Talks vs. Anti

By Morton Mintz , Washington Post Staff Writers

a Senate hearing yesterday how for a decade he had laid groundwork to ensure that the Justice Department would not prosecute major oil companies for joining to deal with oilproducing countries.

John J. McCloy said he had alerted President Kennedy to a possible need for "concerted jor oil companies." action" in 1961, a year after the occurrence of "a rather tion of the Organization of Pe-(OPEC).

Kennedy, concerned after a jolting encounter with Soviet Laren. the possibility of a political was to review a message ma-confrontation in the Middle jor oil companies wanted to East, "right then and there made an arrangement" for Mc-Cloy to see Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, McCloy told the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corpora-

McCloy was then an adviser to President Kennedy, who had asked him to set up a system for arms control. At the same time, he was a member of the New York law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, which has repre: sented as many as 23 oil companies at a time.

McCloy told how he had appraised Robert Kennedy and each succeeding Attorney General through John N. Mitchell that the time could come when the companies would need a business review "enforcement intention' letter from the Justice Department.

McCloy said that time came in January, 1971, after OPEC countries had agreed on a 50 to 55 per cent.

Mitchell, in a deposition made public by subcommittee chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho), said his predecessor, Ramsey Clark, had informed him of an "understanding" between the department and ma-

In 1969 and 1970 Mitchell had five conversations with startling phenomenon"; forma McCloy, his log showed. On troleum Exporting Countries Jan. 13, 1971, they talked by amounted to that. phone and then met, joined by antitrust chief Richard W. Mc-

Premier Khrushchev about The purpose of the meeting was to review a message masend to the OPEC nations, saying they intended to deal with its members in the Persian Gulf and with Libya in a single negotiation. By avoiding dual negotiations, the companies hoped to prevent the Gulf playing leapfrog with prices.

This was "the only hope for offsetting a "concerted onrush of government demands" from OPEC, McCloy testified.

An oil industry lawyer and in their share of profits from McLaren said the department former presidential adviser told 50 to 55 per cent.

"does not presently intend to "does not presently intend to take action under the antitrust laws with respect to this agreement or the actions con-templated therein," but "reserves the right to take action in the future" if events

dictate. McCloy insisted that this and other such letters, ob-tained purely out of an "abundance of caution," were not a waiver of the antitrust laws. But Church said they

Later in January, 1971, the oll companies sent the mes-sage to OPEC and dispatched two negotiators to Iran. There, they were stunned to find that, despite a decade of careful preparation by McCloy in Washington, the principle of a single negotiation was not favored by Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, who had agreed with the Iranians that dual negotiations were to be preferred. He had become "more countries and Libya from Persian than the Persians, McCloy remarked in a joking tone.

> In addition, Under Secre tary of State John N. Irwin II, who rushed to Iran after Mc-Cloy had requested State De-partment help, surprisingly recommended to Washington that negotiations be split.

The companies then yielded. a decision that was followed by a succession of tougher OPEC demands.

McCloy himself was worried at the time. In a cable obtained by the subcommittee, he warned of "the chain reaction inherent in separate negotiations"

Yesterday, however, McClov said the industry had made

Two days later, in a busi- the decision "on its own rejoint demand for an increase ness review letter to McCloy, sponsibility, irrespective of what the government did." Until the Arab-Israeli war last October, the decision had

worked out well, he said.

But a skeptical Church revealed that Irwin, in a closed hearing, had said that if the government had held fast for one negotiation, the Iranians would have gone along.

"We probably would have done better if we had held the fort," McCloy acknowledged.



By Ken Fell—The Washington Post
John J. McCloy: warned of "chain reaction" on oil.