

The China Scholars and U.S. Intelligence

BEFORE ACTUALLY BOARDING AIR FORCE ONE for his February meeting with Chairman Mao, Richard Nixon will be forced to run a gauntlet of intelligence briefing sessions designed to bring him up to date on the latest Chinese developments. The cram course on contemporary China, programmed by CIA director Richard C. Helms, will range from an elementary Who's Who in the Chinese government and questions of unfamiliar proletarian protocol—e.g., What should Pat Nixon say to Mme. Mao, the militant leader of the Peking Red Guards?

—to more esoteric information not generally found in either the *New York Times* or the *Peking People's Daily* Sunday Supplement. More or less hard answers to questions like "Whatever happened to Lin Piao, Chairman Mao's ex-close-comrade-in-arms?" "What progress are Chinese rocket experts making with their long range missile systems?" "How do the factions within the People's Army and Communist Party line up in the present leadership struggle?"

In order to provide Nixon with the data he needs on this trip, Helms is able to cull the output of hundreds of mil-

by David Horowitz

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itary and civilian radio intercept operators, who listen-in on a rotating shift, round-the-clock basis to Chinese radio transmissions. Also mobilized are the battalions of cryptographers at Fort Meade, Md., trying to break Chinese military, diplomatic and commercial codes; the covert operators in such places as Hong Kong and Singapore, busily suborning Asian journalists; and, more prosaically, the dozens of linguistically trained Ph.D.'s hard at work in Langley, Va., translating Chinese telephone books. But there is another intelligence network on which Nixon will rely which is just as vital, if somewhat smaller and more loosely articulated. This is the academic phalanx of American China scholars: the once scorned and now twice-rewarded denizens of a startling variety of scholarly and semi-scholarly institutions. These range from conglomerate think tanks like the RAND Corporation, and elite centers of corporate-academic cross-fertilization like the Council on Foreign Relations to seemingly more chaste academic set-ups like the East Asian Institutes at Harvard and Columbia. But the distinctions are more apparent than real, for what we have in China studies is the clearest case yet in which the big foundations and the State Department founded, funded, nurtured and directed an entire academic field, providing at last a definitive answer to the age-old question: “Who shall educate the educators?”

[AN INTELLIGENCE WHO'S WHO]

FOLLOWING THE MC CARTHY FREEZEOUT China scholars began to come in from the cold in the early Kennedy years. Something of the origins of the American China scholar intelligence network that subsequently developed can be gleaned from a private letter written in 1962 by the head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BIR), Dr. Allen Whiting. This letter, made available by its recipient, who at that time was the head of Berkeley's Center for China Studies, aimed to recruit him to the BIR's “elite project.” Who was going to take over after Chairman Mao?, the BIR wanted to know. “Experience with post-Stalin Russia,” Whiting wrote, “has shown the importance of anticipating succession crises in communist countries and especially of understanding the significance of their outcome in terms of changes in communist policy.” American intelligence had already sifted *prima facie* evidence suggesting conflicts within the Chinese leadership. Whiting complained, however, that inadequate attention to the make-up of the factions “has left us with no firm picture of attitudes held by competing groups on such

key questions as the allocation of resources of industrial, military and agricultural development, the handling of non-communist scientists and bureaucrats, and the role of the armed forces for advancing China's goals in Asia.” The proposed project would begin to make up this deficiency in analysis and information, and “provide a foundation for ongoing research and revision in subsequent years.”

In addition to the recipient of Whiting's letter, top personnel of three of the four remaining major academic centers for studies of contemporary China: Harvard, Columbia and Michigan (including Professors John Lindbeck, Howard Boorman and Alexander Eckstein) were invited to engage in the BIR's classified projects. No academic military expert was available for the project, Whiting noted, but “this will be remedied by utilizing government personnel and by informal consultation with Mrs. Alice Hsieh of the RAND Corporation.”

Dr. Whiting is now Professor Whiting of the University of Michigan's prestigious Center for Chinese Studies. His 1962 group turned out to be a small State Department acorn which would mature into a mightier academic oak. In April 1964, Whiting represented his Bureau at an academic conference held in New York which was concerned with “Research on the Government and Politics of China.” Made possible by funds from the Ford Foundation, the Greyston Conference was intellectually sponsored by the Joint Committee on Contemporary China (JCCC), which was in effect the supreme council of contemporary academic China studies. The JCCC was itself funded by Ford through the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), two immensely influential foundation conduits. The planning of the conference was the work of Professors George E. Taylor, John M. H. Lindbeck (of the Whiting project) and A. Doak Barnett, together the first three chairmen of the JCCC. (Taylor was the head of the fifth and final major academic center, the Far Eastern Affairs Institute at the University of Washington, Seattle.)

Intended to create an ongoing academic interest in China's government and politics, the conference was presented with guidelines for research by A. M. Halpern of the RAND Corporation, a charter member of the JCCC before leaving to serve on the China project of the Council on Foreign Relations, which was subsequently to play a critical role in eventually transforming US China policy (see “The Making of America's China Policy” in RAMPARTS, October 1971). Not surprisingly, Halpern's suggested guidelines followed and extended the pattern of the Whiting project. Noting the “lack (of) a coherent theory of the present nature of the sources of power and the distribution of these sources of power among the various newly constructed institutions” in China, and the evidence that “resistance has taken place at almost all parts in this revolutionary process,” Halpern described a challenging exercise in intelligence analysis for the assembled Chinese scholars: “The indicated research problem is the determination of what the actor roles are, who occupies them, and what kinds and degrees of influence the actors have over what resources.”

After the Greyston Conference, the Joint Committee on

Contemporary China issued a Subcommittee on Chinese Government and Politics, whose mandate was to pursue and fund related topics on these problems. Berkeley Professor Robert A. Scalapino was made chairman of the committee, which included Barnett, Lindbeck and Taylor, all of whom doubled as State-Defense Department advisers and administrators of powerful university institutes at Columbia, Harvard, Seattle and Berkeley.

In the summer of 1964, a new conference was convened under sponsorship of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which had recently begun to underwrite counter-insurgency research under the rubric of small arms control. John M. H. Lindbeck chaired the conference which was designed to bring government and academic researchers together to once again address themselves to the problem. The Whiting people were there (including Whiting himself, Eckstein and Mrs. Hsieh) as was JCCC chairman George E. Taylor. One visible fruit of the encounter was a \$622,000 grant from the Arms Control Agency for a project at Columbia's East Asian Institute on "Leadership in Communist China." The Columbia Research Proposal is a virtual paraphrase of parts of the Whiting letter: "Communist China today is on the verge of an historic transitional period when the first generation of revolutionary leaders will pass from the scene. . . . There are reasons to believe that even under the seemingly monolithic leadership dominated by Mao, there has been a slow but steady development over time of significant differentiation among Communist leaders. . . ."

The Chinese leadership project and the conferences, study groups and organization associated with it, cannot in any sense be seen as a corrupted part of contemporary China studies in America's universities resulting from government intrusions into the academic field. These projects are contemporary China studies as they exist today, and as they were originally created. Put in blunter terms, the \$100 million academic field of contemporary China studies (now about a decade and a half old) was set up precisely to provide to the state such services as those Helms, Kissinger and Nixon will now be drawing on. It would not in any remotely comparable sense exist *at all* if it were not technically able or professionally willing to provide such services. This is the logical result not only of the present structure of the field, but the very history of its origins and development.

[OSS AND FULL PROFESSORS]

THE CRUCIBLE OUT OF WHICH CONTEMPORARY China studies was born, like its counterparts in other fields, was the wartime Office of Strategic Services. The OSS has been aptly described by Roger Hilsman, formerly Whiting's superior in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and now appropriately a Professor at Columbia's School of International Affairs: "When OSS, America's wartime secret intelligence service, was set up in 1941, one of the basic ideas behind it was the novel and almost impish thought that scholars could in some respects take the place of spies." (*Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*)

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the war was emphasized to a congressional committee in 1952 by Dean Rusk, then president of the Rockefeller Foundation, one of the key agencies responsible for the postwar development of international studies:

"In 1941 and 1942, when I was in the Military Intelligence . . . there came a point where it was of the greatest importance for us to encourage concentrated attention on what was then called the weird languages, such languages as Indonesian, Burmese, some of the Indian dialects, some of the languages of Indochina. . . . I doubt, for example, that up until a year ago there were more than a half dozen Americans in the entire country who knew very much about Indochina, and there were perhaps not a dozen who had much of a knowledge of a country like Indonesia, except businessmen who might have been established in plantations rather isolated and remote from the great stream of Indonesian life. So, we have attached considerable importance to these area studies [i.e., the postwar university programs funded by the Rockefeller Foundation]."

Into the wartime gap in the government's knowledge of "weird languages" and areas were thrust the existing academic experts and available research institutions. Speaking as a former military intelligence officer with responsibility for the Pacific islands, Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, and Burma, Rusk noted the "desert of information" about the areas at the time and recalled that in this situation "the intelligence agencies of the government had leaned heavily on the Institute for Pacific Relations." This institute had been created principally with Rockefeller Funds in 1925, and for the next quarter of a century was the center of organized research in the Far East. Drafted for military service when the Pacific war erupted, it performed its professional best, and in 1945 received the Navy Certificate of Achievement for providing intelligence on the Pacific Theater of Operations. The IPR also provided agents and operatives to the government services. These included the pioneers of the postwar area studies programs, including Harvard's John King Fairbank, his wartime boss George E. Taylor, his co-organizer of area studies at Harvard, Edwin O. Reischauer, and John M. H. Lindbeck.

While the handful of academic mandarins with a knowledge of foreign areas and the proper elite connections were running the OSS and the Office of War Information, steps were taken to develop crash programs for military personnel in Dean Rusk's "weird languages." After the war, this military-trained language group eventually provided the vast majority of second-generation academic scholars in the field.

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Indeed, the war was hardly over when a concerted effort was launched to create an academic infrastructure embracing the concept of strategic area studies found to be so useful in the conflict. A major promoter of this effort was the Council on Foreign Relations (then headed by sometime CIA director Allen Dulles), which organized a series of six regional conferences in 1946 on “teaching and research in international relations.”

Resistance to the new “area studies” concept in the traditional academic faculties, however, was very strong. University studies in Chinese, at the time, were mainly confined to philology, literature and ancient history and were carried on by isolated individuals in a handful of departments of “Oriental Languages.” An academic specialty in the Chinese or Russian “area” would have been incomprehensible to most of these scholars. The State, intelligence, and military agencies of the government may have experienced needs for “area experts” during the War, but few self-respecting academic departments could relate to such a policy-generated intellectual category. Since experience had shown that to override academic prerogatives and revolutionize existing academic departments from within was virtually impossible, it was necessary to create a whole new institutional complex as a base from which to overpower the traditional university and make it responsive to the research needs and training imperatives of an imperial world strategy. This was accomplished by a massive intervention on the part of the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations (later joined by Ford) and their satellite creations, the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council.

The role of these foundations in creating institutes of Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese Studies can hardly be underestimated, since there was neither money nor enthusiasm for the new development within the universities themselves. In the words of the US Office of Education Report on Language and Area Centers:

“It must be noted that the significance of the money (granted for these programs) is out of all proportion to the amounts involved since most universities would have no center program had they not been subsidized. Our individual inventories indicate clearly the lack of enthusiasm as well as of cash on the part of most college administrations for such programs.”

As for the faculties, those traditional departments which failed to go along with the new developments—particularly in the Oriental field—were shunted aside and left to wither for lack of funds.

[MC CARTHY'S CHINA WAR]

WHILE SLAVIC STUDIES WERE PUSHED FORWARD in ambitious programs funded by the foundations, intelligence and military agencies all working harmoniously in the “bi-partisan” atmosphere of the day, the development of China studies suffered a paralyzing blow, as a result of the schism over official policy, which revolved around the demagogic figure of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. In 1950, less than a year after the victory of the Chinese Revolution, banner headlines announced that Owen Lattimore, one of the most prestigious China scholars in the country, had been identified by Senator McCarthy as the chief Soviet agent in America. The Institute for Pacific Relations, which had been drawn on so heavily for policy advice and information, was already under assault by the McCarran Committee, and in the controversy that ensued was to receive its death-blow. (The Rockefeller Foundation withdrew its funding in 1952.)

In the critical events surrounding the McCarran and McCarthy investigations, the mandarins of the China service and the China institutes revealed themselves as partisans in the split. In the polemics of the witchhunt, as in the internal government debates over China policy, George E. Taylor and John King Fairbank, for example, who had worked together in the OSS, in the Office of War Information (OWI), at the State Department, and in the fraternity of professional academic China scholars, came out on opposite sides of the political fence. Taylor's aggressive role as a McCarthy partisan in the witchhunt, which destroyed the careers of more than a few of the country's most notable China experts, would long be remembered by those colleagues who remained to bear witness.

Fairbank, who had himself been named as a communist and denied it under oath, cut a weak figure by contrast. “I am a loyal American,” he assured the witchhunters, and—as if that were not enough to appease them—a capitalist as well: “I am engaged in one form of American free enterprise. My university is a private American corporation....” But Fairbank's pleas for rationality on the part of the House Committee and his previous service to American state policy in Asia were of no avail, and by an irony which may have amused his opponents in the bureaucracies of Moscow and Peking, this enthusiastic servant of American power was condemned by McCarthyism to years of exile as a mere academic at Harvard. So vindictively effective was Fairbank's banishment from Washington that as late as 1965, when invited to an advisory session with State Department officials, he was prevented from actually entering the State Department offices and was forced to meet officials in an apartment thoughtfully provided by John D. Rockefeller IV.

Fairbank's “banishment” to Harvard underscores the crucial point in understanding the McCarthy attack on the China field, namely, that it was not, as is often implied, an invasion of the academic enclave by political forces, so much as an *intra-bureaucratic struggle within the government*, and specifically within those agencies of the state charged with responsibility for China policy. The principal

targets of the assault were deeply and officially involved in the making of US China policy. Ranged on one side of the dispute were policy officials like Ambassador Bullitt who wanted a larger military and economic intervention in behalf of Chiang, and on the other side those like Fairbank and Lattimore (a State Dept. adviser) who argued that no amount of military and economic aid to Chiang could save his regime, and that such aid as was sent—while US policy was tied to his regime—“plays into communist hands.”

That some of the State Department experts attacked by McCarthy were also professors explains how intellectual issues became involved; but they were attacked because they were intelligence agents and policymakers during an unsuccessful intervention in an epoch-making civil war, not because they happened to have eccentric or unorthodox ideas on modern China.

[THE CHINA STUDIES SCHISM]

AFTER THE MCCARTHY PURGES, Fairbank and Taylor were the only two significant China experts to survive and retain positions of power in the university. In the ensuing years, Fairbank swung right with the political tides and applied his considerable administrative and entrepreneurial skills to the development of a new generation of China scholars, for whom he became a kind of guardian sponsor and promoter. While Washington remained off-limits to him, Harvard was itself a veritable center of intelligence and other governmental activities and Fairbank was not neglected by the more sophisticated wings of the corporate elite. In 1955, he was able to set up an East Asian Research Center at Harvard with several hundred thousand dollars from Ford and Carnegie for studies of China's present-day economy and politics. When in 1958 he was elected president of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS), it was an accurate recognition of his influence and standing in the China field.

While Fairbank was building up a wide academic following, and staffing the Oriental departments of the major universities with his students, George Taylor was creating an important center of Chinese studies in Seattle, built around scholars like Karl Wittfogel. Taylor's pro-McCarthy sympathies insulated him from the Washington cold. He was able to render such services as lecturing at the Air War and Army War Colleges and acting as an official US delegate to SEATO in 1957. On the other hand, because of his role in the McCarthy hearings and his right-wing views, Taylor was isolated from his academic colleagues in the major centers of higher learning across the country.

This situation created a serious problem in the organization of China expertise from a long-range planning point of view. The most powerful administrative figure in academic China studies was, despite his continuing loyalty to the flag and the free enterprise system, *persona non grata* in Washington and was tarred with a reputation (somewhat unjust in view of his more recent attitudes) of being soft on communism and Mao; his principal counterpart, who was welcome in government circles, was *persona non grata* in the academic profession and also overcommitted to Chiang

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from a long-range perspective. Fairbank and Taylor represented, in short, the political exhaustion of a generation. If they joined hands in a gesture of unity however, they could pave the way for a new alignment of forces in the China field. It was increasingly urgent, from a US policy point of view, to heal the breach and forestall possible new splits over the charged issue of China policy. Such a peace was needed to re-establish intelligence channels from the government to academia. The cooperation of these two professors—Fairbank in particular—was essential, moreover, on the academic side in making the effort a success. But Taylor and Fairbank could not themselves be on the steering committee, as it were, within the foreign policy elite; they could not be the key operatives moving between government, foundation and campus in setting up the new networks and structures. That was a role for men less identified with the bitter policy struggles of the past, less vulnerable to attack from political dissidents, but thoroughly integrated into the CFR policy elite: A. Doak Barnett and John M. H. Lindbeck, for example.

[ORGANIZING A FIELD]

BORN IN CHINA, A. DOAK BARNETT was the son of a missionary who rose in the YMCA hierarchy to become the senior secretary of the International Commission for China. Almost fifteen years younger than the Fairbank-Taylor-Lattimore group, Barnett was not involved in the China policy debacle, although his older brother Robert was a member of IPR and a career officer in the State Department at the time. After receiving an M.A. in political science from Yale in 1947, Doak Barnett went to China and the Far East as a correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News* and a fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs. In 1949 his brother was put in charge of Western European economic affairs and the following year Doak joined the Economic Cooperation Administration, then headed by Paul G. Hoffman (who went on to Ford and the CIA, and of Bay of Pigs fame). In 1952 Barnett returned to the Far East as a public affairs officer attached to the US consulate in Hong Kong and spent another two years there as an associate of the American Universities Field Staff. In 1956, in a step which augured things to come, he joined his brother in the State Department as head of the department of foreign area studies at the Foreign Service Institute. The following year, he was called on by the Council on Foreign Relations to head the first CFR study group on China policy since the revolution.



Illustration by Jim McConnell

The CFR study group on "Communist China and United States Policy in Asia," which met during 1958 and 1959, included such figures as Robert R. Bowie, who had been a special adviser to John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner in Germany and had just completed terms as Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department (1953-55) and Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (1955-57), Major General Paul W. Caraway, Assistant Chief of Staff, Far Eastern Command (1956-57), and currently a member of the joint strategic survey council of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, William Hollister, CIA, and Dean Rusk, then president of the Rockefeller Foundation. Also present were Richard L. Walker, C. Martin Wilbur, head of Columbia's East Asian Institute, and John M. H. Lindbeck.

The pivotal significance of the CFR study group on China, which resulted in a large volume by group director Barnett (*Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy*), can best be seen in the events that followed. In 1959 the AAS's Advisory Committee on Research and Development (chairman: William Lockwood, CFR) appointed a special three-man committee headed by AAS President John Fairbank, and including C. Martin Wilbur, to organize a Ford-funded meeting of China scholars at Gould House to discuss the future of China studies, the possible investment of large funds, and the creation of a committee (eventually the JCCC) to centralize standards, and inevitably directions, for the field. Present at the conference from the academic side were sixteen China scholars, including Fairbank, Lockwood, Boorman and Pye of the CFR, and from the study group itself, Richard Walker, C. Martin Wilbur and John M. H. Lindbeck. RAND had one representative present, A. M. Halpern, the State Department had one, and the Ford Foundation had a team of four, which included a new "program associate": A. Doak Barnett.

Barnett was not just one of several Ford representatives at Gould House. Together with John B. Howard (CFR, Director of International Training and Research at Ford and previously a regional planning adviser in the State Department), who was also present at Gould House, Barnett subsequently "drew up [the] memoranda on research and training on China for action by the trustees of the Ford Foundation." The action then taken by Ford on the basis of these memoranda was on a scale, for a specific field, without parallel in the history of educational investment. "In this decade (1959-1969) the Ford Foundation expended about \$28 million in the United States and \$2.5 million abroad to achieve the objectives it set itself in 1959."

While the Ford money was the critical factor in creating the structures and setting the directions of the field, financially speaking it was just the beginning. Universities are estimated to have spent another \$15 to \$20 million during the decade in support of the foundation-sponsored projects in the China field. To this can be added \$15 million in NDEA funds for language training, and another \$8 million from "other governmental and private agencies" for research generally of a policy-oriented character. In short, about \$70 million (and estimates less conservative than these run as high as \$100 million) was expended in a single

decade on a field so small that at the beginning of the period in question there were only 100 graduate students in it in the entire country. In the circumstances it is probably futile to speculate on the extent to which the funds (and their controllers) exerted an influence on the direction of China studies, the kind of research undertaken, and the political and methodological biases promoted simply because there is probably no limit, or one so minor as to be insignificant.

According to George Taylor's history of the JCCC, the Ford Foundation made two key structural decisions in funding the field:

"Of crucial importance was the Foundation's decision to support a scholarly committee, not necessarily a committee of the Councils, in order to help plan, organize, coordinate, advise, and stimulate activities on a national level. This the Foundation has done, and the [JCCC] has indeed played a major role in helping to achieve those objectives listed in the Foundation's program with which it agreed. . . . The second major objective, which was to support the development of training and research programs at the universities, was carried out by the Foundation itself. Primary attention was given to developing programs at four universities which had strength in both Chinese and Russian studies—Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley, and the University of Washington. . . ."

While the JCCC and its spin-off committees provided an essential means for coordinating research at the national level, the bulk of funds and the principal bases of influence were lodged in the four privileged university institutes, particularly the largest and most prestigious of these, Harvard and Columbia.

Accordingly, in 1961, Doak Barnett left Ford to become a full professor of political science at Columbia and chairman of the Contemporary China Studies Committee there. As head of contemporary China studies at Columbia, Barnett had as many as 50 graduate students working under him at a single time. Combined with his access to Ford funds and his entree to the upper circles in Washington and New York, this would have enabled Barnett to wield unusual power in any academic field. But in Chinese area studies, which had only 700 graduate students by the end of the decade, Barnett's position was virtually unique. He utilized this power to develop a research and training program strongly directed toward US policy and intelligence needs and to advance students with a clear service orientation to positions of academic responsibility and power.

[MAKING THE CONNECTIONS]

BARNETT'S LEAP FROM FORD TO COLUMBIA was an impressive one for a man with little academic background and no Ph.D. or scholarly publication to speak of, but then Ford eased the passage with a \$1 million endowment to create a chair especially for the occasion. The administrative authorities at the university, President Grayson Kirk and Schuyler Wallace, themselves important members of the Council on Foreign Relations elite, were more than understanding. In that same year, Barnett became a member of the new Commit-

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tee on the Economy of China, an important spin-off from the JCCC, and in 1963, continuing his disdain for intermediate steps, he became a member and chairman of the JCCC at the same time. There he joined his colleague in the Council on Foreign Relations, John Lindbeck.

In the interim, Lindbeck and Barnett had played roles of such perfect complementarity and (in terms of academic tradition) strong improbability that it would be surprising if they were not planned that way. In contrast to Barnett, Lindbeck possessed a doctorate in divinity and academic experience, beginning as a lecturer at the Princeton School of Military Government and advancing to an assistant professorship at Yale before going to the State Department in 1950. But nothing in his performance prior to the Council on Foreign Relations study group in 1958 would have suggested the instant academic eminence in store for him during the Ford decade. Lindbeck began his second academic career in 1958 as Deputy Director of the Research Project on Men and Politics in Modern China, headed by CFR member, former State Department officer (and Whiting Project associate) Howard L. Boorman.

In 1959, as Barnett moved to Ford to set up the China program, Lindbeck left Columbia to become Associate Director of Harvard's East Asian Research Center, and a charter member of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China. It was not only in the choice of institutions that the complementarity of the two careers manifested itself, but in the functional roles as well. Lindbeck made no attempt to assemble at Harvard the kind of student following (or cadres in training) that Barnett was to forge at Columbia. Lindbeck probably did not have the talents to fill such a role in any case; in a full decade at the top of his field, he did not even make the pretense of an intellectual contribution. But he did have a talent for administration and liaison, and it was as the “academic” link man in contemporary China studies that Lindbeck's career ultimately establishes its contours.

In 1966 Fairbank explained:

“Since 1959, Dr. John M.H. Lindbeck, as associate director of this center, while participating in instruction at Harvard, has carried the main burden of contact with government agencies and, in large part, with the foundations and the national committees they support.”

Four years later, at Lindbeck's funeral, this was the principal if not the sole theme of the eulogists' remarks:

“There is no other individual who played as important, seminal, or decisive a role in the development of Chinese studies during the last decade. Whatever activity, what-

ever development, whatever committee or endeavor concerned with the advancement of Chinese studies in the last ten years, John was there, John was involved, and he made his influence felt. He was one of the founders and builders of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China and guided it as chairman from 1964 until very recently. He was one of the founders and the guiding force behind the Universities Service Center in Hong Kong. The same can be said of the Liaison Committee on Contemporary China through which the development of Chinese studies in the United States was brought into much more intimate contact with that in Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and several other countries. He was also there at the birth of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on US-China Relations. He served as chairman of the former and as vice president of the latter. . . . His advice was sought by our government and by a number of foundations. His latest and very significant contribution was to the Ford Foundation for which he just completed a worldwide survey of the state of modern and contemporary Chinese studies.”

This account was seconded by Barnett: “John's special genius, . . . was a leader, organizer, and administrator of research and teaching programs.” And Fairbank: “When historians eventually get around to studying the record of these years, they will find that John Lindbeck was at the center of the planning, negotiation, and persistent effort that produced a whole series of new institutions and activities to serve the profession.” All this time, Lindbeck never lost contact with his old milieu in Washington and in the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1959 he served as a formal consultant to RAND, from 1961 to the Institute for Defense Analysis, and from 1963 to the State Department. In 1967, when Barnett left his academic position to go to Brookings, his successor as Director of Columbia's East Asian Institute was John M. H. Lindbeck.

The preeminent position of Barnett and Lindbeck, who walked out of the State Department and into the commanding positions of the academic contemporary China field, and who for eight critical years provided the key contacts between funding sources, academic projects and government agencies, and who played pivotal roles in creating new centralizing academic structures and in setting new national research priorities, would almost suffice in itself to explain the deflection of the field from any scholarly intellectual purpose in this period to one of dedicated government service.

But there is a danger in focusing on these individuals and overlooking the structural sources of their power and influence.

For the very structure of administration and innovation in the university, as revealed in this sequence of events, is firmly controlled by the network of CFR, foundation and corporate interests whose long-term dominance of the foreign policy machinery of the American state is equally a matter of historical record.

Nor, in the light of this history, can the subordination of the academic mind to *raison d'etat* be regarded as the result of an intrusion of external forces into an otherwise schol-

arly sanctuary. On the contrary, it is scholarly interests and values that must intrude where and as they can into what is pervasively and traditionally a government and corporate preserve. For the research methods and problems, the avenues to prestige and success in *academic* terms, are all defined in the area of international studies by agencies and institutions dominated by these interests.

[WHAT'S TO BE DONE]

AT THIS POINT THE QUESTION NATURALLY arises as to whether anything short of a social revolution could change the situation to the advantage of those values of "disinterested scholarship" which provide the self-justifying rationale for the academic profession. The Asian field has been rocked more than most by the Vietnam war, and as a result is the only one in which the "radical caucus" has been organized as an independent association, calling itself the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. In 1969, a classical Chinese scholar at New York University, Professor Moss Roberts, in conjunction with the Columbia chapter of CCAS, began to probe the connections between the JCCC, the military and the academic China field. The preliminary results of their investigations were presented to the national convention of CCAS in 1970, in a document that has since become known as the "Columbia Report." The following May it was presented in an amplified version to the Association of Asian Studies itself.

At the AAS meeting, Professor Roberts introduced a resolution calling for the creation of a standing committee to investigate the JCCC, the SSRC and the Ford Foundation with reference to the problem of government-academic liaison. The Columbia Report had been already denounced at the convention by John King Fairbank, who compared the proposed professional investigation to the McCarran witchhunt of the IPR. Fairbank's analogy was so far-fetched that, while only a handful of professors thought it wise to oppose him publicly (Fairbank's control of patronage in what is still a relatively small field is enormous), the meeting nevertheless voted to refer the resolution to the AAS Executive for action.

Here the difficulties of working within the profession for its reform became apparent. Although the AAS is the largest and most prestigious body in the Asian field, it has virtually no funds, meets only once a year and lacks the cohesiveness, let alone the self-conception, to act as a political force. For these reasons it played a role of virtually no importance in the creation and shaping of the contemporary China field, and the same reasons made it a weak instrument for rectifying the results of the process.

In the nine months that have elapsed since the AAS voted in favor of the Roberts-CCAS resolution, no AAS investigation has taken place. Not even the standing committee to conduct such an inquiry has been appointed. Instead, after six months of inaction, the AAS Executive appointed a committee to advise it on the propriety of the Roberts Resolution. Then in November 1971, the AAS Board by majority vote decided that the proposed inquiry was outside the

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"constitutional jurisdiction" of the AAS, and should not be conducted.

At first glance this seemed to be a peculiar decision for the governing body of the Association of Asian Studies to make. For, evidently, it was denying to itself the principal function of a professional association: to establish and enforce the standards and ethical guidelines under which its members could claim status as professionals. If the AAS was not the proper agency to conduct inquiries into ethical relationships in the field, and to render such judgments, what agency was?

A second glance, however, showed that this was not strange at all. For the Asian studies establishment that was powered by the prestige and influence afforded by institutes, foundations and government agencies was not different from the Asian studies establishment represented on the board of the AAS. To pick a symbolic figure: the president of the AAS, whose Executive dismissed the Roberts Resolution was C. Martin Wilbur, a central actor in the whole contemporary China studies sequence. A representative figure among the scholars in the OSS and the State Department in the early days, he was a member of the key CFR committee with Barnett and Lindbeck, an organizer of the Gould House Conference, the sponsor of Barnett at Columbia (as Director of the East Asian Institute) and a charter member of the JCCC.

If the action of the AAS Board was a foregone conclusion, however, the real struggle remained. In March, the AAS will have its annual meeting in New York. The *CCAS Journal* has recently published a special supplement—*Modern China Studies: How the Foundations Bought a Field*—which has been distributed to all AAS members. Professor Roberts has meanwhile expressed the determination of his CCAS group to continue the effort to create a committee on research organization and funding of the China field, as a first stage in promoting scholarly control of the means of scholarly production. Whether the March AAS meeting will mark the beginning—however modest—of the disengagement and withdrawal of the academic troops from the imperial quagmire remains to be seen. But one thing is certain. As in Vietnam, the way out is not to be found by going further in; if the Asian scholars do not act this year to restore integrity and scholarly purpose to their field, they will face an even greater and more daunting task tomorrow.

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