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4. "Satisfying the 'Light of Modern Science' Light?"

Blakey's first sentence in his Chapter 5, "The Warren Commission Evaluated," is "A critical examination of the work of the Warren Commission was a first order of business." (pages 7186-7271). He does not say "the first order of business and in fact it was never done."

Coverup remained coverup and it also remained the first order of official business. No matter how dishonest officials sought to hide the painful fact.

It never really happened.

Next Blakey said that they "questioned closely" the three ~~Member~~ Members of the Commission still alive, "Gerald R. Ford, John Sherman Cooper and John J. McCloy" and, "On the questions of conspiracy, these men stood firm over the years. There were no facts to support a plot." Blakey again ~~is~~ being Blaskry because Cooper did not believe there was no conspiracy, as records in his archive at his state university and copies of them in the Russell Archive, both of which I have and have included in other books of this series, leave without any question at all. Perhaps most eloquent in Cooper's statement of the exact opposite of what Blakey, without direct quotation, attributes to him is the oral history Cooper did for the Russell Archive.

That earlier Blakey, J. Lee Rankin, who was to the Warren Commission what Blakey was to the House assassins committee, had conned both Russell and Cooper out of their refusal to sign the Warren Report as drafted. McCloy, a professional fixer, fixed this by deceiving Russell and Cooper about the "compromise" he had drafted. It was no "compromise" and it did not make a record of the Russell-Cooper objection to the single-bullet and the conspiracy conclusions as drafted.

McCloy, the fixer of fixers, changed a few words, employed a ^{few} ~~few~~ that had no relevance and in this and in his rewording he led Russell and Cooper to believe that he had indeed drafted a compromise and they then signed that Report. But when + put in Russell's hands proof that they had been deceived and misled and then got for him official confirmation of ^{this} it, he never talked to his former friend Lyndon Johns on again and he ~~discouraged~~ encouraged my work to disprove tthe Warren Report until his death.

Blakey ~~or~~ then says that ^{if} these three "as well as the Commission, suppressed, neglected to unearth or overlooked evidence of a conspiracy ^{that} would be an indictment of the entire government of the United States, It would mean the whole structure was corrupt from top to bottom"(page 71) absolutely

Here for a change Blakey is partially ^{truthful} ~~successful~~ only not all who worked for the government, not all who were part of "the entire government," were involved in the "corrupt" Warren Report.

Even when he knows the truth, the truth that was long public before his ~~own~~ committee was created, Blakey still finds it impossible to be honest. What he omits from what is next noted was public in the Commission's disclosed records and was printed, in facsimile, in one of those books of mine to which Blakey referred as "etc.," as reported above. What Blakey said is:

First, we considered the purpose of the Warren Commission in the view of men who had staffed it. At the initial staff meeting, on January 20, 1964, Chief Justice Warren discussed the role of the Commission, and his remarks were the subject of a memorandum by Melvin A. Eisenberg, a staff attorney. Warren emphasized that the Commission had to determine "the truth, whatever that might be," but we were aware of allegations of certain pressures that might have inhibited the truth-seeking process. (page 77)

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What Warren did say and what Eisenberg repeated, on the subject of conspiracy, ^{it} includes:

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When the position had first been offered to him he declined it, on the principle that Supreme Court Justices should not take this kind of role. His associate justices concurred in this decision. At this point, however, President Johnson called him. The President stated that rumors of the most exaggerated kind were circulating in this country and overseas. Some rumors went as far as attributing the assassination to a faction within the Government wishing to see the Presidency assumed by President Johnson. Others, if not quenched, could conceivably lead the country into a war which could cost 40 million lives. No one could refuse to do something which might help to prevent such a possibility. The President convinced him that this was an occasion on which actual conditions had to override general principles. (Whitewash IV^m page 24).

This is all but seven lines of that Eisenberg ^m memo, and ~~clearly~~ clearly the President believed there had been a conspiracy and Warren ~~believed~~ believed that the chances of their having been a conspiracy conspir^acy were so great th^at the "actual conditions had to override general principles."

Inherent in this, as Blakey does not mention, is that there was an official determination in which Warren shared to conclude that there had been no conspiracy.

Blakey does say that the meeting was on January 20 but he does not say that Eisenberg did not write his memo ~~for~~ for a month, on February 17. Not does Blakey report what is on the next page of that "wtc" book he never identified, Whitewash IV. On that ~~a~~ page, dated the day after that meeting, January 21, is a ^l memo titled "Staff meeting of Jaⁿuary 20." It was by Howard P. Willens, the man Katzenbach loaned to the commission after he told others that he would have eyes and ears on the Commission.

And, again not worth mentioning to Willins, he makes no ~~metri~~ metri

mention at all of what we have quoted, written a month later, by Eisenberg.

Blakey was far from alone in his inability to be honest and his penchant for omitting what could be embarrassing.

Blakey began this chapter with an enormous lie, that they made a "critical evaluation" of the work of the Warren Commission. He then said that "there were no facts to support a plot," a conspiracy. Yet an honest "critical evaluation of the work of the" Commission could not avoid the overwhelming solid proof that there was a conspiracy. What is quoted above is merely one of the many indications that Blakey began determined to support the official lie that there had been no conspiracy when, as we have seen, before that Commission was established there was the official statement that amounts to an order that there be no finding of any conspiracy. We saw this as formulated in the quoted Katzenbach memo Blakey had and suppressed that from his use of that memo.

Blakey then gets more preposterous:

Burt W.

Griffin sensed there was more to the pressure than presidential politics, that there were fears of a witch hunt, since the memory of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy was still vivid: "There was a great deal of concern that we not conduct an investigation that would have overtones of . . . McCarthyism." In addition, there was pressure that stemmed from

Warren's impatience, said Griffin, who told us that the Chief Justice was very impressed with the FBI investigation, ". . . and if we had not found anything . . . more than already seemed to be the conclusions, there was not anything there to be found." Howard P. Willens, who like Redlich was a principal Rankin assistant, denied Griffin's suggestion that Warren had importuned the staff to reach conclusions comparable to the FBI's (pages 72-3).

That FBI was a crude joke on the Commission and its staff and although Blakey again omits what he knows is available and is

nit in accord with his preconception, he refer^As to as his work two ~~FBI~~ executive session transcripts, of ^{on the FBI} sessions at which the Commission Members let their hair down. Including Warren. What Warren and the others said, all of them, is not in any sense or in any degree consistent with what Blakey made up to further his and the official official preconception, that there had not been any conspiracy. All said the opposite of being very "impressed" by the FBI's work and conclusions. See in particular the executive session transcript of January 22, on Post Mortem, beginning on page 475, and ⁱⁿ Whitewash IV, which is devoted to ^{the 5 witnesses} that session. Both transcripts are published in ^y facsimile ^{and in full} after I got them Via FOIA.

Warren could not have been so favorably impressed with the FBI's ^a total omission of the missed shot in order to argue that there had been no conspiracy and Warren, no more than a bright schoolchild, was impressed by the FBI Reports's failure to say a word about the shooting ^y in ~~no~~ five ^{my} ~~volunteers~~ ^{and that it did not} ~~not to have even men-~~ tioned the cause of death.

Blakey has a bit more on Warren and his positions:

*in what
sense
show*

At the very first meeting of the Commission, on December 5, 1963, Warren announced his belief that the Commission needed neither its own investigators nor the authority to issue subpoenas and grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses if they were compelled to testify, after first having chosen to take the Fifth Amendment on grounds of self-incrimination. The Chief Justice was overruled by the Commission on the subpoena and immunity authority, though immunity was never used; but he held sway on his insistence that evidence that had been developed by the FBI would form a foundation for the Commission investigation. It was not a decision to be accepted without debate. "How much . . . does the FBI propose to release to the press before we present the findings of this Commission?" Senator ~~W~~Russell demanded (73-4).

As again Blakey omits, of whom did the Chairman "demand" that information and what was he talking about, as Blakey also omits. It was the most conservative Member of the Commission, Senator Russell,

and he asked that of Katzenbach.

But again, that was not a Commission "meeting." It was their first TOP SECRET executive session and ~~in~~ contrary to what Blakey has been saying about approval of the FBI's work, the Commission was ~~in~~ incensed because the FBI was ~~in~~ leaking what ~~it~~ would control what ~~it~~ the Commission would be able to conclude.

As it did.

What follows immediately reflects that Blakey knew the Commission was not in love with what the FBI said in its report that President Johnson ordered of it as soon as he was back in Washington from Dallas, *the day of the assassination;*

And when the bureau's initial report was presented to the Commission on December 9, it left a lot to be desired: it was difficult to decipher and, in the opinion of Congressman Boggs, there were "a million questions" still to be answered. Rankin endorsed the decision to forgo an independent investigative staff, saying it would require an inordinate amount of time to put it together, and advising it would be more prudent "to use the intelligence facilities that the government had at hand." Rankin had another reason for his belief that there was more to be lost than gained from hiring an independent detective force: "[T]he whole intelligence community in the government would feel that the Commission was indicating a lack of confidence in them . . ." Rankin's viewpoint did not, however, meet with the unanimous approval of his staff. Griffin, for one, had lost respect for the FBI while serving as a federal prosecutor in Ohio. "I frankly didn't think they were very competent, . . ." he told us. "I felt then, and I still feel that they have a great myth about their ability, but they are not capable . . . of ever uncovering a serious and well-planned conspiracy. They would only stumble on it." Redlich was also critical. "I thought the FBI report was a grossly inadequate document," he said. "In fairness . . . , they apparently decided to produce something very quickly, but based upon what I feel I know and remember about the facts of the assassination, . . . it was a grossly inadequate document." (page 84)

Whatever Blakey may have had in mind in referring to this FBI ~~monstrosity~~ as "the bureau's initial report" ~~is~~ not apparent but not in any sense is it the FBI's "initial" report to that Commission

Again, no love of the FBI or of its work which was ever so much worse than "a grossly inadequate document."

But note that Blakey avoids giving his own opinion and that so long ~~as~~ after his committee's life had ended.

That is anything but "a critical analysis" of the FBI's work as the Commission's only investigators but ~~it~~ that is not inconsistent ~~with~~ with his reported ambition to become the attorney general.

What for Blakey has ~~it~~ pass as that "critical examination" ² ~~he~~ says ~~they~~ ^{they} made when he ^{and} his committee did no such thing continues to focus on Warren. Under the heading, "Self-Imposed limitations" he says:

incident single page

Certain strategic decisions by the Commission, including controversial ones, were the product of clearly defined, at times hotly debated, policy. Perhaps the most questionable of these was an edict that deprived the Commission of crucial evidence. At Warren's insistence, the Commission did not inspect the X-rays and photographs taken of the President's body during an autopsy at the U.S. Naval Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland. The decision was based on a dual conviction of the Chief Justice, according to Redlich: he wanted everything that was viewed by the Commission to be part of the published record; and he "felt publication of the autopsy film . . . would be a great disservice to Mrs. Kennedy and the Kennedy family." Warren was also known to believe there was ample other evidence to substantiate conclusions about Kennedy's wounds — the clothes he had been wearing, bullet fragments, and the testimony of the autopsy doctors.

Warren was also widely criticized for making it a matter of Commission policy — at least that is the way it appeared — to go easy on Marina Oswald. ~~It was a well-intentioned decision on the part of the courtly Chief Justice, but it caused the one run-in Redlich had with the chairman. Warren was unhappy with the way Redlich had taken testimony from James H. Martin, who was Mrs. Oswald's business manager following the assassination, in which Redlich described her as "cold, calculating, avaricious, scornful of generosity, and capable of an extreme lack of sympathy in personal relationships." Redlich explained to us that he had intended to cast Marina Oswald in an unfavorable light since the Commission had an obligation to pursue all possible motives. "One of the motives could have been," he said, "that Mrs. Oswald, through the kind of person that she was, drove Lee Harvey Oswald to the assassination."~~ (p. 75).

As Blakey does not say, the Commission could have over-ridden Warren on the X-rays issue ~~had~~ as he also does not report, before the autopsy began Robert Kennedy, in writing, waived all claims to withhold anything. When the Commission approached him on this issue his response was they could do anything they thought necessary.

Both are in facsimile in Post Mortem and I know Blakey had that because his committee bought two copies of it from me. (And I had to keep after them to get paid.)

There also was no need to publish everything. All courts recognize interests that preclude publication for a number of reasons. The ~~Commissi~~ Commission could have studied them, could have had experts examine them, could have done as Blakey did, get a medical artist to duplicate them.

Whatever the explanation, it was not a real investigation without the evidence that was on film. More than just the X-rays.

The part about Marina is the poorest kind of amateur shrinkery and there are other related issues the Commission ignored entirely.

Again, when Blakey is a little on the side of letting the truth escape him he can't be fully honest and he still suppresses what should be known, and again I published it, so Blakey knew. He does report that former Assistant ~~Director~~ ^{FBI} Director William C. Sullivan told the Committee that "Hoover did not want the Warren Commission to conduct an exhaustive investigation for fear that it would ~~disc~~ discover important and relevant facts that ~~were~~ the FBI had not discovered," Sullivan said. One Hoover tactic, ~~was~~ according to Sullivan, was to take advantage of the presence of a friend of the FBI on the Commission" (pages 76-7).

That friend was Gerald Ford, *with an unselected President.*

Blakey then says a bit, an entirely inadequate bit about the Ford-FBI relations. But he omits that Ford was actually an FBI informer and that in return for his findings against his associates he received an FBI agent's attache case, with a combination lock on it.

This and more is all in the disclosed FBI records and Blakey omits it and my publication of it.

The FBI was not Ford's only friend. Blakey also suppresses from

his book what was public and what, again, I had published (in Whitewash IV) ~~that~~ that Ford had become President by his own ~~per~~ ^{per}jury.

When his personal ~~crookedness~~ ^{crookedness} forced Spiro Agnew's resignation as Nixon's elected vice president and Nixon selected Ford to replace Agnew, ~~Ford's~~ Ford's nomination first had to receive the favorable decision of the Senate Judiciary Committee. In his testimony Ford was asked about his personal behavior because he had placed his former campaign manager on the public payroll to act as his assistant on the Warren Commission and that assistant also ghosted Ford's book. Which means that the taxpayers paid for that. Ford was also asked if he had used any confidential Commission information in his book, which he had. He lied and said that he used only what the Commission published. He actually stole the TOP SECRET executive session of January 27, used it and even altered it to be more favorable to ~~the~~ the FBI that the actualities were.

I published the truth about these matters and Ford's false testimony without which he could not have been approved by both that committee and the entire Senate in Whitewash IV alone with a word for word comparison of the ~~stolen~~ ^{stolen} TOP SECRET ^R text and the ~~Ford~~ ^{made} alterations in what he stole.

His was straight-out perjury and that Blakey suppresses. That perjury also made it possible for ~~him~~ ^{Ford} to become President and that also Blakey suppresses.

Blakey ~~rambles~~ rambles with odds and ends of well-known conjecture that was not even real conjecture but is based on ignorance and he displays that although he is ignorant he uses what seems likely to be of some support for what he says. For example where he says there "is a man of Spanish descent" in a "photograph of Oswald ~~the~~

handing out 'FairPlay for Cuba' leaflets (sic) in New Orleans,"
 (Page 81), Blakey pick^ed up that booboo from some of the nutty
 assassination literature and uses it, again, as his own, or literary
 cribbing again. The fact is ^hat the only man photographed with
 Oswald, just in the same picture, not with Oswald and receiving ~~it~~
 rather than giving out the single-sheet Oswald had had printed, not
 "leaflets", was not associated with Oswald in any way. Nor was he
 "of Spanish descent." He was a Japanese who had his import-export
 offices in the old International Trade Mart building. His name is
 Ehara. The photo^{to a}graph is from motion film taken by a New Orleans
 TV station, I think WWL-TV, but ⁶gain. I do not have access to my
 files now and I do not remember Ehara's first name clearly.

I do remember the name of the man with Ehara, a friend of his ~~and~~
 in the same business in that same building. He was ~~John Alice~~, ^{ced Ah-LEE-say, first name, I think John} ~~pronoun-~~

There is nothing worth taking any time for under Blakey's heading
 "The Ruby Investigation" (pages 81-6). It comes to an end with
 a few words about the non-productive eavesdropping on the mob, the
 baseless Blakey hangup.

Or, really a nothing chapter for a man who had run the kind of
 investigation that of the House assassins was supposed to have been.

His next chapter, his sixth, is titled "Dallas in Light of
 Modern Science" (pages 87-108). He begins that with "The Witnesses
 in the Plaza." (pages ~~87-91~~ 87-91). This is necessarily selective with
 so little space ^{as what it is not} given it. Blakey uses some of what is well-
 known in the testimony the Commission took and he then is careful
 not to quote the most graphic of the testimony that was not in
 accord with the official ^{pre-}conception, the official
 mythology, ^{with} of even those whose testimony he included encapsulated.

Part of his explanation of this is how he starts "Scientific

Analysis"(pages 91-95)with. Again, very little space for such a subject, in such a chapter. He begins it saying:

indeed single space

As had the Warren Commission, we recognized that human testimony labored under "the difficulty of accurate perception," so we sought to base our conclusions, wherever possible on physical evidence that could be subjected to to scientific tests: the autopsy X-rays and photographs, weapons, bullet fragments, cartridge casings, photographs, motion picture film, fingerprints and handwriting samples."(page 91).

Again skimming, mostly what the Commission had and not including what existed, what required no investigation to have, what was not in accord with that preconceived official mythology.

Of which there was much that Blakey should have had, would have had, if he had not been hung up on his mafia myth. Not a word of this is in Hawkshaw Blakey's House "investigation" or in his book, but more than enough of it is scattered throughout this series of books written as a record for history. What Blakey did not get because he was on his mafia kick and did not even get the records I had forced out of oblivion in that FOIA litigation or worse, did get and suppressed ^{them} because they said and proved the opposite of what the Commission had said. And of this Blakey, not in ignorance but in deliberate dishonesty says "we could do little more than double check the results of the 1964 investigation" (page 91). How untruthful this is when it is considered that the books of a single, unofficial aging man did with the Commission's own evidence what Blakey, with his generous ^y finding, abundant ^{resources} scientific and the contexts of those books to draw on say he could not do! "Did not, any way"

Blakey on Blakey again and again he condemns himself as no critic ^o could.

He next does, however, ^{say a} what he did not in our earlier mention ~~and~~ of the Dallas police "Dictabelt and tape," accidentally tell the truth and the truth is that they were brought to his attention, Blakey says, by unnamed "critics" on September 17, 1977" (page 91). Or, as we quoted him earlier in presenting that as the result of the committee's own derring-do, he was untruthful.

^{He then credits Mary Ferrell} Here Blakey again seeks to put all critics down with unjustified language and caps that by saying "we were anxious to receive hard facts," precisely what did not interest them when they asked me in and I had to force the very hardest of "hard facts" on them, what ^{sworn to} was presented in federal court, ~~under oath~~ and was unrefuted. And after I embarrassed them into accepting these "hard facts" the Blakey gang ignored ever word of it. ^{and there were many words,}

~~And~~ it included the very best of "scientific evidence," again ~~entirely~~ unquestioned when it was presented under oath to begin with. ^{really "hard facts:"}

Blakey runs off with this, saying nothing new, for several pages, to the top ~~of~~ page 95.

He also does not say that he had intended this as the putdown of putdowns and when it kicked back on that is was all that saved him from the most total and abject intellectual bankruptcy.

He follows this with "The Acoustical Reconstruction" (pages 95-100) and in that is careful to "reconstruct" only in terms of the ~~official~~ official assassination mythology, so even then the full potential of that "reconstruction" was designed to eliminate the possibility of a real reconstruction. which could have identified the source of the shots as other than in the official preconception, Blakey's being the same as the Commission's, which was the same as the FBI's.

So, even when the possibility, if not the probability, of doing what he was supposed to do and from the outset had not done was put in Blakey's hands he saw to it ~~that~~ that he would come up with nothing new, to the degree possible, ^{he} ~~and~~ designing the "scientific test" to exclude, ^{to} ~~the~~ the degree possible, ^{he could,} all that would not be in accord with his preconceived and officially ordained case that was the old case rehashed.

Next Blakey ~~sw~~ has what he refers to as "A Refined Analysis" (pages 101-3). This refers to the confirmation of the Bolt, Baranek conclusions after making this shooting test as it was confirmed by several other subject experts.

Again, not new. It got extensive attention when produced. Blakey's next subhead refers to what Blakey would have ^{demonstrated} if he had produced it, "The Proof of Conspiracy" (pages 103-6)

He here produces no "case for conspiracy".

Then he has "The Assassination Reconstructed by Science" ~~has~~ (pages 106-8). The title is not in accord with the fact. In his "scientific" reconstruction, Blakey ~~saw~~ saw to it, to the degree that he could see to it, ~~so~~ that what it "proved" was how it all began, with that ordained national policy agreed to before the victim was in his grave, that Oswald was the lone assassin in all official accounts of the assassination.

In this account the first shot was ~~at~~ Zapruder frames 157-161.

This was first suggested in the first book on the assassination in its handling of the actualities of Zapruder's testimony.

Then Blakey refers to the "three expended shells casings found on the sixth floor." He says of them that the "experts" determined that they were rifle fired from Oswald's - and it was never proven that at the time of the assassination that rifle was his or in his possession.

Here Blakey does not, with all that alleged science, catch up with the FBI's ~~much~~ much earlier examination of those casings for he omits what the FBI did not overlook and did report. Or, Blakey knew what ~~he~~ he was doing and he knew it was not honest, for he does not say what is the "scientific" fact, that two of those casings had been in a rifle before the day of the assassination.

Here Blakey works in what was not produced by his "science," if that is ~~the~~ a word that can be used instead of dishonesty because it is dishonesty that he works in for all the world as ~~if~~ though that dishonesty was part of that "scientific" reconstruction, which ~~it~~ it was not and ^{it} could not have been, that the bullet that came to be called "the magic bullet" was "found on Connally's stretcher" (page 107) when the only testimony is that, ^{firmly and repeatedly!} it was not.

And, of course, there is much that Blakey had and knew that is contrary to what he makes read like part of that "science" when it was not. What he knew contradicted the official assassination mythology and is in ^{in that FOIA litigation} the records I got, so they were available to ¹⁴ Blakey and I am confident he dared not avoid getting them.

Blakey's "science" was careful not to consider what there is reason to believe was the fact, that some of that "evidence" was planted.

This is what Blakey means in "Dallas in the Light of Modern Science." He does not include what he had to have known, that the police testing, Dallas police and in Dallas, proved that Oswald had not fired a rifle that day.

And ever so much more.

Blakey being Blakey again.