

# INSIDE, STRAIGHT

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## THE MISSING LINK

Incontrovertible Documentation of the Involvement of Some Elements of the C.I.A. in the Assassination Plots against President John F. Kennedy ("Executive Action")

The following seven pages are reprinted excerpts from two publicly-available documents. They show that a person bearing a code name used by a C.I.A. "Executive Action" project was arrested in Chicago in early November 1963, in connection with a plot to kill President Kennedy there.

These documents speak for themselves. Enough material is reprinted to show their authenticity, sufficient for the average reader. More details may be obtained by direct inquiry to the issuers of the two documents, as identified at the start of each excerpt.

### The Chicago Arrest of a Man with Code Name "M1(Rifle)"

A French-American native-born Chicagoan was arrested at 1:15 P.M. on Saturday Nov. 2, 1963 in Chicago, under circumstances described in an excerpt from a legal complaint brought against the National Archives (reprinted on the next page.)

The arrest was "fingered" by a person reputed to be associated with Federal intelligence or enforcement agencies, just before Pres. Kennedy's scheduled visit to the Army-Navy football game at Soldiers Field. (The President's visit was cancelled.)

The person causing the arrest gave (perhaps inadvertently) the code name known to him to have been assigned to the arrested suspect, namely "M1(Rifle)". This code name is shown in the "alias" or "A.K.A." box on the Arrest Record (reprinted on p. 3 below.) Other assassination-team members may have had other prefixes to their "Rifle" code names.

### The C.I.A. "Executive Action" Project, Code Name "ZR/RIFLE"

The Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities' interim report (excerpted on pp. 4-8 below) shows that the C.I.A., under Allen Dulles, set up in 1960-61 an "assassination capability" project, with the code name "ZR/RIFLE". (p. 187). This project was never used against any foreign leaders. (p.182.) Chicago-based gangsters were part of the project. (p.189, also p.77, not excerpted here.) To quote from p. 182:

"In general, project ZR/RIFLE involved assessing the problems and requirements of assassination and developing a stand-by assassination capability; more specifically, it involved "spotting" potential agents and "researching" assassination techniques that might be used."

### "Coincidence" Again?

The agreement in code name, place, and time period cannot be dismissed as simply another "coincidence" in the long list which interweaves the assassination evidence. A follow-up of this linkage, by legislative investigators, is required.

(The plaintiff, Sherman H. Skolnick, resides at 9800 South Oglesby Avenue, Chicago, 60617.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION.

SHERMAN H. SKOLNICK, plaintiff,

vs.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE, defendant.)

4/6/70  
Civil Action.

No. 70C790

COMPLAINT.

The plaintiff, SHERMAN H. SKOLNICK, complains against the defendant, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE, and alleges:

5. Among the data compiled by plaintiff and his staff researchers, and students, associates, others assisting him and them, including information gathered from documents and interviews, are the following:

(A) That prior to the assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, November 22, 1963, there was a plot or plots to assassinate the President in Chicago, Illinois, on or about November 2, 1963, when the President was expected to be in attendance at the Army-Air Force football game in Soldiers' Field, to be held that same day, November 2, 1963.

Among those involved in the plot, or plots, were a person known as Thomas Arthur Vallee, a possible double for a person known as Lee Harvey Oswald; and three or four others including Lee Harvey Oswald, or person using such name, and a Mr. Bradley and a Mr. Gonzalez.

(B) Keeping Vallee under surveillance and carrying out other duties related thereto were U.S. Secret Service agents. Prior to the scheduled visit of the President, Acting Supervisor Martineau, Secret Service Division, Chicago, received a personal call from the Chief of the U.S. Secret Service, James J. Rowley. Rowley told Martineau that the Secret Service had word of an assassination plot, or plots, supposed to take place during the President's coming visit to Chicago. According to Rowley, four men had come or would come to Chicago to participate.

Martineau called in all men in his charge in Chicago and told them of Rowley's call. He also informed them the following as to this matter:

(a) there were to be no written reports; (b) nothing was to be sent by TWX; (c) Martineau was to report only by phone to Rowley, personally; (d) no file number was to be given to this case.

All Secret Service agents in Chicago were shown four photos of the men allegedly involved in the plot or plots. Shortly before the scheduled visit of the President, Martineau assembled some of his agents to discuss the results of the investigation. Among others at the meeting in Martineau's office were the following Secret Service agents, James Griffiths, Robert J. Motto, Thomas D. Strong, and Steven F. Maynard. As a result of surveillance, the plot, or plots, was thought to be genuine. The four men appear to have come to Chicago and were staying with a northside "landlady", at or about 1200 North, near a police station.

(C) The plot, or plots, or portion thereof, was or were aborted by the activities of Daniel Groth, who is shown in a Chicago Police Department Report as being a witness against Vallee, who was stopped two blocks from his purported residence. A copy of said Report is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Appendix A. Also attached hereto and made a part hereof as Appendix B, C, and D, are three pages from the so-called Potential Assassin File of the Chicago Police Department. Said File on Vallee has disappeared and re-appeared from time to time, and the photo attached thereto of Vallee is gone.

The purported Police Report, App. A, has no narrative of the purported arrest which succeeded in aborting the plot, or portion thereof, to the benefit of the potential assassin or assassins. Said Report shows discrepancies among others, as follows:

(a) the alias column shows M. I. (Rifle), which may have been a password or form of identification;

(b) there appear to be unexplained differences as to the police districts, whether Area 1 or 20th District.

Daniel Groth was known to often "hang around" the U.S. Secret Service office in Chicago. Whether Groth was actually in the capacity of private citizen-witness, or Chicago Policeman, or some form of federal agent or operative, remained a mystery to certain Secret Service agents.

(D) News coverage of the November 2, 1963, plot or plots was inexplicably withheld or deferred until after November 22, 1963, when the assassination of the President occurred in Dallas. Immediately after the assassination, the Secret Service in Chicago and nationwide did nothing except work on the assassination problem.



Groth in published statements after 70 C 790 got to court, did not deny that "M.I." in the "also known as" column was not an error but, in fact, Vallee's code name. "M.I." is believed involved with Minutemen and/or Military Intelligence, or both, as a code word.

ARREST REPORT / CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT		VALLEE THOMAS ARTIUR		M W 1933	
5. OFFENSE OF ARREST Wilson & Dunen		6. AKA (LAST) M.I. (Rifle)		10. R.D. NO. 323797	
7. BEAT 20 20 Street		8. RESIDENCE ADDRESS 4614 N. Aulina		11. C.B. NO. 1393986	
9. EMPLOYED (C) SCHOOL Y.P.P. Printing Co		12. SEX M		13. HAIR Blk	
14. OCCUPATION Lithographer		15. EYES Blue		16. COMPLEXION Med	
17. VEHICLE OF ARREST Mazda		18. DISPOSITION Owner Care		19. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 327 30 4015	
20. WITNESS TO ARREST (NAME, RACE, YEAR OF BIRTH) Schurila, Peter H W 1934		21. ADDRESS 5700 S. Cottage Grove		22. PLACE OF BIRTH Chicago Ill	
23. PRISONER TRANSPORTED TO Madden & Groth 2 Nov 63		24. YEAR NO. 20 1H. District Beat 4299 Groth & Co		25. DATE & TIME 2 Nov 63 1315	
26. PREVIOUS OFFENSE		27. PREVIOUS OFFENSE		28. APPROVAL OF CHARGER	
29. NARRATIVE		30. PREVIOUS OFFENSE		31. APPROVAL OF CHARGER	
32. BOOKING OFFICER Robert Mingaglia		33. CHARGE CHARGED TO Robert Mingaglia		34. PRISONER SEARCHED BY Robert Mingaglia	
35. DATE & TIME - BOND Nov 63 1730		36. TRIAL DATE 6 Nov 63		37. FINAL DISPOSITION	
38. BY WHOM TAKEN Z 256/13		39. RETURNED BY		40. DATE	

Prints & Photoed 2 Nov 63 1330

This is a Task Force Area 1 On View Arrest -  
Arrested for traffic violation and Carrying concealed weapon.

ARRESTING OFFICER WILL APPEAR IN COURT

MID  
H 26  
A

Editorial note: Notice that Daniel Groth is not shown here as a policeman but as a witness against Vallee, two blocks from Vallee's home.

# ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS

## AN INTERIM REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES SENATE

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE  
VIEWS



NOVEMBER 29 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 18), 1975

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1975

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### C. INSTITUTIONALIZING ASSASSINATION: THE "EXECUTIVE ACTION" CAPABILITY

In addition to investigating actual assassination plots, the Committee has examined a project known as Executive Action which included, as one element, the development of a general, standby assassination capability. As with the plots, this examination focused on two broad questions: What happened? What was the extent and nature of authorization for the project?

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

Sometime in early 1961, Bissell instructed Harvey, who was then Chief of a CIA Foreign Intelligence staff, to establish an "executive action capability," which would include research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders.<sup>1</sup> (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 51; Harvey 6/25/75, pp. 38-37) At some point in early 1961 Bissell discussed the Executive Action capability with Bundy. The timing of that conversation and whether "the White House" urged that a capability be created were matters on which the evidence varied widely, as is discussed in section (2) below.

Bissell, Harvey and Helms all agreed that the "generalized" capability was never used. (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6/25/75, p. 43; Helms 6/13/75, p. 52)

<sup>1</sup> During the late spring or early summer of 1960, Richard Bissell had requested his Science Advisor, Mr. Joseph Scheider, to review the general "capability of the class of operations" which would include assassination and elimination. Scheider testified that assassination was one of the "capabilities" he was asked by Bissell to research. (Scheider 10/8/75, pp. 5-6, 24-23)

Scheider indicated that Bissell turned to him because he was knowledgeable about "capabilities" which were available in CIA laboratories, and because Bissell would have considered it might be an area of an operational committee which passed on proposals involving the operational use of drugs, chemicals and biological agents. The proposal was approved in February 1961.

In February 1961, the operational use of drugs, chemicals and biological agents. The Division Chief called the "Health Alteration Committee" endorsement of what the "capabilities" were. The Division Chief believed to be "promoting Secret blood" which would be used for assassination. The Committee's advice on a technique target from pursuing his usual activities for assignment would be certain to prevent the "do" do not consciously seek subject's permanent removal from the scene; we also do not want to avoid this complication develop." (Memo, Acting Chief NE, Division to DC/CI 2/25/60)

In April, the Committee unanimously recommended to the DDP that a "standing operation" be undertaken, noting that Chief of Operations advised that it would be "a standing operation" which would be undertaken by the DDP.

The approved operation was to mail a monogrammed handkerchief containing an incipit to the name of the recipient, he did remember mailing from the A-10 material for the purpose of handkerchief "treated" with some kind of material. (Scheider 10/8/75, pp. 52-55; 10/15/75, pp. 35-36)

During the course of this Committee's investigation, the CIA stated that the handkerchief was a terminal illness. (Scheider 10/8/75, pp. 52-55) It added that the colonel: "suffered a terminal illness" and "was not very long after our handkerchief proposal was made." (Memo, Chief of Operations, NE, Division to the SA/DDO, 9/25/73.)







tioned in his initial discussion of Executive Action with Bissell (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). However, the testimony from Bissell and from the White House aides is in conflict with Harvey's testimony as to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to Bissell.

The testimony regarding the relationship between "the White House" and the Executive Action capability is summarized as follows:

*Harvey*—Harvey testified that his missing notes which had been destroyed had indicated that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an Executive Action capability. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37) Harvey said that he "particularly remember[ed]" that Bissell said that he received "more than one urging from the White House. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 36-37; 7/11/75, p. 58) As he testified:

"On two occasions or on more than one occasion, and I particularly remember the more than one because I recall at the time this was not just not just a one-shot thing tossed out. . . . the White House—I quote this much: this is exact—had urged him (Bissell)—him in this case not personally, but the Agency—to develop an Executive Action capability." (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 36-37)

But Harvey had no direct evidence that Bissell actually had any such discussion with "the White House." No specific individual in the White House was named to Harvey by Bissell. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 31) Harvey said that it would have been "inappropriate" for him to have asked Bissell whom he had talked to and "grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37)

*Bissell*—Bissell specifically recalled assigning Harvey to investigate the capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51) However, Bissell did not recall "a specific conversation with anybody in the White House as the origin" of his instruction to Harvey. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51)

During the course of several appearances before the Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had been urged by the White House to develop an Executive Action capability.

In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the "widespread" quotation of Harvey's notes in the Inspector General's Report, Bissell said, "I have no reason to believe that Harvey's quote is wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51) Bissell also said that as far as he knew, it was true that he was asked by the White House to create a general stand-by assessment capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 49, 51)

Based again on Harvey's missing notes ("White House urging"), and his statement that he had no reason to challenge their accuracy, Bissell initially gave his opinion that "McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow were the two people from whom such a request was most likely to have come because they were 'the two members of the White House staff who were closest to CIA operations.'" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 49-51)

At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell said that the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the Agency" (7/11/75, p. 81). Two days later he said: "There is little doubt in my mind that Project RHPLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 49)

When Bissell appeared before the Committee on July 17 and 22, his testimony, given in light of information obtained since his earlier ap-

pearances, was that there was no White House urging for the creation of the Executive Action project, although tacit approval for the "research" project was probably given by Bundy after it was established.

First Bissell was shown the Harvey notes which had been preserved and which, without any mention of the White House, indicated Harvey had received his assignment prior to January 25/26, 1961. Those dates—just 5 days after the change in administration—made Bissell conclude that it was "very unlikely that that assignment to [Harvey] was taken as a result of White House urging or consultation." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10) Bissell said that Bundy did not have any influence at the Agency before the Presidential inauguration. Bissell added that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the new administration on matters prior to the inauguration. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23)

Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he had been contacted by telephone conversations with Rostow and Bundy after his first appointment since Rostow's duties in 1961 had nothing to do with "our" action, he had "never discussed" Executive Action with Rostow. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/22/75, p. 22)

Bissell's final testimony about Bundy (given after his telephone contact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy about the capability after it had been created. (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp. 10-11; 7/22/75, pp. 21-22) But Bissell confirmed his original testimony that he had not briefed Bundy on the actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the CIA. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31) Bissell was "quite certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the Executive Action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35) He testified:

Q. Would you think the development of a capability to kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient importance to bring to the attention of the President Bissell. In that context and at that time and given the limited scope of activities within that project, I would not. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35)

Bissell said that he and Bundy had discussed an untargeted "capability" rather than the plan or approval for an assassination operation. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11) Bissell said that although he does not have a specific recollection, he "might have" mentioned Castro, Lummaba, and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of Executive Action "because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51)

Bissell said his impression was that in addition to expressing no unfavorable reaction to the project, Bundy actually might have given a more affirmative response. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28) Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy's reaction as approval (or at least no objection) for the Executive Action concept. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 30)

Q. . . . I think the testimony of this witness is going further in saying what you received from [Bundy] was, in your view, tantamount to approval? Bissell: I, at least, interpreted it as you can call it approval, or you could say no objection. He [Bundy] was briefed on something that was being done, as I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His [Bundy's] comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favor-



able than that, but this is a matter that probably someone listening to the conversation on which such a person could have had differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 33)

All of the Bissell testimony on his Executive Action conversation with Bundy was speculative reconstruction. From his first appearance to his last, Bissell had no "clear recollection" of the events. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 29, 36) But Bissell maintained that more "formal and specific and explicit approval would have been required" before any "actual overt steps in use of the capability." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 31)

Bissell said that Harvey's notation about White House urges to develop an Executive Action capability may have been a slightly confused account of a Bissell/Harvey conversation subsequent to the initiation of the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy's reaction to Harvey. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25)

Bissell ultimately testified that the development of an Executive Action capability was "unintentionally" or "very much more likely" initiated within the Agency. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 22, 27) He had acknowledged on his first day of testimony that this would not have been unusual:

It was the normal practice in the Agency and an important part of its mission to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason to be certain whether these would be used or where or how or for what purpose. The whole ongoing job of S... a secret intelligence service of recruiting agents is of that character... it would not be particularly surprising to me if the decision to create such a capability had been taken without an outside request. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68)

Bundy—McGeorge Bundy also testified to a conversation with Bissell, during which the Executive Action capability was discussed. Bundy's testimony comports with Bissell's on the fact that they discussed an untargeted capability, rather than an assassination operation. But Bundy said that the capability included "killing the individual." (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 5) Bundy's impression was that the CIA was "testing my reaction," not "seeking authority." (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 13) Bundy said:

I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any judgment either. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 10)

Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development of the Executive Action capability or "pursue the matter at all" (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 19) because he was satisfied.

That this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, that there should be a decision to move against the individual. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 7)

Bundy believed that neither of these conditions had been fulfilled. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 7)

Bundy recalled the conversation with Bissell as taking place "sometime in the early months of 1961." (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 4) When questioned about the dates in Harvey's notes, Bundy noted the change that his conversation about Executive Action took place before January

<sup>1</sup> See p. 127, supra, for Bundy's testimony about having a vague recollection of hearing and not connect this to the conversation about executive action.

25—when Harvey was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant to Bissell's directive—as "near zero" because the new Administration had been in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the National Security Staff. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 9)

Bundy testified that he did not brief the President on the Executive Action project:

CHAMBERLAIN: And you have testified that you did not take the matter to the President?

Bundy: As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 16)

Bundy explained that the division of responsibility for national security affairs excluded Rostow from jurisdiction over covert operations, making it unlikely that Rostow would have been briefed on a project like ZR/RIFLE. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 11)

Rostow—Rostow testified that he was "morally certain" that during his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference to executive action or "such a capability" for such an intention to act by the U.S. (Rostow, 7/9/75, pp. 10, 13)<sup>1</sup>

3. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION OR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXECUTIVE ACTION PROJECT BY THE DCI

Richard Bissell said he was "quite certain" that Allen Dulles had full knowledge of the Executive Action project for two reasons: first, it "would have come to the DCI's attention" when Harvey was transferred between components of the Agency and assigned to work on Cuban operations;<sup>2</sup> and second, Bissell "would imagine" it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation of the project. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35) Bissell and Harvey briefed Richard Helms on Project ZR/RIFLE when he became DDP. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 53; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 63) But Bissell did not recall briefing John McCone about the project when McCone took over as DCI. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11) McCone testified that he had no knowledge of such a project. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 43) William Harvey said it was assumed that the project was within the parameters permitted by the DCI. But Harvey testified that officially advising the DCI of the existence of the project was "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until "there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or a specific recruitment." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 59)

4. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER PROJECT ZR/RIFLE WAS CONNECTED TO ANY ACTUAL ASSASSINATION PLOTS

The Committee has sought to determine whether the CIA development of an Executive Action capability was related in any way to the actual assassination efforts. One question raised by this inquiry is whether the participants in the assassination operations might have officials with responsibility for national security affairs during the latter part of the Kennedy Administration. However, there is no evidence which raised the name of anyone who would have had such a position at the time of the assassination. (Harvey, 7/17/75, p. 11; Gray, 7/9/75, p. 86)

<sup>1</sup> Harvey's transfer to Cuban operations was not completed until late in 1961.

perceived the Executive Action capability as in some way lending legitimacy to the actual assassination efforts.

(a) Conversation between Bissell and Bundy

In his early testimony, Bissell said he did not have a recollection of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba, and Tjufflo with anyone in the White House in the course of discussing the project to develop an executive action capability. However, Bissell testified that it was "perfectly plausible that I would have used examples" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). He continued:

In such a discussion of a capability, I might well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were the sorts of individuals that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed. (Bissell, 6/21/75, p. 51)

Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that their discussion on the development of the capability for assassination did not involve any mention of actual assassination plans or attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), *supra*). There is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversation raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts against Castro had already been mounted and were moving forward. Bundy was responsible to a new President for national security affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information about covert operations at the CIA.

(b) Bissell's instruction to Harvey to take over responsibility for undercover contact: November 1961

Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November 1961, in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with John Rosselli as part of Project ZR/RIFLE. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 86; and 6/11/75, p. 19) Harvey's notes placed the meeting on November 15, 1961. (IG Report, p. 39), during the period in which Harvey was freed from his duties on another Agency staff and assumed direction of Task Force W which ran CIA activity against the Castro regime.

According to Bissell and Harvey, their November meeting involved only the planning and research of a capability rather than a targeted operation against Castro. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 13; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60) But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose of the Rosselli contact had been to assassinate Castro, and that "it is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain it [the contact] unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19) Bissell stated that because the assassination plot against Castro involving the underworld figures

Had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs \* \* \* and there was an authorization to pursue it actively \* \* \* the responsibility that was given to [Harvey] was that of taking over an inactive contact. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 14)

Bissell said that in effect he had asked Harvey to stand watch over the contact in case any action should be required and further testified

that it was never required. However, as noted above, the Rosselli operation was reactivated by Harvey in April 1962 after Bissell had left the Agency.

The Inspector General's Report stated: "After Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE." (IG Report, p. 40) Harvey recalled that during a discussion with Bissell of the creation of an Executive Action capability, Bissell advised him of the then going operation involving the names of Malen and possibly Rosselli and Chacoma, "which was a part of the Agency's effort to develop \* \* \* a capability for executive action." Harvey said that at the time of this discussion, the operation had been "in train" for "approximately two years or perhaps 18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 54, 55, 61)

Although his "net impression" was that both the "exploratory project" and the "specific operation" were "fully authorized and approved," Harvey said he could not testify that "specific White House authority for this given operation was implied or stated." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54) Bissell does not recall telling anyone in the White House that something had been done to bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19-20) Harvey did not recall any mention of the White House or any authority higher than the DDP in his November 1961 meeting with Bissell. (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61)

Although Richard Helms was briefed and given administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE, three months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever considered as part of the plot to assassinate Castro. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55) Asked whether the assassination efforts against Castro were related to ZR/RIFLE (Executive Action), Helms testified: "In my mind those lines never crossed." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52)

Bissell's testimony, however, leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the syndicate which had Castro as its target \* \* \* folded into the ZR/RIFLE project \* \* \* and they became one." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47) When asked whether the Executive Action capability "was \* \* \* for assassination" was "used against Castro," Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47) The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15, 1961, however, provided for approximately five months the reactivation of the CIA/underworld assassination operation against Castro.

(c) Use of QJ/WIN in Africa

QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive programs prior to Project ZR/RIFLE. As noted above, QJ/WIN's function during "multi-purpose" covert use. The Lumumba section of this report treats fully QJ/WIN's role.

Two factors may raise a question as to whether QJ/WIN was already being used in an *ad hoc* capacity to develop an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated. First, there is a

similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey, QJ/WIN, the recruiting officer, and Scheider were connected with the Lumumba matter and re-appear in connection with the subsequent development of an assassination capability before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52; IG Report, pp. 37-38) Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm evidence connecting QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate Lumumba. (see pp. 43 to 48), *supra*)