

Calendar Books

Burning the Clandestine At Both Ends

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.

THE LAWLESS STATE: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies, by Morton Halperin, Jerry J. Berman, Robert L. Brosgage and Christine Morwick. Penguin Books. 297 pages. Paperback.

SECRETS SPIES AND SCHOLARS: Blueprint of the Essential CIA, by Ray S. Cline. Acropolis Books Ltd. 272 pages. \$10.

Ray S. Cline, one-time deputy director of the CIA who later also headed the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, has written a limited memoir-history of his 30 years in the cold. How in the world should his book be read?

How about viewing Cline as a thoughtful insider willing to divulge limited but enlightening material to better inform the public debate on this vital issue? Okay?

Let's pick a topic to see how this approach works. And not any of those horror stories either. Cline is sick of this ravaging of the intelligence community by an irresponsible press that just concentrates on the negative and blows it out of proportion.

How about something from what Cline calls the "fabulous '50s," before CIA became something to scrawl on the wash-room wall. Say 1956. That was the year that the romantic figure of Allen Dulles, spy master of them all, toured the world in a DC6 under blackout orders but nevertheless was met and honored by heads of state and other important people who entertained him and Cline, who also went along.

It was a triumphant progress through the "free world" and well it might have been because that year the CIA pulled off what Cline calls one of its "greatest coups of all time." That was finding a text of the secret speech to the 20th Communist Party Congress in which Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin for his crimes.


CLINE SAYS THE speech was secured through non-American intermediaries "at a very handsome price." And that's not all. Cline says he made an eloquent pitch for full and quick release of the speech and eventually won out over the boys in clandestine operations. They wanted to leak it out piecemeal and generally looked at the whole thing through the covert viewpoint which Cline found at times "excessively narrow and Byzantine."

Well, as luck would have it, one can't even write about the "greatest coups of all times" without someone interjecting a note of controversy. That someone was James Angleton, who was head of counterintelligence at the time and who was involved in securing the speech. Angleton probably doesn't like being called "excessively narrow and Byzantine" any more than the next fellow.

Angleton said publicly there was no "handsome price" paid at all. And the reason the clandestine types wanted to hold up release was that they were training Eastern Europeans to help along the national uprisings that were expected after release of this speech. Well, the speech got out before they were ready.

SO THERE'S DISAGREEMENT on this point. It's rather a big point, but so what? Well, shouldn't Cline have known? If Cline, despite his high rank in the organization and his direct involvement in consideration of disposition of the speech, was kept in the dark on so important a factor, what else was kept from him and how does it flaw the book?

Why did Angleton violate the secrecy that he has spent his life maintaining on this point. Is Angleton following some "excessively narrow and Byzantine" scheme.



Ray S. Cline

This points up a difficulty with such a spy agency insider's account. There is always the nagging question of what are they really up to? Was Cline really in the dark? Is Angleton now really leveling? Deception was, after all, a way of life. What are their real purposes? What are their real views? One of the worst things Cline is willing to say about the agency is that its years of illegal domestic mail opening constituted "an error."

But Cline's book is more than reminiscence. There are recommendations on how to make things better. The CIA, for all he loves it, has become a PR liability. Drop the name, convert Langley Head-

quarters to a purely analytical and estimative agency and spread the clandestine operators out among other agencies of government "to deflect and diffuse public and journalistic curiosity . . ." If everyone is suspect no one is suspect.

The products of this new analytical agency, he says, would be more available to scholars and journalists. That's an interesting suggestion. The Nixon Administration got steamed because the folks at the Bureau of Labor Statistics were being professional about unemployment and consumer prices. What would the reaction have been if an authoritative government body began putting out information on foreign affairs and occurrences that seemed to run against Henry Kissinger's views?

THE BOOK BY HALPERIN, a former National Security Council aide to Kissinger, and others connected with the Center for National Security Studies is broader in scope and quite different in the basic conclusion it reaches. While Cline believes the intelligence community barely survived the savaging it received, Halperin, et al, believe it is democracy that barely made it.

The authors draw heavily on other published works to catalogue the horror stories, not only of the CIA, but of the FBI, of the National Security Agency, of military intelligence, even the abuses of grand juries.

Like Cline, they feel the role of clandestine operations in the gathering of intelligence is overrated. Unlike Cline, they believe it is so overrated as to be unnecessary, even obsolete, and should be abolished. Checks and balances aren't enough. The system had them and the system produced the abuses.

And the presumed dewy-eyed reformers don't seem half so dewy-eyed as Cline on the kind of measures needed to enforce changes. In calling for a greatly increased openness with the product of intelligence analysis and estimation, Cline expresses the hope that the world view thus presented would "never be distorted or suppressed for partisan political reasons."

Halperin has recently won a damage suit against Richard Nixon and others for tapping his telephone in violation of the Constitution. It took a long, hard civil legal action to establish what one kind of took for granted about the Fourth Amendment.

Perhaps that's why Halperin and his co-authors want something more concrete in the way of enforcing the changes they would make in the intelligence setup. For instance, they think anyone who uses the intelligence agencies to break the law should go to jail.