

all-out "quarantine"—economically, politically, and culturally—of the Castro regime. I said that the time for war was over, that we must move vigorously—if possible, in association with our sister American republics—to a "cancer" in our own hemisphere and "to prevent Soviet penetration." Our government was even then, I felt, planning "a number of steps" and "will very probably take the strongest possible economic measures to overcome economic hardship being fast-tracked by this regime over our country and our citizens."

We flew back North late that night and on Wednesday, October 19, Kennedy and I were co-speakers at Cardinal Spellman's annual Alfred E. Smith Memorial. Kennedy spoke first and read a speech which, with this distinguished audience well in mind, he carried off with an incredible display of bad judgment. As the nonpartisan, nonpartisan affair, he proceeded to make were obviously partisan political overtones. When spoke extemporaneously, all I had to do to top his performance was to avoid any statement that smacked of partisanship. The effect was easily predictable. He had received his applause. I received a prolonged ovation.

Kennedy himself referred ruefully to this incident when met in Miami immediately after the election. He was discussing voting patterns among Catholics and he pointed out the economics rather than religious primarily determined how those wealthy Catholics reacted at the Al Smith Dinner in New York.

I had reserved Thursday for preparations for the four-day and final television debate. Foreign policy was to be the subject for discussion, and I knew that this was a major opportunity for me to move ahead—not only in the debate series but in the campaign itself. But Kennedy, recognizing that my Miami speech had taken most of the wind out of his sails on the Cuban issue, chose this day before the fourth debate for a major counterattack of his own. King Mack headlines in all the afternoon papers put it succinctly:

KENNEDY ADVOCATES U.S. INTERVENTION IN CUBA
CALLS FOR AID TO REBEL FORCES IN CUBA

I could hardly believe my eyes. As early as September 22 Kennedy had given an exclusive statement to the Scripps Howard papers in which he said, "The forces fighting the

forces in exile and in the mountains of Cuba should be armed and assisted." But he had not followed up by advertising what was, in effect, direct intervention in Cuba in violation of our treaties with other Latin American countries. Now, on October 20, he said:

Just attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far, these freedoms have had virtually no support from our gov-

ernment as I saw the story and read the statement I asked Seaton to come to my hotel room. I knew that President Seaton had arranged for Kennedy to receive regular reports by Allan Dulles, Director of the CIA, on all covert operations around the world, as well as on the latest intelligence estimates—precisely so he would be as well aware as I was our policies and programs were. I asked Seaton to call the White House at once on the security line and find out whether or not Dulles had briefed Kennedy on the fact that for months the CIA had not only been supporting and assisting but actually training Cuban exiles for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself.

Seaton reported back to me in half an hour. His answer: Kennedy had been briefed on this operation.

Senator Kennedy was briefed on Cuba by CIA representatives on July 14, 1960, at Executive Park, Massachusetts. Press accounts at the time claimed Elgi has been in a "nothing withheld manner" on the "two hot spots, Cuba and the Congo." The New York Times on July 24 reported, "... Such a candid disclosure as was asked to the Senator's fund of knowledge about the situation in Cuba will remain secret. But it provides guidance for his campaign in response to dealing with foreign policy and defense, and it puts him on the same footing as the Administration's candidates, presumably Vice President Johnson."

However, after the publication of the first edition of this book, the White House issued a statement on March 20, 1963, denying that the two-and-a-half-hour briefing covered any United States operations relating to Cuba. On March 21, I made the following statement: "Because the Cuban case was such an important case in the campaign, I personally researched the facts relating to it. The statements in my book, *The Crisis*, were based not only on the public press accounts of the briefing President Kennedy received during the campaign in 1960, but on personal conversations with responsible individuals who had knowledge of the facts.

President Eisenhower has authorized me to state that, following the question he had established in 1954, he had given instructions that, in regard to U.S. intelligence activities abroad, Senator Kennedy was to be fully briefed on our foreign problems as I was.

"Beyond that I have no further statement. My book speaks for itself."