1135 a.m.

December 12, 1963

Warren

MR. BELMONT.
MR. MOHR
MR. CONRAD
MR. CONRAD
MR. DE LOACH
MR. EVANS
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN

Commission

the matter of the Commission. He wanted to work out an arrangement with me which he thought might be satisfactory. He said be understood in. Belmont handled the investigation.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

I told hir. Rankin that hir. Belmont, hir. Rosen and I handled the preparation of the report and will handle additional leads as they come in.

things the Commission will want developed further, in regard to the ISI - whether they should be handled directly with me or somebody I would designate.

I replied that will designate someone. I explained that I sent Air. Malley down to Dallas to handle all of our angles down there; that he was in the ground there; and that I think he probably would be the man who would be more familiar with things hir. Rankin should further explore. I stated Mr. Malley is in Dallas at the present time but will be ordered back tomogrow; that he will be available; and that we will be glad to run out any additional matters he may want.

I adviced hir. Rankin of the difficulty I have had about the Descriment's desire to issue certain conclusions; that they winded to issue a diagonest before the report went to the Commission reaching conclusions. Oswald was the assassin, no foreign or subversive element involved, and thubenstein and Sawald had no connection; that I fintly disagreed; they took

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Section

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr. December 12, 1963 Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan

it up with the White House and the President agreed with me that we should reach no conclusion; nevertheless the report does reach two conclusions in substance.

I said I personally believe Oswald was the assassin; that the second aspect as to whether he was the only man gives me great concern; that we have several letters, not in the report because we were not able to prove it, written to him from Cuba referring to the job he was going to do, his good marksmanship, and stating when it was all over he would be brought back to Cuba and presented to the chief; that we do not know if the chief was Castro and cannot make an investigation because we have no intelligence operation in Cuba; that I did not put this in the report because we did not have proof of it and didn't want to put speculation in the report; that this was the reason I urged strongly that we not reach conclusion Oswald was the only man.

As to Rubenstein, I said I did not want a statement about
Rubenstein and Oswald; that we have no proof they were ever together. I
stated Rubenstein is a shady character from the hoodlum element of Chicago,
has a poor background, runs a nightclub in Dallas, and is what would be
called a police buil; that the police officers in that precinct have been able
to get food and liquor from him at any time they drop in; that while I think
there was no connection between him and Oswald, I did not want the report
to be 100% sure on that.

Rubenstein should be reached at this time because he has not been tried; that was why I suggested to the Attorney General of Texas - and understood the Chief Justice did too - that his court of special inquiry be held in abeyance until after the Commission makes its findings. I said I thought they would go ahead with the Rubenstein trial in February; that was why I felt our report should name marely the facts we have established.

I further stated there may be some aspects Mr. Rankin will want to have run out further; that there may be letters written to members of the Commission; that we have letters from people who claim to have seen. Oswald; that up to the time we submitted the report we had cleared up all these angles except the Cuban thing which I discussed generally and explained that the informer recanted and blew that angle out of the window; that sort of thing may be popping up all the time. I advised Mr. Rankin if he wanted any leads followed out or any implementation of what we have already done we will give him 100% cooperation.

Mr. Rankin stated ho knew we would; that he just wanted to establish linison; that he does not want to bother me until properly.

Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, December 12, 1963 Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan

establishing it as a matter I should know. I told him not to hesitate to call me; that I will designate Mr. Malley and he will advise me at once of anything. Mr. Rankin then said he would get in touch with me if he thinks there is anything which should be taken up on that level.

I mentioned to him the actions of the Soviet Embassy, the Communist Party in New York, and John but in making available to us their information on Oswald.

in the case which led to the murder of Oswald.

[duin] A Tries

I told him. Rankin the Department held the report about five days and then began to lesk items from the Department on it, items such as the shooting of General malker, things not known in Dallas; that I kept pressing them to get the report to the Commission; that a debate was going on between the Department and me; that I did not want any conclusion drawn but I thought a conclusion had been made in the letter of transmission to the Commission; that there would have been no purpose in appointing a Presidential Commission except to evaluate the facts; that it was the duty of the FBI to get the facts and let the Commission reach a conclusion.

I told Mr. Rankin we would want to do anything we can here to make his job easier. He said he has always had complete confidence in that and in me.

that the films would be preserved and available for the Commission. I answered that we have them ourselves; that we have films taken by private individuals; that the President was not being covered by a car with television people as they do here in Washington; that there was not a professional photographer where this took place; that the Secret Service car immediately in back had already passed the building, which was at an angle, with the result they couldn't tell where the shots were coming from. I mentioned the comment by former Chief of Secret Service Baughman that he could not understand why the Secret Service men did not open fire with machine guns at the window. I said the Secret Service men did not see where the shots came from and would have killed a lot of innocent people if they had done.

and the state of the

In connection with stories indicating Oswald could not have a done this alone. I stated he was a marksman and it wasn't anything he

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shots off even faster than he did; that there is no question in my mind about it; that we also found the fingerprints and the bullets so conclusively fired from the gun; that we have all this and we have all the photographs.

Mr. Rankin inquired if we also have the television film run off of the shooting of Oswald, and I told him we have this.

Mr. Rankin said Mr. Malone delivered to him a copy of the report and also offered to help in any way possible; this was very kind of Malone; but he will not deal with Malone in anything unless it is some emergency and he has to handle it locally. I told Mr. Rankin this was all right and if he should need to call upon Malone, Malone would be available.

I also told Mr. Rankin there is a direct wire between the New York Office and here; that he can always place any calls to here over our wire; and that I will arrange for this.

I told Mr. Rankin to let us know if there is anything we can do.

Very truly yours,

J. E. IL

John Edgar Hoover Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME LO. 45PM

DATE 12-13-67

BY PAL

Sid Angeron 6.

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

The Chiaf Justice The Supress Court Washington, D. C. Dear Hr. Chief Justi At the direction of President Johnson, as transmitting herewith to you and to the other simulate of the Countrion copies of the reperfief the Tederal Burrou of Investigation on the assistaids After of President Kennedy and on the subsequent simpoting of Les Harvoy Canald. You will note that H in some aspects the investigation is continuing and in in ther information will be made available to the Robinsion as it develops. The Secret Service and The Department of State have also prepared reports with respect to the properations nade to punna The President and cortain background information in the hands of the State Department with respect to Cavald. You will have these promptly. This report is not a classified document to Fince it dues not contain defense information. Honevar, we have been treating it as a highly lassified document and I trust that you and the Other Explora of the Commission will do likevise ubill allch thee as you determine to release matters contained within it. Within the Government it is the ching road by a very limited number of pacule of a contain to know busis. X You will recall that at the tirm of To annuancing the redoral nursus of investigation. Sinvelligation, and prior to the appointment. Sould be unionated to the series of the Country of the Line of the the thi report would be eade public. Thay and 12 St PH '63 11 113 to 1 1/10 88-3 33 DEC 19 196**3** 

however, informed him of your request that this report not be released until the Commission has had time to review all of the facts and evaluate there. At the same time I are sure you are aware that there is such public the speculation and runor in this connection which would be contrable to allow as quickly as possible. For example, the latest Gallup poll shows that over half the American people believe that fixed acted as part of a considerable runor in this country and abroad to the effect that Fuby acted as part of the same or a related conspiracy.

I think, therefore, the Consistion should consider releasing—or allowing the Department of Justice to release—a short press statement which would briefly make the following points:

- (1) The FUI report through scientific examination of evidence, toutinony and intensive investigation, actablishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee Karvay Gowald shot President Kennedy on Sovewher 22, 1961. The evidence includes ballistic tests, fingerprints and pain prints, clothing fibers and other technical detailment places Cavald at the scene of the crise and establishes that he fired the shots which killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally of Texas.
- cation into whether Daweld may have conspired with or been assisted by any organization, group or parson, foreign or dewestic, in carrying out this destardly act. In this regard, the Fai has questioned hundreds of persons and checked out numerous runers and reports. To date this aspect of the investigation has been negative. No evidence has been uncovered indicating that any organization, group or person, including failes night alud owner, Jack Buby, was involved with Gausid in the assactionation of President Kennedy, or that the subsequent shooting of Cavald was part of a consiliarcy.

I would be halfy to discuss any of the wattors contained in this letter or in the report with you or other renbers of the Consission at any time you should desire. I am, of course, sleays at your survice.

Sincerely yours.

Richolan del. Katzontach Deputy Attorney Coneral

emoranaum MR. MOHR D. DE LOACH ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT Nick Katzenbach, the Deputy Attorney General, called me at 11:00 A.M.,

this morning, and asked that I come around to his office.

Upon seeing Katzenbach, he made reference to the proposed press release which the White House had originally planned to issue over the weekend in connection with the captioned matter. (The Director instructed we advise Katzenbach that we strongly felt that only the first paragraph of this release should be issued, or the first three paragraphs of the revised release which Mr. Belmont read to the Director on Saturday.) Katzenbach told me that there was a stalemate at the White House in connection with this release. Abe Fortas strongly felt that the entire release should be given to the press. Ted Sorenson agreed with us that only the first three paragraphs of the revised release prepared Saturday should be given out. Fortas believed that speculation, rumors and gossip should be disspelled right now. He claimed it made no difference that the Presidential Commission would present findings to the President and the general public. He felt rumors concerning collusion between Ruby and Oswald, also those concerning international conspiracy, should be hit hard now.

As a result of the disagreement between Fortas and Sorenson, there will be no press release from the White House To get his point across, however, Katzen-bach has prepared a letter to Chief Justice Warren and each Commission member transmitting a copy of the report. The report will be delivered today. In his letter, Katzenbach states that the report is being delivered at the instructions of the President. He also calls upon the Commission to quickly issue a statement concerning its findings so that rumors, gossip and speculation can be eliminated. He goes on to point out that investigation thus far has nailed down the point that Oswald assassinated the President and had no assistance. He further mentions that Ruby operated strictly as an individual of and had no assistance. He points out there is no evidence of collusion or international intrigue.

Katzenbach asked me if the FBI could deliver these reports. I told him we could not, that it was our position that the reports are now out of our hands and delivery

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Rosen

1 - Mr. Evans

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. M. A. Jones **(** 

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NOT RECORDED

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WANT THE

Memorandum Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr Re: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

Property

should be handled by the Department. He asked if we could package them for him inasmuch as he had no facilities for doing this. I told him I thought our Mail Room could handle this chore for him. He then stated that he had no way in which to deliver the report to John J. McCloy, the Commission member in New York. He wondered if the FBI could handle this for him. He added that each report would, of course, have his letter transmitting the report as an attachment to the package; therefore, the package actually would be coming from him and not the FBI. I told him I would check on this angle and let him know.

Katzenbach has requested 11 copies of the report from us. Seven of these copies will go to Presidential Commission members, as he promised last Friday, 12/6/63. One copy of the report will go to the Chief Counsel of the Commission, presumably Lee Rankin. The Department desires two copies and Katzenbach wants to give Secret Service one copy, making a total of 11 copies needed.

## ACTION:

(1) That we package the copies for Katzenbach and have them delivered to his office. (Mr. Belmont advises there are sufficient copies.)

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(2) That we turn over to Katzenbach ten copies of the report, it being noted that the Department already has one copy.

(3) That we tell Katzenbach that we are charging him with the safety and handling of these reports inasmuch as we have discharged our duties, other than the gentinuing investigation. It is further suggested we tell him that we have no objections to the Secret Service receiving a copy of the report; however, this, of course, is up to Katzenbach inasmuch as he is charged with the safety of a specific number of reports.

-2-

(CONTINUED)

Memorandum Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr Re: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

## ACTION (continued):

(4) That we tell Katzenbach that under the circumstances we will have our New York Office deliver a copy of the report to John J. McCloy.

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