10. THE OSWALD'S G0VERNMENT RELATIONS

When the six blind men of the fable felt the elephant, they described six different things. This is the approach of the Report. At one point it evaluates Oswald's relations with the government (Chapter 15), at another his possible participation in a possible conspiracy (Chapter 6), and at two points (Chapters 6 and 7), his "politics." In each case, the evaluation was in vacuo isolated from everything else and considered as a separate and in itself distinct thing.

When Allen Dulles was director of the Central Intelligence Agency, his vast new office building outside Washington in Virginia was not full of spies. It was staffed largely with researchers and analysts. What is most lacking in this Report is analysis. The Commission gathered much information. But its meaning was not extracted. It is the function of analysis to put assembled information in a meaningful form. This entails the proper assembling of the facts. The tremendous effort that went into the collection of the information available to the Commission is wasted unless that information has meaning. A case in point is the ridiculous episode of the comparison of hairs from a blanket known to have been Oswald's property with hairs taken from Oswald after his arrest. Instead of being satisfied that Oswald's hairs would properly and predictably be on his blanket, the Report compares hairs from both sources. It did, of course, find Oswald's hairs on the blanket. And it also found hairs that definitely were not his. Knowing that his hairs were on his blanket as a matter of scientific fact added nothing of meaning to the Commission's store of knowledge. But learning of the presence of other hairs, unless they were to be -- as they were not -- traced to their source, was of no value and added only confusion. Unless the Commission was prepared to trace the unknown hairs to their ultimate source, what they learned would have been of interest only to Oswald's wife.

Such endeavors were pseudo-scientific. They were distractions and, except for adding unnecessary bulk to impress the uninformed or unselective, contributed nothing

to the Report. Had only Oswald's hairs been on Oswald's blanket, what value did this have?

This, unfortunately, is the manner and method of the drafters of the Report. It is typical of the processes by which their conclusions were reached. When combined with the selective reasoning of the blind men confronting the elephant, the yield was another mass of data that, whether or not accurate, could not possibly have meaning and significance imparted to it.

What Oswald's politics, if any, were, whether or not his relations with the government were normal, and whether he was an agent, cannot possibly be learned from isolated examination of each subject separately. Nor can any tenable conclusion be reached about his participation in or the existence of a conspiracy except by evaluation of all such information, studied not as a trunk, a tail, a leg or by the texture of the skin, but as an elephant -- in its entirety. Even then, the exclusion of certain basic considerations, such as the possibility Oswald was an agent of not the CIA or FBI as such, but of their agents or of groups related to them, directly or indirectly, made impossible the precise answer to whether or not Oswald was any kind of an agent.

The denials of the CIA and the FBI that Oswald was their agent were as predictable as they were meaningless (R327). Equally unworthy of serious consideration is the Report's statement that the Commission had access to the "complete files." The Commission had access only to what the agencies wanted it to see. This may, in fact, have been complete files or complete files as they then existed or ever existed. The case of the denial of the Gary Powers U-2 flight over the Soviet Union is fresh in history. Even when the plane was in Russian hands, and even when the prestige and integrity of both the country and the President were at stake, worthless denials were made. What did the Commission expect, that any agency with which the presumed assassin of the President had been associated was going to rush forth and claim credit for him or his terrible crime?

Besides, the denials by the agency heads could have been quite truthful and still have been meaningless and worthless. Only formal employees are carried on payroll and expense accounts. The agents of agents, the informants and contacts, are not pay rolled. They cannot and should not be, for their security and that of the agency is too deeply involved and too important. Such people are remunerated from unvouchered funds of which there is no precise accounting. By their very nature they are not to be accounted for. If this were not an absolute necessity, there would be no justification for their existence in a democratic society. The people's money cannot be spent indiscriminately except when absolutely essential, as in the case of intelligence.

If Lee Harvey Oswald had any non-pay rolled relationship with the CIA, John McCone had no reason for knowing it. Nor could he with any certainty trace it down and learn it. The whole sad history of the Bay of Pigs and the partly revealed story of the American pilots who lost their lives in its prelude make clear the indirection with which the CIA works and has to work. The survivors of those pilots are not receiving and have not received compensation from the CIA. Their checks come from mysterious corporations. The mysterious boats and ships that are in and out of Florida and other ports on other than orthodox maritime business are not registered in the name of the CIA. They cannot and should not be. But no one doubts in whose interest they ply the Caribbean.

Having by its approach and method precluded any meaningful analysis of Oswald's politics, relationship with the government and his motives, if any, the Report then makes even more certain of the worthlessness of its conclusions by falling for the ploy of the police and engaging in semantics. It uses political words out of context and gives them a meaning diametrically opposed to reality. Throughout the Report are references to Oswald's "commitment to Communism." To most Americans this means the belief and philosophy of the American Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Above all, it connotes an attachment to the Soviet Union.

This was the opposite of the truth. The Commission knew it. All of its data prove that Oswald was not, either philosophically or by membership, connected with the Communist Party. He hated it and the government of the Soviet Union with passion and expressed his feelings with what for him was eloquence.

While seeking to mitigate this forthright misrepresentation with equally vague and undefined references to Marxism," which most Americans equate with Communism, the Report leaves itself with as much intellectual integrity as the boy with his fingers crossed behind his back denying he was in the cookie jar.

Almost from the moment of his arrest, the police knew all about Oswald's background, for the FBI's Oswald expert, James P. Hosty, Jr., participated in the first interrogation. Oswald discussed what he considered his politics without inhibition. Insofar as he or they understood what he was talking about, it is, to the degree they desired, reflected in the reports of the interrogators. Appendix XI consists exclusively of these reports (R598ff.).

The moment the police heard Oswald had defected to the Soviet Union and heard from his own lips that he was a "Marxist," they ignored his frank statements about his disapproval of the Soviet Union, and the diversion and "Red scare" were launched. It received the widest dissemination. Editorial and headline writers needed no encouragement in their speculations and inherent accusations of a Communist plot to kill the President. From that moment on, Oswald was even more friendless, the trial of any conspiracy was brushed over, and the hounds were off in the wrong direction. To this day, even in the Report, the only really serious consideration given to any possibility of a conspiracy is restricted to the involvement of the Soviet Union or Castro Cuba.

If those among his acquaintances who told the Commission of Oswald's political beliefs, such as the Paines and George de Mohrenschildt, understood correctly, Oswald did not understand Marxism. Not a single witness or fact showed him either a Communist or pro-Communist. Every scrap of evidence from his boyhood on proved him consistently anti-Communist. Ruth Paine told FBI Agent Hosty, when he interviewed her in early November, that Oswald described himself as a Trotskyite and that she "found this and similar statements illogical and somewhat amusing" (R439). De Mohrenschildt, at the time of the assassination occupied with a business relationship with the Haitian government, was apparently the only member of the Fort Worth Russian-speaking community for whom Oswald had any respect (R282). De Mohrenschildt was described by the Commission and some of its informants as provocative, non-conformist, eccentric, and "of the belief that some form of undemocratic government might be best for other peoples" (R283). He was an agent for French intelligence in the United States during World War. The Commission's investigation "developed no sign of subversive or disloyal conduct" on the part of the De Mohrenschildts (R383).

Oswald is not known to have ever had any kind of a personal contact with any party or any official of any part of the left, except by correspondence, and then of his initiative and of no clear significance. The total absence of such contacts, in person or otherwise, is in itself persuasive evidence that, as a matter of real fact rather than conjecture, he had no political affiliation. The searches of the Commission appear thorough and the facilities and resources of the investigative agencies are extensive.

As a 16-year-old, Oswald wrote the Young People's Socialist League asking information (R681). This is an old and well known youth group whose anti-communism has been almost religious in its fervor.

Thereafter he wrote the Socialist Workers' Party, seeking literature including the writings of Leon Trotsky. The Commission prints 14 pages of this correspondence (19H 567-80). Again, this is an anti-Communist party and Trotsky is perhaps the best known of the former Russian Communists who fought the Soviet regime. Some of Oswald's correspondence with this group and all of his correspondence with the Communist Party (20H257-75) and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (20H511-33) make sense only when the possibility of Oswald's being somebody's agent is considered.

The Report finds "Oswald had dealings" with these groups (R287). He did, in the same sense that one who writes the White House and gets a reply has "dealings" with the President.

Referring to the Communist Party U.S.A. alone, the Report states, "in September 1963, Oswald inquired how he might contact the party when he relocated in the Baltimore-Washington area, as he said he planned to do in October, and Arnold Johnson suggested in a letter of September 19 that he 'get in touch with us here (New York) and we will find some way of getting in touch with you in that city (Baltimore)' " (R288).

The Report is correct but incomplete, for on the same date Oswald made the same request of the Socialist Workers' Party (19H577). The Report's authors considered it expedient to ignore the letter to the SWP. The reason for this omission and the reason for similarly false letters from Oswald to both historically antagonistic groups are worthy of consideration. In omitting all reference to the SWP, the Report gives the false impression of a non-existing affiliation with the Communist Party, else why should Oswald want to get in touch with the Baltimore-Washington branch? There is no evidence he planned such a move. He planned to go to Mexico and he went there. But why should Oswald have wanted to be in touch with both parties, antagonistic as they are, especially because of his own clear antipathy toward the Communist Party? One of the obvious reasons is that he was trying to penetrate them as some kind of agent. He could not have found political sympathy in or from both. It is this possibility that completely escaped the consideration of the authors of the Report and it is the most obvious consideration. Especially when thought of in the light of Oswald's relations with Cuban refugee groups, detailed elsewhere in this book, could this line of reasoning have led to a meaningful analysis and conclusion.

There was "no plausible evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald had any other significant contacts" with any of these groups, the Report concludes, evaluating the Oswald initiated correspondence and requests for literature as "significant."

But Oswald's real attitude toward the Communist Party and the Soviet Union were well known to the Commission. He made no secret of them, and the Russian-speaking community in Fort Worth reported his dislike. Oswald himself was well recorded in letters, drafts of speeches and notes and, in fact, in public speeches. A number of such documents appear in Volume 16. They are part of the Commission's record.

Toward the end of their stay in New Orleans, the Oswalds went to Battles Wharf, Alabama, to participate in a seminar. He unburdened himself of his anti-Soviet feelings. Marina got a thank-you note from Robert J. Fitzpatrick, of the Society of Jesus, in which she was asked to convey "thanks to your husband, too, for his good report to our seminar. Perhaps we do not agree with him regarding some of his conclusions but we all respect him for his idealism." (16H243).

Oswald's hatred of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union exude from 150 consecutive pages of his notes in the same volume, as well as from other exhibits (l6H283-434). For example, in Exhibit 97 (pp. 422-3) he raged "The Communist Party of the United States has betrayed itself! It has turned itself into the traditional lever of a foreign power to overthrow the government of the United States, not in the name of freedom or high ideals, but in servile conformity to the wishes of the Soviet Union . . . (the leaders) have shown themselves to be willing, gullible messengers of the Kremlin's Internationalist propaganda . . . The Soviets have committed crimes unsurpassed . . . imprisonment of their own peoples . . . mass extermination . . . individual suppression and regimentation . . . deportations . . . the murder of history, the prostitution of art and culture. The Communist movement in the U.S., personalized by the Communist Party, U.S.A., has turned itself into a 'valuable gold coin' of the Kremlin. It has failed to denounce any actions of the Soviet Government when similar actions of the U.S. Government bring pious protests." (Spelling improved.)

The Report quotes some of this as well as ". . . I hate the U.S.S.R. and Socialist system . . ." (R399).

He also described himself as one with "many personal reasons to know and therefore hate and mistrust Communism . . ." ( 16H442).

Even his oft-mentioned notes on Russia, widely discussed but unquoted in the press, are a narrative full of the kind of information intelligence agencies, including our own, seek about other countries, especially the Soviet Union. It includes such items as the location of an airport, the layout of a city, and all sorts of intimate details of the electronics factory in which he worked, including what it produced, its rate of production, the number of employees engaged in various pursuits and other such non-travelogue data.

It is abundantly clear that the Report distorts and misrepresents the Commission's information on Oswald's politics. It both says and implies the opposite of the truth. It pretends a man whose hatred of the Soviet Union boiled in his guts was a protagonist of that political system and perpetuates a lie foisted off on an innocent public by the police. In such a Report, by such a Commission, dealing with such a tragedy, this is unpardonable. Can there be any reason for this except a desire to "fool the public?" How many more people, here and abroad, were willing to accept what might have otherwise been unacceptable conclusions, how many were less critical than they might have been of the Commission, because of this pretense that Oswald had a "commitment to Communism," that he somehow was an agent of a hated political force. The Report concludes that he was serving no foreign government and that he was the agent of none (R21-2). But the Report repeats the false representation of Oswald's politics. The Commission instead should have inquired into who created and broadcast this deception and with what motives. As a result, the Commission's own motives are suspect.

Oswald's Marine Corps Service and First Passport

Only ill the light of what Oswald's politics really were might any sense be made of his relations with various agencies of the U.S. Government, his trip to Russia, his defection, and his defection from his defection.

With but 43 days of his Marine Corps enlistment remaining, or three months if the penalties of the courts martial had been imposed (19H725), Oswald received a "hardship discharge" (19H676). This was a clear fraud about which neither the Marine Corps nor any other government agency ever did anything. Why?

There are 112 pages of photocopies of Oswald's Marine Corps record reproduced at one point in the 26 volumes of hearings and exhibits (19H656-768), but that record is incomplete in at least one major respect.

This series of documents shows Oswald enlisted on October 24, 1956; He was twice court-martialed, once for the dream offense of many ex-servicemen and once for an even more unusual departure from regulations. The second breach, in non-military language, consisted of swearing at a non-commissioned officer and assaulting him "by pouring a drink on him on or about 20 June 1958 at the Bluebird Cafe, Yamato, Japan." He was sentenced to a $55.00 fine and four weeks at hard labor, the second part waived on condition of good behavior. Less than six months earlier he had been court-martialed for accidentally shooting himself with his own loaded .22-caliber pistol, possession of which was prohibited. The generous Marines found this injury "was incurred in line of duty and not related to misconduct." His sentence was 20 days at hard labor, a $50.00 fine, reduction in rank to private, with the confinement at hard labor suspended for six months unless sooner vacated (19H663-4, 682-4, 692, 707-8, 747-52).

Of Oswald's personal activity in the Marines, the Report states: "He studied the Russian language, read a Russian language newspaper and seemed interested in what was going on in the Soviet Union." In the unit with which he served upon his return from the Far East, Oswald was referred to as "comrade" and "Oswaldskovitch" (R388) But his clearance to handle classified information was not revoked It was granted May 3, 1957, "after careful checks." Upon discharge he signed a form acknowledging he had been informed about penalties for revelation of classified information. This included awareness "that certain categories of Reserve and Retired personnel . . . can be recalled to duty . . . for trial by court-martial for unlawful disclosure of information . . ." (19H680). When Oswald defected and appeared in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, he declared his intention to tell the Russians all he knew, and he knew about the radar installations in which he served and of codes (R262, 265, 393). The Report is barren on the subject, but there have been accounts published of the necessity for changing codes after his defection.

Yet on his return to the United States, Oswald was not kept under regular surveillance (R439), was not charged with breach of security, and was not even confronted with the fraudulent nature of his hardship discharge. Explanations of lack of proof might be offered, no matter how unacceptably, for the failure to charge him with breach of security. But the failure to keep him under surveillance or to do anything about his fraudulent discharge are not susceptible to such facile pleadings. And the Report is incomplete on even this unsatisfactory explanation. It reads, "No evidence has been found that they used him for any particular propaganda or other political or informational purposes" (R393). There is no reference here to military or security information.

The hardship discharge was to enable Oswald to care for his mother. He made not even a gesture in this direction and the Marine Corps would appear to have been aware that he had no such intention. The effective date of his discharge was September 11, 1959 (19H680; 22H79). On September 4, 1959 he applied for a passport from Santa Ana, California. It was issued September 10, 1959. Accompanying this application was a Marine Corps certification that had to be filed with the passport application and submission of which is noted on the application. "This is to certify," it read, "that PFC (E-2) Lee Harvey Oswald, 1653230, U. S. Marine Corps is scheduled to be released from Active Duty and transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve (Inactive) on 11 September 1959."

Under "Occupation" on the application, Oswald described himself as "shipping export agent." The places he intended visiting included Cuba and Russia. During a proposed length of stay of only four months, he said he was going to be a student at "the College of A. Schweitzer" in Switzerland and the University of Turku, in Finland. He had all of his transportation arrangements made and specified in the application that he would leave New Orleans by Grace Line ship September 21, 1959 (22H77-9).

The Marine Corps certification of Oswald's imminent discharge that accompanied his passport application at the very time it was processing a hardship discharge was not lost in the mass of the Commission's documentation. Nor is it suppressed in the Report. Instead, the Report ignores both this and the fraudulent nature of the discharge in the text and, in a 13-line section of Appendix XV in which the nature of the discharge is not referred to, notes that a statement that "he was about to be discharged" accompanied the passport application (R746). Why did not the Marine Corps revoke Oswald's security clearance; why did it keep him in a classified job and cooperate in getting him a passport while it was discharging him so he could support his mother?

This is the background of Oswald's now famous trip to the Soviet Union, where he arrived in mid-October 1959.

Renunciation of Citizenship

On Saturday afternoon, October 31, Oswald appeared at the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, laid his passport on the receptionist's desk and delivered a note to Consul Richard E. Snyder requesting revocation of his United States Citizenship. "I have entered the Soviet Union for the express purpose of applying for citizenship in the Soviet Union," it said. "My request for citizenship is now pending before the Supreme Soviet . . . I affirm that my allegiance is to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (R747).

Snyder quite properly delayed the execution of the prescribed form under a subterfuge. He immediately cabled the State Department which immediately informed both the CIA and the FBI (R748). A week later the Embassy received another letter from Oswald. He protested the Embassy's failure to permit him to renounce his U.S. citizenship and reiterated his hope for Soviet citizenship (R749). But at the same time, Oswald was careful to receive no messenger or messages from the Embassy and an American newspaperwoman, Priscilla Johnson, thought he "may have purposely not carried through his original intention...." Until February 13, 1961, the Embassy heard nothing from Oswald (R750). About January 4, 1960, he left for Minsk.

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps initiated a change in his honorable discharge, not because of the fraud by which he obtained it, but for his subsequent action in defecting, a matter totally unrelated to his service. Under date of January 30, 1962, Oswald wrote the man he thought was Secretary of the Navy, John Connally. This letter appears in facsimile in a number of places in the appended volumes (19H248, 281, 713). It is printed in full in the Appendix in the section on his life in the Soviet Union (R710). In the text, the sentence in this letter in which Oswald asserted he would "employ all means" to right this wrong alone is quoted to indicate Oswald had "a general hostility against the government and its representatives" (R387-8).

The sentence from which this was excerpted and the sentence preceding it read, with the spelling corrected, "I have and always had the full sanction of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow, USSR, and hence the U.S. government. Inasmuch as I am returning to the U. S. A. in this year with the aid of the U. S. Embassy, bringing with me my family (since I married in the USSR), I shall employ every means," etc. The remainder of the paragraph reads, "The U. S. government has no charges or complaints against me. I ask you to look into this case and take the necessary steps to repair the damage done to me and my family. For information I would direct you to consult the American Embassy, Chikovski St., 19/21, Moscow, USSR."

Oswald sometimes expressed himself in awkward or exaggerated ways, and this might have been such a case. But it certainly was not going to help his appeal to misrepresent his relationship with other parts of the government. The Report disregards this paragraph in considering whether Oswald was an agent. It does infer that speculation that he was an agent was attributable to his mother, who first expressed this belief to the State Department in January 1961 (R326, 660). Publication of this letter soon after the assassination and the obvious lack of FBI mistrust, in themselves, were more than enough to suggest Oswald was an agent. Immediately after publication of the Report, J. Edgar Hoover publicly affirmed that the FBI had no reason to mistrust Oswald and interpreted what the FBI had received from the State Department as "a clean bill of health."

Oswald's representation to Connally that the government was helping him was not an exaggeration. The government broke its back if not the laws, and if it did not break the laws, it certainly twisted them. Even the gremlins in the State Department in Washington were working for him. Under 1960 procedures, a "refusal sheet" was made up on Oswald on March 25. On the basis of this sheet, which indicated he might have been "naturalized in the Soviet Union or otherwise . . . expatriated himself," a "lookout card" should have been executed by the Passport Office. On finding the lookout card, the Passport Office would be in a position to "take appropriate action, including the possible refusal of a passport...." A card was made up, in case Oswald "applied for documentation . . . outside the Soviet Union." But the State Department notified the Commission on May 18, 1964, that it found no "other indication or evidence that a lookout card was ever prepared, modified or removed" (R750-1).

The Report's effort to gloss this over reads, "Had a lookout card been prepared on the ground of possible expatriation, it would have been removed and destroyed after the decision was made in 1961 that Oswald had not expatriated himself and thus prior to the time he applied for a second passport in June 1963" (R751). The Commission's language is as tricky as the State Department's. There is no doubt a lookout card should have been executed. There now is no evidence that it was or was not, according to the Report. An "operations memorandum" included the following language: "An appropriate notice has been placed in the lookout card section.." There is no reason to presume such a card, the regular order of business, was not executed and filed. There is likewise logical reason to not presume many interests might have been served by the subsequent disappearance of this card.

In any event, the Commission's obvious effort to protect and justify the State Department is beside the point for another reason It is based on the assumption that the only reason for executing a lookout card or similar device was "the ground of possible expatriation." The history of the State Department with respect to passports for a wide variety of nonconformists and political deviates is spread wide upon the public record and in many courts, including the Supreme Court, which ordered changes in passport regulations and practices to eliminate State Department abuses. One such decision was handed down during the Commission's deliberations. The great number of such lawsuits is abundant evidence against the position of the Report The practice of the State Department has been consistent. Whether or not Oswald expatriated himself, in the absence of very compelling reasons, what he declared to the Moscow Embassy was enough to put and keep him on every list and card file in every State Department office. If he was not there, the reason was not the bungling of a bureaucracy. Also, as many people can testify, the State Department has found it possible to delay indefinitely the granting of passports to such people. Oswald got his second passport overnight.

But instead of considering the strong suggestion that this was an evidence that Oswald was of unnatural interest to the government, the Report set for itself the task of justifying and explaining away this and subsequent similar indications by the State Department. The Report also conveniently overlooks the State Department's attitude toward Oswald reflected in the passport it Issued to him on his departure from the Soviet Union. That passport was good only for his "direct return to the United States" (R753, 758).

Oswald initiated this move in an undated letter from Minsk received at the Embassy February 13, 1961. It was a negotiating letter in which he expressed a desire to return to the United States "if we could come to some agreement concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against me" (R752). This letter referred to one Oswald said he wrote in December 1960, of which the Report says "there is notification he bud written to the Embassy previously." In substantiation, it cites his diary as referring to the February letter as "his 'first request' concerning his return to the United States." If Oswald did write the Embassy in December 1960, need that letter have been only about his return (R752)?

The Embassy's reply of February 28 told him to come to Moscow and he demurred, asking that everything be done by correspondence. Meanwhile, it asked the State Department whether Oswald would be subject to prosecution and if so should he be informed. It also suggested that mailing Oswald his 1959 passport might facilitate his exit. In reply to Oswald's March 20 letter, the Embassy again told him he would have to come to Moscow. The Department instructed the Embassy first to make a thorough investigation to be certain Oswald had not renounced his American citizenship and to give him his passport only after arrangements had been made for his departure from the Soviet Union and then only "for direct return to the United States" (R753).

Oswald's reply of May 16, 1961, was postmarked in Moscow, not Minsk, and demanded full guarantees he would not be prosecuted "under any circumstances." He reported his marriage to a Russian woman and reiterated his reluctance to go to Moscow, although, without comment in the Report, his letter was postmarked in that city. And under date of July 11, the Department told the Embassy Oswald's "precise status is a matter which will be left to the Embassy's discretion in the event an emergency situation should arise." The Department also said "The Embassy's careful attention to the involved case of Mr. Oswald is appreciated" (R754).

But on Saturday, July 8, 1961, Oswald appeared at the Embassy and had an interview with Snyder. The nature of this interview is hardly indicated, other than Snyder's belief Oswald had learned his lesson the hard way. Much more must have happened, especially by way of guarantees to Oswald, for he phoned his wife immediately and told her to come to Moscow. On Snyder's instructions, he returned to the Embassy two days later. Oswald also described his situation as that of a stateless person, as his Russian internal passport classified him. He signed a passport renewal application form, executed by Embassy employees on the typewriter (18H144ff.). Oswald signed and Snyder at two points signed and certificated it. His existing passport was stamped, on instructions from Washington, "This passport is valid only for direct travel to the United States" and returned to him (R757).

Printed at the bottom of this renewal application were listed acts that could preclude issuance of the renewal These included naturalization or a declaration of allegiance to a foreign state and service in the armed forces of or employment by a foreign state. The printed form provided the words "have" and "have not," the inapplicable words to be stricken out. As precisely as possible, the words have not~ were typed over. The form then read that Oswald had committed one or more of these acts. The Report says of this, ". . . apparently admitting that he had committed one or more of the acts which would at least raise a question as to whether he had expatriated himself. Snyder was not able to remember with certainty to which of the acts listed of the statement Oswald's mark was intended to refer, but believed it may have been to 'swearing allegiance to a foreign state' " (R755).

Whenever possible, the Report infers inefficiency of the federal bureaucracy. Perhaps a little of the infection has spread to the authors of the Report, for it was the Embassy's and not Oswald's mark. This form was typed by the Embassy and Snyder supervised and certificated the whole operation. But the Report, which cannot so state, tries to infer this was a typographical error (R756). This could not possibly have been the case, for the same clause of the renewal application instructs the applicant to execute a "supplementary statement under oath" in explanation to be "attached and made a part hereof." And Oswald did in his own handwriting execute the four-page questionnaire before Snyder, whose name is affixed, together with the stamp of the consulate (18H146-9).

In this statement Oswald was allowed to swear that his visit to the Embassy in October 1959 in which he had handed a written statement of the renunciation of his United States citizenship to Snyder personally was for "notification of future residence in the USSR." He was permitted to evade the intent of the question about whether he was considered a national of the USSR, which officially considered him without citizenship, by saying this document said "my nationality is American." And in answer to the question whether he, among other things, had employment under the government of a foreign state," he was permitted to say he did not regard his employment in Russia as the kind meant in the questionnaire. During all of his life in Russia, he had been a Russian government employee, and the Commission made quite a point of the added cash he had received, alleged from the Russian Red Cross. He was permitted not to answer all the other questions about this employment.

Of all of this the Report grudgingly concedes, "In any event, Oswald filled out the supplementary questionnaire which was required to be completed if the applicant admitted he had performed one or more of the possibly expatriating acts . . . under oath." Then the Report resurrects its familiar government employee whipping boy, saying, "The Passport Office employee who processed the Oswald case in Washington testified that she routinely regarded the questionnaire, rather than the application itself as the controlling document for expatriation purposes, so she probably paid no attention to the strikeout." Snyder is also quoted as describing this matter as routine. Apparently there have been hordes of American defectors to Russia not reported in the press (R756).

The following day Oswald brought Marina to the Embassy "to complete the papers necessary to obtain permission for his wife to enter the United States." On August 18, 1961, "Based upon Snyder's recommendation and the information in its files the Passport Office" decided Oswald had not expatriated himself (R757). (One can only wonder what kind of information it had in its files.) It authorized renewal of Oswald's passport effective September 10, 1961, but only "for direct return to the United States."\

On October 12, 1961, the Embassy informed the Department of four letters from Oswald reporting difficulty in obtaining Soviet exit visas and personal harassment in Minsk. Further correspondence followed in which Oswald expressed his "impatience in receiving American approval for Marina's entry into the United States, and his efforts to obtain a repatriation loan." There is considerable streamlining at this point, for the Report merely says that "the passport problem was finally concluded on May 24, 1962 . . . A week later he used it to return to the United States" (R758). In concluding the law was observed in Oswald's return to the United States, the Report does admit that he applied for Soviet citizenship but did not receive it (R759).

But Oswald would not and did not leave until he could bring his wife with him. That required both an exit visa from the Soviet Government and a non-quota immigrant visa from the United States. At her July 11, 1961, interview, Marina falsely "denied she was or ever had been a member" of any Communist organization- She admitted before the Commission that she had been a member of Komsomol, the Communist youth group, until expelled following her decision to go to the United States (R761)

The big problem was the U. S. Visa. The Report explains it this way:

"Marina Oswald's ability to obtain a nonquota immigrant visa depended on the favorable resolution of 3 questions. First, it had to be determined that she was the wife of an American citizen, which depended on whether her husband had expatriated himself. Second, it was necessary to determine that she was not and had not been affiliated with a Communist organization on other than an involuntary basis. Third, it had to be determined that she was not likely to become a public charge after she was admitted to the United States. Section 243(g) of the Immigration and Neutrality Act presented a fourth issue. This section of the act prohibits the issuance of immigrant visas by American Consuls stationed in countries which have refused to accept or have unduly delayed accepting the return of persons sought to be deported from the United States. The Soviet Union had been designated as such a country in 1953. However, the sanctions of section 243(g) are often waived; and even if they were not waived in Marina's case, she could obtain her visa at an American Embassy in some other country on her way from the Soviet Union to the United States, if she were otherwise entitled to the visa" (R761)

The Embassy on August 28, 1961, recommended "a favorable advisory opinion and approval of . . . (Marina's) petition together with a waiver of the sanctions...." And, when the Oswalds were unable to supply proof Marina would not become a public charge, the "Embassy decided to accept Oswald`s own affidavit to support his wife as sufficient assurance that she would not become a public charge" (R761-2) The machinery to get approval for Marina's entry into the United States was set in motion when the visa office asked the Dallas office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to act on her immigrant visa. But the Immigration and Naturalization Service, while finding no evidence Oswald had ever been connected with Communist or subversive groups, decided against waiving the sanctions because, while it may, "in an individual meritorious case . . . filed by a reputable relative where no substantial security information is developed" it was "of the opinion that both these restrictions are present in this case." The District Director affirmed this decision of the Dallas office on January 30, 1962. In saying sanctions should not be waived, he expressed disbelief of Oswald's repentant statements in the light of his original declarations when he entered the Soviet Union (R761-3).

Meanwhile, the State Department "had previously indicated its impatience" at the time taken. The Visa Office had phoned the Immigration and Naturalization Service, saying that, in the opinion of the political desk, "We're better off with subject in U.S. than in Russia." Nonetheless, the Service would not waive the sanction but recommended against denying the petition. Everybody, including Oswald, was informed. This meant that Marina could come in, but not directly from Russia. The day after Oswald got the news, the Moscow Embassy sought and got approval of the Brussels Embassy for the issuance of a visa to Marina. Her entire file was even sent to Brussels. She was to get the visa within two or three days of her arrival (R764).

This plan was "rendered unnecessary" by the yielding of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to pressure from the State Department. But the Immigration Service refused to reverse itself until it got a high-level letter. They were keeping their skirts clean. On March 27, 1961, such a letter was written by "an acting administrator in the Department of State." Not until May 9, 1962, did the Immigration Service act. Even then, it put on the record that it had reversed itself "in view of the strong representations." But the State Department "had informally learned on May 8" of this letter and "quickly telegraphed the Moscow Embassy," in the language of the Report (R766). The Oswalds were on their way.

The Report is troubled by this history and attempts to justify it. First, it addresses itself to the assurance that Marina would not become a public charge and the decision to accept Oswald's affidavit. Ignoring the sad and contrary history of other defectors, it held that Oswald was healthy, a veteran, with 2l/2 years of experience in a factory, hence, would have no trouble supporting his wife (R766) .

Marina's Communist membership was less logically but just as easily swept away. The Report admits the law prevented admission of anyone who "is or was a member of, (or) affiliated with, a Communist organization" unless the alien established "to the satisfaction of the consular officer when applying for a visa" that such membership was "involuntary," or necessary to life, or the alien was under 16 years of age. Membership in her union would not have disqualified Marina. But how about her false statement about her Communist membership? With perhaps more candor than intended, the Report holds "If this fact had been known to the State Department, Marina Oswald would not necessarily have been denied a visa.. But, the Report concedes, "had her membership in the Komsomol become known to the Department after her denial of such membership, it is possible she would have been excluded from the United States on the ground of wilfully misrepresenting a material fact." And at that point the Report goes off on a tangent of what judicial decisions hold to be a material fact (R767).

The Report does not state that Marina was eligible to enter the United States. The law is clear that she was not. Her false statement made it possible. Without it she could not have met the requirements of the law. With the efforts it made on behalf of her husband, it can not be concluded that the State Department might not have evolved some mechanism. But the law is clear; she was not eligible for entry into the United States.

Even the waiver of sanctions troubles the Report, but only for a little more than a page. It admits that this provision of the law had been invoked against Soviet nationals beginning ten years earlier. The waiver provision is not in the law, but the Department of Justice had held the Attorney General has such powers. These may be used "if no substantial derogatory security information is developed . . ." in a "meritorious case . . . filed by a reputable relative." To comply with this Marina would have had to have been held a "meritorious case" and her husband "reputable" by the Department of Justice and the State Department. The out found by the authors of the Report is simple: "Regulations did not require automatic denial of the waiver . . ." (R768-9).

Even the loan made to Oswald for repatriation required special interpretations and new dictionaries. Three provisions of State Department regulations were quoted as prerequisites: "a. Who are in complete and unquestioned possession of their citizenship rights; b. Who are entitled to receive United States passports; c. Whose loyalty to the United States Government is beyond question, or to whom the provisions of Section 423:1-2(b) apply" (R771).

The Report holds "Oswald undoubtedly satisfied the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b)," although one might believe otherwise, especially because the passport granted was good only for "direct return to the United States." But it concedes "there is serious question" about (c). It found the loan was made under another provision allowing for "a compelling reason," especially when there is danger to the "prestige" of the United States (R772).

Still another lookout card should have been prepared for Oswald, under State Department procedures, for in every case this is required until complete repayment of the loan. Again, the lookout card was never prepared. The Report's authors were so satisfied with their explanation of the first failure to file a lookout card on Oswald they use it again: A simple, bureaucratic error.

"In any event," the Report concludes this section, "Oswald's loan was repaid in full on January 29, 1963, five months prior to his application for a new passport" (R772)

The Second, "Overnight" Passport

On June 24, 1963, Oswald applied for a passport at New Orleans in which he specified he intended visiting, among other countries, the Soviet 'Union. This passport was granted the next day, "routinely," because "there was no lookout card." The Commission accepted the State Department's additional explanation that, at the time this passport was issued, "there was no information in its passport or security files which would have permitted it to deny a passport to Oswald." First, it is necessary to ask how an investigation could possibly accept the evasion involved in the use of the word "deny." Whether or not the State Department could legally deny passports, it has a long history of denying them illegally, including cases under judicial consideration at the time of the Commission's deliberations. The courts have held against the State Department consistently. Also, the State Department has found frequent occasions to merely delay, sometimes indefinitely, responding to passport applications. Here the Report was looking only for easy outs and its authors showed a lamentable willingness to accept any excuse (R775).

Even in so doing, the Report quotes authorization to withhold passports from people the Secretary of State believes might do just exactly those things for which the Department so exerted itself to bring Oswald and his family to the United States. The language is broad and includes any act that might be "prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations" or "otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States." The Department had earlier decided to withhold passports from "persons whose conduct abroad has been such as to bring discredit upon the United States...." Even the Report (R775-6) acknowledges these were the reasons for bringing Oswald home.

Despite the unquestioned history of Oswald's career abroad, the Report "concludes that the Department was justified in granting a passport to Oswald on June 25, 1963" (R777). It did not find it necessary to comment on the additional reason it cited for executing a lookout card, Oswald's record in Russia (R775). And nowhere does it raise the question of Oswald's ability to pay his way home which would have seemed a likely consideration of concern to the Department. At the time the passport was granted, Oswald could not have paid his way abroad or back with his own money.

The Report implies the Department's ability to deny Oswald a permit was limited by law, ignoring the ease with which it could have followed its practice of merely delaying the passport. Passport Application Form 7-64, DSP-11, in use in 1965, under section G, employs almost identical language as the 1959 form previously quoted (18H144), with the changes strengthening the strictures.

And how about that "routinely" issued 24-hour passport? The teletyped list of 25 applicants from the New Orleans office (18H324) sent toward the end of the day with all sorts of abbreviations typed, written and stamped on it, according to the Report, bore no identification of the office of origin. Another bureaucratic error? This is "routinely" added in Washington! The symbol is not "N.O." but "NO." The pencil used is red. And the designation is not placed at the top with all the others, in the margin or on the bottom. It is placed any place. And in this case it just happened to be "beside Oswald's name" (R774). Oswald's name was the twentieth in a list of 25. It just also happens that his is the only name with a checkmark after it except for what appears to be two cases of minor children. By another strange coincidence, his is the only name which has an unintelligible curlicue in front of it. Neither the checkmark nor the curlicue is mentioned in the Report. All of this is routine and normal, the Report declares, including the overnight service.

But in questioning Orest Pena, in whose bar m New Orleans the real or false Oswald had gotten spectacularly ill, the Commission had established that a) Pena had applied for a passport the same day as Oswald; b) had not gotten his in 24 hours ( l lH360 ) . Pena's name is not even on the list with Oswald's. Yet Pena had previously and without trouble or difficulty traveled abroad, never needing loans to get back. He had also rendered valuable service to the FBI in reporting on the activities of pro-Castro Cubans who patronized his bar. The Report finds it expedient to ignore the Pena case in its effort to prove that it was normal and routine for Oswald to have received any passport with his history, and then to have received it within 24 hours.

Without doubt, it was to the interest of the United States government to get Oswald back to the United States as soon as possible Whether this need satisfactorily explains the relations between Oswald and the State Department is another question. Whether it explains the lack of prosecution is a question the Report does not even address, although it mentions the bargain against prosecution upon which Oswald insisted and the concern of the consul whether such prosecution would follow Oswald's repatriation. The apparent fraud by which Oswald got his Marine Corps discharge and the participation of the Marine Corps in getting his passport are likewise not a subject to which the Report addresses itself, although it and the Commission find space and time for the widest conceivable assortment of trivia. It is a fact that Oswald was not even threatened with prosecution. There is no evidence that the Marine Corps ever questioned him about his threatened disclosure of classified national defense data.

The Report addresses the numerous aspects of Oswald's relations with the government piecemeal, as the blind men addressed the elephant. Does the Report reach more valid conclusions?

Marina

Marina's relations with the government are nowhere mentioned in the Report except in relation to her entrance into the United States. The Report could ill afford to, for she was indispensable to the Commission. Almost anything the Commission wanted she testified to, and where it suited the purposes of the Report, such as in the preposterous story of the Walker shooting, the Report bases unquestioning conclusions exclusively upon her word. It quotes her false statements as the truth, as with Oswald's breakfasts, saying she said he never ate breakfast (R330). But she painted a picture of a considerate husband who never troubled his wife to make his breakfast and always made his own (18H596).

That Marina was less than completely truthful was a problem to which the Commission had to address itself but its approach was different, for it does not in the Report indicate in any way that Marina could be other than the heart and soul of probity. But she had made statements not in conformity with the Commission's belief, especially after first placed in protective custody. Confronted with her statement that she had never seen Oswald clean the rifle, she testified, "Yes, I said I had never seen it before. But I think you understand. I want to help you, and that is why there is no reason for concealing anything. I will not be charged with anything." Actually, she may have been referring to the rifle and not alone its cleaning. At this point one of the interpreters declared, "She says she was not sworn in before. But now, inasmuch as she is sworn in, she is going to tell the truth" (1H14).

Marina, by her own description, is a liar. This is consistent with her earlier record of lying to get into the United States. When it suited her purposes to lie, she did so. Can such a person be considered a dependable witness in such a proceeding?

What was her interest, when she appeared before the Commission and while in protective custody? She was in the country illegally by virtue of her false statement about Communist membership. She was eligible for deportation on both counts, to a country where she had no reason to believe she would be welcome and to a life she had wanted to leave. The Report avoids any consideration of Marina's plight, yet it is basic in evaluating her independence and credibility as a witness.

Marina just disappeared from view on Saturday, November 23, 1963. When her husband tried to reach her, he learned merely that she was no longer at the Paines'. The Report fails to detail what happened to her or to indicate that anything did happen to her. There is merely a hint in the report of the Secret Service Inspector Kelley in Appendix (R631-2):

"Thereafter, I was called by SAIC Bouck who advised me that the President and the Attorney General were concerned about the safety of this family and instructed that all precautions should be taken to insure that no harm befell them. SAIC Bouck was advised that the family was presently under our protection; we would continue providing protection until further notice.

Later that same day, I was contacted by SA Robertson of the FBI who asked whether we had someone with the family. He was assured that we had. He requested to be advised where the family had been taken. Since their ultimate destination was unknown to me at the time, I assured him that when I learned of their whereabouts I would relay it to him. He said that they received instructions from the Attorney General and President Johnson that precaution should be taken to insure the family safety.

At 11 p.m., Sunday, November 24th, I was advised of the location of the family and immediately notified Robertson and inquired whether they now wished to take over their protection. He said no they had no such instructions, they merely wished to be assured that someone was looking out for their safety. I assured them that adequate protection was being provided and that they were available for interviews by the FBI. He stated that they did not wish to interview the family at this time; that they merely wanted to make sure they were in safe hands."

She had had two visits from the FBI in early November. She understood the magnitude of the crimes with which her husband had been charged, and she could not help realizing she was all alone with no means of support in a strange country where her name and that of her country of origin were hated. And she had two infants to support, besides herself. She had little choice.

Kelley indicated a willingness of the Secret Service to turn their charges over to the FBI. And following Oswald's murder, Peter N. Geilich, administrative assistant at Parkland Hospital, reported hearing the Secret Service announce ". . . they were leaving the case and that the Dallas police would take over the protection of Oswald's family," only to hear them change their minds (21H188). For a long period of time, she was in protective custody and she correctly understood her situation. She referred to it, in quotation marks, as "guarding" (18H541) and "protecting" (18H547). In one of the two different translations of a letter she wrote the Dallas Civil Liberties Union in December she said, in the State Department's translation, "I have no complaint about the Secret Service personnel who are 'protecting' me . . . I am completely free to go where I want and see whom I want . . . I just don't want to see anybody . . . " This was especially true of the one woman who might have been thought her friend, her benefactress, Ruth Paine (18H547). According to the testimony of the chairman of the Dallas Civil Liberties Union, Gregory Lee Olds, it took "a certain amount of negotiating with the Secret Service and the FBI" before he could even write Marina (7H325).

Marina wrote a lengthy narrative at the beginning of her period of protective custody (18H548). It is at variance with statements she subsequently made under oath to the Commission. The later version was more in keeping with the Commission's desires. On a number of important things, such as her relations with her husband and especially the last night, and on their plans, this version is entirely unlike the accounts so widely broadcast. Marina concluded it by expressing a

different opinion of the FBI agents (18H642):

"I am a little offended at the FBI agents who have been tormenting me every day with their trivial questionings, some of which have nothing to do with Lee's case; for example; what sort of furniture we had in Russia, how many people lived in our house and their ages, not to mention questions about my friends and relatives. I think that they should not count on my practically becoming their agent if I desire to stay and live in the United States . . ."

It is interesting that even after a period of protective custody, despite the lurid language subsequently attributed to her, she referred to "Lee's case," not to his crimes; that she felt an effort was being made to make some kind of agent of her, which is not inconsistent with her husband's face-to-face accusations to the FBI Agent Hosty when Oswald was being interrogated; and that she might not desire to remain in the United States. But soon the dollars started pouring in and she was a wealthy young girl, even by American standards. This should have made making up her mind much easier.

Once she made up her mind, she found she was almost a social lioness, invited out and sought after. She found Americans a warm people who held no malice against her and made her as much at home and welcome as possible.

But as a witness she was in exactly the position visualized by framers of the passport regulations, under undeniable pressure. And the nature of her testimony bears eloquent witness to the consequences.

At the conclusion of the hearing of February 6, 1964, Marina is then attorney, John M. Thorne, said: ". . . she has been, as you know, under protective custody of the Secret Service from shortly after the assassination. She has been most grateful for this protection . . . I haven't had personally enough time to think this thing out for myself. I don't know. It is her request, however, that, at this point she feels the protection is no longer necessary . . . and if the Commission would give this matter consideration -- we don't know whom to go to. I haven't thought about it. I don't know who has suggested the Secret Service continue protecting her . . ." There was no direct answer about who had the Secret Service protecting Marina, or against whom, but in response the Chief Justice said, ". . . she may feel from this moment on that she is under no protection except what she might ask for . . . " Thorne then indicated, discreetly, that Marina might want "protection" from her mother-in-law, Marguerite Oswald (lH125-6).

Thus, from the time of the assassination until after the first sequence of her appearances before the Commission, she was constantly in the hands of the government.

Whether she can be considered an impartial witness, under neither pressure nor

compulsion of any kind, can best be judged from her own words:

"Mr. Rankin. After the assassination, did the police and FBI and the Secret Service ask you many questions?

Mrs. Oswald. In the police station there was a routine regular questioning, as always happens. And then after I was with the agents of the Secret Service and the FBI, they asked me many questions, of course -- many questions. Sometimes the FBI agents asked me questions which had no bearing or relationship, and if I didn't want to answer they told me that if I wanted to live in this country, I would have to help in this matter, even though they were often irrelevant. That is the FBI.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know who said that to you?

Mrs. Oswald. Mr. Heitman and Bogoslav, who was an interpreter for the FBI.

Mr. Rankin. You understand that you do not have to tell this Commission in order to stay in this country, don't you, now?

Mrs. Oswald. Yes.

Mr. Rankin. You are not under any compulsion to tell the Commission here in order to be able to stay in the country.

Mrs. Oswald. I understand that.

Mr. Rankin. And you have come here because you want to tell us what you could about this matter, is that right?

Mrs. Oswald. This is my voluntary wish, and no one forced me to do this.

Mr. Rankin. Did these various people from the police and the Secret Service and the FBI treat you courteously when they asked you about the matters that they did, concerning the assassination and things leading up to it?

Mrs. Oswald. I have a very good opinion about the Secret Service, and the people in the police department treat me very well. But the FBI agents were somehow polite and gruff. Some times they would mask a gruff question in a polite form.

Mr. Rankin. Did you see anyone from the Immigration Service during this period of time?

Mrs. Oswald. Yes.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know what that was?

Mrs. Oswald. I don't remember the name. I think he is the chairman of that office. At least he was a representative of that office.

Mr. Rankin. By 'that office' you mean the one at Dallas?

Mrs. Oswald. I was told that he had especially come from New York, it seems to me.

Mr. Rankin. What did he say to you?

Mrs. Oswald. That if I was not guilty of anything, if I had not committed any crime against this Government, then I had every right to live in this country. This was a type of introduction before the questioning by the FBI. He even said that it would be better for me if I were to help them.

Mr. Rankin. Did he explain to you what he meant by being better for you?

Mrs. Oswald. In the sense that I would have more rights in this country. I understood it that way.

Mr. Rankin. Did you understand that you were being threatened with deportation if you didn't answer these questions?

Mrs. Oswald. No, I did not understand it that way. You see, it was presented in such a delicate form, but there was a clear implication that it would be better if I were to help.

Mr. Rankin. Did you --

Mrs. Oswald. This was only felt. It wasn't said in actual words.

Mr. Rankin. Did you feel that it was a threat?

Mrs. Oswald. This was not quite a threat -- it was not a threat. But it was their great desire that I be in contact, in touch with the FBI. I sensed that.

Mr. Rankin. But you did not consider it to be a threat to you?

Mrs. Oswald. No.

Mr. Rankin. Did anyone indicate that it would affect your ability to work in this country if you cooperated?

Mrs. Oswald. Excuse me, No.

Mr. Rankin. Is there anything else about your treatment by law enforcement officials during this period that you would like to tell the Commission about?

Mrs. Oswald. I think that the FBI agents knew that I was afraid that after everything that had happened I could not remain to live in this country, and they somewhat exploited that for their own purpose, in a very polite form, so that you could not say anything after that. They cannot be accused of anything. They approached it in a very clever, contrived way." (lH79-80)

The foregoing is not the reflection of the relations between both Oswalds, and the United States Government seen in the Report. Most of what has been quoted from the Report is not from its text, which contains the Commission's findings, but from the Appendix. While this is not an exhaustive analysis of the Oswalds' government relations, it is sufficient to show that the Report does not by any means indicate the highly unusual character of this relationship. The dead Oswald could not set the record straight.

Marina became the Commission's star witness. The quoted sections of her testimony, not in any way reflected in the Report, are abundant evidence of her situation, once she decided she wanted to remain in the United States.

The possibility of Lee Harvey Oswald's having had indirect relations with the United States Government remains to be explored. The following chapter may indicate whether the presumed assassin was connected with groups that, in turn, may have been tied to government agencies. It shows that the Commission had reason to explore this field but did not.