be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to attain in such a short time by using only the radio and self-study props. Such progress would require people, Weeks asserted--instructors or, at a minimum, persons proficient in the language who would be willing to converse extensively with the student. Oswald supposedly had access to neither formal nor informal tutors.

In 1974 a transcript of an executive session of the Warren Commission was released after a prolonged legal battle by a private researcher. 35 Classified as Top Secret until its release, it contains a reference by Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin to the Commission's efforts, "to find out what he [Oswald] studied at the Monterey School of the Army in the way of languages. 36 There is no known official record of Oswald having studied there. The Monterey School (the Defense Language Institute), located in California, was operational in 1959. It was, and still is, the linguistic West Point for U.S. military and intelligence personnel who need to learn a language thoroughly and quickly. If Oswald studied there, it would explain his phenomenal progress.

The Monterey School is not a self-improvement institution offering courses to anyone who is interested. In 1959 it was a school for serious training relating to government work, not to the academic whims of military or intelligence personnel. Only those with a certain level of aptitude were admitted, and training was in a language selected for the student by the government, according to needs or assignments. 37 If Oswald went there, it would also explain why he was not seen as a threat to

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statistics to indicate that attaining Russian fluency requires more than twice as many hours as did Spanish or French—1,100 hours or more, including instruction. Weeks opined that the kind of progress described in Oswald's case would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to attain in such a short time by using only the radio and self-study props. Such progress would require instructors, Weeks asserted, or, at a minimum, persons proficient in the language who would be willing to converse extensively with the student. Oswald supposedly had no access to either formal or informal tutors.

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In September 1959 Oswald left the Marine Corps—three months ahead of his scheduled discharge. ³⁸ In the first of what was to be a long series of quick and favorable treatment by various government agencies, he was given a dependency discharge because of an injury to his mother. ³⁹ The speed of his release surprised his Marine peers. ⁴⁰ But the Marine Corps was duped, or so it appears; the discharge was obtained on false grounds. Oswald's mother's injury consisted of a jar falling on her toe while at work. She stayed home for a week, but when she returned she did not mention the injury at all, much less describe it as a continuing problem. This incident took place the year before Oswald's dependency discharge. ⁴¹

Perhaps Oswald was in a hurry to get out of the Marines because he had other things to do. In October 1959—one month after his early

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discharge—he was on his way to Moscow to defect. As with mof his defection and his return, his journey to Russia is enign. First, there is the problem of financing. The trip cost at lea

First, there is the problem of financing. The trip cost at lead The Warren Commission decided that Oswald, being frugal, money out of his Marine Corps pay. *2 Before his departure for his bank account contained only \$203. He could have squire \$1,300 in cash and carried it around with him to pay for his trip but by no means impossible); alternatively, his trip could but by no means impossible); alternatively, his trip could but by someone. Friends and relatives claim not to but him any money during this period, but perhaps someone else

Second, there is the problem of Oswald's itinerary. He England on October 9 and left October 10, according to his stamped at the London airport. ⁴³ His next destination was He route to Moscow. He arrived there on October 11. But the available commercial flight that would have gotten him there the Either his nest egg of cash was bigger than anyone imagined to hire private air transport—or he was flown to Helsinki by mercial aircraft, private or military.

After arriving in Moscow in October 1959, he told Soviet chis desire for Soviet citizenship. The officials were unimprobably more than a bit suspicious. They rejected his requestenship and ordered him to leave Moscow within two hours. Alleged response to this rejection was to slit his left wrist. He was alleged response to this rejection was to slit his left wrist. He was to a hospital by a Soviet Intourist guide who found him bleed hotel room. He was then confined to a psychiatric hospital Soviet decided his fate. Certainly they must have debated who wald was an authentic defector or a spy. This was an era in United States and the Soviet Union were playing extensive swith ostensible defectors.

After waiting several days for the Soviets to make up their mind decided to take action. He went to the U.S. Embassy in Mosc he denounced the United States, praised the Soviet Union, a that he wanted to renounce his U.S. citizenship. ⁴⁷ He also made very dramatic announcement: he stated that he had offered to Soviets radar secrets that he had learned in the Marines. He arinously that he "might know something of special interest," ar reference to the U-2. ⁴⁸

This action seems counterproductive on Oswald's part. To n threats to the U.S. Embassy might cause officials to panic, to extraordinary means to stop the young Marine from spilling such the U.S. Embassy did not previously know of Oswald's accomplete.

am Anson, "They've Killed the President" (New York: Bantam,

ichard B. Russell (Dem., GA), Rep. Gerald Ford (Rep., MI). gee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York: Bantam, 1975). ohn J. McCloy (coordinator of disarmament activities in the nistration), Sen. John Sherman Cooper (Rep., KY), Allen W. ission members: Chief Justice Earl Warren, Rep. Hale Boggs st, Warren Commission Executive Session, January 22, 1964

elin, Final Disclosure (New York: Charles Scribners & Sons

re Session Transcript, January 27, 1964

nse Thomas S. Gates, June 2, 1960. and/or Henry Hurt interviewed several of the men who worked gs, "Events Incident to the Summit Conference," p. 124, Senate ons Committee, 86th Congress, 2nd Session. Testimony by Secof Oswald's experience, as described here, are taken from J. Ed-Legend (New York: Bantam, 1966), unless otherwise specified.

1 Report, p. 609. n the Atsugi radar bubble (Epstein, Legend).

cument MI 62-1178, DL 89-43. November 30, 1963 interview owers, Oswald's Atsugi squadron leader, p. 3.

1, Legend, p. 280

Reasonable Doubt, p. 200

ny Summers, Conspiracy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978). "They've Killed the President," p. 157.

ks, 1964), p. 122. Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: "They've Killed the President," p. 157.

am R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance (New York: Dial Press,

Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Op-Respect to Intelligence, Investigation into the Assassination of

> ing Office, 1976), pp. 58-59.
> 20. Wise and Ross, Invisible Government, pp. 122-24.
> 21. HSCA Report, p. 220. President John F. Kennedy, DOUK V (VI asimisbury)

22. Summers, Conspiracy, p 156; HSCA IX, p. 603; HSCA VIII, pp. 313-

15; HSCA XIX, p. 601.

own research confirmed the use of such a ploy by British intelligence, as far back as World War I. 23. Summers too notes this possibility; Summers, Conspiracy, p. 156. His

24. HSCA Report, p. 220.

VIII, p. 298.

VIII, p. 232.

HSCA XI, p. 84

XXIII, p. 796.

Warren Report, p. 685

Ibid., p. 611.

interest in Marxism in high school and occasionally extolled Communism and encouraged the youths to join the Marines. Implicitly, the Commission seemed squadron in New Orleans headed by anti-Communist zealot David Ferrie, who As will be described in Chapter 4, he was a member of the Civil Air Patrol Yet he became possessed by an urgent desire to join the Marines at age sixteen. debunked capitalism (Report, pp. 362, 381, 383, 385-86, 690; XXII, p. 812). to view Oswald's Marxism as a linear development from his high school days. But this alleged high school interest may have been rechannelled in the Civil which have somehow rung false [about Oswald]." p. 143. Says Summers, Voebel's statement "recalls the plethora of incidents his former school friend Edward Voebel as "baloney." (See Summers, Conspiracy Air Patrol toward the Marine Corps and from there, toward a life of intrigue. Moreover, the assertions of Oswald's high school Marxism were described by 31. Ibid., p. 612. According to the Commission, Oswald manifested some

32. Epstein, Legend, pp. 86-89.

guages, Southeastern Massachusetts University, February 18, 1981. 34. Interview with Professor James Weeks, Department of Modern Lan-

Transcript, Warren Commission Executive Session, January 27, 1964.

37. Telephone inquiry, Public information Office, Defense Language Insti-

tute, Monterey, CA, Feb. 18, 1981.

38. Warren Report, pp. 613-14.

Ibid., p. 614.

40. VIII, p. 257

XVI, p. 337; CD 107, p. 37

43. XVIII, p. 162. See Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 331. Warren Report, p. 367.