Camp Street entrance. Caire says Oswald applied for a job with him, claiming public relations experience. It should by now not surprise the reader to learn that Caire is one of the multitude who were not called as witnesses by the Commission and should have been. His New Orleans reputation is excellent. He is considered a generous man, easily touched. He says he lost about $10,000 on his effort to help the "Crusade," that about $4,000 was raised, and that some of it was "pocketed" by another.

That he was not called as a witness is not because the FBI was unaware of these things. Caire complains that their questionings "cost me about 100 hours" of time.

The Canal Street address is not where Oswald was arrested, which was in the 700 block, and it is not a good address but was then and is now a blank one. The numbers go from 1030 to 1034. In the covered-over passageway on that side of 1030 is a small fruit stand. Its number is 1030½.

If Oswald made a mistake and meant 117 Decatur, that is the address of Orest Pena's Habana Bar and Lounge, where there were other interesting developments in the story of Oswald in New Orleans, and at about this time, notably the spectacular and conspicuous drunk staged there by Oswald or his counterfeiter. And why should Oswald have noted the names of the city editor and reporter in the middle of these entries.

We do not know whether he made these notes before or after he got himself arrested in this handbill operation, which makes sense only as part of a scheme to establish a "cover." But there is reason to believe it was not after the arrest, because there is what seems to be such an item in his notebook (16H62), also facing a blank page. It is the listing of WDSU-TV, over which he broadcast after his arrest. This listing has the names of several of its staff and their phone numbers

Page 80

but no address. It logically would have been entered after his arrest.

When this manner of establishing a "cover" is considered in conjunction with the strange business of his notebook copyings and his possession at the time of his arrest of a list of entries that could serve only to show he had been a defector to the Soviet Union, along with the equally perplexing plea of guilty he entered when he was not guilty, it is apparent the whole affair requires explanation the government has not made. The least likely preparation of a sincere Castro sympathizer sallying forth on a propaganda venture that could lead to his arrest is evidence of Communist or Russian connections. This handbill operation seems to have been designed for an arrest and a police record. As soon as Oswald harvested the "pro-Castro" press he thus made, he took it to Mexico with him and used it in an unsuccessful effort to get a Cuban visa. After this failed, he still kept reminders of the affair. One was found when the Dallas police searched his property in the garage of the Paine residence, in Irving, Texas, after his arrest on November 22,1963. In the inventory of what was seized there is Item #231 (24H335), a "slip of paper containing names Carlos J. Bringuier, Miguel M. Cruz and Lt. William Gaillot." Cruz was with Bringuier when he broke up Oswald's handbill operation; Gaillot, the police officer in charge.

Such items and entries in the notebook would be 1ess troubling if there were any serious official explanation of their purpose and if so many questions did not remain, so many indications of Oswald's intelligence involvement.

When the FBI prepared an "analysis" of this notebook, of what J. Edgar Hoover described (5H112) as "those items in Oswald's notebook requiring investigative attention," the presence in it of the telephone and license numbers of the car of James P. Hosty, Jr., the FBI's Oswald "expert," was not included. Hoover's

Page 81

explanation is that "this report was not prepared for this Commission." This explanation, too, is not persuasive.

Oswald was, in fact, violently anti-Communist, as much in the Commission's evidence proves. Two weeks after his arrest for the handbill distribution -- on August 22, only six days after his third and last such operation -- he made a particularly violent anti-Communist speech before a Jesuit institution in Mobile, Alabama, where Rev. Paul Piazza was on the staff This is not consistent with his phony "Fair Play for Cuba" activity but is consistent with suspicion about his purposes and connections.

Hoover also told the Commission (17H816) that FBI headquarters has obtained affidavits from every special Agent who was in contact with Oswald, as well as from their SACs (Special Agents In Charge). These affidavits show that none of these FBI agents developed Oswald as an informant."

Here again, the self-serving affidavits are no substitute for the Commission's own investigation.

These affidavits, with the February 12,1964, covering letter from Hoover, were entered into the record as Exhibit 825 (17H741-62). The most conspicuous omissions are those one would most suspect. There is no affidavit from Warren deBrueys, the Cuban expert, whose New Orleans-Dallas route matched Oswald's. Nor is there one from Milton Kaack. Pertinent to this omission is the following exchange between Dulles and Quigley (4H438):

Mr. Dulles: Who was in charge of this other investigation from the FBI office with regard to Lee Harvey Oswald that you found out about later, was this Special Agent Milton R. Kaack?

Mr. Quigley: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles: Did you make your report to him, did you?

Mr. Quigley: Orally, yes; I discussed it with him.

On its part, the Commission, through Rankin, went out of its way to praise the wonderful help provided by

Page 82

the federal investigative agencies. For example, Rankin wrote Hoover April 22, 1964, to ask if the FBI had:

any information hitherto not disclosed to this Commission concerning the association of Lee Harvey Oswald with any Communist or subversive organization or individual either in the United States or abroad or with any criminal or criminal groups either in the United States or abroad. The Commission is most anxious to be assured that it possesses the full extent of your agency's knowledge and information concerning the aforementioned associations of Lee Harvey Oswald.

The Commission must have liked this letter very much, for it introduced it into evidence twice almost simultaneously, as Exhibit 864 addressed to the FBI (17H857) and as Exhibit 868 addressed to the CIA (17H864). The difference between the copies printed in facsimile is that one is almost illegible with magnification and the other is in part still illegible under magnification. This is neither unique nor necessarily innocent. The Commission's staff were mature people and the Government Printing Office knows its business. Clear copies could have been provided the printer or the letters could have been set in type.

The letter shows the Commission's great and continuing concern with Oswald's possible connections with the Russians, whom it well knew he hated, and with criminals, where there was no reason for such concern. What this inquiry did not seek and what the Commission knew it should seek is evidence of Oswald's connection with Cuban refugee groups -- once again, silence about the groups. The FBI under the aegis of the CIA, was not about to interpret Rankin's inquiry to cover those it knew to be manipulated by its sister spooks.

The CIA also did not interpret the inquiry to include the Cubans, for it replied (Exhibit 869) under date of May 4, 1964, in the negative.

CIA Director John A. McCone's affidavit also assured the Commission that the CIA had no contact of any nature with Oswald (17H866). What is missing

Page 83

from this assurance is that none of the vast treasure poured out to the Cuban groups reached Oswald. Indeed, it was not possible to give this assurance.

McCone, accompanied by his then assistant, now the agency's head, Richard M. Helms, followed Hoover on the stand (5H120ff). Helms' statement to the Commission is likewise inconclusive, although it was taken to be and without scrutiny seems to be. He said (5H121):

On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all of our records searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone ln the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records.

Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been suggested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no material in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated with him.

Shades of U-2, the Bay of Pigs, Laos and a hundred. other ghosts! The Commission believed this, or at least said it did. What is missing here also is the assurance the CIA had no way of making, that Oswald had no relationship with it through groups it sponsored or financed.

The FBI and CIA had no way of making these assurances, yet the Commission seemed able to jump to the conclusion that Oswald had no relations with the government even through any front or agency of any government branch.

Going along with this, the Commission also had indication that Oswald was other than he seemed to be, other than it made him out to be. Recall the official story, when added up, that Oswald was a Marxist Marine who had a "confidential" security clearance, one of the lower categories, who knew the secret radar codes and told the United States Embassy in Moscow that he was giving them and all other secret knowledge

Page 84

he possessed to the Soviet Union, and for this was entirely unpunished on his return. What is fact but not a conspicuous part of the official story is that he would not return until assured he would not be prosecuted.

When men were being discharged from the armed services for real or imagined connections with Communist or those described as "Communist front" groups, it is stretching credulity to believe it was normal for Oswald, self-styled a "Marxist," who taught himself Russian and openly subscribed to Russian papers, to have enjoyed any kind of security clearance. This dichotomy did not trouble the Commission. It managed to avoid gathering evidence bearing on this.

My writings on the assassination and its official investigation have been restricted to what comes from the official information. Here I make a minor departure because I think it is important.

At one o'clock in the early morning of December 15, 1966, in the Oakland, California, studios of Radio Station KNEW, I had just finished appearing on Harvard educated lawyer Joe Dolan's lengthy phone-in radio program on which listeners called with comments or questions about the assassination and its investigation.

There was a man on the line who had called toward the end of the program. He wanted to speak to me but not on the air. Further, he wanted the assurance that our conversation would be private. This was, of course, mysterious. I took the call.

The caller was disturbed by the "beep" on the line. He associated that with the required signal for recording. I assured him that the engineer was not on it, that it was not being taped, and that he could talk to the engineer to learn these things. Overhearing this, the engineer explained to me and I to the caller that, with phone-in programs, the beep is automatically built into the line so there can be no possibility of listeners not knowing the conversation is being broadcast. The stranger on the other end of the line was partly

Page 85

satisfied. He alluded to this beep several times in the next hour and a half. We talked that long.

It was part confessional, part shame mixed with self-pity and self-derogation, part fear, and all worry. This man had been in the Marine Corps with Oswald. From his personal experience, he did not believe a single word about the Oswald of this period that became public with the Report. He had agonized in silence for the three years between the issuance of the Report and our conversation because he knew things, he said, that had not been made public and were not in accord with what had been publicized and he was certain what he knew was correct.

Following his military service, he had built a successful life, had a family, and was worried about the possible consequences of being associated with any account not in consonance with the official Oswald "line." He feared he or his business might be hurt or that his family might suffer. By no means could I assure him that nothing would happen; I did encourage him to consider the importance to the country, to his family and himself, of any information he might possess.

But he would talk only in anonymity. I respect his desires and will not reveal the few unintended clues to his identity that slipped out. I have made and will make no effort to trace him.

Briefly, it is his story that Oswald was bright, not a kook of any kind, not a blatant or proselytizing Marxist, and really a quiet, seriously. They knew each other socially and engaged in certain recreational activities together. He never heard Oswald say anything about Communism, for or against, in all this time.

More important is what he disclosed about Oswald's position in the Marine Corps. The unit in which both served, said my informant, was one of three similar ones of which one was always in Japan and the others in the United States. Their function was classified.

Page 86

Every man in the outfit carried security clearance. They had a security designation of which I had never heard. These were that kind of unusual military organizations.

Of all the men in the outfit, five had special "top" security approvals. The entire complement carried a minimum of "confidential" (the grade the official file records Oswald as having had). Above this there were "secret," "top secret," and a special one, "crypto." Of all the men, only five were "crypto."

One of these was Lee Harvey Oswald!

"Can you possibly be wrong?" I asked him.

He insisted not.

"Could your memory be playing tricks?"

No, he was positive. He went farther when I questioned him about "crypto," which he indicated was "black box" stuff. I took it to mean a connection with nuclear weapons.

If correct, this is more than in disagreement with the entire official story of Oswald his relations with the government and the assassination. It is an assault on the integrity of many of the members of the staff of the Commission and of the investigative agencies. It raises questions about the transcripts of Oswald's official Marine Corps records. In every way he could, this man insisted he was not in error, that he knew.

And he went into more detail. Correctly stating that Oswald got a "hardship" discharge so he could care for an allegedly destitute mother (it was common knowledge among his mates that Oswald had said he planned to go to Switzerland for study instead), the mysterious caller specified that Oswald spent his last two or three weeks in the service "with CID." It is, obviously, not a requirement of a "hardship" discharge that the enlisted man stay with military intelligence.

Immediately my mind flashed back to my first book on this subject, Whitewash: The Report on the Warren Report where I had exposed certain unorthodox

Page 87

aspects of Oswald's discharge (pages 123-4) that are here appropriate. That section reads:

With but 43 days of his Marine Corps enlistment remaining, or three months if the penalties of the courts martial had been imposed (19H725), Oswald received a "hardship discharge'' (19H676). This was a clear fraud about which neither the Marine Corps nor any other government agency ever did anything. Why?

There are 112 pages of photocopies of Oswald's Marine Corps record reproduced at one point in the 26 volumes of hearings and exhibits (19H656-768), but that record is incomplete in at least one major aspect.

This series of documents shows Oswald enlisted on October 24 1956. He was twice court-martialed, once for the dream offense of many servicemen and once for an even more unusual departure from regulation. The second breach, in non-military language, consisted of swearing at a non-commissioned officer and assaulting him "by pouring a drink on him on or about 20 June 1958 at the Bluebird Cafe, Yamato, Japan." He was sentenced to a $55.00 fine and four weeks at hard labor, the second part waived on condition of good behavior. Less than six months earlier he had been court-martialed for accidentally shooting himself with his his own loaded .22 caliber pistol, possession of which was prohibited. The generous Marines found this injury "was incurred in line of duty and not related to misconduct." His sentence was 20 days at hard labor a $50.00 fine, reduction in rank to private, with the confinement at hard labor suspended for six months unless sooner vacated (19H663-4,682-4, 692, 707-8, 747-52).

Of Oswald's personal activity In the Marines the Report states: "He studied the Russian language, read a Russian language newspaper and seemed interested In what was going on In the Soviet Union." In the unit with which he served upon his return from the Far East, Oswald was referred to as "comrade" and "Oswaldskovich" (R388). But his clearance to handle classified information was not revoked. It was granted May 3, 1957, "after careful check." Upon discharge he signed a form acknowledging he had been informed about penalties for revelation of classified information. This included awareness "that certain categories of Reserve and Retired personnel . . . can be recalled to duty . . . for trail by court-martial for unlawful disclosure of Information . . ." (19H680). When Oswald defected and appeared in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, he declared his intention to tell the Russians all he knew, and he knew about the radar installations in which he served and of codes (R262, 265, 393). The Report is barren on the subject, but there have been accounts published of the necessity for changing codes after his defection.

Yet on his return to the United States, Oswald was not kept under regular surveillance (R439), was not charged with breach of security and was not even confronted with the fraudulent nature of his hardship discharge. Explanations of lack of proof might be offered, no matter how unacceptably, for the failure to charge him with breach of security. But the failure to keep him under surveillance or to do anything about his fraudulent discharge are not susceptible to such facile pleadings. And

Page 88

the Report is incomplete on even this unsatisfactory explanation. It reads "No evidence has been found that they used him for any particular propaganda or other political or informational purposes" (R393). There is no reference here to military or security information.

The hardship discharge was to enable Oswald to care for his mother. He made not even a gesture in this direction and the Marine Corps would appear to have been aware that he had no such intention. The effective date of his discharge was September 11, 1959 (19H680; 22H79 ). On September 4, 1959, he applied for a passport from Santa Ana, California. It was issued September 10; 1959. Accompanying this application was a Marine Corps certification that had to he filed with the passport application and submission of which is noted on the application. "This is to certify," it read "that PFC (E-2) Lee Harvey Oswald, 1653230, U.S. Marine Corps is scheduled to be released from Active Duty and transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve (Inactive) on 11 September 1959."

Under "Occupation" on the application, Oswald described himself as "shipping export agent." The places he intended visiting included Cuba and Russia. During a proposed length of stay of only four months, he said he was going to be a student at "the College of A. Schweitzer" in Switzerland and the University of Turku, in Finland. He had all of his transportation arrangements made and specified in the application that he would leave New Orleans by Grace Line ship September 21, ( 22H77 -9).

The Marine Corps certification of Oswald's imminent discharge that accompanied his passport application at the very time it was processing a hardship discharge was not lost in the mass of the Commission's documentation. Nor is it suppressed in the Report. Instead the Report ignores both this and the fraudulent nature of the discharge in the text and, in a 13-line section of Appendix XV in which the nature of the discharge is not referred to, notes that a statement that "he was about to be discharged" accompanied the passport application (R746). Why did not the Marine Corps revoke Oswald's security clearance; why did it keep him in a classified job and cooperate in getting him a passport while it was discharging him so he could support his mother?

This is the background of Oswald's now famous trip to the Soviet Union, where he arrived in mid-October 1959.

After an hour and a half of this, when there was nothing but repetition, I wondered if I would be able to awaken for a pre-dawn television show in San Francisco. I had to call an end to it, yet was reluctant to because there lingered the hope that, in talking, this man might suddenly find the courage to go public.

Finally, I asked him to write me an anonymous letter, setting forth all he had said and anything else he might recall and noting anything that came to his mind that would tend to substantiate his story. First,

Page 89

he protested that his handwriting could be checked. I suggested he type it. Typewriters, too could be traced, he demurred. Finally, he said he might write it all down and then get someone he could trust to transcribe it in a hand that could not be traced to him. He would think it over.

That was eighteen weeks before this writing, although it seems much longer. He has been silent.

Of the things he mentioned, "Crypto" security clearance bothered me; I had never heard of it. From time to time I asked reporters about it. In February 1967, when I was in Boston, I mentioned this strange post-midnight telephone call to Bob Scott, newsman at WNAC, who has connections with people who had been in military intelligence. He soon phoned to report that there had been such a security designation.

But certain parts of his story sounded provokingly familiar, so as soon as I got home I started checking against the Commission evidence. One thing I recalled closely coincided with parts of this information.

At the first opportunity I reread the May 18,1964, testimony of Kerry Wendell Thornley, a former Marine Corps buddy of Oswald ( 11H82ff ). Thornley was questioned by Assistant Counsel Albert E. Jenner, Jr., who had played the minor part in the New Orleans interrogations, most of which had been conducted by Liebeler. One thing was immediately obvious: Thornley's testimony was physically separated from 100 percent of the other testimony about Oswald's Marine Corps career. It is all alone on this subject in Volume 11, which the preface also makes clear. This confirmed my hunch that I had to reread this testimony that I had not studied for two years.

Sure enough, what I seemed to recall is there.

Thornley had an apparently incorrect recollection that, because of his court martial for the enlisted man's dream offense, pouring a drink on his sergeant's head, Oswald had temporarily lost his security clearance and

Page 90

was assigned to janitorial duties. This follows: (11H84-5)

Mr. Jenner: I was going to ask you what losing clearance meant. You have indicated that -- or would you state it more specifically.

Mr. Thornley: Well, that meant in a practical sense, that meant that he was not permitted to enter certain areas wherein the equipment, in the case equipment, was kept; that we would not want other unauthorized persons to have knowledge of. And on occasion information, I imagine, would also come to the man who was cleared, in the process of his work, that he would be expected to keep to himself.

Mr. Jenner: I assume you had clearance?

Mr. Thornley: Yes, sir; I was, I think, cleared for confidential at the time.

Mr. Jenner: Cleared for confidential. I was about to ask you what level of clearance was involved.

Mr. Thornley: I believe it was just confidential to work there at El Toro on that particular equipment.

Mr. Jenner: That is the clearance about which you speak when you talk about Oswald having lost it?

Mr. Thornley: Oswald, I believe, had a higher clearance. This is also lust based upon rumor. I believe be at one time worked in the security files, It is the S&C files, somewhere at LTA or at El Toro.

Mr Jenner: Did you ever work in the security files?

Mr. Thornley: No, sir.

Mr; Jenner: And that was a level of clearance --

Mr. Thornley: Probably a secret clearance would be required.

Mr Jenner: It was at least higher than the clearance about which you first ipoke7

Mr. Thornley: Yes, sir.

This story of Oswald's having a high security clearance is not consistent with most material in other volumes or with the Report. Note also Thornley's unprodded recollection of Oswald's "having worked in the security files; it is the S & C files." This is hardly a normal assignment for enlisted men who learn to speak Russian, ostensibly for themselves, openly subscribe to Communist publications and are ostentatiously pro-"Marxist."

The Thornley testimony is not inconsistent with the information that destroyed the peace of mind of my worried California informant. It is testimony that Jenner, who in late 1966 and 1967 was one of the members of the staff of the former Commission most vocal in its

Page 91

defense and his own (though he always managed not to show up for those electronic confrontations With me that he had earlier accepted), as a competent and experienced lawyer, should have latched onto and probed and prodded until he had obtained from Thornley all the witness knew. It is not at all out of step with his own and the Commission's record that Jenner did not. Need we wonder longer why this testimony alone was separated from the other evidence on 0swald's Marine Corps career?

Thus, what might have been a major revelation remains instead one of the major mysteries, officially hidden by the Commission but now, I think smoked out. It is particularly pertinent in the developing New Orleans story.

There are many other things in the record that bear on this, some negatively. For example, no member of the staff ever pursued this strange inconsistency, Oswald the Marxist in a position of high security trust in the Marine Corps. It should have been a troubling legal hangnail to each and every one, and to the members d the Commission. Instead, the Commission used this least desirable method of gathering "testimony" and that on a selective basis only. Ex parte and incompetent depositions were taken from Thornley, Nelson Delgado (8H228-65), another former 0swald Marine Corps chum, and his former superior officer Lt. John E. Donovan (8H289-303). From all the few others included in the record, there are but brief and insufficient affidavits

With one exception, all reveal a Commission interest in whether 0swald was a homosexual. That exception is the man who arranged dates between and his sister.

Lieutenant Donovan, "the officer in command" of the crew in which 0swald served (8H290), when asked about whether the murdered accused assassin had been a homosexual.:

Page 92

Mr. Ely: I believe you mentioned earlier that he did not seem to you particularly interested in girls. Was this just because he was interested in other things, or do you have any reason to believe that there was anything abnormal about his desires?

Mr. Donovan: I have no reason to suspect that he was homosexual, and in that squadron at that time one fellow was discharged from the service for being homosexual. He was in no way tied in with it that I know of . . . (8H300)

Perhaps Donovan's most significant testimony tends to cast 0swald in a different role than the Report and indicates the magnitude of the breach of security and military trust he threatened at the Moscow Embassy when going through the motions if not the actuality of defection:

Mr. Donovan: I recall that he got a hardship discharge. We offered to get him a flight -- that is a hop from El Toro to some place in Texas, his home. He refused. We considered that normal in that if you take a hop you sacrifice your transportation pay. We offered to take him to a bus or train station. He refused. But that is not particularly unusual, either. I recall that he was gone for some period of time, and shortly before I got out of the Marine Corps, which was mid-December 1959, we received word that he had showed up in Moscow. This necessitated a lot of change of aircraft call signs, codes, radio frequencies, radar frequencies. He had access to the location of all bases in the west coast area, all radio frequencies for all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and the relative strength of all squadrons, number and type of aircraft in a squadron, who was the commanding officer, the authentication code of entering and exiting the ADIZ, which stands for Air Defense Identification Zone. He knew the range of our radar. He knew the range of our radio. And he knew the range of the surrounding units' radio and radar . . .

Mr. Ely: You recall that various codes were changed. Now, at what level were these changed: Was this an action of your specific unit, or a fairly widespread action?

Mr. Donovan: Well, I did not witness the changing in any other squadrons, but it would have to be, because the code is obviously between two or more units. Therefore, the other units had to change it. These codes are a grid, and two lines correspond . . . There are some things which he knew on which he received instruction that there is no way of changing, such as the MPS 16 height-finder radar gear. That had recently been integrated into the Marine Corps system. It had a height finding range far in excess of our previous equipment and it has certain limitations. He had been schooled on those limitations. It cannot operate above a given altitude in setting -- in other words you cannot place the thing above a given terrain height. He had also been schooled on a piece of machinery called a TPX-1 which is used to transfer radio -- radar and radio signals over a great distance. Radar Is very susceptible

Page 93

to homing missiles, and this piece of equipment is used to put your radar antenna several miles away, and relay the information back to your site which you hope is relatively safe. He had been schooled on this. And that kind of stuff you cannot change.

Mr. Ely: Did Oswald have any kind of clearance?

Mr. Donovan: He must have had secret clearance to work in the radar center, because that was a minimum requirement for all of us. ( 8H297 -8).

Oswald's prerequisite for returning to the United States -- a promise not to be prosecuted -- is contrary to the regulations quoted from Whitewash above and with the seriousness of the promised offence. It is hardly enough to say, as does the government, that Oswald said he did not give secrets away. There was no official proceeding to discover the truth after he returned.

One of the longest depositions is that of Nelson Delgado (8H228-65). It was taken April 18, 1964, by Wesley J. Liebeler. In its 37 pages much is destructive of the official case as set forth in the Report. Some of the most fascinating leads, whether or not lost upon Liebeler, are not in the Report, not even by indirection. Some are consistent with an Oswald-government, Oswald-intelligence relationship.

Delgado concurred with the others in reporting Oswald's access to "secret" data (8H232). He placed Oswald in "the silent area that is the war room" (8H259), not exactly where one expects the Marine Corps to assign "Communists."

In distributing mail in his barracks, Delgado learned that Oswald was getting Communist literature. Those superiors to whom he reported it, including a Lieutenant Delprado , "just brushed it off. He didn't seem to care" (8H260).

The homosexual questions also brought negatives. When Liebeler came to the end of his long interrogation, he asked Delgado, "Can you think of anything else about him?"

Delgado said he had never seen Oswald drunk, though he knew Oswald drank an "occasional beer."

Page 94

Liebeler then asked, "Do you think he had any homosexual tendencies?"

Delgado replied, "No; never once," adding that "in fact, we had two fellows in our outfit that were caught at it, and he thought it was kind of disgusting . . . "

For all its pretended interest in ferreting out every detail of Oswald's history there is indication a few secrets remain, at least in the official record. This is revealed in part of Delgado's testimony that will also interest us in another sense. Oswald had been in Tijuana, Mexico, before the weekend that he, Delgado and some of their companions had a fling. Oswald knew his way around. As Delgado put it:

We went down to Tijuana, hit the local spots, drinking and so on, and all of a sudden he says, "Let's go to the Flamingo." So it didn't register, and I didn't bother to ask him, "Where is this Flamingo? How did you know about this place?" I assumed he had been there before, because when we got on the highway he told me which turns to take to get to this place, you know. (8H253)

"The bartender was a homosexual.'' Liebeler wanted to be doubly sure. He asked, "Was that apparent to you?"

Delgado was positive. "Oh, yes; it was apparent to us . . ." (8H253).

Oswald's interest was not in this homosexual. He "shacked up" across the street from the bar:

Mr. Delgado: Right across the street from the jai - alai games, there are some hotels, these houses, you know; and as far as I knew, Oswald had a girl. I wasn't paying too much attention, you know, but it seemed to me like he had one. (8H253)

Delgado did not help the official account of Oswald's alleged rifle skill. This part of the story is mixed in with Delgado's complains about the unfaithfulness of the FBI reports of their repeated pre-deposition interrogation -- there were four of them (8H236), lasting for hours (8H240).

Page 95

One report that Liebeler did not quote directly, from his reflection of it, placed Oswald, in a shooting competition with 40 men, "fifth from the highest." Delgado: "No; he didn't even place there." Of Oswald's "skill,," Delgado said, "It was a pretty big joke, because he got a lot of 'Maggie's drawers,' you know, a lot of misses, but he didn't give a darn." (8H235).

Delgado told the agents that on the rifle range Oswald "didn't show no particular aspects of being a sharpshooter at all" and that he didn't take care of his rifle and was penalized for this neglect (8H233) .

The existence of Delgado's difficulties with the FBI agents is made clear but not the reason or reasons. Presumably these came in part from the vanity of one of the agents who spoke Spanish. It was not only native to Delgado, but he carried a military specialty designation for his fluency.

One of the reports entirely misrepresented what Delgado says he told the FBI agents. What Delgado displayed at the end of this excerpt from his testimony (8H238) is a medal:

Mr. Liebeler: Now the report that I have says that Oswald, like most marines, took an interest in the pool -- they call a pool instead of a pot, but that is the same thing?

Mr. Delgado: Yes; pool.

Mr. Liebeler: Oswald took an interest in the pool, which was started for the marine getting the highest score. It says, however, "Delgado said neither he nor Oswald came close to winning."

Mr. Delgado: No, no; that is erroneous, because I won. He didn't win at all.

Mr. Liebeler: You never told these FBI agents that you yourself did not come close to winning?

Mr. Delgado: No; because I was -- I was one of the highest ones there, I always had an expert badge on me.

Mr. Liebeler: You were a good rife shot?

Mr Delgado: Yes; just like I got one now (indicating).

Of one of the unpleasant episodes with the FBI that had to do with the agent's own opinion of his own competence in Spanish there is this account:

Page 96

Mr. Delgado: No. I Just knew it was the spring because that is the time everyone goes out to fire. It's either going to be warm or it's going to be very cold when they go out there; it's never in between. I could have said that, but that was the day I was upset, because this guy kept on badgering me.

Mr. Liebeler: You are talking now about the interview when the Spanish speaking agent was present?

Mr. Delgado: Yes.

Mr. Liebeler: Which one of them kept badgering you?

Mr. Delgado: The Spanish agent.

Mr. Liebeler: What was he badgering you about?

Mr. Delgado: He kept on sitting -- he'd been talking, he'd looking at me, you know, and doing this (indicating), you know, and he was sitting just about where this gentleman is now, and I'd been looking out of the corner of my eye, because I couldn't concentrate on what he was saying because he kept staring at me, and he was giving me a case of jitters you know . . . .

Mr Liebeler: You and this agent did not strike it off too well?

Mr Delgado: No I am afraid not. We just spent hours arguing back and forth.

Mr. Liebeler: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Delgado was far from alone in complaining about the "inaccuracy" of the FBI reports. Most witnesses, when asked of conflicts between their testimony and the FBI statements, made this specific. Others volunteered their objections. These include a number of Secret Service agents. Mrs; Sylvia Odio, among others, went further and said the FBI did not ask the right questions, either, as we shall see. This treatment of Delgado is hardly the kind calculated to elicit cooperation, if that is what the FBI wanted.

Liebeler did his own blundering. Although Oswald pretended to be a Marxist, few if any of his companions really believed he was, although he always had Marxist literature conspicuously at hand and quoted from it. Oswald was a heavy reader and considered both above average in intelligence and more serious than his companions. During a discussion of what Oswald read, this ensued:

Mr. Delgado: Yes: and then he had this other book. I am still trying to find out what it is. It's about a farm, and about how all the animals

Page 97

take over and make the farmer work for them. It's really a weird book the way he was explaining it to me, and that struck me kind of funny. But be told me that the farmer represented the imperialistic world, and the animals were the workers symbolizing that they are the socialist people, you know, and that eventually it will come about that the socialists will have the imperialists working for them, and things like that, like these animals, these pigs took over and they were running the whole farm and the farmer was working for them.

Mr. Liebeler: Is that what Oswald explained to you?

Mr. Delgado: Yes.

Mr. Liebeler: Did you tell the FBI about this?

Mr. Delgado: Yes.

Mr. Liebeler: Did they know the name of the book?

Mr. Delgado: No.

Mr. Liebeler: The FBI did not know the name of the book?

Mr. Delgado: No.

Mr. Liebeler: It is called the Animal Farm. It is by George Orwell.

Mr. Delgado: He didn't tell me. I asked him for the thing, but be wouldn't tell me. I guess he didn't know. The Animal Farm, Did you read it?

Mr. Liebeler: Yes.

Mr. Delgado: Is it really like that?

Mr. Liebeler: Yes; there is only one thing that Oswald did not mention apparently and that is that the pigs took over the farm, and then they got to be just like the capitalists were before, they got fighting among themselves, and there was one big pig who did just the same thing that the capitalist had done before. Didn't Oswald tell you about that?

Mr. Delgado: No; just that the pigs and animals had revolted and made the farmer work for them. The Animal Farm. Is that a socialist book?

Mr. Liebeler: No.

Mr. Delgado: That is just the way you interpret it, right?

Mr. Liebeler: Yes: I think so. It is actually supposed to be quite an anti-Communist book.

Mr. Delgado: Is it really?

Mr. Liebeler: Yes.

Liebeler seemed suddenly to realize that he had set on record Oswald's anti-Communism before he went to the Soviet Union; he had further, made this faux pas "alone and unassisted." Liebeler abruptly changed the subject at this point, asking before Delgado said another word if he and Oswald "began to cool off toward each other."

Probably the most provocative ignored part of Delgado's testimony is what can be interpreted not as the improbable interest of the Cuban consul in Oswald but of Oswald's intelligence contacts while he was still in

Page 98

the Marines. When questioned about it separately, Delgado gave it as his opinion that Oswald's talk about Cuba and going there was not serious and "just barracks talk" (8H243). In another part of the deposition (8H260), Liebeler asked, "Did he later tell you he had been to the Cuban Consulate (in Los Angeles, near their base)?"

Delgado replied, "Yes; but I thought it was just his, you know bragging of some sort."

Liebeler then asked, "You didn't really believe that he had?"

Delgado said, "Well, no . . . "

He volunteered the account of an unusual visitor to Oswald and conduct that could indicate an intelligence connection when answering a question about whether Oswald had visited the Cuban consulate, about which Delgado had no knowledge and which he did not believe. It began this way:

Mr. Delgado: . . . And I took it to be just a -- one of his, you know, lies, you know, saying he was in contact with them, until one time I had the opportunity to go into his room I was looking for -- I was going out for the weekend, I needed a tie, he lent me the tie, and I seen this envelope in his footlocker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters -- you see, he would never go out, he'd stay near the post all the time. He always had money. That's why . . . So then one particular instance, I was in the train station in Santa Ana, Calif., and Oswald comes in, on a Friday night. I usually make it every Friday night to Los Angeles and spend the weekend. And he is on the same platform, so we talked, and he told me he had to see some people in Los Angeles. I didn't bother questioning him. We rode into Los Angeles nothing eventful happened, just small chatter, and once we got to Los Angeles, I went my way and he went his. I came to find out later on he had come back Saturday . . .

Well, like I stated to these FBI men, he had one visitor; after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that Oswald had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him In. So I had to find somebody to relieve Oswald, who was on guard, to go down there to visit with this fellow and they spent about an hour and a half, 2 hours talking, I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back.