

*Secret Service Statements*

Statements of Witnesses - Roy H. KELLERMAN, March 9, 1964, 2 H 62-112  
Testimony

This then-assistant special agent in charge of the White House detail, 48 years old, was in his 23rd year of service with the Secret Service following an apprenticeship with the Michigan State Police. The first several pages are taken up with his background, education (high school), the early part of the day of Nov. 22, 1963, and details of the Presidential car, etc. (to and including part of P.67) He then is lead into a discussion of the organization and facilities of the motorcade, including its communications equipment and composition. (67-8)

On the important item of othe space between the Presidential and the followup cars, which other agents place in the neighborhood <sup>of</sup> 20 to 25 feet, Kellerman said, "...I would say, from the practice of that driver that he has, five feet would be a maximum." His emphasis was even greater (p.73) when he said of the followup car, "I am positive it was right on our rear wheels."

Discussion of the progress of the motorcade (pp.69-73).

After making the turn onto Elm St., Kellerman said they had no more than passed the first sign (since removed) when he heard "a report like a firecracker pop". He said he turned his head to the right because he was sure the sound came from "the right and perhaps into the rear." He believes he heard the President say, "My God, I am hit." And he said, "I turned around and he has got his hands up here like this." (p.73)

I am not in a position to completely contradict Mr. Kellerman, but from what I can see of the printed Zapruder films, his recollection is in error as to when he turned.

Kellerman then said he had seen enough to know the President was hit and "So, in the same motion I <sup>9</sup>came right back and grabbed the

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speaker and said to the driver, 'Let's get out of here; we are hit,' and grabbed the mike and I said ... " to Lawson in the lead car to get to the hospital immediately. Continuing, "Now, in the seconds that I talked just now, a flurry of shells come into the car. I then looked back and this time Mr. Hill, who was riding on the left front bumper of our followup car, was on the back truck of that car; the President was sideways down into the back seat."

Again Kellerman's recollection is unsupported by that of others. It is extremely improbable that he issued the instructions and grabbed the radio mike in the interval between the first and second shots.

Note, however, that he referred to "flurry of shells". (p.75)  
He repeated the <sup>hr</sup> phrase properly, "flurry of shot" on the next page.

Of the shots after the first, he said there were 2 together, "like a double bang". He described the interval between the second and third shots as that of a sonic boom in which the two overpressures can be distinguished. These are so close together that frequently only one is heard on the ground. He said that after he spoke to Lawson by radio, he looked around and saw Special Agent Hill on the back of the Presidential car. This would seem to indicate again Kellerman's radio call was later than he recalled. (p.76)

Hill was not only on the car, he was across the trunk with Mrs. Kennedy. I do not believe it is important, but other testimony also indicates that the first instructions came from the followup car.

After describing the splatter from the President's shot in the head, Kellerman reemphasizes the short space between the second and third shots. (p.77)

Again he emphasizes this, again with the sonic boom comparison, and is very definite in his language. He referred to them as "two

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sharp reports." He also said that definitely there was a difference between the sound of the first and the sound of the second and third shots.

Under questioning, he addresses himself to the number of shots. His Conclusion, of course, is mine:

"Mr. Specter. Mr. Kellerman, you said earlier that there were at least two additional shots. Is there any area in your mind or possibility, as you recollect that situation, that there could have been more than two shots, or are you able to say with any certainty?

Mr. Kallerman. I am going to say that I have, from the firecracker report and the two other shots that I know, those were three shots. Mr. But, Mr. Specter, if President Kennedy had from all reports four wounds, Governor Connally three, there have got to be more than three shots, gentlemen." (p.78)

When asked, he repeated it, with the conclusion, "There have got to be more than three shots." (p.78) Under questioning he persists in using the description, "Flurry".

He has no independent recollection of the number of shots. Specter then argues with him about the number of wounds, saying Kellerman's "characterization is only lay opinion", to which Kellerman agrees. When Specter wants to continue this discussion about the wounds, Kellerman asks if they can't proceed logically with the trip to the hospital, to which Specter agreed.

He knew Connally was alive because Connally responded to conversation. The stretchers were out immediately and they put the Governor onto the first stretcher. Then they got Mrs. Connally and then Mrs. Kennedy, and Hill laid his coat "over the President's face and shoulder." Hill, Kellerman and two other people unknown to Kellerman put the President

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on the other stretcher. He was wheeled into the hospital, accompanied by Kellerman and Hill. The President was taken to the right, Connally to the left. Kellerman said, "I did not see any wound" in the President's face, and Speer noted in the record, "Indicating with your hand at that moment the front part of his face?" to which Kellerman replied, "Right, sir." (p.79)

This is interesting in view of Dr. McClelland's statement about the wound in the left temple that was fatal and Kellerman's subsequent reference. It is interesting that Speer cared to limit the part of the front of the President's head on which there was a visible wound. (p.79)

Kellerman did not see any of the President's back or the back of his head.

He describes what transpired when he left the emergency room. Kellerman describes the means by which he phoned the White House and recounts the disagreement he had on time with Gerald Behn. Kellerman told Behn to write down the time, Behn wrote down 41 minutes after the hour, Kellerman remembers 38.

Without any further identification than appears in the record at this point, there may in fact be no disagreement because the exact moment referred to is never described. If Behn was talking about the time he was told to write down the time, and if Kellerman was talking about the time of arrival at the hospital, there would not only be no conflict, but they would apparently be in agreement. Kellerman then goes into a description of the President's wounds as he observed them in the morgue at the Naval Hospital that night. (p.80)

He describes the large area of the skull that was missing and its general outline. He decides, apparently based on what he learned

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at the hospital or in the autopsy report, that the wound on the back of the head was the point of entry for the larger wound. Obviously, he had no way of knowing this for himself, but he is allowed to testify to it. In representing this wound:

"Mr. Specter. Indicating the bottom of the hairline immediately to the right of the ear about the lower third of the ear?

Mr. Kellerman. Right. But it was in the hairline, sir.

Mr. Specter. In his hairline?

Mr. Kellerman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Near the end of his hairline?

Mr. Kellerman. Yes, sir." (p.81)

Note the line of this injury is described by Specter as "about the lower third of the ear."

Exhibits 385 and 386 actually have this wound extending above the top of the ear. I have no way of knowing which is right, nor do I have any reason to believe that Kellerman made a precise enough observation. I point out the conflict because there are other substantial reasons for doubting the accuracy of the ~~xxxxxx~~ representation in Exhibits 385 and 386. Note again that it was near the end of the hairline. Any good photograph of the President can identify that point.

Then to the wound that Kellerman initially called a shoulder wound and which the Commission persistently calls a neck wound:

"Mr. Kellerman. The other wound that I noticed was on his shoulder.

Mr. Specter. Which shoulder.

Mr. Kellerman. Right shoulder/

Mr. Specter. And was it - what was its general position with respect to the breadth of the back?

Mr. Kellerman. Right straight.

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Mr. Specter. No. Upper shoulder, lower shoulder; how far below the lower neckline would you say?

Mr. Kellerman. The upper neckline, sir, in that large muscle between the shoulder and the neck, just below it."(p.81)

Rightly or wrongly, here again Kellerman is in dispute with the artistry of Bethesda Naval Hospital. He described it as "below" the muscle between the shoulder and the neck. The artist's drawing has this wound just barely<sup>not</sup>/missing the President's body entirely. Kellerman's reference to the anterior neckwound is interesting. He says of it that "I will have to collaborate/<sup>with</sup>- the medical people in Dallas said that he had entry in the throat or an exit."

It is never possible to reach into a man's mind, but if the doctors had told him they didn't know whether it was a wound of entry or exit, he would never have ~~made~~ phrased it in this fashion. It seems to me that he has begun by saying exactly what the doctors told him, that the anterior wound was one of entry, and then corrected himself because he knew why he should. (p.81)

There is further discussion about the wounds that Kellerman saw or didn't see at Dallas, how Hill covered the President with his coat down to the President's waistline "to eliminate any gruesome pictures", and that when last Kellerman saw the President in the emergency room the President's tie and collar were still in place. Kellerman said he never saw any blood in this area of the President's body or any place else on front.

Technically, this may be true, since he said the President was entirely covered; but how he could have avoided seeing the blood on the shirt is difficult to understand. (p.82)

Kellerman also did not observe any holes in the President's clothing

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on the front. There is then discussion of Gov. Connally's wounds, of which Kellerman has no personal knowledge. (p.83)

Kellerman saw that Gov. Connally's hand, which he said the Governor had lying on his stomach as he was being wheeled in, was bloody, but he recalled no blood on the stomach part of the Governor's body.

In view of the fact that on p.79 Kellerman identified himself as one of the 3 men who lifted the Governor from the car and put him on the stretcher, this previously cited incident and several other ~~many~~ inaccurate recollections by Kellerman would seem to identify him as not the most precisely accurate observer.

The Commission's questioning then goes into the damage to the Presidential vehicle. Kellerman identifies a damage to the area of the frame around the windshield between the visors when the visors are raised upward, as was the case at Dallas (Exhibit 349, 16 H 945). He did not notice this until "upward of the 27th" or any time beginning 5 days after the assassination. The car was then in the White House garage and the windshield was about to be removed. Kellerman said he had no occasion to examine the windshield area between the assassination and the 27th. (p.84)

From the inside, the injury, which is described as an "indentation", is "directly to the right of the mirror holder." It would thus be helpful to know where the Mirror is located because it would seem improbable that, had the object causing this damage come from straight back or anything close to that direction, the question of damage to the mirror might become pertinent. There is no discussion of the mirror or its location, hence, we do not know.

There is likewise no discussion of the extent of this damage, its depth, etc. The picture is as unclear as most of the Commission's

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photographs, but it seems as though a <sup>piece</sup>~~piece~~ of chrome has been raised upward a half-inch or more for a length of perhaps 3 inches, tapering toward the edge.

When asked what prompted him to make this investigation on or about Nov. 27, Kellerman replies:

"Mr. Kellerman. First, Mr. Congressman, I wanted to look this car over for - let me go back a little bit. When this car was checked over that night for its return to Washington, I was informed the following day of the pieces of these missiles that were found in the front seat, and I believe aside from the skull, that was in the rear seat, I couldn't conceive even from elevation how this shot hit President Kennedy like it did. I wanted to view this vehicle, whether this was a slant blow off the car, whether it hit the car first and then hit him, or what other marks are on this vehicle, and that is what prompted me to go around and check it over myself.

Representative Ford. Had anybody told you of this indentation prior to your own personal investigation?

Mr. Kellerman. Not of the windshield<sup>el</sup>; no, sir.

Representative Ford. You were the first one to find this indentation?

Mr. Kellerman. I believe I am the first one who noticed this thing up on the bar." (p.85)

If it is true, as Kellerman says without contradiction, that he was the first to notice this, one can only ask what kind of examination did this car get?

The Commission then goes into a lengthy discussion of the damage to the windshield itself, apparently from the inside. (p.85) This extends for several pages and includes a discussion of added damage and



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removal of the windshield.

Then they return to Kellerman's reasons for believing there were more than 3 bullets. He says, "when they examined that vehicle that night when it was brought back to Washington, D. C., two pieces of a bullet or bullets were found on the passengers side of the floor of the right front seat." He was told this by Agent Floyd Boring. They also found a ~~piece~~<sup>piece</sup> of the president's skull that night. Kellerman does not say and is not asked at what point in the car. Kellerman concluded the evidence found in the car was turned over to the FBI "because they were assigned to going over the car."

If the Secret Service found this evidence that night, and if Kellerman five days or more later found unreported damage to the vehicle, what kind of examination was made? (p.90) There is further discussion of Gov. Connally's wounds and some of the Zapruder films. (p.91)

Kellerman saw the Zapruder films in color and some black and white films. Kellerman marks in red on Exhibit 347 the point at which he believed the President's car was at the time of the first bullet and at the time of the second and third bullets. He describes this as a "guess", and the mark for the second and third bullets he said is about the same.

He ~~has~~<sup>is</sup> asked an FBI REPORT dated December 10, 1963, referring to an interview allegedly with him by Special Agent Francis X. O'Neill, Jr., and James W. Sibert quoting Kellerman as having said that, on hearing a shot, he immediately turned around and looked past Gov. Connally directly in back of him to the President and quotes the President as saying "get me to a hospital". (p.92)

He denies having said the President said this. He also denied having been interviewed by these agents, but said they were present at

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the Naval Hospital with him, on the night of the 22nd. He was interviewed, he said, around the 27th. He recalls only one discussion with them at the Naval Hospital:

"Mr. Kellerman. ... this was before we even knew that a shell had been found from the hole in the President's <sup>shoulder</sup>~~shoulder~~. We couldn't determine what happened to it. They couldn't find it in the morgue; they couldn't find any leeway as to whatever happened to the shell when it hit the President's shoulder; where did it go. So our contention was that while he was on the stretcher in Dallas, and the neurosurgeon was working over him no doubt with pressure on the heart, this thing worked itself out.

Mr. Specter. When you say 'our contention,' what do you mean by that?

Mr. Kellerman. One of these agents - I forget which one it was; it could have been Sibert or O'Neill, but I am not sure." (p.93)

Note Kellerman refers to this bullet as the one that "had been found from the hole in the President's shoulder." He refers to this again shortly. With further respect to the autopsy:

"Mr. Kellerman. There were three gentlemen who were performing this autopsy. A Colonel Finck - during the examination of the President, from the hole that was in his shoulder, and with a probe, and we were standing right alongside of him, he is probing inside the shoulder with his instrument and I said, 'Colonel, where did it go?' He said, 'There are no lanes for an outlet of this entry in this man's shoulder.'

Mr. Specter. Did you say anything in response to that?

Mr. Kellerman. I said, 'Colonel, would it have been possible that while he was on the stretcher in Dallas that it works itself out?' And he said, 'Yes.'" (p.93)

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Note that Col. Finck is doing the probing, Not Cdr. Humes. Col. Finck, then, was not just an observer. (p.93)

There is then discussion of the head wound, following which they return to the shoulder wound. Kellerman consistently refers to the lower posterior wound as a shoulder wound, as the Commission consistently refers to it (except on the few occasions when they slip) as a neck wound. He said all comments made about the path of the bullet, which here Specter refers to as "into Mr. Kennedy's back", were made by Col. Finck who, Kellerman says, "did all the talking, sir. He was the only one."

Again Specter questions him about the FBI report and Specter directs his attention "to the issue about which way you turned." The report does not say which way he turned, but apparently the inference is he turned to his left, and Specter asks, "did that describe a turn to the right or to the left?" (p.94).

Kellerman said he will "stand on my original statement" that he had ~~made~~ made during his testimony, and he insists he never told anybody he turned anyway except to the right. He also insists the Zapruder films coincide with this. He identifies two photographs (Exhibits 352 and 353, 17 H 4948). He describes these as views of the back seat of the Presidential car after the occupants were removed. He does not know when the picture was taken and says it could have been taken at the White House garage. He says they show blood and flower petals. (p.95)

The discussion then turns to what happened at the hospital, what agents took up what positions inside the hospital, and their ~~preparations~~ <sup>preparations</sup> for the return to Washington.

Kellerman then voluntarily goes into the question of the removal of the body from Dallas, describing the visit of an unnamed gentleman

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who:"... came into the little doctor's room, his name I don't recall, but he represented himself to be from the Health Department or commission, some form. He said to me, he said, 'There has been a homicide here, you won't be able to remove the body. We will have to take it down there to the mortuary and have an autopsy.' I said, 'No, we are not.' And he said, 'We have a law here whereby you have to comply with it.'

"With that Dr. Burley walked in, and I said, 'Doctor, this man is from some health unit in town. He tells me we can't remove this body.' The Doctor became a little enraged; he said, 'We are removing it.' He said, 'This is the President of the United States and there should be some consideration in an event like this.' And I told this gentleman, I said, 'You are going to have to come up with something a little stronger than you to give me the law that this body can't be removed.'

"So, he frantically called everybody he could think of and he hasn't got an answer; nobody is home. Shortly he leaves this little room and it seems like a few minutes he is back and he has another gentleman with him, and he said, 'This is' - the name escapes me - he said, 'He is a judge here in Dallas,' and he said, 'He will tell you whether you can remove this body or not.' I said, 'It doesn't make any difference. We are ~~gone~~ going to move it,' and I said, 'Judge, do you know who I am?'

"And he said, 'Yes,' and I said, 'There must be something in your thinking here that we don't have to go through this agony; the family doesn't have to go through this. We will take care of the matter when we get back to Washington.' The poor man looked at me and he said, 'I know who you are,' and he said, 'I can't help you out.' I said, 'All right, sir.' But then I happened to look to the right and I can see the

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casket coming on rollers, and I just left the room and let it out through the emergency entrance and we got to the ambulance and put it in, shut the door after Mrs. Kennedy and General McHugh and Clinton Hill in the rear part of ~~the~~ this ambulance.

"I am looking around for Mr. Greer and I don't spot him directly because I want to get out of here in a hurry, and I recognize Agent Berger and I said, 'Berger, you get in the front seat and drive and, Mr. Stout, you get in the middle and I will get on this side,' and as <sup>are</sup> we ~~were~~ leaving - Mr. Lawson, I should say, was in a police car that led us away from Parkland Memorial Hospital. As we are leaving a gentleman taps on the driver's window and they roll it down and he says, 'I will meet you at the ~~the~~ mortuary.' 'Yes, sir.' We went to the airport, gentlemen." (pp96-7)

This version by Kellerman is not completely consistent with other versions. It makes it clear that Kellerman was determined the President's body had to go to Washington immediately, regardless of any provision of Texas law.

After describing briefly the trip to the airport and the provisions <sup>in</sup> made ~~for~~ the plane to accommodate the casket, there is this exchange:

"Mr. Specter. Was <sup>there</sup> ~~there~~ any further difficulty of any sort -

Mr. Kellerman. No.

Mr. Specter. Imposed by any Texas officials on the removal of the body?

Mr. Kellerman. No, sir. Whatever happened to the hearse, I don't know. I never left the plane." (p.97)

Then follows discussion of what happened on the plane, who was present at the swearing-in, its departure from Dallas and arrival in Washington, and things he did on the way (p.98), especially in making

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arrangements. The details of the trip to the hospital and who accompanied him and the President's body. During the autopsy, he was asked if he left that room, and he replied that he did on 3 different occasions, each one for a minute or two, to make a phone call. And:

"Mr. Kellerman. OK. First I was informed by a Navy personnel that I should call Mr. Rowley. There wasn't any phone - there was a phone in the room, but I wasn't aware of it at the time. So, I left and walked out into the corridor and called him. This was my first knowledge that they had found a projectile. The second call, I think I called home; that was my first call to home and that was it.

Mr. Specter. Now, the projectile that you just referred to was found where?

Mr. Kellerman. This was the projectile that was reportedly given to our Special Agent Richard Johnsen as we were leaving the hospital in Dallas." (p.99)

Kellerman said he obtained this information about 9 o'clock. The bullet apparently had come into the possession of the Secret Service much earlier. (p.99)

He decided to call Secret Service Agent Hill into to view the President's body because he thought it would be better to have more witnesses.

Of the X-rays of the head: "Yes, of the numerous X-rays that were taken mainly of the skull, the head. The reason for it was that through all the probing which these gentlemen were trying to pick up little pieces of evidence in the form of shell fragments, they were unable to locate any. From the X-rays, when you placed the X-ray up against the light the whole head looked like a little mass of stars, there must have been 30, 40 lights where these pieces were so minute that they

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couldn't be reached. However, all through this series of X-rays this was the one that they found, through X-ray that was above the right eye, and they removed that." (p.100)

The fragment that was removed from behind the President's eye he described as about the tip of a matchhead or a little larger.

The afternoon session began with a recapitulation of parts of Kellerman's morning testimony. In addition, he is asked about whether he saw a priest at the hospital (two). He said there were no stretcher bearers at the hospital, whereas the stretchers were ready and waiting to come ~~xxxxx~~ out, and although he said, "I did not at any time see a man in a white uniform outside, indicating a medical person." In fact, there was a nurse with at least the President's stretcher, and doctors were all inside the emergency rooms waiting. I cite this again to show that Kellerman's observations are not precise. He had other things on his mind, other responsibilities, and he has been asked to testify about things which he either had no reason to recall or does not accurately recall.

He is then asked about the autopsy (p.102) and based on estimates he thought they were at the Naval Hospital at about 7 o'clock. He figured that at the latest the autopsy began at 7:30, that he and the family left the hospital at 3:56 a.m., prior to which the undertaking people had spent perhaps 2 hours with the President's body; hence, he reasoned the autopsy itself was completed by 2 o'clock in the morning, and that the actual autopsy work consumed 4-1/2 to 5 hours. He was present all the time except as previously described, and he was there during the time the funeral director's personnel was preparing the body.

He has some interesting comments to make when asked about the autopsy itself:

"Mr. Specter. Now, with respect to the time you were present at the autopsy, was there any conversation of any sort concerning the possibility of a point of entry from the front of the President's body?"

Mr. Kellerman. No." (p.103)

When Specter changes the subject, Kellerman asks to elaborate on the answer he had just given:

"Mr. Kellerman. Just for the record, I wish to have this down. While the President is in the morgue, he is lying flat. And with the part of the skull removed, and the hole in the throat, nobody was aware until they lifted him up that there was a hole in his shoulder. That was the first concrete evidence that they knew that the man was hit in the back first.

Mr. Specter. When did they lift him up and first observe the hole in the shoulder?

Mr. Kellerman. They had been working on him for quite some time, Mr. Specter -- through the photos and other things they do through an autopsy. And I believe it was this Colonel Finck who raised him and there was a clean hole.

Mr. Specter. What was said, if anything, by those present at the autopsy concerning the wound in the throat?

Mr. Kellerman. To go back just a little further, the reason for the hole in the throat, the tracheotomy; I am thinking they were of the opinion that when the - when he was shot in the head, and they had found this piece remaining above the eye underneath; I am sure there was some concern as to where the outlet was, and whether they considered - this is all an assumption now; whether they considered this - that there was a hole/<sup>here</sup>in the throat prior to the tracheotomy, I don't know. But to complete the examination, they lifted him up by the shoulders, and there was this hole. ..." (p.103)



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This does put the autopsy and the experts conducting it in somewhat of a different light than was cast upon them by the Commission. It is understandable that the doctors at Parkland, once their patient was dead and to be taken away from them, would have had no reason to lift the body. This is not understandable at the time of the autopsy. It raises the question in my mind that perhaps is prompted by my knowledge that the autopsy report, in part, is based upon newspaper accounts of dubious authenticity and secondhand information obtained by telephone after the completion of the autopsy. The inference is clear: The doctors were seeking to establish a case, not to learn independently what they could, in order to provide a precise, scientific description and conclusion based exclusively upon their own examination. (p.103)

Kellerman is then asked about his own reactions on the scene, whether in retrospect he thinks he should have tried to jump upon the President to protect him from further injury (p.104) and then the Commission gets into generalities of the Secret Service's operations to protect the President and the specifics of this particular case (p.105). Kellerman goes over the division of responsibilities and the functions of the various people (p.106) with the questioning by Cong. Ford for more than 6 pages before Specter<sup>interrupts</sup> to tell the Congressman they are going to have other witnesses better qualified to answer these questions (p.110)

However, several interesting exchanges occur during the Congressman's interrogation:

"Representative Ford. In other words, PRS never turned over to you any information about any dangerous individuals in any one of these communities on this trip.

Mr. Kellerman. That's right.

Representative Ford. Is this unusual?

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Mr. Kellerman. Yes. But let me reserve the right to recheck that question again; may I? (p.108)

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Representative Ford. Was it surprising to you that when the President was going to a city as large as Dallas, that there were no names turned over to you, either by your Protective Research Section, or by any other Federal agents - individuals or an individual dangerous to the President?

Mr. Kellerman. I recall, to give you an answer, Congressman, that it did seem strange that here we are hitting five cities in one State and - and from (p.109) the apparent trouble Ambassador Stevenson had down there one evening, we certainly should have had some information on somebody." (p.110)

In response to a question by the Congressman about whether or not usually the agents protecting the President receive information from PRS and others, Kellerman replied, "... I don't recall any information whatsoever, except that picket thing.

Representative ~~CONGRESSMAN~~ Ford. It is surprising to me, as well, and I gather it was certainly, on reflection, surprising to you -

Mr. Kellerman. Yes; it is.

Representative Ford. Was this in itself any warning to you that there might be some breakdown in the system?

Mr. Kellerman. Gee - no; I never cherished that thought, sir." (p.11)

Several other interesting revelations conclude Kellerman's appearance. The first reveals the intrinsic/shabby nature of the investigation whose thoroughness was assumed and, in fact, widely publicized and praised for its exhaustiveness:

"Representative Ford. When were you first interviewed by anyone

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regarding the directions from which the shots came?

Mr. Kellerman. I don't recall ever being interviewed." (p.111)

Here we have the man who, of all those on the scene, was most directly responsible for the President's safety not even being asked by anybody what he believed of the source of the shots. Again, this shows the Commission didn't want to learn anything except what it could use to substantiate the FBI report.

And on the subject of the time and attention the members of the Commission could devote to its operation:

"Representative Ford. I believe that is all. I have to go back to a very important committee meeting, Mr. Chairman. I may be able to get back later, Mr. Chief Justice.

The Chairman. I will be here the rest of the afternoon, so there will be no necessity of your coming back if you are tied up. Thank you very much for presiding all day." (p.111)

Apparently the Commission members thought that as long as one of them was there, that was enough. All they had to do was to lend their presence to dignify or legitimize what the staff was doing. The country and the world at large expected more of their members of the Commission. All were known to be busy men - busier than most in our national life. However, they did assume a responsibility, and with the assumption of the responsibility went a major obligation to the country, to history, and to the late President and his family. (p.111)

Mr. Craig and his associates, whose almost total silence while they were allegedly representing the interest of Oswald I have previously noted, finally asked a question. Is it to search out some hidden fact, some not quite understood facet, anything at all that might be of benefit to their client, the late Oswald? No. Here again (and I think this is

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only the second time I have noted a question by any of them ) they ask a question on the Commission's behalf:

"Mr. Craig. Mr. Kellerman, is there any special agent in charge of the protection of the person next in line in succession, to your knowledge?

Mr. Kellerman. I think Mr. Rowley would like to man that. I think they have had a little difficulty to find a man.

Mr. Craig. There is no such person now?

Mr. Kellerman. No, they have made numerous attempts with the people, and so far they have got a negative reply." (p.112)

Again, what a commentary on the protection of our public officials, when the Secret Service has difficulty locating a man to protect the next in the line of succession.