4. THE MARKSMAN

"The essence of intelligence," Allen Dulles, Commission Member and former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, once said, "is to get one fact and bulldog it to death."

Unfortunately, as a Commission Member, Dulles did not practice what he preached. Had he done so, the Dallas shootings would have busied the bulldogs for years. There is no single thing that is proved beyond reasonable doubt bout the marksman, the rifle, the ammunition, the shooting or the number of shots except that President Kennedy was killed, Officer Tippit was killed, and Governor Connally was wounded. The Report evades much of the solid evidence the Commission could not avoid developing, misuses the testimony to which it does refer, ignores and compounds the sins of the police agencies, escapes the obvious and evolves unalloyed speculation in contradictory forms.

What the Report concludes is that Lee Harvey Oswald alone owned and used a cheap Italian war-surplus rifle to fire three rounds of presumed Western 6.5-mm, ammunition, killing the President and wounding Governor Connally. It declares he was a skilled marksman with the "capability" and was on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository Building and at the very window from which the shots are all stated to have been fired.

Only the completely incredible allegation of the totally impossible Leslie Brennan about things he could not possibly have seen can be used to place Oswald at that window. Without exception, all other quoted testimony proves that immediately after the shooting no one was heard moving around or seen on the sixth floor or leaving it by either the stairs or elevators until after Oswald was definitely seen in the second-floor lunchroom. There were three witnesses directly beneath this window and listening on the fifth floor and another working at the elevator shaft and the stair landing on the fifth floor, and there were others elsewhere in the building. Both elevators were on the fifth floor and could be started from no other floor.

Entirely by surprise the Commission received and the Report neglects the most reasonable and probative testimony on marksmanship from one of the witnesses heard with least enthusiasm. New Orleans attorney Dean Andrews was called because he reported Oswald's connections with Cuban groups to the Secret Service, by phone, while hospitalized. He caught the Commission entirely by surprise by saying Oswald had not and could not have killed President Kennedy. He emphasized the point that the Commission had never asked all the experts quoted: Marksmanship

is a skill that requires a high degree of coordination and practice (11H330-1).

"I am basing my opinion on five years as an ordnance man in the Navy. You can lean into those things, and with throwing the bolts -- if I couldn't do it myself, 8 hours a day, doing this for a living, constantly on the range, I know this civilian couldn't do it. He might have been a sharp marksman at one time, but if you don't lean into that rifle and don't squeeze and control consistently, your brain can tell you how to do it, but you don't have the capability . . . to fire three shots controlled with accuracy, this boy couldn't do it."

Commission Assistant Counsel Wesley J. Liebeler asked, "You base that judgment on the

fact that, in your own experience, it is difficult to do that sort of thing?"

"Mr. Andrews. You just don't pick up a rifle or a pistol or whatever weapon you are using and stay proficient with it. You have to know what you are doing . . . Somebody else pulled the trigger . . . It's just taking the 5 years (experience) and thinking about it a bit. I have fired as much as 40,000 rounds of ammo a day for 7 days a week. You get pretty good with it as long as you keep firing. Then I have gone back after 2 weeks. I used to be able to take a shotgun, go on a skeet, and pop 100 out of 100. After 2 weeks, I could only pop 60 of them. I would have to start again, same way with the rifle and machine guns. Every other person I knew, same thing happened to them. You just have to stay in it."

Assuming what was never true, that Oswald was a skilled marksman, how, where and with what did he practice to maintain this skill? There is testimony from a number of witnesses proving that a person seen at shooting galleries and looking like Oswald was not and could not have been him. There remains only the word of Marina, and all she said was that in New Orleans she saw him practice using the bolt and the scope, "dry runs," with a weapon she did not recognize, and in the dark! Even her unbelievable allegation that Oswald fired one bullet at General Edwin Walker is entirely without support. The expert testimony by FBI Ballistics Expert Robert A. Frazier was that he could not state even the manufacture of either the rifle or the bullet (3H429-10). The only bullet the Commission ever "knew" Oswald fired from his rifle was this Walker bullet.

Oswald's marksmanship in the Marine Corps, several years earlier, was poor, despite the efforts of the Report to establish otherwise. It nonetheless concludes "that Oswald had the capability with a rifle which enabled him to commit the assassination" (R19, 195). The method by which this transformation was accomplished is of admirable simplicity: First, make invalid comparisons and then, when you get the best possible testimony, if it does not suit your purpose, just keep scraping the barrel until you do get what you want.

During his Marine Corps career, Oswald was twice tested in marksmanship. The first time came after an extensive period of training and under skilled supervision, with an excellent weapon with which he was thoroughly familiar and ammunition of unquestioned dependability. After first firing at least 250 rounds, he just managed to make the grade mistakenly called "Sharpshooter." This is one of three designations used by the Services to describe rifle skill. It is actually only the middle grade, the top being "Expert Rifleman." At that time, Oswald did make the middle grade, not near the top. In a later test, when not under the intensive training, he did very badly. He just made the very bottom of the lowest grade that everybody has to make, placing but a single bullet over the absolute minimum in the target. And even this was with a known weapon he had fired several hundred times and handled regularly!

The Commission asked the Marine Corps for information "relative to Marksmanship capabilities of Lee Harvey Oswald." From the Headquarters of the Marine Corps came a response dated June 8, 1964, by Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Folsom, Jr., head of the Records Branch of the Personnel Branch, "by direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps" (19H16-8). Colonel Folsom also correlated proficiency with practice. He stated, "The Marine Corps considers that any reasonable application of the instructions given to Marines should permit them to be qualified as at least a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine Corps is of the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of adaptability to weapons firing so become qualified. Consequently a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor 'shot' and a sharpshooter qualification is a fairly good 'shot'."

So, Oswald at his military best was only "fairly good" and at the end of his service was a "poor shot."

To offset this destruction of its sand castle, the Commission compared Oswald with a number of men who have spent their lives firing and studying weapons, men of the highest competence, firing weapons regularly as part of their livelihoods for all or most of their adult years, men who had had scientific weapons training. Then on July 24, 1964, the Commission called James A. Zahm , a Marine non-commissioned officer in weapons training (11H306ff.) Zahm was willing to call Oswald a good shot. But even he specified a minimum of ten practice shots as prerequisite in the use of the telescopic sight (R192). And this, of course, assumed a good telescopic sight.

After deliberation, the Report concludes that Oswald's Marine experience, "his other rifle experience (a bad performance with a .22 rifle) and his established familiarity with this particular weapon (totally non-existent) show that he possessed ample capability to commit the assassination" (R195).

Just how easy were these assassination shots? Could the performance be regarded as within the "capability" of a man who was at the time less practiced than when the Marine Corps several years earlier had evaluated him as a "poor shot?"

The Commission arranged what it presumably considered a fair test, with its three genuine marksmen, "rated as master by the National Rifle Association" (R193). The marksmen took as much time as they wanted for the first target and all hit the target. For the first four attempts, . . . missed the second shot . . . Five of the shots hit the third target . . ." (R193). And they were firing at still targets, not moving, living things!

These three really were "masters." Two were civilians in the Small Arms Division of the Army's Development and Proof Services, and the third man was in the Army and had "a considerable background as a rifleman" (3H445). Yet even they were not able to do what the Report says Lee Harvey Oswald, the poor shot in the Marines, when out of practice, "had ample capacity to commit."

There is no reason to doubt that the ten-dollar rifle could be fired accurately. The improbability of an assassin ordering his weapon by mail when the same weapon was readily available locally (26H63) is not referred to in the Report, nor is his getting such a cheap weapon for such serious shooting. But the testimony of the experts is clear and unequivocal. The rifle could be fired accurately. (3H390ff.) Only not at the time of the assassination, and nor when received at the FBI laboratories in Washington, for initial testing, or at Edgewood Arsenal for further tests.

Robert A. Frazier, the FBI's expert, said, "When we attempted to sight this rifle at Quantico we found that the elevation adjustment in the telescopic sight was not sufficient to bring the point of impact to the aiming point . . . every time we changed the adjusting screws to move the cross hairs in the telescopic sight in one direction it also affected the movement of the . . . point of impact in the other direction." The defect in the sight was structural (3H405). So, ". . . we left the rifle (alone) as soon as it became stabilized and fired all of our shots with the point of impact actually high and to the right." Frazier did not know the nature of "the defect in the scope" but he had noticed a damage from which "the scope tube could have been bent or damaged" (3H406). After some experimentation, they learned that "you could take an aiming point low and to the left" and fire accurately (3H407). Such experimentation and adjustment were unreported from the assassination scene or anywhere else in Dallas.

By the time Frazier got it, "apparently the scope had been taken off the rifle," hence, there is no way of knowing how it was set in Dallas (3H411). And when the rifle was first received, there were no shims under the sight. Shims had subsequently been added. This mystery is cleared up in Volume 17 where the table of contents refers to "Three shims inserted under the mount of the C2766 rifle during tests performed on the rifle." One can only wonder what else was done to it before it got to the masters who even then failed to duplicate the feat. The same source prompts limitless conjectures in describing Exhibit 542 as a "replica" of the "C2766 rifle" (17H241). All of the expert testimony establishes beyond cavil there is no such thing as a replica of a rifle. This is the basis of identification of used shells and bullets. Both are marked unmistakably by each weapon, like fingerprints, characteristically and uniquely, a point the Commission belabored and with which it unnecessarily cluttered its record. Other experts found the sight adjusted for a left-handed man, which Oswald was not. This information is buried among the exhibits (25H799).

The precision with which the Commission attacked the manufacture of the ammunition is equally scientific: They presumed it. With the bullets, this would seem more reasonable than in other cases. When the rifle was found (R79), it had a live cartridge in firing position. This was of Western Cartridge Company manufacture. There were also three empty shells found in the same area. The Report leaves one to assume on this basis that the three shells were expended at that firing and all were Western bullets (R555). There were no extra bullets in the clip, and the Report treats this unusual situation as normal. It was, in fact, one of the most obvious bones for Dulles' 'bulldogs. Also, the clip did not come with the rifle and had to be purchased separately (R555). There is neither evidence that Oswald ever bought a clip or that the Commission sought proof that he had. Ammunition is not sold by the piece but by the box. The possibility of Oswald having had more than the four bullets attributed to him is eliminated by the thorough searches of his person and residences, so complete at his rooming house that a check back by four detectives revealed but a single item overlooked -- a paper clip. Nothing would be more conspicuous or unforgettable to an ammunition dealer than such an unusual purchase. Yet, even though some motions were made in the direction of checking such purchases with the dealers who handled that ammunition, there was no real search and the negative results of what investigation was made are completely overlooked in the Report (3H416).

Even though the Report does not indicate the manufacture of the empty shells, they were made by the Western Cartridge Company. These shells were identified as the same as the shell of the remaining live cartridge, which was loaded with what Frazier described as a "full metal jacketed bullet of the military type" (3H399). As will become dear, it was not a fair assumption that the expended shells had contained the same type of bullet. This type of bullet, unlike the consistent references of both the Report and the Commission, is not a "high velocity" bullet. Frazier said it had "a rather low velocity (3H414).

But when the testimony from Frazier turned to positive scientific identifications of the bullet and fragments in the Commission's possession on Wednesday, May 13, 1964 (5H58ff.), all he said of them was that they were of lead.

Almost by accident, in trying to suggest what it cannot and does not prove, that Oswald practiced with a rifle, the Report casually mentions that "examination of the cartridge cases found on the sixth floor of the Depository Building established that they had been previously loaded and ejected from the assassination rifle, which would indicate that Oswald practiced operating the bolt" (R193). This intelligence is not examined by the Report in connection with the bullets. It is, of course, not necessary to use bullets to practice operating the bolt. And it is equally true that practice is not the only procedure that will mark a shell. Firing, for example, does exactly the same thing.

A footnote at this point refers to something totally unrelated, four photographs of Oswald following his arrest. But there is a letter from J Edgar Hoover on the bullets buried in the very last of the 26 volumes (26H449-50). Of these empty cases, Hoover reported one had marks indicating it had been loaded and extracted at least three times and "three sets of marks on the base of this cartridge case which were not found (on the others) or any of the numerous tests obtained" from the rifle. Of a second casing, it had been "loaded into and extracted from a weapon at least twice," and there are two marks connecting this casing with the rifle, Hoover says, but it is not possible to determine whether these were made on the same or different occasions. The inference is clear: It could have been just one entry into this weapon. And the same was true of the third casing.

And even with the live bullet, there were additional marks which "were not identified with" the rifle!

Is it not surprising that the Report completely fails to indicate that by the best science available all three empty cases and the live bullet were connected with another rifle? Nor is this surprise lessened by the failure of the Report to say whether the empty shells had been fired from another rifle. Could they have been reloaded following fire from another rifle and marked by merely being placed in the Mannlicher-Carcano, or vice versa?

Then there is the question of how the casings were loaded. Bullets of an entirely different character in this casing were readily available in Dallas. There is evidence only that Oswald did not buy any. This is proved in another of the Commission's burials, like the others reproduced in facsimile, in greatly reduced size. It is Exhibit 2694, an unsigned, undated, unidentified document bearing no letterhead. The tables of contents of these volumes are usually less informative than they might easily be. In this case, even less than usual is revealed. The listing is "Report of the investigation of possible target practice of Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas, Tex., area (CD778, pp. 5-23)" (26H58-68).

What relates to the investigation of target practice reports its illegality, and no evidence that Oswald ever did practice target shooting. But during the course of this investigation, presumably by the FBI, the sources of ammunition of this type in the Dallas area are generally indicated and some specific investigations reported. The rifle, according to one dealer, had been imported by "boat loads" and had a wholesale value of but $3.00. At two specified sources, this type of cartridge loaded with an entirely different type of bullet, hunting or soft-nosed bullets, was found. At one of these, "On March 26, 1964, two boxes, 20 rounds each, of 6.5 M/M Mannlicher-Carcano, Western Cartridge Company, ammunition were obtained for forwarding to the Laboratory of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. One box loaded with a hunting load (soft nose) was obtained from John Thomas Mason, and the other, which was a military load, was obtained from John H. Brinegar" (26H64).

The other source identified the Crescent Firearms Company as the supplier of both rifles of this type and soft-nosed bullets (26H65). The Commission was in touch with this company, from which on July 23, 1964, it obtained an affidavit five brief sentences long. This set forth that the FBI had been in contact with the company November 22, 1963, had learned of the sale of the C2766 rifle to Klein's Sporting Goods in Chicago, had gotten all appropriate records from Crescent, and mentioned not a single word about ammunition (11H205).

The Dallas police did think of checking into the source of the ammunition, at least briefly. This led to a kind of shell game with evidence in which there was a never-ending confusion by the witnesses involved about what happened to the shells following detection, who had them when, what he did with them, and at whose instructions. First there was testimony, then clarifying affidavits, more testimony and more affidavits, which merely added confusion. Originally only two of the empty cases were given to the FBI. This gave fertile ground for more faulty recollections.

Involved were Captain Will Fritz, homicide chief, Lieutenant J. C. Day, of identification, and Detectives Dhority, Sims and Studebaker. In an affidavit dated June 9, 1964, Fritz said of this third shell, "I told Detective Dhority that after these hulls were checked for prints to leave two of them to be delivered to the FBI and to bring one of them to my office to be used for comparison tests here in the office, as we were trying to find where the cartridges had been bought. When Detective Dhority returned from the Identification Bureau, he returned the one empty hull which I kept in my possession. Several days later, I believe on the night of November 27, Vince Drain of the FBI called me at home about one o'clock in the morning and said that the Commission wanted the other empty hull and a notebook that belonged to Oswald. (Hardly possible because the Commission was not appointed until two days later.) I came to the office and delivered these things to the FBI." (7H404)

The possibility that these empty shells had been discarded by hand, especially in the absence of fingerprints on them, seems never to have been considered by anybody. Yet in view of what was known to all the police agencies and the Commission, this possibility should have been thoroughly pursued.

As of the date of its purchase, the Commission did link the C2766 rifle to Oswald. This was done by handwriting experts, who identified the penmanship on the order blank purchasing the rifle under the name of "Hidell" as Oswald's. The rifle also was mailed to Oswald's earlier Dallas post office box (17H635, 677-8, 788-9). From that moment on, however, in one of the pet phrases of the Report, this particular rifle "to the exclusion of all others" was not associated with Oswald personally. Marina saw him with a weapon but was unable to distinguish between a rifle and a shotgun, a difficulty the Chairman said his wife also would encounter. The George De Mohrenschildts, acquaintances of the Oswalds, saw a rifle in their apartment before the move from Dallas to New Orleans. There is no positive identification of this rifle. On their return to Dallas, Oswald did not unload the Paine station wagon in which the property and Marina were traveling. He went instead to Mexico. In the Paine garage, the normal storage place for the rifle reportedly was on the floor, wrapped in a blanket -- hardly a careful man's way of protecting his weapon. If the Commission had any evidence that as of the time of the assassination Oswald and Oswald alone owned and possessed this rifle, it is not quoted in the Report. Nor is there mention of the question of general accessibility to the Paines' garage. The Report contains no indication whether or not this garage was usually locked or whether the entrance from either the inside or outside was open to strangers or friends, especially when Ruth Paine and Marina were away or visiting neighbors. It is known, however, that the Paines on at least one occasion did go away and leave their premises unprotected. During the second police search of the property, both Paines drove off while the police were still searching.

As was the case with the evidence about the bag, the information in the Report does not accurately reflect the Commission's best information about the marksman, his marksmanship, his weapon and ammunition. Rather than the superb marksman required to shoot even better than the best "masters" the Commission tests, Oswald was a poor shot. Whether or not the secondhand war surplus rifle was capable of being fired accurately, the best evidence is that at the time of the assassination the condition of the sight precluded this, unless the marksman was proficient and practiced with the maladjusted and broken sight. There is no evidence Oswald had either the practice or the skill. There was at best an abortive investigation of the source of the ammunition. Oswald was never connected with either the ammunition or the clip in which it was contained. The clip did not come with the rifle. The empty cartridge cases from which the bullets were presumed to have been fired and the live cartridge had all been in this rifle on a previous occasion and/or in another unidentified and ignored rifle. Mysteriously, the police suspended their investigation of the source of the ammunition without tracing it to Oswald. The police also swore to contradictory and conflicting statements about what they did with the empty shells.

Nonetheless, the Report concludes that Oswald had the skill required for the assassination and that the rifle was the assassination weapon. What it does not ignore about the ammunition it is satisfied to presume, even in the presence of contrary evidence. It also presumes Oswald's possession of the rifle and ammunition and, on the basis of these presumptions, concludes that Oswald was the marksman who committed murder.