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White House Photograph

Richard M. Nixon and his White House chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, aboard plane

Ex-President Is Accused of Initiating Break-In at the Watergate

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 16—H.R. Haldeman, who was Richard M. Nixon's chief of staff and closest adviser during the first four years of the Nixon Presidency, contends that Mr. Nixon himself "initiated the Watergate break-in," participated in the cover-up from "day one" and may have personally erased 18 1-2 minutes of damaging dialogue from a critical Watergate tape.

Mr. Haldeman, who is now in prison for his own role in the Watergate cover-up, makes those charges in a book, "The Ends of Power."

The book adds little substantive evidence to the reams of tapes, testimony, documents and interviews that have chronicled the activities of Mr. Nixon and his aides from the time of the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972, until Mr. Nixon

resigned from office on Aug. 8, 1974.

Rich Anecdotal Material

But Mr. Haldeman presents his own theories and suppositions about aspects of the Watergate scandal: how the burglary happened to be committed, for example, and how the cover-up came unraveled. Always, in these matters, he says that he does not know the facts and can only make guesses, based on his position as a White House insider.

Even more interesting, perhaps, the book provides insights into the former President's personality from the point of view of a man who describes himself accurately as closer to Mr. Nixon "than anyone else professionally," and it includes rich, new anecdotal material about Richard M. Nixon, the man and the President.

In addition, Mr. Haldeman vividly characterizes some of his former colleagues on the White House staff. He describes Henry A. Kissinger, the national security adviser and Secretary of

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State, as "a brilliant, impulsive, witty gentleman" but also pompous, publicity-seeking and insecure. He calls Charles W. Colson, the special counsel, an "ironman bully" and "the President's personal hit man." He attributes a viciously anti-Semitic quotation to Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., who succeeded Mr. Haldeman as chief of staff and who is now Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe. And he pictures John W. Dean 3d, the White House counsel, and Jeb Stuart Magruder, a campaign aide who was ensnared in the Watergate scandal, as young men who were out of their element in the high councils in which they moved.

Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder and Mr. Colson have written books themselves since they left office, and they portrayed Mr. Haldeman in an unfavorable light.

Mr. Haldeman believes that the Watergate burglary resulted from the desire of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Colson to gain revenge on Lawrence F. O'Brien, who was then chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Mr. O'Brien was a fierce partisan who had been attacking Republicans daily in the spring and summer of 1972 for allegedly interfering in an antitrust case against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. He had been a close assistant to John F. Kennedy and is now commissioner of the National Basketball Association.

Mr. Haldeman describes how the White House became aware that, while a lawyer in private practice, Mr. O'Brien had represented the late Howard R. Hughes. Then, Mr. Haldeman writes:

"Which leads me to my own theory of who initiated the Watergate break-in. Richard Nixon himself caused those burglars to break into O'Brien's office."

Mr. Nixon did so, according to Mr. Haldeman, by instructing Mr. Colson to "get the goods" on any illicit relationship between Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Hughes. Those instructions, Mr. Haldeman asserts, led inexorably to the burglary.

The staff of the Senate Watergate committee pursued a similar line of reasoning at great length and was never able to prove it.

Mr. Colson, in a television interview this morning, described the Haldeman theory as "false."

"It just didn't happen that way," he said.

In his interviews with David Frost last year, Mr. Nixon also denied any responsibility for the burglary.

Today, there was no direct response from Mr. Nixon, who is living at San Clemente, Calif. The only comment on the Haldeman assertions came through a Mr. Nixon's aide, Col. Jack Brennan. "Former President Nixon's memoirs will be published in May," he said.

Mr. Haldeman also concludes that "the break-in effort collapsed because the Democratic Party was ready for it. They knew it was going to happen, and let it. And the C.I.A. monitored the burglars throughout. Finally, the break-in was probably sabotaged."

The author offers these as theories and provides little evidence to substantiate

that paragraph, and none was revealed in any previous testimony or document.

Re-election Seen as Key

As for the Watergate cover-up, Mr. Haldeman contends that Mr. Nixon participated from the beginning because he wanted to avoid any personal connection with the break-in or other black mark that might prevent his re-election in the fall of 1972.

Mr. Nixon, in the Frost interviews, ascribed to himself a different motive. The former President said that he had withheld the truth from the prosecutors primarily to protect his own staff members and that he had agreed to pay money to the Watergate burglars for humanitarian reasons.

In the end, Mr. Haldeman writes, "The cover-up collapsed because it was doomed from the start." The book continues:

"Morally and legally it was the wrong thing to do—so it should have failed. Tactically, too many people knew too much. Too many foolish risks were taken. Too little judgment was used at every stage to evaluate the potential risks vs. the gains. And when the crunch came, too many people decided to save their own skins at whatever cost to the President or anyone else."

Moreover, Mr. Haldeman declares, "The four major power blocs in Washington were waiting in the wings to take the fullest advantage of the sword that was being so surprisingly handed to them. The press, the bureaucracy, the Congress and the intelligence community, all had their own reasons for seeing that the sword was wielded most effectively."

Reasons for the Collapse

The "Watergate disaster," Mr. Haldeman writes, was not the result of "the failure of the White House staff system." Rather, he says, it was the result of Mr. Nixon's trying to work outside regular channels and keeping people like Mr. Haldeman in the dark.

One of the remaining mysteries about the Watergate case is how 18 1-2 minutes of a conversation between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Haldeman three days after the burglary happened to be erased from the tape that was delivered to the prosecutors under subpoena. Days of testimony from men and women who were then on the White House staff and expert witnesses failed to resolve what was said in the conversation or who erased it.

Mr. Haldeman has answers to both those questions, although he is careful to point out that his answers are little more than hypothesis.

As for what was said in the conversation, the book contains the following passage:

"Since the discovery of that gap, I've racked my brain trying to remember what was said."

Reconstructing Key Conversation

"Now, looking back, taking all the new evidence of what was really going on that week, I wonder if one of my conversations with Nixon about Colson didn't take place June 20. With that thought in mind, I've reconstructed the way the conversation might have gone."

NIXON: On that D.N.C. break-in, have you heard that anyone in the White

House is involved?

HALDEMAN: No one.

NIXON: Well, I'm worried about Colson.

HALDEMAN: Why?

NIXON: The F.B.I.'s starting their investigation, and I know one thing, I can't stand an F.B.I. interrogation of Colson. Colson can talk about the President if

he cracks. You know I was on Colson's tail for months to nail Larry O'Brien on the Hughes deal. Colson told me he was going to get the information I wanted one way or the other. And that was O'Brien's office they were bugging, wasn't it? And who's behind it? Colson's boy, Hunt.

end indent

Mr. Haldeman goes on to say that he believes Mr. Nixon tried to erase the conversation. "But Nixon was the least dexterous man I have ever known: Clumsy would be too elegant a word to describe his mechanical aptitude," Mr. Haldeman writes. "So I believed that Nixon had started trying to erase the tapes himself, but realized it would take him 10 years in fits and starts."

However, on second thought, Mr. Haldeman recalls that in a conversation after he resigned Mr. Nixon referred to the gap in the tape as "Rose's 18 minutes," a possible indication that Mr. Nixon believed that his secretary, Rose Mary Woods, had erased the tape.

"Now, I'm confused," Mr. Haldeman writes.

When he was asked in the Frost interviews whether he had erased the tape, Mr. Nixon replied, "I never touched it." He said that he had no idea how the part of the tape was destroyed.

One of the most arresting parts of the book does not appear in the excerpts in *The Times*. It is a chapter in which Mr. Haldeman discusses Mr. Nixon's personality.

"I see Nixon as a multifaceted quartz crystal," Mr. Haldeman writes. "Some facets bright and shining, others dark and mysterious. And all of them constantly changing as the external light rays strike the crystal. Some of them very deep and impenetrable, others completely on the surface. Some smooth and polished, others crude, rough and sharp."

That metaphor, the author says, leaves room not only for such strong characteristics as intelligence, analytical ability and courage but also for what Mr. Haldeman characterizes as "the coldly calculating, devious, craftily manipulative side" of the former President.

A Pointed Assessment

Mr. Haldeman recalls: "I saw both greatness and meanness in Nixon in such bewildering combination that, years later, peering out of a hotel window at the White House which I had been forced to leave, I muttered out loud: 'Nixon was the weirdest man ever to live in the White House.'"

Elsewhere in the book, Mr. Haldeman

contends that Mr. Nixon personally ordered that a wiretap be placed on the telephone of Joseph Kraft, the columnist. With that effort, Mr. Haldeman writes, "Unintentionally and unknowingly an important precedent for Watergate had been established: the use of private White House personnel for wiretapping."

He asserts that wiretaps on other newsmen and staff members of the National Security Council resulted from Mr. Kissinger's "rage" over leaks of classified information. Mr. Haldeman concedes, however, that "Nixon was 100 percent behind the wiretaps. And I was, too."

Mr. Kissinger has repeatedly denied that he ordered wiretaps and has placed the blame on Mr. Nixon.

General Haig, the allied commander in Europe, who was Mr. Nixon's chief of staff during his last year as President, is the only principal member of the White House staff who is still in high office.

According to Mr. Haldeman, he and General Haig talked on the telephone in late 1973, and General Haig warned Mr. Haldeman that "they have an uncanny intelligence operation in the Jewish community that is out to get you."

Mr. Haldeman says that he dismissed the suggestion. General Haig was said to be away from his office and could not be reached today for comment.

Perhaps as a footnote to the Watergate affair, Mr. Haldeman offers another theory that is substantiated only by rather thin circumstantial evidence. He declares that Fred Fielding, who was Mr. Dean's staff assistant at the White House, was the secret source whom Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, in the book and movie, "All the President's Men," termed "Deep Throat."

Mr. Fielding, in a telephone conversation today, called that assertion "fantasy and nonsense."

Haldeman Book Says Soviet Asked U.S. In '69 to Join Nuclear Attack on China

Ex-Aide Asserts Nixon Refused—Kissinger and Rogers Deny Account

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 16—H. R. Haldeman, the White House chief of staff under President Nixon, writes that the Soviet Union made several overtures to the United States in 1969 proposing a joint nuclear attack on China's atomic facilities but that Mr. Nixon turned them down.

The account, drawn from Mr. Haldeman's book, "The Ends of Power," published today by Times Books, was promptly disputed by William P. Rogers, then Secretary of State, and by Henry A. Kissinger, who was Mr. Nixon's national security adviser at the time.

"That is not true," Mr. Kissinger said in a television interview. "I do not recall any such event and I wouldn't have forgotten it." Mr. Rogers agreed. "I have no recollection of that," he told The New York Times. "There just wasn't any such thing."

Release Date Was Broken

The Times is publishing excerpts from Mr. Haldeman's book in its Friday issue. Originally the excerpts were to be printed in five installments, starting on Monday, but The Times rescheduled them after other news organizations broke the release date and the book's publication date was moved up.

Mr. Haldeman, in one of his chief disclosures, contends that that Mr. Kissinger was so alarmed by the buildup of Soviet forces along the Chinese border in late 1969 that, on Dec. 10, he volunteered the prediction to Mr. Haldeman that there was "a very strong probability that the Russians would attack China by April 15." On other occasions, he quoted Mr. Kissinger as having said that he saw "a 60 percent chance" of a Soviet strike against China.

In an effort to warn Moscow of a possible confrontation with the United States in case of an attack on China, Mr. Haldeman says, the Americans moved to re-

'The Ends of Power'

Two pages of excerpts from H. R. Haldeman's book begin on page A17.

open the suspended Warsaw talks with Chinese and planted an uncoded military message about the dangers of fallout to Japan and Siberia that might be posed by a Soviet nuclear attack on China.

The United States is known to have been concerned in late 1969 about a Soviet buildup along the Chinese frontier and about various hints that Moscow was considering a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Chinese nuclear facilities at Lop Nor in the Sinkiang region.

But many American officials, including Secretary Rogers, were skeptical that Moscow was really contemplating an attack. Rather, Mr. Rogers recalled today, Moscow appeared to be engaging in military posturing to induce the Chinese to make political concessions. Moreover, the Haldeman account ignores previous American efforts to reopen the Warsaw talks and to arrange a high-level mission to Peking.

On other foreign policy matters, Mr. Haldeman made these assertions:

¶It was the discovery of soccer fields in Cuba that tipped off the Americans that the Soviet Union was secretly building a submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba, in violation of an understanding reached in 1962 after the Cuban missile crisis. "Those soccer fields could mean war," he quotes Mr. Kissinger as having said. "Cubans play baseball. Russians play soccer."

¶Mr. Kissinger, known as "the hawk of hawks" among the White House staff, is said to have urged the controversial

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Book's Release Stirs Debate

The circumstances surrounding the premature release of parts of H. R. Haldeman's book raised a host of journalistic and legal questions. Page A16.

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bombing of Hanoi on Christmas 1972, though he conveyed the impression to columnists like James Reston of The Times that he had split with Mr. Nixon over the issue by opposing it.

¶The refusal of Mr. Rogers to step down as Secretary of State at the end of Mr. Nixon's first term deprived Kenneth Rush, a career diplomat, of the job and forced the President to turn to Mr. Kissinger, who did not want what he considered a less powerful post. With the Watergate scandal building up, Mr. Haldeman says, the President "knew Henry was his most precious asset with the press, the Congress and the public" and he insisted that the national security adviser also serve as Secretary of State.

¶President Nixon conceived "the Madman Theory," a stratagem to convince the Vietnamese that "he would do anything to win the war and his finger was on the nuclear button" and they should therefore make concessions. The theory collapsed because Hanoi did not yield.

Nixon's Initiative on China Affirmed

Most of Mr. Haldeman's account supports what was already known, such as his assertion that Mr. Nixon took the lead in opening up American relations with China while Mr. Kissinger was initially "a reluctant passenger." The author is often more revealing about the interplay of personalities than about the sequence of events.

The Haldeman account provides a portrait of Mr. Kissinger as witty, charming, insecure, inconsistent, nosy, brilliant, egotistical, and the butt of pranks played by other White House staff members who, like Mr. Nixon, "secretly got a kick out of Henry's love life."

According to the account, John Ehrlich-

man, who was the President's domestic adviser, collected "nude photos of various starlets that Henry had dated" and then sent them to Mr. Kissinger in White House envelopes along with bogus Presidential memos making "bizarre demands" for certain types of action.

Mr. Kissinger became a problem in the 1972 election campaign, Mr. Haldeman says, because he sometimes upstaged President Nixon by shaking hands with the crowds. When told to leave the handshaking to the President, Mr. Kissinger shot back with a smile, "You're just jealous, Herr Haldeman."

Desk Tray Placed on Documents

On visits to Mr. Haldeman's office, Mr. Kissinger "tried to read everything of interest on my desk," the author says, adding that an aide would tease Mr. Kissinger by purposely setting a luncheon tray on documents he was trying to read furtively.

At another point, Mr. Haldeman accuses Mr. Kissinger of posing as a liberal outside the White House when he was seen as hard-liner by insiders. "In the White House by day we knew Henry Kissinger as 'the hawk of hawks,'" he writes. "But in the evenings, a magical transformation took place. Touching glasses at a party with his liberal friends, the belligerent Kissinger would suddenly become a dove."

The author credits Mr. Kissinger with devising the strategy of deterring a Soviet attack against China by trying to reopen the Chinese-American talks in Warsaw in a gesture designed to let Moscow know that "a Soviet nuclear strike might bring the Russians into confrontation with the United States."

This venture produced "high comedy," according to Mr. Haldeman. When Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel Jr., acting on instructions, sought to approach Lei Yang, Peking's charge d'affaires at a Warsaw social function, the Chinese, taken aback, walked out and Mr. Stoessel had to chase after him down the stairs. Prime Minister Chou En-lai was said to have told Mr. Kissinger later, "If you want our diplomats to have heart attacks, approach them at parties and propose serious talks."

Mr. Haldeman's account implies that the opening in Warsaw led to Peking's invitation to Mr. Nixon to visit China. Other accounts by high-level Nixon Administration officials have said that American feelers to China had gone on long before and the President's visit was developed through Pakistani intermediaries.



Fred J. Maroon

President Nixon, says H. R. Haldeman, imposed a rigid self-discipline to shield him from mistakes. "And when it burst," he observes, "the effects were devastating."

Haldeman's Book Released Early After Summary Appears in Print

By CAREY WINFREY

In publishing a front page article summarizing and quoting from H. R. Haldeman's book "The Ends of Power" yesterday, The Washington Post broke the official publication date, caused the publisher to release the book and the prepublication syndicator to release clients from embargo arrangements and raised a host of journalistic, legal and ethical questions.

The book, which was published by Times Books, a subsidiary of The New York Times Company, under tight security arrangements, was scheduled for publication March 10. Prepublication rights had been sold to some 30 newspapers in the United States, including The New York Times (at rates from \$5,000 to \$25,000 depending on circulation and other factors). The agreement allowed the papers to print about 10,000 words in five excerpted installments beginning next Monday.

Prepublication rights had also been sold abroad and to Newsweek magazine (for a reported \$125,000), which is owned by the Washington Post Company and which planned to publish 30,000 words from the book in two installments beginning with next Monday's issue.

Syndicate Released Clients

Yesterday The New York Times Syndication Sales Corporation, another subsidiary, released its clients from the obligation not to print the material until Monday. The New York Times, a client of the corporation, made the decision to run the entire series of excerpts, some 10,000 words, in today's editions. A number of other client newspapers said they planned to do likewise.

Newsweek magazine released its entire excerpt late yesterday afternoon and Thomas Lipscomb, president of Times books, said copies of the book would be shipped to booksellers today.

In its Thursday editions, The Post said that "the latter two-thirds of the book was made available" to the paper but did not say how. It also said that the report was written by staff writer Hynes Johnson from information supplied by writer Nancy Collins.

Miss Collins, a reporter for the newspaper's Style section, said yesterday, "I cannot of course tell how or from whom I obtained the material."

A clerk at the Sheraton Motor Inn in Scranton, Pa., a motel near the plant where the book was printed, said that someone registered under the name of "Nancy Collins" had checked out yesterday morning.

"Asked about her name on the motel

registry, Miss Collins said, "I have no comment." Then she added: "I will go to my grave . . . I will never reveal how I got it. It's nobody's business." When a reporter suggested that it might be other people's business if a law had been broken, she said, "No violation of the law occurred."

Harry Rosenfeld, assistant managing editor, said, "I can tell you that we did not get information about the Haldeman book from Newsweek."

A spokesman for Newsweek said "We don't know where they got it."

Some journalists applauded the Post's decision to undercut its sister publication as an act of journalistic independence, while others questioned the propriety of violating agreements.

Sydney Gruson, executive vice president for affiliated operations, at The New York Times Company, said, "We're disappointed that The Post decided to publish since we had an agreement in which confidentiality was involved with a company affiliated with The Post, namely Newsweek." Mr. Gruson added that he was "not taken with the journalistic enterprise" of The Post. "If they had been able to buy it," he said, referring to the fact The Washington Star, a regular Times syndication client, had pre-empted its Washington competitor, "I'm sure they would have waited quite contentedly along with everybody else."

Neither Katharine Graham publisher of The Washington Post, nor Benjamin Bradlee, executive editor of the newspaper could be reached yesterday. But Mr. Rosenfeld said "there was absolutely no contact with Newsweek, no association whatsoever with our story. I don't know whether The Washington Post tried to buy the book but, as for the implications about our journalistic integrity, we think ours was a first-class news story."

Maurice C. Greenbaum, of Greenbaum, Wolff and Ernst, a firm whose clients include publishers and authors, said that what constitutes "fair use" in quoted material from a copyrighted work is decided on a case-by-case basis. "You cannot quantify a possible violation by looking at the number of words alone that are quoted in an article," Mr. Greenbaum said.

The book that became "The Ends of Power" had its genesis in a proposal by Mr. Haldeman to write a newspaper column on foreign policy. In rejecting the proposal a little more than a year ago the New York Times Syndicate passed it on to Mr. Lipscomb at Times Books.

Mr. Lipscomb began talking to Mr. Haldeman by telephone about "other ideas that seemed more interesting." At the

time Mr. Haldeman was working on a book about Mr. Nixon's accomplishments as President, an idea, Mr. Lipscomb suggested, whose time had not yet come. "Before we could consider Nixon's accomplishments," Mr. Lipscomb recalled telling Mr. Haldeman, "we should have better evidence and better information on what happened at Watergate from the perspective of the Oval Office."

In January 1977, Mr. Lipscomb flew to Los Angeles with Joseph DiMona, an author he felt would work well with Mr. Haldeman. According to Mr. DiMona, Mr. Haldeman "stonewalled us there for five days." The two men returned to New York with reels of tape from their conversations and the conviction that the book would never be born.

David Frost's televised interviews with the former President changed that conviction and apparently also changed Mr. Haldeman's feelings about his former boss. "We rushed out there," Mr. DiMona recalled, "and there he was with a 40-page letter that began: 'Dear Mr. President, My dismay, disappointment and surprise at the presentation and representations in the first Frost interview could not have been greater.'"

Mr. DiMona persuaded Mr. Haldeman not to send the letter. Instead he worked with Mr. Haldeman for about two weeks filling reel upon reel of audio tape with all-day interviews.

Tapes Supplemented Memory

The bulk of the material—the transcripts ran to five reams of paper—was collected in three two-week sessions, two in California and one in Washington. In addition to Mr. Haldeman's memory, the pair relied on a complete set of the Nixon tapes, which had been supplied to Mr. Haldeman as a defendant in the cover-up trial, and on notes and diaries not locked up when Mr. Haldeman resigned from the White House.

Leonard Schwartz, vice president for marketing at Times Books, said that extraordinary precautions had been taken to prevent any leak of the manuscript.

Mr. Schwartz said that the company had had the type for manuscript set on three Linotype machines that were kept under constant watch by security guards. When the printing plant was shut for two days, all 4,000 pounds of metal type was brought to the publisher's Park Avenue offices and locked up. The book was given no name at the printing plant, only a number, and two trusted employees proofread it.

The advertising concern that was hired to promote the book was not given a copy. All copies used in sales of the book were numbered, hand-carried to prospective clients and returned to a locked safe.

There were unconfirmed reports yesterday afternoon that four copies were discovered missing at the Scranton, Pa. printing plant.

A contract was not signed until shortly before Mr. Haldeman began serving a one- to four-year sentence at the Federal correction facility at Lompac, Calif., in late June. By November, Mr. DiMona had a first draft, which he took to Mr. Haldeman for extensive revisions. By the time the book was completed only a few weeks

ago, it had been rewritten in whole or part some five separate times.

Even before the manuscript was completed, Clifton Daniel, Washington bureau chief for The New York Times during the Watergate period who retired from the paper last September, was engaged to excerpt the manuscript for sale by the syndication service (Newsweek did its own excerpting).

Seymour Topping, managing editor of The New York Times, said that the syndication rights were acquired not by the newspaper nor its news service, but by "an affiliate of the New York Times Company as distinct from the newspaper," which sold the rights "to about 30 newspapers including The New York Times. We examined the book and we determined that there was a certain amount of news material."

Mr. Topping added that the newspaper had plans underway to challenge, corroborate and put into perspective many of Mr. Haldeman's allegations. Some of that independently gathered material appears in today's issues of the paper.

Asked about allegations that some of the revelations in the book were inaccurate, Mr. Lipscomb said, "A book publisher's function is different from a newspaper publisher's. We are not under obligation to check on the accuracy of every claim or opinion by an author. Our job is to provide a forum. We do not choose liars but then everyone from Talleyrand to Kissinger has been accused of telling less than the truth."

But Stewart W. Richardson, editor in chief of Doubleday & Company, expressed a different viewpoint. "We believe a publisher has an obligation to check out the accuracy of certain controversial non-fiction works. Our procedure is to send the book out for an objective reading by an independent authority in the field."

Doubleday was the publisher of "Roots," a book whose credibility was also called in question by some journalistic accounts.

Mrs. Haldeman Regards Nixon As Worse Off Than Husband

Joanne Haldeman says that neither she nor her husband have ever heard a single word from former President or Mrs. Richard M. Nixon concerning Mr. Haldeman's conviction and imprisonment following the Watergate scandal.

Mr. Nixon has telephoned "a few times" since his former aide's downfall, Mrs. Haldeman said in the March issue of the Ladies Home Journal. Once he wished them a happy anniversary, the other times he wanted to check facts he needed for the book he is writing, she said. But she added that there has never been a word of sympathy from the Nixons for the Haldemans' fate.

Some of her friends find this "appalling," Mrs. Haldeman said, but she added that she does not because she believes that Mr. Nixon is worse off than her husband, who is completing his sentence at Lompoc Federal Prison.

"There are lines at Lompoc Prison that Bob cannot step across until he is released," she said, "but the walls

at San Clemente are inescapable. There are all kinds of prisons. I'll take Lompoc."

Mrs. Haldeman also said that she disagreed with her husband's asking Mr. Nixon for a pardon. "I felt we had to stand on our record and let the people judge," she was quoted as saying in the magazine article. "And to me, it would have been very uncomfortable to live with a pardon."

Mrs. Haldeman continued: "As far as Watergate goes, I certainly don't admire the President's actions. However, I—and I mean this with tremendous sincerity—I think that what happened to Bob, to John Ehrlichman and to John Mitchell has been very hard on Richard Nixon. I feel that it has affected him emotionally. It's just that he's not able to express these feelings openly. What to say—'Gee, I'm sorry?'"

"Often people wonder why I'm not bitter, but I'm not. Bob served a cause, and, if he could turn back the clock, he would consider it a privilege to serve again."

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Associated Press

Charles Colson appearing yesterday on ABC-TV's "Good Morning, America." He rejected H. R. Haldeman's assertions that he was President Nixon's "hit man" and that he "encouraged the dark impulses in Nixon's mind."