

10/26/62 - Scali - 175

Frank Ball

ABC's state dept independent was in that agency's  
 June room at 1:30 pm eating a ~~to~~ Bologna sandwich when he was ~~pleased~~  
 by Alexander S. Fomin, a ~~comrade~~ in the USSR embassy suspected of being a  
 much more important informant functionary. He is some expert who is  
 Abel felt it, asked Seale to lunch with him ~~and~~ had before. When ~~Seale~~  
 Seale pleaded preoccupation, Fomin urged the ~~importance~~ of the ~~meeting~~  
 meeting upon Seale & they both sped to Air Decid at Post, where Fomin  
 immediately the following settlement of the ~~proposed~~ ~~174~~: 1) USSR  
 with a view of missiles under a UH inspection; 2) ~~to~~ ~~accept~~ ~~no~~  
 more "offensive weapons in future; 3) ~~we~~ ~~pledge~~ ~~not~~ ~~to~~ ~~produce~~ ~~later~~ ~~(if~~ ~~it~~ ~~is~~  
 certain this was not Fomin's language - it is not in quotes - but he would  
 never have ~~misdealt~~ those ~~missiles~~ were "offensive" but ~~admitting~~ the ~~words~~  
 him is ~~misleading~~, ~~deliberate~~ & a ~~pre-arranged~~ ~~device~~. Fomin urged Seale to  
 take this up at the State Dept & presence of Stevenson was to "pressure" this  
 time at the UN he would find Zorin "interested". The remarkable thing  
 is that this is more of a ~~concessing~~ than Stevenson would have ~~been~~ ~~asked~~  
 had he been permitted to offer his original plan - but ~~that~~ ~~was~~  
 very close to his resolution. - Lybush had not ~~committed~~ ~~yet~~ ~~so~~ ~~do~~ ~~anything~~  
 in the US to ~~prevent~~ ~~behaviour~~ ~~of~~ ~~later~~ ~~that~~ ~~you~~ ~~stopped~~ ~~I~~ ~~think~~ ~~it~~  
 would have been apparent in ~~later~~ ~~could~~ ~~commit~~ ~~later~~ ~~that~~  
 with any ~~understanding~~ it would have ~~been~~ ~~apparent~~ that  
 one ~~promised~~ ~~peace~~ ~~terms~~ ~~decided~~ ~~the~~ ~~missiles~~ & ~~once~~ ~~permitted~~  
 the USSR had achieved its purpose in moving ~~back~~ in & had no  
 need to return them. This was ~~high~~ - ~~but~~ ~~in~~ ~~g~~, ~~necessary~~  
 to ~~protect~~ ~~US~~ ~~interest~~ & ~~make~~ ~~of~~ ~~FR~~ ~~look~~ ~~good~~. Zorin did not, so he  
 could have, made the proposal at the UN, openly or to others, for this  
 would have put ~~of~~ ~~FR~~ ~~under~~ ~~public~~ ~~pressure~~ ~~to~~ ~~soon~~ ~~it~~ ~~would~~ ~~have~~ ~~been~~ ~~forced~~  
 the ~~request~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~UN~~ ~~before~~ ~~it~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~adequately~~ ~~considered~~. Fomin  
 thought the deal, outside channels ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~at~~ ~~all~~, but in a way that would not ~~be~~ ~~known~~ ~~to~~  
 Seale.

106661 (scat-2) Sudi notes to Hillman, who decided this would be, in all events,  
"the first information that the USSR was sending for a way out." Both statements  
Pruitt's office, when the Secretary of State Lygia wanted to his yellow ruled pad  
rather than to his secretary and ~~had~~ wrote out a message in red ink  
cleaned with the white board by phone and told Sudi, "I want you to go back  
to Hillman & tell him this: (177) US "Sudi red frontal it is in this" &  
suggests representations of both governments "could work this matter out with U  
Pruitt & ask them." Sudi dictated the message at 7:35 in the State  
office shop, almost next door to US R Embassy. (While this is fact, it is not  
nearly so fast as Abel was reported. On the other hand, it reflects her  
little time for reflection by the US Govt, & perhaps most conspicuously, Abel's  
account indicates it never had a clear chance to get lost in the US (Wynn)  
from Sudi's assurance that his reply came "from the highest  
sources" & "was in immediate touch with the highest  
sources in Moscow" (Abel words) Meanwhile, at 6 pm, a teletype message  
started coming in from the US Emb in Moscow. Copy from A 177-181.

There is nothing in the way Abel quotes a paraphrase to justify  
his comment & description <sup>"containing"</sup> "an argumentative" & "verbal" "the importance of  
a frightened man" Only in a mind dedicated to the justifications of US policy &  
paraphrase would such a description occur. By the latter is an eloquent, person-  
ate, straightforward expression of what should have been obvious from the  
beginning. It is now why it is not in any way suggests the USSR is going  
to retreat from its position & its commitment or defend later. Or  
completely explains its intentions (but as Abel presents it, not its reasoning of  
how missiles would defend later, which they could not) It is in Abel's  
version of openly chides Kennedy for his description at Vietnam over the Bay of  
Pigs and then goes even further, implying Kennedy had "lost your self  
control" & "very stiff dice." It puts the ~~blame~~ blame of mutual extermination  
directly up to Kennedy. And at the same time at least to that all the  
entire world would be already in later. It is honest in declaring the  
would not speak for Castro (or so, even though this would have been a

50411-3) memorandum & presumption for the US to make the make it specific from  
the first). It says the ships ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~then~~ <sup>then</sup> ~~upon~~ <sup>upon</sup> ~~agreement~~ <sup>agreement</sup> with ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Threat~~ <sup>Threat</sup> ~~preference~~  
the Russian ships would be searched, showing they had no such weapons as  
the American ~~people~~ <sup>people</sup> military people ~~would~~ <sup>would</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~inquired~~ <sup>inquired</sup> (that's words)  
(had this was never done, so it is certain ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> Kennedy must  
have been satisfied ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~order~~ <sup>order</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~truth~~ <sup>truth</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~a~~ <sup>a</sup> ~~very~~ <sup>very</sup> ~~bold~~ <sup>bold</sup> ~~offer~~ <sup>offer</sup> ~~if~~  
he was lying.) This letter is a remarkable document & the reason for  
its suppression by the US is ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~affair~~ <sup>affair</sup> ~~apparent~~ <sup>apparent</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~fact~~ <sup>fact</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~fact~~ <sup>fact</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup>  
also significant & may or may not be the reason ~~but~~ <sup>but</sup> ~~equally~~ <sup>equally</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup>  
his role. In Moscow the letter had to be first translated, then  
~~typed~~ <sup>typed</sup> ~~into~~ <sup>into</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~slow~~ <sup>slow</sup> ~~process~~ <sup>process</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~teletype~~ <sup>teletype</sup> ~~typing~~ <sup>typing</sup>  
began. Either it was given to the U.S. Emb. after Moscow got word of  
the delivery of the ~~same~~ <sup>same</sup> ~~message~~ <sup>message</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~no~~ <sup>no</sup> ~~reply~~ <sup>reply</sup> ~~or~~ <sup>or</sup> ~~Flinn~~ <sup>Flinn</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup>  
instructed ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~time~~ <sup>time</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~advise~~ <sup>advise</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~State~~ <sup>State</sup> ~~Department~~ <sup>Department</sup> ~~about~~ <sup>about</sup> ~~when~~ <sup>when</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~message~~ <sup>message</sup>  
was handed on. The first part is the whole liberty probability. In  
one state Dept is the teletypewriter printed the long letter, it was  
short by short, decided then given to Rusk, who had Ball & Thompson  
with him. Why this had to be looked, especially under the cir-  
cumstances, escapes me. It was a hideous waste of time & talk  
ends while the world waited on the brink. Rusk & company, in  
what ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~words~~ <sup>words</sup> "kept looking for the ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~catch~~ <sup>catch</sup>" "What ~~about~~ <sup>about</sup> ~~kind~~ <sup>kind</sup> ~~men~~ <sup>men</sup>!  
What sort of closed minds! How could anyone in Loh's position have been  
tried to pull a fast one? Had he been certain of war, he would have  
immediately pressed his button & sent the missiles flying, and he clearly explained  
how the missiles could not be used to fight a war - only ~~mastermind~~ <sup>mastermind</sup> ~~instructions~~ <sup>instructions</sup>.  
Rusk made a fearful mistake when possible consequences can  
only be unexplained after a century of lies. He consulted Dean  
Acheson. (Quote Acheson "tracked part of 182")

Sculi-4 This eloquent & articulate man, powerful & respected despite  
a record of consistent error in policy & lack of understanding, whose  
failures had been ~~repeatedly~~ sustained only because of the tremendous  
power of US arms, the magnitude of its wealth & the blindness of  
the war which left her doing among the major combatants with  
her hand unencumbered for ~~her~~ economy less than, whose mind  
& heart were in fact so ~~to~~ implacable hatred and whose insti-  
tution was just fixation of his own record, would have found old  
Mephistopheles was of ~~the~~ glow from a halo blinder. Or suppose  
she in this place & office and if the glory of the blighted land  
shown in all its glory from that land, or perhaps it would have  
~~been~~ been the light of hell's fire. ~~Suppose~~ ~~the~~ stupidity or  
the simplicity of the man who believed or at least would say that  
"he had the Shumbram on Shushur" and his monumental  
lack of understanding of ~~it~~ - a ~~war~~ war, in difference to the  
magnitude of the catastrophe that could at any second through  
~~any~~ any one of ~~a~~ countless thousands of errors or mischances  
(some of which befell us) end civilization! He wanted to turn  
his unimpressive Shumbram on the unimagined ~~to~~ captive hand  
"another turn a day" for untold days - any one of which  
frustrated modern war - for nothing but the indulgence of hate!  
What would ~~the~~ possibly have profited from his ~~advice~~ <sup>ADVICE?</sup>  
Only dangers & hazards beyond description, multiplying in  
portentous geometrical proportions. Was there ~~any~~ any



(Sadi-6) Could they be human & not find the lost "harrenbno"?  
He had not even documented - so he might have and some  
offered as an alternative - the removal of prison as a missile not  
80 miles from his shore but standing on his ~~shore~~ tobs in  
Turkey. (183)

Only Roger Williams could add 1+1 get 2, which he  
apparently drew among the intellectual acorn of his diplomacy  
had the mental capability does (Archson must have gone  
home to play with his gold-plated toy soldiers & Urmanni  
with miniature brants) He put Sadi's offer & his letter  
together & ~~also~~ saw what must be brought in fresh man  
base any honesty, that the head of a state cannot put in writing  
what "he would later discover if need be." And at last, it  
would seem, that it was finally understood that Mr. had  
made a damned good offer, "his way of spelling out... the  
mutual shape of a settlement tolerable to both sides" (Walt  
Ward, 183)

So the "at Comm" met at 10 p.m. in "extraordinary  
session" Walt says. But did it even have a session of other  
delegates? They ~~did~~ decided it ~~was~~ to treat "the letter as a  
one side proposal" meaning a serious reply."

Fine! The world teeters on a cliff over oblivion and the cliff  
begins to shake. ~~The~~ Multiple Dick Darlings to the  
doom! ~~And~~ a whole committee of Dr. Darlings. So what  
do they do? They let the world teeter and "went so be"

Scott-7

in George Ball's words "with a vast sense of relief."

and back at the "O.K. Cornell" in Foggy Bottom Roger  
Hilsman left to two Soviet bastards spinning  
the better ~~Soviet proposal~~ "to make <sup>sure</sup> ~~contact~~ the text contained no  
broody traps."

Certainly reports who had been so completely lacking in  
comprehension of what they had done to the world or under-  
standing of ~~what~~ why the world would not let ~~it~~ ~~go~~ their  
policies continue; naturally such sinister men who accepted  
all night but ~~was~~ working to them selves which practicing  
international law like ~~a~~ Philadelphia lawyers, such  
diplomatic shysters who had invented most of the  
shady deals of recent years, would not trust  
anyone else. Even if their hearts & minds had  
been clean, they had the right & obligation to be as  
certain & minutely possible about the true facts of  
this offer.

But did concerned men have to suspend while  
Herbert Sonnenfeldt & Joseph Neuberst, Hilsman's  
reports, spent the long night sus parting, studying,  
analyzing & closing angles? While the common sleep?

Sudi's

Knowing of the possibility of the Turkey-missile plot  
(and being relieved it had not been used) in itself should  
have compelled some more some effort no matter how  
slight & furtive, to take an option on the deal. Before  
~~the~~ going home could not a query be sent to K. H. the  
enclaving, teletyping, ~~according~~ teletyping, decoding,  
message carrying & translation taking place  
while they slept, or would they not have phoned  
Dobrynin to slip over and pick up a little note, ~~for~~  
with his legs ~~dragging~~ riding the mechanical  
diplomatic pony express of the last half of the 20th  
century. Could not they have slept after getting  
W. from promptly or in promptly, at billet doors  
for K. H. on his awakening, ~~sending~~ simply ~~the~~  
"Dear Nikita - We understand you offer -----  
If our understanding is correct, by your get a  
deal?"

Everybody could then have gone to ~~sleep~~  
sleep, & slept ~~for~~ in peace. And they'd have

ambushed a better deal than they later needed



Scena

They forgot that by their bed-time a fourth of the  
deadline Robert Kennedy had given ~~to~~ DeBrynau  
had run out. They didn't think ~~of~~ that they were not  
~~at~~ alone <sup>with</sup> the power to impose deadlines. Nor did  
they consider their deadline worked ~~against~~ against them  
as well as for, or that there are all sorts of varieties of  
deadlines.

With the first lull break in the clouds they imagined  
the storm had passed.

So, they went home to sleep, "with a vast sense of  
relief", leaving the world in crisis - for K. did not  
know of the vastness of their relief - and he wanted  
relief, too. And they failed to catch a better deal  
than the one they soon grabbed.

PS to  
Scali

Even the question of the removal of the missiles from Cuba did not really exist, for that, for, was in Khrushchev's hands. But so far removed from the normal thought processes of diplomatically handling the U.S. government in an era when it was <sup>other</sup> manipulated by governments of their ownable leaders like monkeys in a game of "chimpanzee" that it failed to detect the niceties of the <sup>cut</sup> ~~set~~ as Khrushchev, for all his pleasant origin and lack of formal schooling was careful to observe them.

The Russian leader was careful not to impinge upon Cuban sovereignty. Like wise, whether or not he intended the missiles as defensive only, he would not either acknowledge or claim that he ran the Cuban Defense Ministry. So he did not, as he would not of a government. In the language of diplomacy, which always permits a certain amount of double-talk in both expression & interpretation, he gave the necessary assurances: he "had reason to believe," in Khrushchev's paraphrase, that Castro would "allow to be his bases." The only "force" that interested the U.S. were the missiles. <sup>best of these,</sup> again in Khrushchev's words, the "problem" would appear in a different light. <sup>of the letter meant</sup>

It depended on how the U.S. experts chose to interpret ~~these~~ passages of the letter. Khrushchev may not have intended the meaning here attributed to them. There is at least as much reason to believe he did. But whether or not he did, the fact that he might have should not have been missed by the Secretary of State, his closest advisor, his <sup>with the</sup> ~~once~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>best</sup> man. The President of the U.S. had to counsel him. They may ~~pretend~~ <sup>PRETEND TO HAVE</sup> MISSED IT.

Scoti-PS

Abel agrees with the then & subsequent U.S. line that Kennedy was always careful to leave NK an "out," to use no more force than was necessary in another formulation, or give him a good pro quo. What he does not acknowledge is that it was NK who gave this surprising victory - his out - to JFK by the manner in which he handled the situation, especially by making it possible for the young President, who he throughout had ~~not~~ but himself wanted to pretend to be making the offer & dictating the terms. The opposite was true.

As the older man knew & probably anticipated JFK had committed himself so publicly & irrevocably that any other posture for him other than that of "out" was political suicide, which he could not accept.