9 THE WITNESSES AND THEIR TREATMENT

Eyewitnesses are always a problem, and the Commission had more than its share of problems.

Few of the spectacular events about which people are called to testify are of a nature that permits careful observation. Rarely do these events happen slowly or with advance warning. The witnesses generally do not know anything out of the ordinary is taking place and are not paying close attention, nor do they believe they are observing events about which they will subsequently be called to bear witness. The assassination of President Kennedy was such a case. Nobody expected he would be shot, including those whose job it was to protect him. For example, nowhere in the Report or the thousands of appended pages of testimony and exhibits, including hundreds upon hundreds of photographs, is there a single picture showing the President's guard looking upward, examining the buildings the motorcade was passing.

Even after the shooting began, none of the Presidential escort looked upward and they were, at that particular moment, directly under the location from which the Report insists all the shots came. The famous Altgens photograph, Exhibit 900 in the Report (R113) and reproduced in various versions under other exhibit numbers throughout the 26 volumes, shows this clearly (see Appendix). Some may have begun to react to the shot or shots that had then been fired. Some of the motorcycle policemen have turned to look in the President's direction. Two of the running board crew of the Secret Service agents in the follow-up car have turned to look backward, but none are looking upward. Almost all the faces visible in this picture register no awareness of unusual events.

When trained people whose responsibility it is to be alert to just such events do not react instantaneously, even less speed in recognition of what is happening can fairly be expected of others.

There is also the problem that everybody does not see things the same way. Powers of observation vary, as do recollections. Lawyers are familiar with the situation in which witnesses to the same event give different versions. Especially when the events to be testified about have great significance and when powerful interests are involved do even more serious problems with eyewitnesses arise. When the police have a stake, there are certain classes of people who are immediately under pressure. Examples are those whose livelihoods depend upon their acceptability to the police, those who require licensing, and those who, either themselves or through relatives or friends, have reason to fear the police and their great power in any community.

If to these already great handicaps is added a special animus, a particular angle or a special theory the agency calling upon the eyewitnesses is determined to pursue, then witnesses are under even greater pressure.

There are always those people who suddenly see a chance to become important, to themselves, to those for whom they will testify, and to their circle of friends and the world at large. The temptation to "remember" having seen what, in fact was not seen then becomes great. The mind plays the game and without external encouragement (which is sometimes provided) there develops a strong recollection. A mind-picture that is really fantasy becomes a certain and fixed recollection.

And there are nervous people and neurotics. These become so shaken by what they do see that they are incapable of clear or accurate observation. In the hands of skillful questioners immediately after the events, they sometimes translate the questions asked of them into mind- pictures of what they think they saw. Soon, as the mind deals with the events, there is a blending of fact and fiction that are indistinguishable to the witness.

Some people are always anxious to be helpful. Rapidly detecting the interests of those interrogating, they throw themselves into a condition in which they more easily imagine the precise shade of color, size, shape or weight about which they are being asked. It subconsciously becomes the exact one they saw, whether or not it, in fact, was.

Inevitably, there are those who do have axes to grind hatreds or dislikes to be indulged, political objectives to be attained, people who, like all of those responsible for the President's safety, had nonetheless seen him slaughtered. The drive to self and public absolution is a powerful force and confronts honest people' with a problem few can adequately cope with, for the subconscious is a difficult, invisible adversary.

On the opposite side are those who have reasons for not recalling things that happened and that they saw or did. Generally speaking, the questioned police had remarkably poor recollections of things most people not involved would assume had been imperishably impressed on their minds. A small but important example of this is what happened to those three spent shells found on the sixth floor of the Depository Building, who had them when, and what he or they did with them. If it was ever accurately determined, this determination was arrived at only after a series of conflicting testimonies and affidavits had been given the Commission.

The American system of justice has built-in safeguards against false, self-seeking or even honestly mistaken witnesses. In court each witness must face the searching examination of counsel for the side his testimony endangers, and good lawyers are skillful and diligent in their cross-examinations. Knowing this, opposing counsel protect themselves, their clients and their witnesses by advance auditions of the testimony in which the witness is closely interrogated and the inaccuracies and imaginings eliminated. To fail to do this is to risk facing disaster in court when opposing counsel demonstrates testimony is false, imaginative, or inaccurate. No good lawyer willingly goes to court with a shaky witness or a phony story. If his integrity does not stop him, the inherent hazards do.

These are the normal problems. The Commission had additional ones. Above all, it was handicapped by a predetermined decision it felt it had to reach and prove, for reasons undoubtedly compelling to it. One man, alone, had to be the culprit; otherwise, the whole structure would come clattering down around everyone's ears. All questioning had to be directed toward establishing this improbability. This meant evading obvious clues and not asking equally obvious questions. Honest men normally do not do well in dishonest endeavors. Honest examiners are unskilled in carrying off a pretense of searching deeply when they do not. Competent lawyers do not normally fail to ask the pertinent questions or overlook the obvious facts and possibilities in their examinations of witnesses, nor do they overlook desirable witnesses.

Most of the available witnesses had already been interviewed by the local and national police. These witnesses had either sworn to affidavits or were recorded with a version of events represented by the reports of the questioners, whether or not in accordance with the stories told by the witnesses. On a number of occasions, witnesses did contest the accounts of the FBI and the Secret Service, but for the most part, whether accurate or not, when confronted with recorded, especially sworn, accounts, the witnesses adhered to them. The interests of the police demanded immediate solution of the crimes, and it is certain they never lost sight of this in taking statements. As the Report itself acknowledges, immediate and widespread publicity was given even the most minor details, originated by public authority and usually not accurate. All potential Commission witnesses had been subjected to these accounts, which carried the weight of public authority. The performance of the press with the picture of Oswald with a rifle and pistol, purloined from his property according to even the official version, illustrates what normally responsible people will do. This picture received the widest possible distribution and news media paid fantastic prices for copies. Yet the picture appeared in four different altered forms. In one case the entire telescopic sight was removed, to make the picture consistent with the then current story, that the sight had been added by a gunsmith.

In addition, the nation and the world wanted a positive, final determination. So, the Commission had more heels than Achilles.

It suffered seriously from the absence of the automatic restraints of the adversary system. There were no cross examiners. This was guaranteed by the character and type of the investigation. The Commission could not, in the normal sense, hand down a decision. It could mete out no punishment to the dead Oswald, its preordained defendant and culprit, not at least in the orthodox sense of jail, fines of the investigation. The Commission could not, in the normal sense, hand down a decision. It could mete out no punishment to the dead Oswald, its preordained defendant and culprit, not at least in the orthodox sense of jail, fines or death. Only the dead man's name and position in history were involved and, to a degree, the reputation and future of his family. The Commission was under no compulsion to allow cross-examination, and there was no requirement that its proceedings be in public. Had they been, there was always the chance that spectators, especially the press, might have seized upon the inconsistencies or false statements or prejudices. The Commission did permit public sessions, but under conditions guaranteeing the least possible attention to them. When a witness such as the lawyer Mark Lane demanded a public session, it was granted. But not being known in advance, the public and press had no reason to be waiting for the hearing to be thrown open. Without doubt, the Commission was satisfied this was a proper and perhaps necessary procedure. But it did eliminate one of the safeguards against unfair or biased proceedings.

Hence, the nature of the proceedings was conducive to the practice into which the questioners fell. With no fear of cross-examination, witnesses were asked about only those things that could help to build a case to the satisfaction of the questioners. This does not mean that all the facts cannot be elicited in this type of proceeding. It does mean that the temptation to avoid the unpleasant facts is great. Specifically, during the hearings of the Commission, questioning rarely turned to anything that did not help build the prosecution case the Commission decided upon. Only when the questioners were really provoked by the witnesses did they ever show flashes of interrogation skill. That was not often -- certainly not often enough. And when the nature of some of the witnesses and their testimony is considered, it must be admitted the Commission's questioners showed great forbearance.

With such an attitude and such a situation, almost anything can be "proved." And it is in just this way the Commission was able to "prove" the things it said it established to its own satisfaction The Commission's record is a most eloquent if unintended tribute to the merits of the American system of adversary legal proceedings.

The basic case the Commission sought to prove was very weak. It was, therefore, dependent upon witnesses whose appearance would never have been risked in an adversary proceeding. They and the lawyers who presented them would have been laughed out of court. The most preposterous and incredible nonsense came from them even without cross-examination.

The importance of witnesses is directly related to the importance of what they say. This, in turn, is directly related to the approach taken by the lawyers or investigators. The Commission's approach imparted great responsibility and significance to witnesses another body or other lawyer might have ignored or to whom they would have assigned minor roles. The Commission's case might have been stronger had it elected some of the alternatives available to it.

With its witnesses the Commission decided upon a reconstruction approach. The reconstructions ended badly. The Commission's time reconstructions ended badly. The Commission's time reconstructions show the opposite of what was intended.

Even at the Book Depository the Commission decided it needed eyewitnesses to both Oswald and the shooting from the sixth-floor window. It drew upon Howard Leslie Brennan (3H140ff., 184ff., 211ff.), who enjoyed none of the desirable attributes of witnesses besides animation, and a 15-year-old boy, Amos Lee Euins (2H201ff.).

Euins, in a selection from his testimony included in the Report (R64), said, "And so I seen this pipe thing sticking out of the window. I wasn't paying too much attention to it . . . Then I looked up at the window and he shot again." Not that he saw the shooting, notice. The Report also says of Euins, "he could not describe the man in the building," but he appeared to have "a white bald spot on his head" (R147).

Two other statements by Euins are not quoted: That he saw this man in the window lean out of the window (6H170), something not otherwise reported; and that he was with a "kind of old policeman" when a "construction man" reported seeing a man with such a bald spot flee the back of the building immediately after the assassination (2H205-6).

The day of the assassination Euins gave the Dallas Sheriff's Department an affidavit stating explicitly the man he saw in the window was white (16H963). But within minutes of the shooting, he told Sergeant Harkness the man was colored (6H170). The Report resolved the dilemma with ease, deciding that the portion of what Euins said which suited the Commission's needs was "probative" as to the source of the shots but is inconclusive as to the identity of the man in the window" (R147). This "eenie-meenie-minie-moe" system of selective credibility is raised to new and exalted eminence throughout the Report. But in a courtroom a lawyer would have to be really hard pressed for witnesses to use a minor who, from a distance of about a hundred feet or so, saw a man several times on a sunny day and had previously described the man as both white and Negro.

Oswald's reconstructed trip home led the Commission into the use of three other witnesses who in no way contributed to the fair construction of the case against him and in no way added luster to the Commission or its record. Two transported him and the third was an aging, ill, former landlady.

The Report has Oswald leaving the Depository at 12:33 and walking seven blocks in the wrong direction to catch a bus coming back past the Depository. He alighted after a few minutes because in that time the bus had traveled only two blocks due to the traffic jam at the Depository intersection (R6). He then took a cab a few minutes later and rode it to near but not to his rooming house.

Placing Oswald at and leaving his rooming house at a time the Report calculated could have allowed him to get to the Tippit killing on time was all that was necessary, and this the Report did with Mrs. Earlene Roberts, the housekeeper. But Oswald had a bus transfer in his pocket when arrested and the police made the initial blunder of calling Cecil J. McWatters, the bus driver. First he was taken to an evening lineup and then to the Sheriff's department for an affidavit ( l9H561 ). In this statement, McWatters swore that the man he identified with the magical words "No. 2" in the lineup was the one to whom he gave that particular transfer, that he picked up the man at 12:40 the exact minute the Commission later wanted him to have the man alighting, that this man was grinning about the shooting of the President, and that he picked up this man at Elm and Houston, the corner on which the Book Depository is located and seven blocks away from where the Commission wanted the man to have taken the bus and five blocks away from the point at which he departed.

March 12, 1964, was transportation day before the Commission. The entire morning was devoted to McWatters and the cabdriver, William Whaley. For 30 pages (2H262-92), McWatters rambled about the details of the bus business and his route, where the man about whom he gave the deposition and the man the Commission wanted identified sat, did and said, what other passengers thought of the man grinning about the shooting of the President, and other such completely unnecessary details that merely added to the impressive bulk of the record without in any way advancing the case against Oswald. The Report used only that brief portion of McWatters' testimony that served its purposes as part of the "overwhelming" approach in which a monumental mass of indigestible unessentials was to bog everybody down but, in bulk and statistics, was imposing. In this spirit, the staff had photographs and diagrams of the bus on which McWatters could identify the seating of his passengers and other impressive and valueless data.

But it turned out that, in identifying "No. 2," McWatters was not identifying Oswald. He had had a suspicion a teenager, a regular passenger on his bus, might somehow be connected with the assassination. In selecting No. 2, without absolute certainty, he had this teenager and not Oswald in mind. Alas! in the No. 2 spot was the real Oswald. The Commission had McWatters' affidavit and it needed explaining. It is referred to but only in order for McWatters to explain it. The brief text does not appear in the Report. Despite the affidavit, Commission Assistant Counsel Ball asked McWatters, "Anyway, you were not able to identify any man in the lineup as the passenger?" Dutifully, McWatters replied, "No, sir" (2H370), only to admit subsequently that he was "under the impression" the man he pointed out to the police at the lineup "was the teenage boy who had been grinning" (2H281). This grinning incident, attributed to Oswald by the police, received tremendous publicity and was instrumental in fixing the character of a ghoul on him. McWatters also went further and, again despite his previous oath, said he "really thought" he was identifying the man who did not get off the bus to whom he had not given the transfer (2H281). He could not identify Oswald (2H283).

Ball and McWatters agreed on one thing. When showing him a copy of his affidavit, Ball told McWatters, "And sometimes when you see something that you signed before it refreshes your memory." McWatters declared, "It sure does" (2H279).

If the Commission got less than the value of his fare from Dallas to Washington from McWatters, cabdriver Whaley was a major disaster. Again, the Report carefully filtered out Whaley's unintended assault on the honesty of the police and their framed "lineup." There are but three brief references to his 18 pages of "testimony" on two different occasions (2H253-62, 292- 4; 6H428-34).

Oswald presumably walked to the cabstand from the bus. Whaley delineated a novel

picture of an assassin running away:

"And instead of opening the back door, . . . he opened the front . . . and got in . . . And about that time an old lady . . . said, 'Driver, will you call me a cab?' . . . he opened the door a little bit like he was going to get out and he said, 'I will let you have, this one,' and she says, 'No, the driver will call me one.' "

Whaley did not because he was certain one would soon be there (2H256). Whaley had seen Oswald approach his cab and enter it and Oswald had sat next to him for almost three miles. He noticed an identification bracelet (2H256). When shown a bracelet marked "Exhibit 383," Whaley said he thought that was the one he saw on Oswald but "I couldn't tell exactly whether that was the bracelet or not" (2H292). Ball, without description, said, "Offer this in evidence," and Congressman Ford accepted "this." The transcript then reads "(Commission Exhibit No. 383 was withdrawn and a photograph of the bracelet was received as Commission Exhibit No. 383-A.)." This photograph is included in Volume 16, where the table of contents is blank of Exhibit 383 and describes Exhibit 383-A as "Photograph of the identification bracelet of Lee Harvey Oswald." The photograph, as poor as those of the Commission consistently are, shows not only what may be taken to be an identification bracelet but also another detached and rather large undescribed object not identified in the interrogation or the picture. In telling how he saw this bracelet, which

would appear to be an "identificationless" bracelet, Whaley testified, "His coat sleeve was like this when he stretches his arm out," for the purpose of opening the door for the old lady. Only it was the left arm, the one away from the door, and Oswald was right-handed (2H293). Whaley was one of the only two among the numerous witnesses who described Oswald as wearing a coat, an identification he changed for the worse. Oswald had worn a jacket that day and the Commission said he left the jacket at work, where it was later found on a window sill. Whaley explained further about this bracelet, saying, "I always notice watchbands, unusual watchbands, and identification bracelets like these because I make them myself . . . particularly notice things like that." Asked if he had told both the Dallas police and the FBI that Oswald had been wearing "a heavy identification bracelet," Whaley said he did "but I don't remember saying it was heavy because I wouldn't know how heavy it was without handling it."

Whaley was not an expert on clothes, as his testimony displayed. Asked early in his first appearance to describe what Oswald had been wearing, he said, "I didn't pay much attention to it right then. But it all came back when I really found out who I had. He was dressed in just ordinary work clothes. It wasn't khaki pants but they were khaki material, blue faded blue color, like a blue uniform made in khaki. Then he had on a brown shirt with a little silver like stripe on it and he had on some kind of jacket. I didn't notice very close but I think it was a work jacket that almost matched his pants. He, his shirt was open three buttons down here. He had on a T-shirt . . ." (2H255).

Later the questioning returned to Oswald's clothing, about every element of which except the T-shirt Whaley had testified incorrectly in varying degrees. When shown Exhibit 150, he exclaimed, "That is the shirt, sir, it has my initials on it . . . Yes, sir; that is the same one the FBI man had me identify." How clothing identifications were made will become more evident shortly.

Whaley identified this shirt by "a kind of little stripe in it, light-colored stripe. I noticed that" (2H259). Exhibit 150 (16H515) shows no stripe.

Shown two pairs of pants, Exhibits 156 and 157 (16H518), Whaley said, "I don't think I can identify the pants except they were the same color as that, sir." Asked "which color" he responded, "More like this lighter color, at least they were cleaner or something." He selected Exhibit 157. Both pairs of pants are gray, the one he selected being quite light in color and highly light-reflective. He had earlier described blue pants. But about the pants, "I am not sure about the pants. I wouldn't be sure of the shirt if it hadn't had that light stripe in it" (2H239-60).

When shown Exhibit 162 (16H520), identified by Ball as "gray jacket with zipper":

"Mr. Whaley. I think that is the jacket he had on when he rode with me in the cab.

Mr. Ball. Look something like it? And here is Commission Exhibit No. 163, does this look like anything he had on?

Mr. Whaley. He had this one on or the other one.

Mr. Ball. That is right.

Mr. Whaley. That is what I told you I noticed. I told you about the shirt being open, he had on the jackets with the open shirt.

Mr. Ball. Wait a minute; we have got the shirt which you have identified as the rust brown shirt with the gold stripe in it.

Mr. Whaley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ball. You said that a jacket —

Mr. Whaley. That jacket now it might have been clean, but the jacket he had on looked more the color, you know like a uniform set, but he had this coat here on over that other jacket, I am sure, sir.

Mr. Ball. This is the blue-gray jacket, heavy blue-gray jacket.

Mr. Whaley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ball. Later that day did you -- were you called down to the police department?

Mr. Whaley. No, sir.

Mr. Ball. Were you the next day?

Mr. Whaley. No, sir; they came and got me, sir, the next day after I told my superior when I saw in the paper his picture, I told my superiors that that had been my passenger that day at noon. They called up the police and they came up and got me." ( 2H260 )

It is no wonder Ball was anxious to change the subject to the lineups. He could not conceive the additional disaster Whaley, alone and unassisted, was yet to launch against the Commission and the police. But he knew how utterly and completely wrong his witness was on Oswald's clothing. Instead of two jackets, Oswald, according to all other witnesses, was not wearing any. The "brown shirt with the silver like stripe" that Whaley had described earlier Ball converted to a "rust brown with the gold stripe on it." The blue khaki pants with matching jacket had become light gray pants with two jackets.

It was not difficult for Whaley to be certain of the shirt, as he later revealed, even though his descriptions varied from white to silver to gold and the "stripe" became a "lining." About a week after he spoke to the police "an FBI man brought the shirt over and showed it to me" (2H293 ).

This type of identification was not restricted to Whaley. It also happened to another witness who was even less necessary to the establishment of the case against Oswald. She is Mrs. Mary Bledsoe , a former landlady, who saw him on McWatters' bus. That is all she could say, but there were other things the Commission wanted her to say especially about a traveling bag of some kind ( 6H400 -27)

Mrs. Bledsoe had had an unsuccessful marriage that ended in divorce in 1925. She had had a stroke. She took in roomers, keeping her records on a calendar. The only month missing from her calendar, mysteriously and inexplicably, was October 1963, when Oswald stayed with her for five days. She said she asked him to leave for no reason that is clear and refused to refund the balance of his rent. The reading of her testimony would indicate her biggest complaint against Oswald was that he would not spend time chattering with her. She talked of him as a bad person without ever being asked or saying anything bad that he ever did. Like all the other witnesses who ever did talk with him, however, she saw the picture of his wife and child. Mrs. Bledsoe 's appearance can hardly be described as testimony. At one point, following one of her non-responsive answers, Ball interrupted her to say, "But, before you go into that, I notice you have been reading from some notes before you." Her reply was, "Well, because I forget what I have to say. When Ball asked her, "When did you make these notes?" (he did not ask her how she knew what she was going to be asked), her reply was a rephrasing of his question. Her attorney, Melody Jane Douthitt , interjected to explain, "When Mr. Sorrels (Dallas Secret Service) and I were talking about her going to Washington, he made the suggestion that she put all the things down on paper because she might leave out something . . . and that's when she started making notes" ( 6H407 -8). This had happened during the previous week.

Most of Mrs. Bledsoe 's answers were, "I don't know," "I didn't pay any attention," "I didn't care," "I didn't look," "I didn't even look," "I couldn't tell you," and other such valuable contributions to the Commission's knowledge.

The major effort by the lawyers had to do with one of the two bags in which Oswald had brought his clothes. This old lady was subjected to one of the longest interrogations in the Commission record. From what is known, it could not have had great significance in the assassination. In addition, the unqualifiedly uncertain character of most of her testimony would have rendered any identification she might make meaningless. But the Commission's lawyers took turns working on her. When one gave up, another tried, and then Miss Douthitt sought to do it for them. Through it all, Mrs. Bledsoe persisted in proclaiming her lack of knowledge. At one point Miss Douthitt became concerned about her interventions into the Commission's proceedings and excused herself in a little confusion, saying, ". . . Mary, pardon me, I am not--this is not for the record." Assistant Counsel Albert E. Jenner, Jr., assured her to the contrary: "That's fine, leave it on the record." Miss Douthitt then spent the next 3½ pages acting as a member of the Commission's legal staff, but without any more success (6H422ff.).

During the lengthy interrogation, the old lady frequently complained of being tired and called to everyone's attention that she had had a stroke. There was no intermission and she had no respite. But when Marina was on the stand in Washington, on the other hand, she was told at the outset that the Commission would take short recesses "for her refreshment" (1H2). After six pages of testimony, without a request by her, the Commission took its first such recess. Four pages later came the lunch recess. Less than four pages after the resumption of the hearings, she was again offered a recess but declined, saying, "Better to get it over with" (1H16).

The Commission even tried to get Mrs. Bledsoe to say she had seen Oswald with a package approximately the dimensions of a wrapped rifle. After a series of such questions, Mrs. Bledsoe said bluntly, "Didn't have anything like that with him" (6H426).

Mrs. Bledsoe's personal dislike for Oswald was clear, even if she never gave a reason for it. Her complaints included using her phone (with her permission) to speak in a foreign language (she presumed it was Spanish ''because the girl is Spanish," referring to Marina) (6H408); not knowing of Marina's pregnancy (6H406); and apparently because she thought she was in some way shamed. One of the first things she told the Commission was, "Of course, I had no idea he was the kind of man he was" (6H403). She also did not approve of his eating in his room, although she had directed him to the grocery (6H403).

Of seeing Oswald in McWatters' bus, she said, "He looks like a maniac . . . I didn't look at him. That is -- I was just -- he looked so bad in his face, and his face was so distorted" (6H409). Even Whaley, who saw two different jackets where there was none, did not see that much.

When Mrs. Bledsoe saw the Oswald shirt, Exhibit 150, before Ball was able to describe his evidence and ask his questions, she interrupted him to exclaim, "That is it." While the counsel persisted in formulating his question, she interrupted him three times to exclaim again, "That is it." While Ball was trying to lay a foundation for his questioning with further questions, she twice again interjected, "That is it." Finally, she said the shirt had been brought to her "by some Secret

Service man."

"Mr. Ball. It was brought out by the Secret Service man and shown to you?

Mrs. Bledsoe. Yes.

Mr. Ball. Had you ever seen the shirt before that?

Mrs. Bledsoe. Well --

Mr. Ball. Have you?

Mrs. Bledsoe. No; he had it on, though." (6H412)

When Mrs. Bledsoe, who had said she had seen Oswald on the bus and given such a graphic description of the expression she alone saw on his face, also said that she had never seen the shirt he was wearing until it was shown her by the Secret Service, while insisting that Oswald had it on, Ball faced a problem. He finally solved it, at least in part, by leading her through the same sort of questions and getting her to say, "Uh, huh," when he asked, "First time you ever saw the shirt was when you saw him on the bus" (6H413).

With three buttons missing from his shirt, she did not see the color of his undershirt. Of his pants, "They were gray, and they were all ragged in here . . . at the waist, uh, huh" (6H410). Shown both pairs of pants, Exhibits 156 and 157, she said it could not have been 157 because "it was ragged up at the top." With only one pair left from which to make her identification, Mrs. Bledsoe said of 156, "That must have been it, but it seemed that it was ragged up at the top" (6H414).

Despite Mrs. Bledsoe's vivid description of Oswald's appearance and her dislike of him and her displeasure at having seen him on the bus, she did not at first connect him with the

assassination, even when hearing his name on I television.

". . . I wanted to hear about the President and there was a little boy came in that room in the back and he turned it on, and we listened and hear about Mr. Tippen (sic) being shot, and it didn't dawn on me, and I said -- told his name as Oswald. I don't -- didn't mean anything to me, so I wanted to hear about the President, only one I was interested in, so, he went on back to work and they kept talking about this boy Oswald and had on a brown shirt, and all of a sudden, well, I declare, I believe that this was the boy, and his name was Oswald -- that is -- give me his right name, you know, and so, about an hour my son came home, and I told him, and he immediately called the police and told them, because we wanted to do all we could, and so, I went down the next night. He took me down, and I made a statement to them, what kind of -- Secret Service man or something down there" (6H412).

Mrs. Bledsoe was not the only witness who, as reflected in the Report, recalled only what the Commission needed. Another was Mrs. Robert A. Reid, clerical supervisor at the Texas School Book Depository (3H270-81). She was used to place Oswald on a path that led to one of the exits from the building on the floor below. This was another shaky time reconstruction of which even she was leery. When Commission Assistant Counsel David Belin went over this reconstruction with her, recalling his time check on her path back to the office at "about 2 minutes, he forgot that, even on the 17-minute-plus reconstruction of the walk from Oswald's rooming house to the scene of the Tippit killing, the time, was given in seconds. Mrs. Reid answered, saying, "Well, it wasn't any less than that, I am sure, because two minutes time . . ."

That was as far as she got. Belin interrupted her with more questions. Mrs. Reid had seen the assassination. She had conversed with a superior, O. V. Campbell, about the source of the shots; Mrs. Reid thought they came from above, Mr. Campbell from the grassy area to the west of the building. She had looked up and seen the Negro employees in the windows. And she had remained outside long enough to see the reaction of the crowd. She then ran into the building, noting no one where, at most, seconds before Officer Marrion L. Baker had had to push his way through people standing around. With all of this, Belin's time reconstruction got her into her office on a two-minute run two minutes after the first shot of the assassination rather than the last.

The Commission's problem was to get Oswald out of the building by 12:33, the time the Report says he left the building (R155). Only by misusing Mrs. Reid could this have been possible, for of all the employees in the doorway downstairs, none saw Oswald leave. The time reconstruction using Officer Baker, the policeman who encountered Oswald in the lunchroom, placed him in the lunchroom not earlier than 12:31:30, and this was accomplished by having the policeman retrace his steps from too far away and starting too early (3H252). By doing the same with Mrs. Reid, it was made to seem that in the half-minute between her reconstructed time and Baker's, Oswald could have gotten his coke and been in her office on his way, presumably, out. And he had to be out by 12:33 because the Commission next located him seven minutes after 12:33, seven blocks away, getting on the bus.

In this case, as in all others, the Commission's time reconstruction proved the opposite of what had been in tended. But Mrs. Reid gave the reconstruction an additional fatal blow by insisting Oswald was, at the time she said she saw him, wearing only a T-shirt. She was specific and positive in declaring he was not wearing the brown shirt. Shown the shirt, in an effort to get her to "remember," she stated flatly, "I have never, so far as I know, even seen that shirt" (3H276). So Mrs. Reid's testimony, even placing Oswald in her office at 12:32, proved he could not have left the building by 12:33. She had described him as walking at a very slow pace, "calm" (3H279), whereas she had been running and excited. It had taken her two minutes running. The Report says it took him one minute, walking. But in this one minute Oswald had had to go to an unspecified place elsewhere in the building, get his shirt and either drink his coke or put an untouched bottle down somewhere, put on his shirt and leave, all without being seen. Nor was a full bottle of coke found anywhere.

Those things Mrs. Reid remembered with clarity were what the Commission required of her. She remembered Oswald when none of the other women in the office did. She remembered not only that he had a coke, but that it was full and in his right hand. They passed at her desk and she did not see him again (3H279).

Prior to her appearance, the Commission had a pretty good idea of what Mrs. Reid could and could not say, especially about the shirt, of which she informed it she had been asked before. Except for the T-shirt, she remembered nothing about Oswald's clothing and could not identify his trousers when shown them (3H279).

What Mrs. Reid did not remember gives an interesting appraisal of the value that can be put on what she did:

On what floor she saw the Negroes looking out the windows after the assassination, she could not even guess, and this was the building in which she had worked for, seven years (3H273). When pressed to identify the floor, she said "a couple of floors up." It was the fifth floor.

With whom she ate lunch, and her estimate of the time she finished was impossible (3H271).

Whether or not she was the last to leave the lunchroom.

Whether there were any men in the lunchroom.

With this history she was not asked about seeing other employees, whether others were in the office area when she returned, or who they were. The only person she saw was Oswald, whom she knew only as an employee and did not even know his name until after the assassination (3H276). And he was the only one to whom she spoke. None of the others saw him. But Geneva Hine, who had not left the building, saw Mrs. Reid return and was sitting where Oswald would have to pass and did not see him. Miss Hine did name employees she recalled seeing (6H393ff.).

Mrs. Reid's testimony is also in conflict with that of other employees. She ate in the lunchroom regularly and saw Oswald only "a few times" (3H276). Others said he was there regularly. In his entire employment at the Depository, she saw him only about five times.

And what characterization of this monster did she give? He was a quiet man who minded his own business. The only conversations he had with the other office employees of which she knew were about his family, including the new baby (3H276). He "always went about his business (3H280). And if the recollections of Roy Truly and Officer Baker were correct, after the policeman poked a pistol in his belly, the killer still took the time to buy, but not drink, a coke, walk through the office at "a leisurely pace," calmly, instead of taking a hallway which led to the same stairs and was as convenient and more private, all with no show of emotion, not even fear.

Naturally, the Report reflects only that slight and most questionable part of Mrs. Reid's testimony that suited the Commission's purposes. She saw him walking in the general direction of a stairway that could have taken him to the entrance of the building.

And if Oswald had entered the lunchroom for any purpose other than to buy a coke, as he had told the police, what could this purpose have been? Could it have been part of an elaborate escape route? Mrs. Reid disproved that possibility. The only other exit is through a conference room, normally locked, and on that day she personally unlocked it for the police (3H277).

These are not exaggerated samplings of the many Commission witnesses. The worst is yet to come. At the scene of the Tippit killing the same was true. For example, Sam Guinyard (7H395) saw the running man "knocking empty shells out of his pistol" and reloading it in a one-hand operation, "rolling them (the bullets) with his hand -- with his thumb." Guinyard saw this from a half-block away (7H397). Guinyard is in contradiction of the other witnesses on the route the man took and on the closest he ever was to this man, his estimate of ten feet having been measured at 55 feet (7H398). Guinyard also testified that after a short interval during which Ted Callaway started in pursuit of the fleeing gunman, they went to the next street and about a hundred feet down it to the scene of the Tippit killing. He was there, Guinyard swore, when the truck driven by Domingo Benavides "came up." "He came from the east side -- going west" (7H398). By the testimony of all other witnesses, including Benavides, Benavides had parked his truck across the street from the police car prior to the shooting.

Not only in listening to incredible witnesses and ignoring their implausible, inaccurate and frequently impossible testimony without anything that could be considered searching questions did the Commission display a remarkable attitude toward those from whom it gathered evidence. Bias was clear in the examination of the only person to come forward with an offer to help the Commission. The Commission did not want any help, as it made clear, and especially did it not want anything that might disturb the neat little package already prepared for it before it began its deliberations.

Mark Lane is a New York lawyer and former assemblyman (2H32-61; 5H546-61). Disturbed as were many lawyers at what was reported from Dallas beginning with the apprehension of Oswald, he conducted his own inquiry. He was retained by Mrs. Marguerite Oswald to look out for her dead son's interest. Soon he presented a brief on Oswald's behalf, challenging much of the police case. His request to be allowed to represent Oswald was rejected by the Commission, as described earlier.

The Commission was untroubled by this situation: The one lawyer who had interested himself in the dead Oswald and had been engaged by the mother to represent him was rejected by the Commission on the ground that the widow, Marina, not the mother, was Oswald's legal representative. The Commission was "cooperating" with her and had obtained big-name counsel. Then Marina, knowing of the rights of married people under the Fifth Amendment, waived or never exercised any rights and became the major witness against her husband.

Lane discomfited the Commission. He put into the record things the Commission had sought to, and continued to seek to, keep out. Among these were quotations from doctors at Parkland Hospital who initially tended the President's wounds, describing the anterior neck wound as one of entry. He also gave the names of some of the doctors who had so stated. The Commission was later to go into an elaborate ritual with some of these doctors, most especially with Doctor Malcolm Perry, in which the identification by the doctors of this wound as one of entry was avoided as carefully as possible. The circumlocutions were unbelievable (6H7-18; 3H366-90).

So Lane was unwelcome to begin with because the Commission wanted no information in contradiction to its story. He was additionally unwelcome because he trod on a sensitive toe. And he kept treading on that toe, pointing out that Mary Moorman still had the FBI receipt for her picture showing the front of the building, but the picture had been unused (2H44). On the finding of the rifle, he declared the affidavit was executed the day after the assassination and at that late time still identified the rifle as a 7.65 Mauser (2H46). The dealer who supplied the rifle to Oswald, according to Lane, was warned by the FBI to keep his mouth closed (2H49).

The really sensitive nerve was touched when Lane recounted his interview with Helen Markham, converted by the Commission, again without need, into the most important witness in the Tippit killing. Lane listed the contradictions between Mrs. Markham's testimony and what she had told him, of her distance from the scene of the Tippit murder, of her description of the killer, of her means of identifying Oswald in the lineup -- by his clothing.

In his second appearance before the Commission on July 2, 1964, Lane and Rankin battled over the propriety of the questions. Lane accused the Commission's general counsel, without contradiction, of making demands that invaded the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship. This had to do not with the contents of the tape recording of the Markham-Lane phone conversation but with the circumstances under which it was made. According to Lane, "The Supreme Court has been quite plain, I think, on the sanctity of working documents of attorneys. And I think, therefore, that the questions are no longer in a proper area" (5H547). With Rankin's persistence in asking questions about the recording but not its contents, Lane declared, "I decline to answer any questions, because the questions you are asking clearly are not for the purpose for which this Commission has been established. And I tell you I am amazed, quite frankly, Mr. Rankin, that the kind of harassment which I have been subjected to since I became involved in this case continues here in this room -- I am amazed by that" (5H550).

Lane also complained about treatment he had received from FBI agents.

When the questioning returned to the tape recording, Lane declared, "I would like to make this quite clear to you, Mr. Rankin. I am not going to discuss any working papers in my possession. These papers came into my possession as a result of an attorney-client relationship. The Supreme Court has written decisions regarding the sanctity of those documents. I think it is improper of you to ask questions which delve into relationships of that nature. And I think you know that the questions you are asking are quite improper" (5H551).

With the persistence of Rankin in pursuing the same questions, Lane demanded to know "Am I a defendant before this Commission, or is the Commission trying to find out who assassinated the President?" The temperature raised again when, in response to further questioning, Lane challenged the Commission to take his and Mrs. Markham's statements under oath and "submit my testimony and Mrs. Markham's testimony to the U.S. Attorney's office, and bring action against both of us for perjury . . . and we will see who is convicted" (5H55l-2). When Congressman Ford asked if it was important that there was a difference between the Markham testimony and his, Lane replied in an attack on the lawyers appointed to represent Oswald, saying, "Of course, it is important. And if there was someone representing the interests of Oswald before this Commission, there could be cross-examination, you sitting as judges could then base your decision upon the cross-examination. But you have decided instead to sit as judges and jurors and defense attorneys and prosecuting attorneys, and you are faced with a dilemma. I cannot solve that dilemma for you" (5H552).

Rankin continued asking the same kind of questions and Lane accused him of asking questions "it would be improper and unethical for me" to answer, and "I am amazed that you would persist in asking questions which you know are improper and which would be unethical for me to answer" (5H552).

No member of the Commission or its legal staff disputed Lane's statement of the law or Supreme Court decisions on the lawyer-client relationship. On the question of the source of his information that Ruby, Tippit and Weissman had met at Ruby's nightclub, Lane said that in declining to give the Commission his informant's name there was "no legal justification." He was not questioned about his informant's reason, but he had publicly stated this person was afraid of reprisal. He told the Commission, ". . . matters which have been given to this Commission in utmost confidence have appeared in the daily newspapers, and one cannot feel with great security that giving information to this Commission, even at secret hearings, means that the information will not be broadcast, and this is the problem which confronts us at the present time" (5H554).

Further recriminations were exchanged:

Mr. Rankin. Do you realize that the information you gave in closed session could have an unfavorable effect upon your country's interests in connection with this assassination and your failure to disclose the name of your informant would do further injury?

Mr. Lane. Mr. Rankin, I am astonished to hear that statement from you. There are 180 million Americans in this country. I am perhaps the only one who is a private citizen who has taken off the last six months to devote all of his efforts to securing whatever information can be found, and to making that known to this Commission, and publicly to the people of this country at great personal cost in terms of harassment that I have suffered, in terms of the terrible financial losses that I have suffered. And to sit here today, after 6 months of this work, which I have given all to this Commission, voluntarily, and again have come here again today voluntarily to give you this information, and to hear you say that I am not cooperating with the Commission, and I am going to do harm to the country by not making information available to you astonishes me. You have hundreds of agents of the FBI running all over the Dallas area -- agents of the Secret Service, Dallas policemen. Are you telling me that in one trip to Dallas where I spent something like 2 days, I uncovered information which the whole police force of this Nation has not yet in 6 months been able to secure? I cannot believe that is a valid assessment of this situation. I cannot, Mr. Rankin.

The Chairman. Mr. Lane, may I say to you that until you give us the corroboration that you say you have, namely, that someone told you that that was a fact, we have every reason to doubt the truthfulness of what you have heretofore told us. And your refusal to answer at this time lends further strength to that belief. If you can tell us, and if you will tell us, who gave you that information, so that we may test their veracity, then you have performed a service to this Commission. But until you do, you have done nothing but handicap us.

Mr. Lane. I have handicapped you by working for 6 months and making all of the information which I have had available to you? I understand very fully your position, Mr. Chief Justice" (5H553-4).

The Commission's attitude toward Helen Markham was entirely different. She appeared March 26 and July 23, 1964 (3H304-31; 7H499-506). In her first appearance she was confronted with apparent inconsistencies in her description of the Tippit killer, including a statement by FBI agent Odum, quoting her description of a "white male, about 18 years old, black hair, red complexion," etc (3H319). This was not Oswald. Asked if she had ever described the killer as quoted by Lane, as "short, a little on the heavy side, and his hair was somewhat bushy," she retreated a little and said of the hair, "it wasn't so bushy" (3H317-8).

She was asked in a number of ways, "Do you know a man named Mark Lane?" and replied negatively to all. She had never spoken with him, a lawyer from New York, a lawyer investigating the case of Oswald, any man who said he was representing Oswald's mother, etc. She denied saying anything to Lane "or anyone else," but then admitted she had spoken to a French reporter and a LIFE reporter. She insisted, "I never talked to nobody," including "by telephone or any other means." This also included anonymous phone calls. Nor had she ever been asked the questions Lane said he had put to her. When statements Lane represented she had made to him were read to her, she unequivocally denied making them, "Not to anybody. Especially was this true of Oswald's clothing in the lineup, which Lane had quoted her as using as a means by which she had identified Oswald and as the chapter on his legal rights shows, a subject about which Oswald had loudly complained to the police (3H317-8).

Even when cautioned to consider her answers carefully, Mrs. Markham maintained a consistent position. She had never spoken to Lane or anyone else by phone or any other means about the Tippit killing.

On July 23, 1964, Assistant Counsel Wesley J. Liebeler took a deposition under oath from Mrs. Markham in Dallas (7H499-506). He went over all her denials with her and she reiterated in every conceivable way that she had never spoken to Lane, including following her appearance before the Commission. Liebeler then informed her, "I'll tell you very frankly we have a tape recording of a conversation that purports to be a conversation between you and Mark Lane . . . and I have a transcript (20H571-99) . . . I ask you to read the transcript . . . Would you like to hear the tape so you can tell us whether or not that is your voice?"

"Yes; sure," Mrs. Markham replied. And then she began a chaotic, incoherent account of a telephone call from a man who represented himself as "Captain Fritz -- over the telephone --." Patiently Liebeler went over it step by step. The transcript began with the long-distance operator, included the telephone number, clear identification of the calling party, purpose, etc., and it had been transcribed from the tape by the FBI. Mrs. Markham said she did not know the phone number -- hers at work -- and reiterated a different version of the caller identifying himself as from the Dallas police. Liebeler tried to cut off her insistent interruptions and babblings until after she could hear the tape and after some difficulty his effort to protect her from herself succeeded -- for a short while.

With the beginning of the tape he asked her to "tell us whether or not this is an accurate reflection of a conversation that you had over the telephone some time ago," and he told the court reporter, "I don't want any of this on the record now...." On her own, when Mrs. Markham started to react, the reporter resumed taking stenographic notes. At that point the most fantastic testimony of all went on the record. Mrs. Markham began by stating, "I never talked to that man." About her own voice, "I can't tell about my voice . . ." Liebeler again asked if the transcript was accurate, and she again lapsed into a series of incomplete and unconnected thoughts, concluding with, "that's nothing like the telephone call I got -- nothing." Gently, not reminding her of her repeated denials of any telephone calls, Liebeler quieted her and resumed playing the tape. Mrs. Markham again interrupted to repeat a still different version of her caller's connection with city hall and to reaffirm, "This man -- I have never talked with." She finally admitted recalling the conversation but insisted it was with the police department. Actually, the conversation had begun with the most explicit possible identification of Lane, his purposes and his mission, and it had been a person-to-person call.

When Liebeler quoted the transcript to show such a misunderstanding just was not possible, she merely repeated her denials, "that man -- I never talked to that man." When asked to explain her voice on the tape, she responded, "And I never heard that lady's voice before -- this is the first time." But she did finally admit the voice was hers. With infinite patience, Liebeler painstakingly explained how the contents showed the opposite of Mrs. Markham's insistence that "he told me he was from the police department." Again Mrs. Markham insisted the lady's voice was not hers, and eliminated the telephone operator because her boss had answered the phone. Then a further switch in which she admitted the conversation but denied it was with Lane or that he had, as the transcript and tape both showed, identified himself. Then, all over again, Mrs. Markham denied giving the description on the tape and in the transcript.

In seeming hysteria, she then handed Liebeler two pieces of paper of which she said, "I didn't know what to do about it." These were a letter from a James Kerr, with return address, asking her to contact him about "a matter which I believe will be mutually profitable" and a telegram from the United States Information Agency, asking her to appear on a television program on which the President and members of the Commission were also going to appear. Secret Service Agent Howlett interrupted to say Mrs. Markham had called him and he had explained the USIA program was a legitimate government function.

By this time, they had proceeded to only the sixth of the 29 pages of the tape transcript.

"Will I get in trouble over this?" Mrs. Markham asked.

"I don't think so, Mrs. Markham," Liebeler replied. "I wouldn't worry about it. I don't think anybody is going to cause you any trouble over that." At this point the transcript, set off in brackets, reads "referring to the telegram. There is nothing to indicate, nor is there any reason to believe, that the conversation and Mrs. Markham's fears of getting into trouble were over a government request that she appear on television with the President of the United States. That other grounds for fear were appropriate would seem obvious.

Still refusing to concede it was Lane who phoned her, Mrs. Markham set the tone for the interrogation with next to her last comment, "That was dirty in that man doing that," to which Liebeler responded, "Well, I would think that's right."

Mrs. Markham's final comment was, "Well, he's not no better than Oswald --- that's right."

The reason the Commission did not accept Lane's challenge to charge him and Mrs. Markham with perjury and let the courts decide who was swearing falsely about material evidence is clear.

The Lane-Markham testimony was, in accordance with its consistent practice, filtered by

the Commission to represent none of the foregoing. The Report reads,

"In evaluating Mrs. Markham's identification of Oswald, the Commission considered certain allegations that Mrs. Markham described the man who killed Patrolman Tippit as 'short, a little on the heavy side,' and having 'somewhat bushy' hair. The Commission reviewed the transcript of a phone conversation in which Mrs. Markham strongly reaffirmed her positive identification of Oswald and denied having described the killer as short, stocky and having bushy hair. She stated that the man weighed about 150 pounds. Although she used the words 'a little bit bushy' to describe the gunman's hair, the transcript establishes that she was referring to the uncombed state of his hair, a description fully supported by a photograph of Oswald taken at the time of his arrest. (See Pizzo Exhibit No. 453-C, p. 177) Although in the phone conversation she described the man as 'short,' on November 22, within minutes of the shooting and before the lineup, Mrs. Markham described the man to the police as 5'8" tall.

During her testimony Mrs. Markham initially denied that she ever had the above phone conversation. She has subsequently admitted the existence of the conversation and offered an explanation for her denial. Addressing itself solely to the probative value of Mrs. Markham's contemporaneous description of the gunman and her positive identification of Oswald at a police lineup, the Commission considers her testimony reliable. However, even in the absence of Mrs. Markham's testimony, there is ample evidence to identify Oswald as the killer of Tippit." (R167-8)

"Pizzo Exhibit C" as reproduced in the Report less than two inches wide, or as reproduced in Volume 21, where it takes up most of a page, does not show Oswald's hair as either "uncombed" or "a little bit bushy." Through out the 26 volumes are a number of photographs of Oswald being arrested, in the struggle that led to his arrest, and after the arrest. His hair remained remarkably neat.

Lawyers who presented such witnesses in a court of law would become a laughingstock. But these were the Commission's stars. Mrs. Markham was even asked by the government to appear on its international television program with the President of the United States and members of the Commission.

The Report was supposed to be based upon evidence. Evidence was gathered in the form of testimony from witnesses. Here we have samples of the kind of eyewitnesses the Commission heard and the kind of testimony they gave. Only the most careful examination of the testimony reveals what is carefully kept out of the Report, that some the most important eyewitnesses simply could not be believed. The Report, however, depends upon their undependable testimony.

These lines from "All's Well That Ends Well," Act IV, are appropriate:

"'Tis not the many oaths that make the truth,

But the plain single vow that is vow'd true."