which set forth, in the disjunctive, a series of such acts, preceded by two phrases — "Have" and "Have Not," on separate lines with the two-word phrase on the second line. Oswald, in filling out the form, struck out the words "have not."

The Commission acknowledges that one existing carbon copy of the application shows that "have not" has been typed over and that in effect Oswald had thus admitted that he might be ineligible for an American passport.

Snyder, who had handled Oswald when



Commission Exhibit 912

he came to the embassy and filled in the application form, was questioned but he did not remember to which of the proscribed acts Oswald had admitted; it may have been "swearing allegiance to a foreign state." On the other hand, Snyder suggested, the blocking-out of "have not" may have been a mere typographical error! (WR 735-737).

The Commission next states that there is an "actual signed copy of the application" in the embassy files at Moscow "which is not a carbon copy of the copy sent to the Department," in which the obliteration is slightly above the "have," which appears on the line above the "have not." The Commission infers from that that the strike-out may have been intended to obliterate "have."

What is an "actual signed copy of the application . . . which is not a carbon copy of the copy sent to the Department"? Where is the original application form that Oswald filed in?

There is "one existing carbon copy," location unknown. There is an "actual signed copy" in the embassy files—but it is not a "carbon copy of the copy sent to the Department."

Is it a carbon copy of any pedigree? Is it the original of the carbon copy sent to the Department?

Only when the testimony is searched does it emerge that on July 10, 1961, Oswald filed in not one, but two separate applications! Coleman Do you have an explanation of why on July 10, two separate typings were made of the application for renewal?

Snyder No, sir, I do not. (5H 286)

Perhaps there was an experiment going on at the embassy on July 10, Oswald, with or without guidance, filled in one application in which he admitted acts of possible expatriation, and another application in which he denied such acts. The "innocent" application (with the "have" obliterated) remained in the embassy files; the "guilty" application (with the "have not" obliterated) was transmitted to Washington.

The Warren Report obscures the whole baffling exercise by employing a plethora of "copies" and "carbon copies" from which no sense can be made. The technique only heightens the impression of subterfuge and deception, by all concerned.

In spite of Oswald's strikeout of the phrase "have not," his application for passport renewal was approved on the basis of an accompanying questionnaire detailing specific acts which the State Department evaluated as non-expatriate.

The Passport Office's Unshaken Trust

Two years later Oswald applied for a passport at New Orleans. In the absence of a lookout card, his passport was granted within 24 hours. But Oswald was generous enough to provide a substitute for the missing lookout card; he specified on his application for a passport that his previous passport had been cancelled (CE 950, page 7). That in itself should have alerted the Passport Office to check his past file, but it did not delay his passport by an hour.

The Commission explains that Oswald was one of 25 applicants, all of whom received the same fast service in getting pass-

ports. The "NO" alongside of Oswald's name on the teletype list of the applicants meant "New Orleans" and the contiguity was purely coincidental.

But the Commission did not inquire why the Passport Office paid no attention to the information that Oswald's previous passport had been cancelled, nor did the Commission report a striking item of information which is found in the testimony of Orrest Pena, proprietor of a New Orleans bar.

Pena testified that he, like Oswald, had applied for a passport at the New Orleans passport office on June 24, 1963 (11H 360). Pena's name is not on the list of applicants for that day (CE 922). Apparently Pena, unlike Oswald, was not so fortunate as to get his passport within 24 hours; and the Commission was not so fortunate as to be accurate in its claim that all those who applied for passports on the 24th of June enjoyed the impartial solicitude of the Passport Office.

Oswald, not content with calling attention to himself by means of suspicion-inviting statements on his passport application, went further. According to the testimony of Lt. Francis Martello of the New Orleans police, Oswald forthrightly told him after his arrest in August 1963 that he intended to re-apply to the State Department for the necessary documents! (11H 56). Oswald's interview by Martello was followed by an interview conducted by FBI agent John Quigley. Quigley surely could have elicited the information that Oswald intended to return to the Soviet Union, from Martello if not from Oswald himself. Had he done so, would not the FBI have taken steps immediately to prevent a second defection by Oswald, with its consequent embarrassment to the U.S. Government? Yes, if Oswald's relationship with the government—and with the FBI in particular—was nothing more than met the eye.

Quigley's interview notwithstanding, Oswald proceeded from New Orleans to Mexico City, where his activities were logged by the CIA. About the middle of October 1963, the State Department received a CIA report which stated that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The CIA memorandum resulted in a review of Oswald's complete file by two Passport Office lawyers, neither of whom saw any need or any ground for action.

James L. Ritchie, attorney advisor in the Passport Office, testified that he read the CIA telegram noting the visit by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy at Mexico City, which had been left on his desk together with the Oswald file, on October 22, 1963—exactly one month before the assassination. He said that he then reviewed the entire Oswald file.

Ritchie I made a judgment there was no passport action to be taken, and marked the file to be filed. (11H 192)

Ritchie's immediate superior, Carroll Hamilton Sealey, Jr., also read the CIA telegram and reviewed the Oswald file.

Coleman Did you after you looked at it say to yourself "can we revoke this passport?" Sealey I am sure that is why I looked at it. I am sure of that, Mr. Coleman, that I

looked at it with that view in mind, if there was any action to be taken of that sort. . . . Coleman . . . Did you know he had defected or attempted to defect in 1959? . . . that he was going to pass some radar information to the Russians if they gave him citizenship? Sealey Yes, sir.

Coleman Did you know that the Soviet desk had indicated in 1961 or 1962 that it would be to the interest of the United States to get him out of Russia and back to the United States? . . . Did you know in his passport application for his 1963 passport that he indicated that one of the countries that he intended to travel to was Russia? . . . And you are saying with all that information that you would look at that file. Read it and just put it back and did nothing about it? Sealey I did nothing about it other than to note the fact that I had read the telegram . . . there was no particular passport significance to the fact that a man shows up down at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City . . . (11H 203)

Abram Chayes was questioned also about the State Department's indifference to the prospect of Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union.

Dufles Is it not correct though that when you were trying to get the visa for Mr. Oswald, you made a very strong case that has continued residence in the Soviet Union was harmful to the foreign policy of the United States, or words to that effect? Chayes Well, we were very anxious to get him back . . . we had him on our hands then . . . he was very directly our responsibility, so that anything he did or that went wrong during that period, he was under our protection and we were necessarily involved. If he went back as a tourist and got into some trouble of some kind or another, we would then have the choice I think to get involved, and we might or might not. (5H 322)

We suggest that the Department had the same choice in 1959, 1961, and 1962, when it elected not only to "get involved" but to move mountains on behalf of Oswald and his Russian wife.

If behind all the help that had been extended to Oswald in returning to the U.S. there was nothing sinister but merely the assessment that "his continued residence in the Soviet Union was harmful to the foreign policy of the United States," then the inference is clear that Oswald's planned return to the Soviet Union a year later was no longer deemed by State Department officials "harmful to the foreign policy of the United States." What had happened in the interim to make the unreliable Oswald reliable and for the Department that was once "anxious to get him back" not to lift a finger to keep him back or at least outside the Soviet Union? Neither the State Department nor the Commission addressed itself to this question.

A Threat of Betrayal

The most forceful indication that there was more to the Oswald "defection" than met the eye is the Government's dumfounding inertia in the face of Oswald's proclaimed intention when he arrived in the USSR to give classified data to the Russians. As embassy official John McVicker described it:

. . . it was almost as though he was trying to bait the consul into taking an adversarial action against him. He mentioned that he knew certain classified things in connection with having been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and that he was going

to turn this information over to the Soviet authorities. And, of course, we didn't know how much he knew or anything like that.

(SH 301)
Snyder testified that Oswald had "volunteered this statement. It was rather peculiar" (SH 295).

The first question that arises is, what kind of information did Oswald possess? John Donovan, former lieutenant in the Marine Corps, testified:

... shortly before I got out of the Marine Corps which was mid-December 1959, we received word that he had showed up in Moscow. This necessitated a lot of change of aircraft call signs, codes, radio frequencies, radar frequencies.
He had access to the location of all bases in the west coast area, all radio frequencies for all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and the relative strength of all squadrons, number and type of aircraft in a squadron, who was the commanding officer, the authentication code of entering and exiting the ADIZ, which stands for Air Defense Identification Zone. He knew the range of our radar. He knew the range of our radio. And he knew the range of the surrounding units' radio and radar. (SH 299)

At the time of the first contact with the would-be defector, the embassy had no way of evaluating how much sensitive information Oswald had; in any case, there is no indication in the record that any attempt was made to dissuade Oswald from disclosing what he knew to a hostile foreign government. However, a dispatch was sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence as well as to the State Department reporting that Oswald intended to furnish the Soviet authorities with information on U.S. radar (CE 917). The Office of Naval Intelligence in its reply to the Embassy (copies of which went to the FBI, CIA, INS, Air Force and Army) asked to be informed of "significant developments in view of continuing interest of HQ, Marine Corps and U.S. intelligence agencies" (CE 918).

The Office of Naval Intelligence then presumably ordered the change of codes and frequencies described by Lt. Donovan, and issued Oswald an unsatisfactory discharge from the Marine Reserves. There is no indication of any other activity by Naval Intelligence; as mentioned already, the Office at no time used its right to request the State Department to issue a lookout card for Oswald. That is curious.

Another curious fact is supplied by the FBI, in a report stating that it was determined on November 2, 1959—only three days after Oswald's appearance at the Moscow embassy—that "no derogatory information was contained in the U.S. Marine Corps files concerning Oswald" (CE 2718). Although Oswald supposedly was notorious in the Marines for his political deviation, his study of the Russian language, and other heresies. The FBI stated further that the Office of Naval Intelligence "advised that no action against him was contemplated in this matter" (CE 2718).

The unsatisfactory discharge from the Marine Reserves went through in 1960. Oswald was indignant, if not incensed, at this "injustice." He filed an application for review of the unsatisfactory discharge, pending a "brief" and a 4 page statement, as well as letters addressed to him by the U.S. embassy which, he pointed out, "hardly

reflects the opinion of the American embassy that I am undergoing, through some sort of breach of loyalty, of their attentions" (CE 2661).

The brief dated April 18, 1962, and the accompanying 4-page memorandum were written by hand by Oswald at Minsk; yet the documents not only manifest correct style and substance but cite specific sections of the U.S. Code. Did Oswald memorize a body of law in advance of his defection? Did he carry a copy of the U.S. Code with him on his travels, ready to consult it, as he apparently consulted it in Minsk? Or did he receive expert advice and assistance in preparing his brief, from some mysterious source?

Oswald, in his brief, not only appealed for nullification of the unsatisfactory discharge but requested recommendation of his reinstatement, on the following grounds:

In accordance with par. 15 (c) (5) I request that the Board consider my sincere desire to use my former training at the aviation fundamentals school, Jacksonville, Florida, and Radar operators school, Biloxie, Miss., as well as the special knowledge I have accumulated through my experience since my release from active duty in the Naval Service. (CE 2661) (italics in original)

The Calm of the Betrayal

Neither the Marine Corps nor the Office of Naval Intelligence nor the FBI seem to have taken the smallest interest in any "special knowledge" which Oswald may have acquired in the Soviet Union. There is no indication that the offer was followed up with Oswald when he returned to the U.S. It would seem that American intelligence agencies are no less self-defeating than their Soviet counterparts who, according to Oswald, had not shown any interest in the classified information he might have revealed and did not even question him.


The Commission did not take testimony from anyone representing the Office of Naval Intelligence, nor do the exhibits include interviews with such persons by the Commission's servant agencies. Consequently, we have no firm information on the action taken by the Office of Naval Intelligence other than that which we have inferred, and no explanation whatever of the decision not to prosecute Oswald on his return to the U.S.

Did the Office of Naval Intelligence conduct an investigation which led to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to launch proceedings against Oswald? Did the Office conclude that Oswald had not carried out his threat to betray classified information? Did the Office even interview Oswald at any time?

Those are some of the questions that the Commission should have answered but did not. We know only that Oswald reappeared at the embassy in July 1961, almost two years after his announced offer to give radar information to the Russians. He was somewhat chastised. He now said that he had not carried out his threat and that the Soviet authorities had never in fact questioned him to elicit what he knew about radar and related matters (CE 977). He reiterated the demands he had made by

letter, in February 1961 and thereafter, for full guarantees that he would not be prosecuted under any circumstances upon his return to the U.S. (WR 752, 754).

The State Department had instructed the embassy not to give Oswald any assurances, one way or the other, about prosecution (WR 753). Snyder, in his report on Oswald's return visit to the embassy, wrote that he "indicated some anxiety as to whether he would face possible lengthy imprisonment" (CE 977); and that he had told Oswald "informally" that he did not perceive on what grounds Oswald might be subject to conviction leading to any severe punishment. However, Snyder emphasized, he had told Oswald that the embassy could give him



Commission Exhibit 931

no assurance of immunity.


If we accept the Commission's evaluation of those transactions, we must accept one implausible inference, and another that is utterly incredible. First, that despite repeated demands for guarantees which the embassy and the State Department refused to give, Oswald decided to return to the U.S. where he faced the risk of prosecution and a long jail sentence. Everything suggests that, on the contrary, he returned knowing full well that he would not be prosecuted.

Second, we must believe Oswald's statement that the Russians had not been interested in his offer of radar information and that they had not solicited and he had not given that information. Collectively, we must believe—and this is even more difficult—that the State Department and the other intelligence agencies accepted Oswald's disclaimer as sufficient to close the book on the question.

If those agencies really believed that the Soviet Union had abjured the classified military information which, there was good reason to believe, Oswald of his own volition had offered them, they are staffed by halts. Because we have a high opinion of the mental competence and vigilance of the FBI, the CIA, and the others concerned with this particular area of security, we find it more plausible to interpret their

serenity as an indication that they knew that there was nothing to get excited about. Even the Commission could not bring itself to utter in silence the bland pose of such preposterous naivete on the part of the State Department and the FBI. Although J. Edgar Hoover and his conferees were not questioned directly about this particular phase of the Oswald affair, Hoover himself absolved the FBI of error by stating self-righteously that "the embassy gave him a clean bill" (ZH 104).

Abram Chayes of the State Department had different ideas about where the buck should be passed. He said that the FBI had questioned Oswald fully and "was satisfied" with Oswald's statement that he had



not given any information to the Russians (ZH 388). Lane and ex-critic "explanations" and back-passing came from other witnesses (see, for example, testimony of State Department lawyer Carroll Seelye, 11H 200). The explanations, individually and collectively, were implausible and evasive.

But the Commission let the matter rest. An FBI content with the "clean bill" purportedly given Oswald by the embassy, a Passport Office prepared to accept Oswald's verbal assurance that he had not given away classified data as he threatened to do, a State Department and CIA ready to believe that the Russians were not even interested in Oswald's radar secrets—those are not the familiar agencies we know and love (or loathe, according to one's inclinations). Allen Dulles, former head of the CIA, and the other government-seasoned members of the Commission, must have known better.

Nevertheless, the Commission as a body managed to swallow and digest a gargantuan serving of clerical error, persistent competence, and perverse official solidarity for a man who seemingly had forfeited all claim to protection from his government. The Commission concluded that the cuisine was delicious, and nourishing too.

What rubbish! The burden of evidence in fact lends considerable credence to Marguerite Oswald's constant thesis—that

her son had gone to the Soviet Union on clandestine assignment by his own government. She made that suggestion, it should be remembered, in January 1961 (CE 2681)—almost three years before the assassination of President Kennedy at the hands of unknown murderers. The record of Oswald's relations with the State Department and other federal agencies, particularly the FBI, despite many blanks and missing links, goes a long distance toward vindicating the intuition and inferences of Oswald's mother.

Marina's Naturalization

The State Department's transactions with respect to Marina Oswald are discussed in Appendix XV of the Report (WR 761-769).

The Commission indicates that Marina falsely denied membership in Komsomol when she applied for admittance to the U.S. Her testimony reveals that she was a member of Komsomol until she was expelled in 1961 as a result of her intention to emigrate to the U.S. (ZH 608-609). The embassy and the State Department accepted Marina's affidavit of non-membership in Komsomol, apparently without any attempt at independent verification.

The Commission, for its part, points out that neither Marina's membership in Komsomol, nor her false denial of membership, had it become known, need necessarily have resulted in her exclusion from the U.S. That we are entirely prepared to believe.

Marina Oswald's application for a non-quota visa was approved by the State Department, on favorable recommendation from the embassy, in October 1961, and her papers went forward to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS ruled against Marina, on the ground that Oswald did not meet the requirements as a "unruffled case" and that, in the opinion of the INS, there was doubt about his loyalty to the U.S. despite his recantation.

That INS evaluation of Oswald was in conflict with the view held by the embassy and the State Department, which held that Oswald had purged himself and was entitled to the help and protection of the U.S. government. The position taken by INS—which was consistent with prevailing official attitudes and policies—did not inspire the State Department to reconsider its own assessment of Oswald. Instead, the Department proceeded to search for ways to circumvent or reverse the negative decision taken by INS on Marina's application.

The record shows that the State Department manifested impatience even before INS made any decision in the matter; and when the decision proved to be negative, the Department informed INS that in its view "we're better off with subject in U.S. than in Russia" (WR 764). The Department also set into motion preparations to have Marina Oswald travel to Brussels, Belgium, and to proceed from that city to the U.S., taking advantage of the fact that certain technicalities would prevent INS from denying access to the U.S. to an immigrant of Soviet nationality whose papers were processed in certain third countries.

At the same time as the Brussels preparations were initiated, the Department removed another obstacle to Marina's entry into

the U.S. by accepting Oswald's unsubstantiated affidavit of support as "sufficient assurance that she would not become a public charge" (WR 762). The embassy explained that Oswald's affidavit had been accepted—still another unusual decision—because he had been unable to find anyone else to execute the affidavit, and despite the fact that Oswald had no concrete prospect of a job on his return.

Concurrently with these ingenious efforts to dissolve all the obstacles which stood in Oswald's way, the State Department exerted continuous pressure on INS to reverse its negative action. A high official of the Department wrote to INS on March 27, 1962, formally urging reconsideration. When the Department learned by telephone, on May 8, 1962, that INS had capitulated, the good news was cabled immediately to the Moscow embassy, without even awaiting the formal communication from INS which arrived the following day and which stipulated that its reversal was based on "strong representations" by the Department.

Thus, Marina Oswald was spared the inconvenience of going to Brussels and proceeding from the Soviet Union directly to the U.S. One wonders if she appreciated the prodigious efforts made on her behalf.

What would have happened if the State Department had not been ready to take such pains for Oswald? Presumably he and his wife would have remained in Minsk, living their family life in much the same fashion as before, when their activities had created no political, diplomatic, or propaganda problems for the U.S. Neither the Soviet government nor the American people were likely to make a cause celebre of Oswald if the State Department had refused to raise its finger on his behalf. The Russians were leery of Oswald from the beginning; and the American public would have given Oswald no sympathy whatever after his unpatriotic and disloyal actions.

The whole self-justification by the State Department for its decisions and its transactions with Oswald is "the interest of the United States." The Department has not provided the smallest substantiation for its claim that such a principle was relevant or decisive in Oswald's case. It has denied its actions on the grounds of scrupulous care for the rights of the citizen, human compassion, trust, and political tolerance. Those criteria are wholly absent from the Department's known practices and policies in passport cases and in cases involving manifestations of political unorthodoxy or suspected unorthodoxy. The self-portrait is not remotely identifiable with the familiar image.

But the Warren Commission has concluded that there was no irregularity, no illegal action, and no impropriety on the part of the officials involved in the transactions with the Oswalds (WR 777). We can only retort, after gasping at the undeviating and uninterrupted record of clerical errors and administrative options which operated invariably for the benefit of the underserving Oswald, that no government agency is THAT perfect.

Better Housekeeping

In the morning
reading of race riots
I wield the vacuum
cleaver, with less than
my usual assurance.
I avoid

the space
under the bed
where my responsibility
lies like a hamster
fed on scraps of
vegetarian pity.

I air the bed-
clothes where pain is
put to sleep
under an old
skin stretched like gauze
on suppurating guilt.
Newsphotos on
the bathroom floor
smell of distant
unmentionable messes:
blood
in Vietnam staining
my irremovable white
conscience.

Embarrassed I
lift too conspicuous
lace doilies from
the furniture
to dwell on higher
planes; my poems,
yesterday's busywork
full of contemporary
holes
from self-
inflicted
blank cartridges.

So I hide
in hasty closets all
my rooms still life,
despairing to reflect
the houses
just like mine
where decadence is
ornamental too
but suffocates us
with the offal
word respectability
our status rolls in.

I try the atavistic but
it doesn't help;
the electric fan
shreds my disgust
to conflict,
ruffles my reflexes
raises my submissive
skirts till I rebel
I've had it.

—have it!
a new kind of Sinking
Protest
to really melt
the grime from our common
humanity.

—I think of buying TV time
to mount a soapbox
(gentling) "now,"
gentle ladies—
—Eileen Sue Jaffe

rid our minds of
all plug-in appliances,
reject the mecca of
the mechanized man. Trap
before we're sterilized
out of the entire
issue?"

Instead I try
this free confessional
detergent, hoping
that you'll feel
the urgency clear through.

It's getting late
for mourning
inequality.
The feminine Mistake
is not the conflict
for careers
but shaped indifference
to neighboring terror, over-
laid fears.

In love
second to none
I celebrate
the product ridding us
of soul pollution. Habits
of consent
have led us to the pass—
the boys
have had us and
their strictly boyish
fun. It's time
to leave the vacuum
and go to work.

The world
debauch of history
needs cleaning up
before we can enjoy
the only
satisfying
difference
in
peace.

—Helene Rosenthal

Vietnam . . . August 11, 1966

15 people die, 182 are wounded
It is a tragedy

because
they are civilian.
15 people die, 182 are wounded
It is a victory
because
they are the enemy.

15 people die, 182 are wounded
It is an atrocity
because
they are ours.
Skin off the labels, taste the darkness
beneath.

Ask a leg if it is civilian,
an eye if it is the enemy,
a tongue if it is ours.
If they do not know, ask Washington—
they have all the answers.

—Eileen Sue Jaffe

Books Received

Poverty Amid Affluence, A Report on a Research Project carried out at the New School for Social Research, by Oscar Ornati. Prepared with the editorial assistance of J. Stouder Sweet. The Twentieth Century Fund, New York. 208 pp.—\$3.25 paperback.

From Metetrich to Hitler, Aspects of British and Foreign History, 1814-1939, edited by W. N. Medlicott. Barnes and Noble, Inc., New York. 267 pp.—\$2.50 paperback.

Vienna in the Age of Franz Josef by Arthur J. May. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla. 154 pp.—\$2.75.

Sex and The College Student, A Developmental Perspective on Sexual Issues on the Campus; Some Guidelines for Administrative Policy and Understanding of Sexual Issues, formulated by the Committee on the College Student, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Athenaeum, New York. 178 pp.—\$2.45 paperback.

The Silk Road by Lucie Boulbois. Translated by Dennis Chamberlain. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York. 250 pp.—\$5.95.

Prison Notes by Barbara Deming. Crossman Publishers, New York. 185 pp.—\$4.95.

Basuto Land by Austin Coates. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London. 139 pp.—\$4.00.

The Day of the Americans by Nerin E. Gun. Elect Publishing Co., New York. 317 pp.—\$6.95.

Eye on Cuba by Edwin Tellow. Harcourt, Brace & World, New York. 291 pp.—\$5.95.

Behind Closed Doors, Politics in the Public Interest by Edward N. Costikyan. Harcourt, Brace & World, New York. 369 pp.—\$6.95.

Whitewash: The Report on the Warren Report by Harold Weisberg. Privately printed by the author, Hyattstown, Md. 208 pp.—\$4.95 paperback.

The New Class Divided, Science and Technology Versus Communism by Albert Parry. The Macmillan Co., New York. 364 pp.—\$8.95.

Third Party Footprints, An Anthology from Writings and Speeches of Midwest Radicals edited by James M. Youngdale, Ross & Haines, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn. 327 pp.—\$6.75.

Report on the John Birch Society, 1966, by Benjamin R. Epstein and Arnold Forster. Random House, New York. 112 pp.—\$3.95 hard cover, \$1.45 paperback.

The Research Handbook: A guide to reference sources by Adrian A. Paradis. Tank & Wagnalls Co., New York. 217 pp.—\$4.95.

Youth in Crisis, A Radical Approach to Delinquency by Otto L. Shaw. Hart Publishing Co., New York. 135 pp.—\$4.95.

The Hidden Assassins by Booth Mooney. Follet Publishing Co., Chicago. 290 pp.—\$4.95.


Between the Lines, A Reporter's Personal Journey Through Public Events by Dan Wakefield. The New American Library, New York. 274 pp.—\$5.95.

E-Thant, The Search for Peace by June Bingham. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. 300 pp.—\$5.95.

The United Nations and How It Works by David Cushman Coyle. New Edition with an Introduction by Hernando Taveres de Sa. Columbia University Press, New York. 256 pp.—\$6.00.

Marxism in Modern France by George Lichtheim. Columbia University Press, New York. 212 pp.—\$6.75.

Panama, Four Hundred Years of Dreams and Cruelty by David Howarth. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York. 298 pp.—\$8.50.



Nationalism in Latin America, Diversity and Unity by Gerhard Masur. The Macmillan Co., New York. 278 pp.—\$5.95.

Western Policy and Eastern Europe, edited by David S. Collier and Kurt Chaser. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago. 245 pp.—\$7.50.

Cultural Frontiers of the Peace Corps, edited by Robert B. Texas. Foreword by Margaret Mead. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 363 pp.—\$6.95.

World Politics and Tension Areas by Felix Gross. New York University Press, New York. 377 pp.—\$10.00.

Liberals and Communism, The "Red Decade" Revisited by Frank A. Warren III. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind. 276 pp.—\$6.95.

A Short History of Ethics by Alastair MacIntyre. The Macmillan Co., New York. 280 pp.—\$2.45 paperback.

The Renaissance Image of Man and the World, edited by Bernard O'Kally. Ohio State University Press, Columbus, Ohio. 186 pp.—\$6.00.

Powers That Be by Beverly Nichols. St. Martin's Press, New York. 240 pp.—\$4.95.

God, Man and Atomic War by Samuel H. Dresner. With a Preface by Admiral Lewis L. Strauss. Living Books, Inc., New York. 227 pp.—\$3.75.

Love and Hate in China by Hans Konigberger. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York. 150 pp.—\$3.95.

Goals, Priorities, and Dollars, The Next Decade by Leonard A. Lecht. The Free Press, New York. 365 pp.—\$5.95.

Berkeley Teachers: Vietnam, Voices and Documents, recorded at the Berkeley Campus of the University of California by Radio Station KPFA, edited, compiled and annotated by Louis Menastine. Folkways Records, New York.

Consumer Finance: A Case History in American Business by Irving S. Mitchellman.

Preface by Leon Henderson, Frederick Fell, Inc., New York. 336 pp.—\$6.00.

Dialectics and Nihilism, Essays on Lessing, Nietzsche, Mann and Kafka, by Peter Heller. The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, Mass. 344 pp.—\$7.00.

An Understanding of Albert Schweitzer by George N. Marshall. Philosophy Library, New York. 180 pp.—\$4.00.

Power and Impotence, The Failure of America's Foreign Policy by Edmund Silliman and William Pfaff. Random House, New York. 244 pp.—\$4.95.

The United Nations Administrative Tribunal by Byung Chul Koh. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, La. 176 pp.—\$4.00.

Human Aims in Modern Perspective, Outlines of a General Theory of Value with Special Reference to Contemporary Social Life and Politics by D. W. Goshalk. 123 pp.—\$4.00.

The Cycle of Civilization, A scientific, deterministic analysis of civilization, its social basis, patterns and projected future by Charles H. Brough. Harlo Press, Detroit, Michigan. 414 pp.—\$5.95.

Look East, Look West: The Socialist Adventure in Yugoslavia by David Torquatus. The Macmillan Co., New York. 310 pp.—\$6.95.

Tales of a Tailor, Humor and Tragedy in the Struggles of the Early Immigrants Against the Serezhob by Sam Lipitin. Translation by Max Rosenfeld, illustrated by William Gropper. Sam Lipitin Book Committee, Bronx, N. Y. 272 pp.—\$3.00.

Reluctant Frontiers, Village Development in Israel by Alex Weingrod. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y. 213 pp.—\$5.75.

Politics in Lebanon, edited by Leonard Binder. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York. 345 pp.—\$8.50.

A Jew in Christian America by Rabbi Arthur Gilbert. Sheed and Ward, New York. 235 pp.—\$4.95.

Pickets at the Gates by Estelle Fuchs. The Free Press, New York. 205 pp.—\$2.95 paperback.

Satin's Failure in China, 1924-1927 by Conrad Brandt. W. W. Norton & Co., New York. 226 pp.—\$1.75 paperback.

Ethics and Society, Original Essays on Contemporary Moral Problems, edited by Richard T. De George. Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N. Y. 217 pp.—\$1.25 paperback.

How Capitalism Can Succeed, A Primer of Economic Choices for People Who Want to Be Both Prosperous and Free by Spencer D. Pollard. Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, Pa. 254 pp.—\$4.95.

Pius XII and the Third Reich, A Documentation by Saul Friedlander. Translated from the French and German by Charles Fullman. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. 238 pp.—\$4.95.

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does not burn people: "defoliation" is just the latest American technique of crop dusting. And since our pilots are not to be blamed for civilian casualties, the fault must be that of the casualties. We are very humanitarian, for when our pilots do "accidentally" bomb civilians, we pay \$33.16 per killed child. (What is the rate for adults, if any?)

The explanation being that simple, I assume that I can now stop worrying about the war, the draft, our country's good name and the possibility of a nuclear hell for the whole world. These worries will now somehow stop torturing me. Thank you, Mr. Steinbeck. San Francisco, Calif. (Mrs.) ZENA DRUCKMAN

TO END THE WAR

We are now engaged in an unwanted and unjust war. We are sending daily hundreds of men to their deaths, and further ravaging a land which has known war for twenty years. We are barbarians who are now bombing innocent villages by "mistake." We are invaders who rally under the flag of democracy while actually stunting that ideal in our efforts. We are men who refuse to accept the facts: if a nation wants Communism, then we must not interfere, for democracy also means freedom of choice. We are hypocrites wandering the world while involving ourselves in situations that do not concern us.

The question now asked is what to do. The answer is worried about the loss of face. To that, one might answer losing a face is better than losing a face, a torso and limbs. Securing a face is preferable to killing innocent people, withdrawing is better than expanding the situation until nuclear war is imminent. And, I feel that when a person admits a mistake, he is respected. By recognizing our fault, we acquire respect.

How do we obtain peace? By recognizing the NLF ("Victory"), North Vietnam, and China. Let our symbol be the dove, not the hawk, which is now worshipped in Washington. We must respect the sovereignty and rights of nations. We must withdraw from Vietnam to save lives, another nation and ourselves. Little Neck, N. Y. JEROME GROPMAN

ALEXANDER DEFENSE COMMITTEE

On behalf of the Alexander Defense Committee, which is aiding victims of oppression in South Africa, I would like to thank you for your protest of the Justice Department order that the A.D.C. register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. We have no doubt that the substantial protest registered by leading organizations and individuals helped to influence the Justice Department in its reconsideration of their order.

Assistant Attorney General Veagley cited a new amendment to the Act, which had been signed by President Johnson on July 4th, as the basis for the Justice Department's withdrawal of their order that we register. However, this new legislation had passed both Houses of Congress before the Internal Security Division had issued its order to us.

We know you share our view that the re-entending of the order represents an important victory for civil liberties generally. It was, of course, essential for the committee's effectiveness in raising funds for the persecuted opponents of apartheid.

Again, thank you for your support. New York, N. Y. ROBERT H. LAMONT

THE BEGINNING OF THE END?

The great tragedy is that so few people read anything that would jar them into doing some thinking on their own. As I talk to people,

it is apparent that they are saturated with propaganda. These people can be convinced that a Communist take-over is imminent although they have never known even one Communist. They see nothing unworthy about our being in Vietnam and killing people over there who never did us any harm.

When Max Barre tells us, practically as a scientific conclusion, as he recently did in his brief memoirs published in the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, that the human race does not have enough intelligence to preserve itself, I tremble at the thought that I may now be observing the beginning of the end. Keokuk, Iowa J. F. HINSON, Esq.

THE OUTSIDE VIEW

We joined the protesters today in demonstrating against the war in Vietnam at the University of Rhode Island, where an honorary degree was conferred upon L. B. Johnson. We faced the strutting arrogance of extraordinarily large contingents of police, presumably there to prevent us from attacking the war-minks while the President dined on to a small audience of political party stoophans, military representatives, a small percentage of the university faculty willing to be compliant, hundreds of boy scouts, some American Legionnaires, a large group of nuns, and several marching societies in garish uniforms. An occasion so obviously contrived could not be anything but cheap and undignified.

We imagined that we were viewing a facet of Americanism with its display of power and contempt for everyone dissenting from the establishment with the same perspective that the whole underprivileged world has of America. From the outside we saw how it looks to the Latin Americans, African Asians, and our own Negro and Puerto Rican minorities. And we were decked with the ugliness of that view. Bradford, R.I. T. GUNNEX

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AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM, A Memorandum of Law prepared by the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam, which appeared in our January and February, 1966 issues, is now available in booklet form. See order form on Page 29.

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AN URGENT MESSAGE

It is no pleasure to have, periodically, to appeal to our readers for financial contributions; I consider our hesitancy to be at least partly my responsibility in that I have not managed to engage in such promotional activities as would sufficiently increase the publication's revenue.

Yet, here I am appealing. I do this for the simple reason that we must not let this publication go under particularly in these fearful days of international terror and peril. This is neither the time nor the place to tell the story behind the story of *The Minority of One*. Our supporters, and especially those who, through financial help, are making this publication possible, would be deeply gratified if I could share with them some facts about the catalytic effect we have had. They would derive satisfaction from certain initiatives that had been undertaken by us—significantly affecting major developments. Prudence dictates that no more be said at this time.

To continue publication as well as the allotted to activities we need to pay up at this time debts in excess of \$20,000. You, our reader and supporter, are of the only group of people to whom we can turn for the needed help. We need it promptly. Whether you can help us with a large sum or only with a small one, we need that help. Your receipt will be of the kind you probably want: future issues of this publication. Hopefully and thankfully, The Editor

Los Angeles Friends of The Minority of One arranges meetings, discussions, and activities. Contact: Tel. NO 6-1757. Portland (Ore.) Friends of The Minority of One. Contact: Tel. 246-5529.

THE PUBLISHERS OF THIS ISSUE

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As Others View It

WAR WITH CHINA

Actually the war with China has already begun. For the moment it unfolds on Vietnamese territory, but that is clearly just an appetizer. Vietnam no longer interests the Americans. It is no longer the issue. This unhappy country only lends itself to two powers full of hate, who have made it an exercise ground. It is the Vietnamese people who absorb the blows, but that is another problem.

The "hawks" figure that the time for procrastination and half-measures is past. It is necessary now to get to the target. According to them, the American presence in Vietnam already has paid dividends throughout the Third World. It has above all damaged China's standing. It is to the American presence that they attribute recent events in Indonesia and Ghana. But that isn't enough. They must cross one more threshold. The enemy, Oh pain, the one who is evil incarnate, is there on the second threshold. All is ready to annihilate him. Just issue an order and an hour later the American bombers can take off in the direction of China.

Le Figaro, Paris

THE GENERAL AND VIETNAM

General de Gaulle has built up a remarkable fund of goodwill among the neutral nations. He recognizes and to a large measure shares their desire to avoid being involved in an ideological struggle between East and West. It is true that the General's record on nuclear weapons, his refusal to sign the Moscow test ban treaty or to join the Geneva disarmament talks, may not endear him to the neutralized. (After Cambodia, he is to make his first visit ever to the French High seas in the Pacific.) But his efforts to escape from the rhetoric of the cold war, to explore the idea of a Europe stretching from the Urals to the Atlantic, and to seek a middle way to Vietnam undoubtedly have a strong appeal.

In the long run the importance of his visit will be to re-emphasize Prince Sihanouk's own neutral position. By the ideological view of Southeast Asian affairs, the so-called domino theory, Cambodia would be the next country to "go" if South Vietnam became Communist. But Prince Sihanouk is no friend of the Americans. Although he pursues an anti-Communist policy internally, in foreign affairs he is closer to the Chinese. As he said a few weeks ago: "By supporting

us politically and diplomatically against our traditional enemies, Thailand and Vietnam, China until now has safeguarded our existence as an independent State." Prince Sihanouk was upset that the Americans rejected the idea of an international conference last year to guarantee Cambodia's borders. (France approved it.) He is now worried over American incursions from Vietnam into Cambodia. If the General can now dramatize the neutralists' fears still further, his visit will be worthwhile.

Manchester Guardian

SOLIDARITY

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the South Viet Nam Liberation Front are fighting against foreign aggression and for the people's right to carry out a revolution.

Therefore, the Vietnamese are fighting for principles concerning all the peoples of the world. For this reason, the Viet Nam struggle has become a matter of great importance for the revolutionary, anti-imperialist movement. This is the way we Cubans look upon the heroic Vietnamese people.

This intolerable aggression upon the Vietnamese people should be considered by all Socialist states as an attack on our own people. This is the way Cuba interprets it. Our people, inspired by the ideology of proletarian internationalism, are determined to give Viet Nam whatever aid circumstances may demand.

The people of Cuba, entrenched 90 miles away from imperialism, once again express their position through the declarations made by our Government to the heroic people of Viet Nam, at a time when Yankee planes are dropping their bombs on the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong.

Granma, Havana

U.S. CLUTCHES

Events in Vietnam have long since ceased to be a subject for ideological atomizing.

It is no longer a question of taking sides in a political controversy. The central fact should now be clear to all but those who are determined not to see. The people of a small Asian country have been struggling for years to free themselves from the clutches of the world's mightiest nation which will not let go of them until they have been totally destroyed.

How else can one explain Dean Rusk's latest statement that the U.S.A. will go on fighting in Southeast Asia until the surrender

or destruction of its enemy, no matter what its critics may say? . . .

Apart from the Ky clique, the only beneficiaries of the American presence in South Vietnam seem to be the local tarts, for whom 140,000 cans of hair spray are reported to have been dispatched as part of the U.S. military supplies. The quantity does suggest a formidable number of potential users and, to that extent, the Americans have perhaps had some success in introducing their way of life into a backward Asian country.

Now, Calcutta

WARNINGS OF WAR

President de Gaulle's speech in Cambodia and U Thant's statement on standing down from the United Nations Secretary-Generalship demonstrate both the growing world concern about the Vietnam war and the frustration involved in seeking a settlement.

An increasing American commitment in South Vietnam—there is talk now of doubling the number of American troops—is bound to stiffen nationalist sentiment against a new form of foreign domination.

The only solution is a neutral Vietnam, in which the Vietnamese settle their own affairs without outside interference.

As usual, President de Gaulle was vague about how this goal was to be reached. But he made one specific proposal which could be helpful. This was his suggestion that the Americans undertake to withdraw their troops within a specified time as a necessary prelude to peace negotiations.

President de Gaulle's proposal is a compromise: it would mean that while the Americans had agreed to withdrawal before peace talks, they would still have troops in the country while such talks were going on.

It was the failure of the US to grasp earlier opportunities of peace talks on Vietnam through U Thant that deepened his frustration and hastened his decision not to seek another term. Yet if the UN is to play any part in ending the Vietnam war and guaranteeing a settlement, U Thant is obviously the best qualified man to act on its behalf in South-East Asia. He might be tempted to stay on as Secretary-General long enough to do so if there were more signs from the great Powers, especially the US and Russia, of their urgent wish for a peace settlement.

The Observer, London