Swept under the secrecy stamp is "Washington got its lines so tangled in Laos that

have played dangerous games with nuchilling evidence that during the past three decades U. S. military leaders

iors by withholding or distorting inforthe military brass sometimes have de-liberately misled their civilian superenough details, however, to report that secret Rand and Institute for Defense to dig out only a few scraps. From top-Pentagon yaults that we have been able Analyses studies, we have collected The evidence is buried so deeply in

a few brief paragraphs. duce voluminous field reports down to reading intelligence digests, which recome distorted in the communications process. Sophisticated intelligence is They confine themselves largely to the easy reading of top policymakers. oversimplified as it is boiled down for More often, the information has be-

the questions they are expected to determs, however, that the policymakers cil meeting, for example, two dozen complex problems may be taken up. couldn't possibly have a full grasp of They are summarized in such simple At a typical National Security Coun-

what the experts privately call "blun-derbuss intelligence." This is stark inpowerful impact that would be softtelligence, stripped of its subleties. Its ened by more sophisticated informa-The simplification process produces

ample, in assessing the Bay of Pigs process led to "terrible errors," for exsources tell us that the simplification catastrophic consequences. Intelligence In the nuclear age, this can have

been the oversimplification and misexpedition. Far more frightening, of course, has

> episodes from the secret studies: information that have brought the U.S. to the nuclear brink: Here are a few

consequences hadn't been so fraught with risk." it would have made splendid comic opera if the

of Quemoy and Matsu islands in 1958. expected Chinese Communist invasion tactical nuclear weapons to repel and superiors into believing it would take column, we reported that the military brass snookered their White House Quemoy-Matsu Crisis—In a recent

nately, the crisis died down before the missiles were unleashed. against the Chinese mainland. The misinformed National Security Council, therefore, tentatively apthe use of nuclear weapons Fortu-

wound up supporting opposites in a rebellion. lines so tangled in Laos in the summer hadn't been so fraught with risk. Dif-ferent U.S. agencies, believe it or not, did comic opera if the consequences of 1960 that it would have made splen-Laos Crisis—Washington got its

aged a young paratroop captain, Kong Le, who then led a rebellion Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department secretly encour-The State Department strongly backed the government of Premier Tiao Samsonith. At the same time, the

Kennedy came to power in 1961 and nam-style war. But the late John F evidence, from different U.S. sources. The confusion led to a crisis, which drew supplies, according to the secret could have involved the U.S. in a Viet-Both Kong Le and Tiao Samsonith

> the remote and mountainous Laos. refused to commit American forces to

of Berlin in 1961 that he sent Lucius acteristically sent Defense Secretary Clay on a special mission to Germany of Robert McNamara to Vietnam in Septo find out what was going on. was so confused by the intelligence out Berlin Crisis—President Kennedy

flicting reports. The President, according to the secret evidence, never really found out. Friction developed between Clay the Berlin field commanders and Joint. Chiefs, who gave the President con-

checkpoints. interference. They could tell how seri-ous the Soviets were by the way they who understood the pattern of Soviet buzzed allied planes and handled the One problem was that Kennedy

a deadly confrontation with the Soviet points to uphold U.S. rights in Berlin. The incident could have precipitated nedy sent 15 tanks through the check-points to uphold U.S. rights in Berlin. Hampered by misinformation, Ken-

sile shipments from entering Cuban waters. A blockade, of course, is an Cuba and prepared to stop Soviet miawith Nikita Khrushchev while the Fentagon lied about what was going Lennedy won a nuclear showdown on. Kennedy threw a blockade around • Cuban Crisis-In 1962, President

to Cuba with missiles and American warships ordered to block their passinge, the President had on his desk a Atlantic between Soviet ships enroute As a confrontation approached in the

> that the risk of nuclear war was 50-50 secret intelligence estimate warning

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15 mm

just blinked." Rusk, then the Secretary of State, remarked grimly: "We've been eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow When the Soviets backed off, Dean

tember 1963, to seek out the facts. tagon until President Kennedy charweapons in the field, wanted to become pumped bad information into the Penmore deeply involved in Vietnam. They brass, eager to test their tactics and Vietnam Crisis — The military

to intervene. advisers, and the U.S. began preparing tary was talked out of it by his military situation to McNamara. But the Secre of his superiors and report the true risked his career to go over the heads An AID official in the Mekong delta

On Aug. 2, 1964, North Vietnamese patrol boats, looking for ships that had raided the North Vietnamese coast, Gulf of Tonkin. No one was hurt; attacked American destroyers in damage was done.

which he used to inflame the nation. Johnson created a phony incident, dubious ingredients, President Lyndon deviation of faulty radar. With these ably never even occurred but was the A second dark-of-night "attack" prob

the truth about the Gulf of Tonkin incident until it was too late. They had no real say about the 60,000 Americans who would die in Vietnam, nor the \$150 billion that the war would cost, sions that would be created at home nor the damage that would be done to national prestige, nor the deep divi-The American people never learned

that have been played in Washington In a future column, we will publish