

Former Analyst's Testimony Could Be Crucial for Gates

Hill Hearing Tuesday to Review CIA Tenure


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Melvin A. Goodman, a division chief in Soviet affairs at the CIA, walked into his boss's office in mid-March of 1985 to ask him about persistent rumors his job was in jeopardy.

According to sources familiar with his account, Goodman was told that he had not been taking a tough enough line in reports about the dangers of Soviet influence in the Third World to suit Robert M. Gates, then the CIA's deputy director for intelligence. Gates had put him on a hit list with two other analytical experts, one for being "too bleak" about the Soviet economy and the other for being "too soft" on Soviet arms control policy.

Gates reportedly wanted Goodman "out of the building," but his immediate boss kept him on as senior analyst until he could nail down a temporary teaching assignment at the National War College. Despite three attempts to bring him back in high-ranking management jobs, Goodman decided in 1990 to retire after 24 years at the agency and join the faculty.

On Tuesday, Goodman is expected to be the first witness before the Senate intelligence committee in a day that some sources believe could



ROBERT M. GATES
... issue of politicized data may arise

seriously erode the panel's strong support for Gates's nomination as the next director of central intelligence.

The 53-year-old Goodman already has told the committee in closed session that intelligence analysis at the agency was "systematically politicized" and corrupted in the 1980s under Gates and the late CIA director, William J. Casey. Two

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other analysts are expected to support his views at the publicly televised session. Gates will have his defenders.

As a result, the public will get one of its first looks at the inner workings of the U.S. intelligence community, especially how classified intelligence estimates used by

the president and his aides to formulate policy are drafted.

What is certain to emerge is a picture of infighting and intimidation in a clique-ridden system where covertly obtained intelligence is used to support or question official policy. According to the critics, Gates—and even more so Casey—sought to shoehorn intelligence into preordained conclusions that supported their own hard-line ideas or those already voiced by then-President Ronald Reagan.

"It's a very important issue," Sen. David L. Boren (D-Okla.), the intelligence committee chairman, told Fox TV News, "because if you spend billions of dollars on the intelligence agency collecting all this data, and then you finally have it slanted, put together the wrong way, [and] given to the policymaker, you've wasted your money. If you just want opinions, you can get that without paying for all this intelligence."

Among those scheduled to testify on Gates's behalf is Douglas MacEachin, the "boss" who ultimately removed Goodman as a division chief.

MacEachin did not return a reporter's phone calls seeking comment on the incident and Gates declined through a spokesman to comment. Asked whether Goodman had been put on some sort of hit list because of his analysis, an official familiar with Gates's account did not respond directly but said it was "MacEachin's decision" to move Goodman out of management and that Gates concurred. "It wasn't a policy thing, it was a management thing," this official said.

Starting in 1981, the critics say, Casey, who served as director from then until 1986, and Gates, his protege, manipulated the system for analyzing intelligence, caused chaos among personnel in areas of interest to the White House, and left many churning out papers and reports that no one read.

"There's only so many papers you can do on Burkina Faso [formerly Upper Volta]," said Stephen Emerson, a former CIA analyst who worked on Africa and the Middle East.

To his supporters, Gates, 48, now President Bush's deputy national security adviser, is the consummate professional, the perfect choice to streamline the CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community and bring it into the 21st century. His advocates say he is tough and often offended those who could not support their argu-

ments. To his critics, Gates, if confirmed, will have the task of cleaning up a mess he helped create.

Tuesday's testimony is expected to focus on a series of examples that will be raised by Goodman and several other former CIA employees, such as Jennifer L. Glau demans. Glau demans, a former Soviet affairs analyst, told the committee in closed session of an atmosphere so intimidating that those who disagreed with Gates's views on an issue began censoring themselves.

Gates himself, in opening testimony before the committee, said he made "some fairly radical changes" in the intelligence directorate and said "a number of those measures were very unpopular." But he denied charges that he had slanted intelligence reports and said he was always "open to different interpretations" and eager to have "all points of view" presented to policymakers.

One of the controversies likely to

be aired Tuesday concerns a national intelligence estimate ordered in 1981 to assess whether Moscow was directing and supporting European terrorist groups along the lines suggested in a book by Claire Sterling. Alexander M. Haig Jr., then secretary of state, had read the manuscript and he wanted official documentation to support it.

When the first draft of the report said the evidence was to the contrary, sources said Gates, then executive assistant to Casey, insisted on blaming the Soviets and rewrote a key section in which he relied strongly on some tenuous reports that had been cited in an annex.

These reports, the committee has been told, came from clandestine European sources that not even the CIA's covert operations directorate, whose sources they

were, would vouch for.

According to interviews Senate staff members had with Goodman, protests about the use of the questionable information led to a scrapping of the Gates version, but had no impact on the report's conclusion. A delegation of CIA analysts and operations officers made a stab at heading off the assessment Haig wanted by warning Casey that the starkest conclusions in the Sterling book were based on CIA disinformation—fake news stories planted in the European press by members of the CIA operations directorate.

Goodman said neither Casey nor, apparently, Gates, who was present, was impressed. The final draft, Goodman told the committee, effectively redefined terrorism un-

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der the heading of "revolutionary violence" so that the Soviets could be seen as supporting it.

According to Goodman, the episode led to tighter controls over the estimating process, including the appointment of Gates as deputy director for intelligence in 1982. During his tenure, Goodman said, analysts in that directorate were not even allowed to "take footnotes" in national intelligence estimates when they disagreed.

Gates has always accused the analysts of trying to prove Haig wrong instead of addressing "the issue in all its aspects." In an article for Foreign Affairs magazine three years ago, he said the analysts "went too far themselves and failed in early drafts to describe extensive and well-documented indirect Soviet involvement.

"Far from kowtowing to policymakers, there is sometimes a strong impulse on the part of the intelligence officer to show that a policy decision is misguided or wrong, to poke an analytical finger in the policy eye," Gates wrote.

Other topics at Tuesday's hearing will likely involve allegations that Gates, who was promoted to No. 2 at the CIA under Casey in 1986, helped politicize the agency by:

- Exaggerating successes of the anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua

by bringing in people from the covert operations directorate to take part in writing current intelligence reports on Nicaragua from 1984 to 1986 and promoting fears of Soviet MiG fighter shipments to the Sandinistas despite intelligence analyses concluding there would be no such deliveries.

- Promoting the idea of potential Soviet penetration of Iran in 1985 when available intelligence suggested otherwise. The alleged danger was used to support covert arms sales to Iran, and then was played down after the shipments were in progress.

- Insisting on the idea that Soviet pressure on the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1986 led to the collapse of an accord with Jordan's King Hussein when the evidence was that internal PLO pressures were to blame. A CIA branch chief who talked Gates out of blaming the Soviets in this report was nonetheless removed from his post shortly thereafter. A senior CIA official reportedly stated, "this talking back to Gates" has got to stop.

- Asserting publicly in 1985 that Moscow was involved in the terrorist activities of Syria and Libya after senior CIA analysts told him there was no reliable evidence of that.

Other CIA analysts, sources say, have been calling the Senate com-

mittee to volunteer information, but many are reluctant to step forward. If Gates is confirmed, they will be working for him.

Gates's confirmation seemed a sure thing before last week's closed session with Goodman and other analysts. One was Hal Ford, a retiree who still works for the agency on a contract basis. He had submitted a prepared statement that one staffer said was "down the middle" on Gates. Ford told the committee to ignore it and voiced his opposition to Gates's confirmation, saying that the accounts of people he respected had led him to change his mind.

As one person who attended the session put it, Goodman's testimony was the panel's "wake-up call"; Glau demans "proved that Goodman wasn't just some malcontent," and "Hal Ford just drove the point home."

On Tuesday, they will be subject to public cross-examination. The committee has voted unanimously to take the unusual step of duplicating closed testimony because of its importance.

Sen. Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.) has taken on the role of Gates's most aggressive defender, a step that clearly pleased the White House. Goodman, for one, has told associates that he feels sure "Rudman's task is to annihilate me."