

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which has not yet been the focus of a critical congressional public hearing, nonetheless is being targeted by both House and Senate intelligence committees as one place where a major cut in intelligence activities should be made.

Established in 1961 by then-Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, the DIA was designed to cut out duplicative operations by the separate service intelligence units and force the military to come up with a single Pentagon analysis of foreign military capabilities.

"It was supposed to become the intelligence arm of the Defense Department," a ranking member of the House intelligence committee said last week, "and instead became just one more military intelligence agency along with the others."

Today the DIA has more than 4,600 employees, both military and civilian, and an annual budget of more than \$200 million.

The armed services, however, maintain their own intelligence operations with more than 50,000 persons.

In 1970, a blue-ribbon defense panel appointed by President Nixon found that "each military department (had) a larger intelligence staff than it had before the creation of DIA."

That situation, Congress has found, still exists.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, said recently the DIA could be cut back to a small element within the Joint Chiefs of Staff—with each of the military services retaining its own tactical intelligence arm.

Church's view of the DIA and that of other senators has been influenced by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), who believes the DIA should be abolished.

According to one leading member of the House intelligence committee, "DIA gives the least return for each dollar expended. It's a retirement home for old generals."

Rep. Robert Giamo (D-Conn.) was a member of the House Appropriations subcommittee that took a close look at the intelligence community budgets this year.

"DIA is not doing a good job," Giamo said recently. He

said that even ranking Appropriations Committee members are "not happy" with DIA.

Giamo, like Church, believes the services should have their own intelligence units for tactical situations but that strategic intelligence should be left to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Last June, in an appearance before the House Appropriations Committee, the DIA director, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, listed his agency's prediction of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus as one of three major accomplishments of 1974.

"That was not terribly difficult," Chairman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) of the House intelligence committee said recently. "It was being threatened on Turkish radio." Pike adds that he too does not believe the DIA "has done that which it was designed to do."

Another aspect of DIA operations, military attaches, came under criticism during the Pike committee study of the failure to predict the 1974 coup in Portugal.

According to the committee staff, the six U.S. military attaches in Lisbon maintained only limited contacts with the Portuguese military and reported surprise when the coup occurred.

It took a month for the attaches to report back to the United States on the publication of a widely read book critical of the Lisbon regime even though the author was a top-ranking Portuguese Army officer.

Lt. Gen. Samuel Wilson, former head of the attaches, told the Pike committee he had to order the attaches to travel outside Lisbon when he discovered after the coup that only one had left the city in the prior 12 months.

## DIA Is Target Of Cutback Effort

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