

between thought and action, a hallmark of superior intellectual history. He has also succeeded in unraveling extremely complex and confused racial theories. Horsman correctly emphasizes the haziness that surrounded racial theorizing in the early nineteenth century and points to the shuttling back and forth between race and culture which went on in the minds of American thinkers and politicians.

The book has no serious weaknesses and offers a treasure trove of sources to the historian interested in early racial theory. If there is a slight smudge, it is Horsman's style, which is not uniformly felicitous.

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*The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From "Solo" to Memphis.* By DAVID J. GARROW. (W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1981. Pp. 320. Notes, index. \$15.95.)

Over the past few years legal suits and federal investigations have pried loose fragments of the story of the FBI's surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Professor Garrow has now gathered them into a usable summary volume. Wiretapping, invasion of private life, efforts to stop the formation of a "Black Messiah," the sorry list of informants and false friends of King, and sinister Bureau political activities in pursuit of King and the civil rights movement are all included. This book should make every citizen of a constitutional democracy shudder to read it.

Unfortunately Garrow has given us several problems. A major one erupts in the first chapter where he raises the Red Specter by discussing two top members of the Communist party, both FBI informants, as well as their former friend, secretly tracked by the Bureau, who later became for a few years a minor irregular associate of King. While this information is interesting, what possible reason can there be for including it? At every point where an attempt is made to relate the communists to King and the civil rights movement Garrow is forced, as he admits, to resort to conjecture and supposition and not to the evidence history requires coeval with reality. It is a stray belonging to a different book.

By emphasizing the non-germane Red issue, though, Garrow has given apparent scholarly support to the FBI's only viable ex-

cuse for its heinous measures employed against King: that of national security. It does not wash. What forces guided the FBI are not presented to the reader in any convincing manner. At the same time the author ignores the Christian tradition of social justice flowing from St. James through the Social Gospel movement, the latter the focus of King's academic studies whose doctrines tumbled from his lips as often as they popped up in his writings—constantly.

The description of the smear campaigns and manipulations suffers—hard as it might be for a reader to believe—from narrowness. The FBI's attack on King was much more massive and carefully coordinated than is spelled out in this book, with all the staggering sums expended never questioned. An example of material neither used nor mentioned is to be found in the 400-page "Inventory of Field Office Holdings" which contains *single line* entries listing files on the surveillance. *Each* entry could range from an inch to several feet of documents. This does not include the "delicate" files and the headquarters material.

Garrow's account is also imperfect. One central question raised by the April 4, 1968, assassination of King was why he was in Memphis at a time and place to coordinate with the movements of his assassin(s). A March 28 riot during a demonstration required him to return. But why did the riot break out? Such an important question cannot be dismissed by citing the House Select Committee's *Final Report* that the FBI had nothing to do with creating the riot. Although this may prove in the end to be correct, the scholarship of the committee is so flawed that its findings ought to have been bolstered by a discussion of the ample documentary evidence available. Garrow also breaks off the narrative just before King's assassination, which he does not discuss. The FBI, however, continued with unabated zeal to control, manipulate, and confuse the evidentiary base of the killing. For example, it did not bother to interview several of the absolutely key witnesses whose testimony would have made conviction of the alleged assassin extremely difficult if not impossible while securing the testimony of scores of trivial witnesses. The ballistics evidence was improperly prepared; key documents were withheld from the public record; massive violations of normal criminal procedure occurred; and so forth.

The most unsatisfactory portion appears near the end when the FBI's activities are at-

tributed to the workings of a few misguided men within the Bureau. With their removal and replacement by men of good character, we are encouraged to conclude that the Bureau righted itself. The recent history of fierce court fights to obtain evidence suggests that this is a simplistic view. Irrespective of the character of the men and women operating within the Bureau, a more accurate diagnosis would have found an organic institutional flaw to be the main problem.

Notes claim 102 pages. While these are for the most part accurate, several minor errors can be found. A few quotations in the text are slightly inaccurate, e.g., the Special Agent Murtagh "get King" comment on page 81 has several variants within the citations provided. For the general reader, the numerous initials employed within the footnotes tend to bewilder:—MVC, CRDP, ASAC, etc.—and ought to have been explained in a separate listing. For the purposes of the historical record, too, a comment within the notes on the extraordinary battle waged by a handful of responsible critics in the face of severe opposition to preserve the evidence for posterity would have been a worthy gesture.

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*Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce, 1921-1928: Studies in New Era Thought and Practice.* Ed by ELLIS W. HAWLEY. (University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, 1981. Pp. xii, 263. \$19.95.)

This book presents the reviewer with two difficulties above and beyond those normal to the task: It is a collection of papers, and it was published seven years after the seminar at which those papers were originally presented. In the interim, two of them were published in journals, and there has been some modest updating, at least in the notes. What we have here is thus neither entirely new to us, nor does it fully reflect work done in the past seven years—nor, given the fragmentary nature of any collection of essays, is it a rounded portrait of its subject.

But it is almost unflinching interesting, if not always entirely for what it says about Hoover. Robert K. Murray's study of "Herbert Hoover and the Harding Cabinet," as we would expect, continues his arguments for Harding's much underrated ability, in addi-

tion to showing how the President and his Commerce Secretary interacted. Both Harding and Hoover come off well—Harding perhaps a little the better. The discussion following the paper emphasized Hoover's stubbornness and ideological commitments. This latter point, with the ideology in question being the "cooperative system," also appears in editor Ellis Hawley's "Herbert Hoover and Economic Stabilization, 1921-22," primarily illustrating Hoover's managerial vision and the degree to which it led him to what other cabinet members might reasonably have considered territorial aggrandisement.

The next two papers—Robert Zieger on "Herbert Hoover, the Wage Earner, and the 'New Economic System,' 1919-29" and Joan Hoff Wilson on "Herbert Hoover's Agricultural Policies, 1921-28"—were both published in 1977, the former in the *Business History Review*, the latter in *Agricultural History*. Both—like all the papers in the volume—are careful studies based on primary sources. Both argue for Hoover's managerial vision and managerial abilities. And both testify, beyond any argument, to his conviction that for things to run right, he should be running them. Professor Wilson's paper sees Hoover's agricultural "corporatism" unsuccessful against the McNary-Haugenites, a view questioned by Professor Zieger in the discussion following, as to Hoover's lack of success and as to the general use of the word "corporatism."

The two internationally oriented papers likewise testify to the breadth of Hoover's concerns. Melvyn Leffler, in "Herbert Hoover, The 'New Era,' and American Foreign Policy, 1921-29," takes a middle ground between those who see in Hoover's actions a fully developed almost Weberian vision, essentially successful in developing a new internationalism, and those who see in it one more example of an increasingly out-of-touch manager unable (or unwilling) to deal with international political realities. Joseph Brandes, in "Product Diplomacy: Herbert Hoover's Anti-Monopoly Campaign at Home and Abroad," shows Hoover appreciating free trade when it benefitted the United States, supporting protection when that was to our benefit, and slaying (or trying to slay) the foreign cartel dragon—in this case, British rubber. Once again, Hoover comes down squarely for cooperation within the U.S. economy.

Finally, George W. Carey, in "Herbert Hoover's Concept of Individualism Revisited," wrestles with his subject's place among

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