C.I.A.: Maker of Policy, or Tool?

Survey Finds Widely Feared Agency Is Tightly Controlled

Following is the first of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other members of the Times staff. 425166

Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, April 24-One day in 1960 am agent of the Central Intelligence Agency caught a plane in Tokyo, flew to Singapore and checked into a hotel room in time to receive a visitor. The agent plugged a neighbors about the agency and invasion of Cuba, spied and lie detector into an overloaded enhancing his own political po-counterspied, established airelectrical circuit and blew out sition. the lights in the building.

lowed, the agent and a C.I.A. to tell a lie in public and then the control of its supposed policolleague were arrested and to admit the lie even more pub- tical master? jailed as American spies.

The result was an international incident that infurtated closed than a world predisposed national interest? Could it spend London, not once but twice. It to suspicion of the C.I.A. and huge sums for ransoms, bribes embarrassed an American Am-unaware of what really had and subversion without check bassador. It led an American happened in Singapore five or regard for the consequences? Secretary of State to write a years earlier began to repeat of the consequences? rare letter of apology to a for- questions that have dogged the eign Chief of State.

leader was handed an opportu- years: nity to denounce the perfidy of "Twas this secret body, which the President?" all Americans and of the C.I.A. was known to have overthrown in particular, thus increasing governments

The Central Intelligence Agency, which does not often appear in the news, made headlines on two counts in recent days. The agency was found to have interceded in the slander trial of one of its agents in an effort to obtain his exoneration without explanation except that he had done its bidding in the interests of national security. And it was reported to have planted at least five agents among Michigan State University scholars engaged in a foreign aid project some years ago in Vietnam. Although the specific work of these agents and the circumstances of their employment are in dispute, reports of their activities have raised many questions about the purposes and methods of the C.I.A., and about its relationship to other parts of the Government and nongovernmental institutions. Even larger questions about control of the C.I.A. within the framework of a free government and about its role in foreign affairs are periodically brought up in Congress and among other governments. To provide background for these questions, and to determine what issues of public policy are posed by the agency's work, The New York Times has spent several months looking into its affairs. This series is the result.

In the investigation that fol- the United States Government and businesses, running out of licly.

The lie was no sooner disintelligence agency and the Five years later that foreign United States Government for

and installed the apprehension of his Oriental others, raised armies, staged an Continued on Page 20, Column 1

lines, radio stations and schools Ultimately, the incident led and supported books, magazines

> ¶Was it in fact damaging, while it sought to advance, the

¶Did it lie to or influence the political leaders of the United States to such an extent that it really was an "invisible government" more powerful than even

These are questions constant-

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

ly asked around the world. Some of them were raised again recently when it was disclosed that Michigan State University was the cover for some C.I.A. agents in South Vietnam during a multimillion-dollar technical assistance program the university conducted for the regime of the late President Ngo Dinh

Last week, it also became known that an Estonian refugee who was being sued for slander in a Federal District Court in Baltimore was resting his de-fense on the fact that the al-leged slander had been committed in the course of his duties as a C.I.A. agent. In a public memorandum ad-

dressed to the court, the C.I.A. stated that it had ordered the agent, Juri Raus, to disclose no further details of the case, in order to protect the nation's order to protect the nation's foreign intelligence apparatus. Mr. Raus is claiming complete legal immunity from the suit on the grounds that he had acted as an official agent of the Federal Government.

Such incidents, bringing the activities of the C.I.A. into dim and often dismaying public view, have caused members of Congress and many publications to question ever more persistently the role and propriety of one of Washington's most discussed and least understood institutions. Some of the misgivings have been shared by at least

two American President, Harry S. Truman and John F. Ken-

A Wide Examination

To seek reliable answers to

these questions; to sift, where possible, fact from fancy and theory from condition; to deter-mine what real questions of public policy and international relations are posed by the exist-ence and operations of the C.I.A., The New York Times has compiled information and opinions from informed Ameri-

opinions from informed Americans throughout the world.

It has obtained reports from 20 foreign correspondents and editors with recent service in more than 35 countries and from reporters in Washington who interviewed more than 50 present and former Cayernand for Cayernand former Cayernand for Cayerna present and former Govern-ment officials, members of Con-

gress and military officers.
This study, carried out over several months, disclosed, for instance, that the Singapore affair resulted not from a lack or political control or from reck-lessness by the C.I.A., but from bad fortune and diplomatic

bad fortune and diplomatic blundering.

It found that the C.I.A., for all its fearsome reputation, is under far more stringent political and budgetary control than most of its critics know or concede, and that since the Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba in 1961 these controls have been tightly exercised.

The consensus of those inter-

The consensus of those inter-viewed was that the critics' favorite recommendation for a stronger rein on the agency— a Congressional committee to oversee the C.I.A.—would prob-ably provide little more real control than now exists and might both restrict the agency's effectiveness and actually shield it from those who desire more knowledge about its operations.

A Matter of Will

Other important conclusions of the study include the follow-

qWhile the institutional forms of political control appear ef-fective and sufficient, it is really the will of the political officials who must exert control that is important and that has most

often been lacking.
¶Even when control is tight and effective, a more important question may concern the extent to which C.I.A. information and policy judgments affect political

decisions in foreign affairs.

¶Whether or not political control is being exercised, the more serious question is whether the very existence of an efficient C.I.A. causes the United States G.L.A. causes the United States Government to rely too much on clandestine and illicit activities, back-alley tactics, subversion and what is known in official jargon as "dirty tricks."

¶Finally, regardless of the facts, the C.I.A.'s reputation in the world is so horrendous and its role in events so exaggerated that it is becoming a burden on American foreign policy, rather that the secret weapon it was intended to be. The Singapore incident, with

its bizarre repercussions five years later, is an excellent lesson in how that has happened, al-though none of the fears of the critics are justified by the facts

of the particular case.

Problem in Singapore

The ill-fated agent who blew The ill-fated agent who blew out the lights flew from Tokyo to Singapore only after a prolonged argument inside the C.I.A. Singapore, a strategic Asian port with a large Chinese population, was soon to get its independence from Britain and enter the Malaysian Federation. enter the Malaysian Federation. Should C.I.A. recruit some well-placed spies, or should it, as before, rely on MI-6, the British secret service, and on Britain's ability to maintain good relations and good sources in Singanore? pore?

Allen W. Dulles, then the C.I.A.'s director, decided to infiltrate the city with its own agents, to make sure that the British were sharing everything they knew. Although the decision was disputed, it is not unsure that the state of the control o common in any intelligence serv-

ice to bypass or double-check on

ice to bypass or double-check on an ally.

(On Vice President Humphrey's visit late last year to the capitals of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, Secret Service agents found at least three "bugs," or listening devices, hidden in his private quarters by one of his hosts.)

I The agent who flew from

The agent who flew from Tokyo to Singapore was on a recruiting mission, and the lie detector, an instrument used by the C.I.A. on its own employes, was intended to test the relia-

bility of a local candidate for a spy's job.

When the machine shorted out the lights in the hotel, the visiting agent, the would-be spy and another C.I.A. man were discovered. They wound up in a Singapore jail. There they were reported to have been "tortured" either for real, or to extract a, ransom.

The Price Was High

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Secret discussions—apparently through C.I.A. channels—
were held about the possibility
of buying the agents' freedom
with increased American foreign aid, but Washington evenmally decided Singapore's price
was too high. The men were
subsequently released.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk
—the Kennedy Administration
had succeeded to office in January, 1961—wrote a formal apology to Premier Lee Kuan Yew
of Singapore and promised to
discipline the culprits.

That appeared to have ended
the matter until last fall, when
Premier Lee broke away from
the Malaysian Federation and
sought to establish himself for

sought to establish himself for political reasons as more nearly a friend of Britain than of the United States, although his anti-Americanism was short of pro-Communism.

To help achieve this purpose, Mr. Lee disclosed the 1960 "affront" without giving any details, except to say that he had been offered a paltry \$3.3-million bribe when he had demanded \$33-million \$33-million.

I The State Department, which lad been routinely fed a denial of wrongdoing by C.I.A. officials who did not know of the Rusk apology, described the charge as laise. Mr. Lee then published Mr. Rusk's letter of 1961 and threatened also to play some interesting tape recordings for

the press.

Hastily, Washington confessed
—not to the bribe offer, which
is holly denied by all officials
connected with the incident, or to the incident itself, but to having done something that had

merited an apology.

[London, infuriated in the first instance by what it considered the C.I.A.'s mistrust of MI-6, now fumed a second time about clumsy tactics in Washington.

Acting on Orders

Errors of bureaucracy and mishaps of chance can easily be found in the Singapore incident, but critics of the C.I.A. cannot easily find in it proof of the charges so often raised about the agency—"control," "making policy," and "undermining policy."

The agent in Singapore was acting on direct orders from Washington. His superiors in the C.I.A. were acting within the directives of the President and the National Security Coun-cil. The mission was not contrary to American foreign pol-icy, was not undertaken to change or subvert that policy, and was not dangerously fool-hardy. It was not much more than routine—and would not have been unusual in any in-

have been unusual in any in-telligence service in the world. Nevertheless, the Sinagpore incident—the details of which have been shrouded in the C.I.A.'s enforced secrecy—add-ed greatly to the rising tide of dark suspicion that many people throughout the world, including many in this country, harbor about the agency and its activi-ties.

ties.
Carl Rowan, the former director of the United States Inrector of the United States In-formation Agency and former Ambassador to Finland, wrote last year in his syndicated col-umn that "during a recent tour of East Africa and Southeast Asia, it was made clear to me that suspicion and fear of the C.I.A. has become a sort of Achilles heel of American for-eign policy."

Achiles neer of American for-eign policy."

President Sukarno of Indo-nesia, Prince Norodom Siha-nouk, Cambodia's Chief of State, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, former President Kwame

Nkrumah of Ghana and many other leaders have repeatedly insisted that behind the regular American government there is an "invisible government," the C.I.A., threatening them all with infiltration, subversion and even war. Communist China and the Soviet Union sound this theme endlessly.

"The Invisible Government" was the phrase applied to American intelligence agencies, and particularly the C.I.A., in a book of that title by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. It was a best-seller in the United States and among many government officials abroad.

Subject of Humor

Subject of Humor

So prevalent is the C.I.A. reputation of menace in so much of the world that even humorists have taken note of it. The New Yorker magazine last December printed a cartoon showing two natives of an unspecified country watching a vocano erupt. One native is saying to the other: "The C.I.A. did it. Pass the word."

In Southeast Asia, even the most rational leaders are said to be ready to believe anything about the C.I.A.

"Like Dorothy Parker and the things she said," one observer notes, "the C.I.A. gets credit or

nings she said," one observer notes, "the C.I.A. gets credit or blame both for what it does and for many things it has not even thought of doing."

Many earnest Americans, too, are bitter critics of the C.I.A. Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, has charged that the agency "is making foreign policy and in so doing is assuming the roles of President and Congress." He has introduced a proposal to create a special Foreign Relations subcommittee to make a "full and complete" study of the effects of C.I.A. operations on United States foreign relations.

Senator Stephen M. Young, Democrat of Ohio, has proposed that à joint Senate-House committee oversee the C.I.A. be-

that a joint Senate-House committee oversee the C.I.A. be-cause, "wrapped in a cloak of secrecy, the C.I.A. has, in effect, been making foreign policy." Mayor Lindsay of New York, while a Republican member of Congress, indicted the C.I.A. on the House floor for a long series

the House floor for a long series of fiascos, including the most

of fiascos, including the most famous blunder in recent American history—the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

Former President Harry S. Truman, whose Administration established the C.I.A. in 1947, said in 1963 that by then he saw "something about the way the C.I.A. has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our is casting a shadow over our historic positions, and I feel that we need to correct it."

Kennedy's Bitterness

And President Kennedy, the enormity of the Bay of Pigs disaster came home to him, said to one of the highest officials of his Administration that he wanted "to splinter the C.I.A. in a thousand pieces and scatter athousand piece

Even some who defend the C.I.A. as the indispensable eyes and ears of the Government for example Allen Dulles, the agency's most famous director now fear that the cumulative criticism and suspicion, at home and abroad, have impaired the CI.A.'s effectiveness and there-

fore the nation's safety.

They are anxious to see the criticisms answered and the suspicions allayed, even if—in some cases—the agency should thus become more exposed to domestic politics and to compromises

tic politics and to compromises of security.

"If the establishment of a Congressional committee with responsibility for intelligence would quiet public fears and restore public confidence in the C.I.A.," Mr. Dulles said in an interview, "then I now think it would be worth doing despite some of the problems it would cause the agency."

some or the problems it would cause the agency."

Because this view is shared in varying degree by numerous friends of the C.I.A. and because its critics are virtually unanimous in calling for more "control," most students of the problem beye looked to Congress for

trol," most students of the prob-lem have looked to Congress for a remedy.

In the 19 years that the C.I.A. has been in existence, 150 resolutions for tighter Congres-sional control have been intro-duced—and-put aside. The stat-istic in itself is evidence of widespread uneasiness about the C.I.A. and of how little is known

C.I.A. and of how little is known about the agency.

For the truth is that despite the C.I.A.'s international reputation, few persons in or out of

the American Government know much about its work, its organization, its supervision or its re-lationship to the other arms of

lationship to the other arms of the executive branch.

A former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for in-stance, had no idea how big the C.I.A. budget was. A Senator, experienced in foreign affairs, proved, in an interview, to know very little about but to feer

proved, in an interview, to know very little about, but to fear very much, its operations.

Many critics do not know that virtually all C.I.A. expenditures must be authorized in advance—first by an Administration committee that includes some of the highest-ranking political officials and White House staff assistants, then by officials in the Bureau of the Budget, who have the power to rule out or have the power to rule out or have the power to rule out or reduce an expenditure.

They do not know that, instead of a blank check, the C.I.A. has an annual budget of a little more than \$500-million only one-sixth the \$3-billion the Government spends on its over-all intelligence effort. The Na-tional Security Agency, a cryptographic and code-breaking operation run by the Defense Department, and almost never questioned by outsiders, spends twice as much as the C.I.A.

The critics shrug aside the fact that President Kennedy, after the most rigorous inquiry into the agency's affairs, methods and problems after the Paylods and prob

into the agency's affairs, methods and problems after the Bay of Pigs, did not "splinter" it after all and did not recommend Congressional supervision.

They may be unaware that since then supervision of intelligence activities has been tightened. When President Eisenhower wrote a letter to all Ambassadors placing them in charge of all American activities in their did all American activities in their of all American activities in their countries, he followed it with a secret letter specifically exempt-ing the C.I.A.; but when Presi-dent Kennedy put the Ambassadent Kennedy put the Ambassa-dors in command of all activi-ties, he sent a secret letter spe-difically including the C.I.A. It is still in effect but, like all still in effect but, like an directives, variously interpreted.

Out of a Spy Novel

The critics, quick to point to The critics, quick to point to the agency's publicized blunders and setbacks, are not mollified by its genuine achievements— its precise prediction of the date on which the Chinese Commu-nists would explode a nuclear device; its fantastic world of electronic devices; its use of a electronic devices; its use of a spy, Oleg Penkovskiy, to reach into the Kremlin itself; its work in keeping the Congo out of communist control; or the feat Sommunist control; or the feat—straight from a spy novel—of arranging things so that when Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in Egypt the "management consultant" who had an office next to the Arab leader's and who was one of his principal advisers was a C.I.A. operative.

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operative.

When the U-2 incident is mentioned by critics, as it always is, the emphasis is usually on the C.I.A.'s — and the Eisenhower Administration's — blunder in permitting Francis Gary Powers's flight ofer the Soviet Union in 1960, just before a scheduled summit conference. Not much is usually said of the incalculable intelligence value of the undistribed U-2 flights between 1956 and 1960 over the heartland of flussia.

And when critics frequently charge that C.I.A. operations contradict and sabotage official American policy, they may not know that the C.I.A. is often overruled in its policy judgments

ments.
As an example, the C.I.A.
As an example, the C.I.A.
strongly urged the Kennedy Administration not to recognize
the Egyptian-backed Yemeni
regime and warned that President Nasser would not quickly
full his troops out of Yemen.
Ambassador John Badeau
thought otherwise. His advice
was accepted, the republic was
recognized, President Nasser's
roops remained—and much military and political trouble followed that the C.I.A. had fore-

een and the State Department had not.

Nor do critics always give the C.I.A. credit where it is due for its vital and daily service as an accurate and encyclopedic source accurate and encyclopedic source of quick news, information, analysis and deduction about everything from a new police chief in Mozambique to an aid agreement between Communist China and Albania, from the state of President Sukarno's health to the meaning of With. the meaning of Nikita S. Khru-shchev fall from power. Yet the critics' favorite indict-

ments are spectacular enough

to explain the world's suspicions and fears of the C.I.A. and its operations.

operations.

A sorry episode in Asia in the early ninteen-fifties is a frequently cited example. C.I.A. agents gathered remnants of the defeated Chinese Nationalist armies in the jungles of northwest Burma, supplied them with gold shd arms and encouraged them to raid Communist China.

One aim was to harrass Peking to a point where it might ing to a point where it might retaliate against Burma, forcing the Burmese to turn to the United States for protection. Actually, few raids occurred, and the arms because

Omited States for protection.

Actually, few raids occurred, and the army became a troublesome and costly burden. The C.I.A. had enlisted the help of Gen. Phao Sriyanod, the police chief of Thailand—and a leading narcotics dealer. The Nationalists, with the planes and gold furnished them by the agents, went into the opium business. By the time the "anti-Communist" force could be disbanded, and the C.I.A. could wash its hands of it, Burma had renounced American aid, threatened to quit the United Nations and moved closer to Peking.

Moreover, some of the Nationalist Chinese are still in north-

alist Chinese are still in northern Burma, years later, and still fomenting trouble and infuriatfomenting trouble and infuriating governments in that area, although they have not been supported by the C.I.A. or any American agency for a decade. In 1958, a C.I.A.-aided operation involving South Vietnamese agents and Cambodian rebels was interpreted by Prince Sihanouk as an attempt to overthrow him. It failed but drove him farther down the road that ultimately led to his break in diplomatic relations with Washington. ington.

Indonesian Venture

In Indonesia in the same year, against the advice of American diplomats, the C.I.A. was authorized to fly in supplies from Taiwan and the Philippines to aid army officers rebeling against President Sukarno in Sumatra and Java. An American pilot was shot down on a bombing mission and was released only at the insistent urging of the Kennedy Administration in 1962. Mr. Sukarno, na-In Indonesia in the same year,

turally enough, drew the obvious conclusions; how much of his fear and dislike of the United States can be traced to those days is hard to say.

days is hard to say.
In 1960, C.I.A. agents in Laos,
disguised as "military advisers,"
stuffed ballot boxes and engineered local uprisings to help a
hand-picked strongman, Gen.
Phoumi Nosavan, set up a "proAmerican" government that was
desired by President Eisenhower
and Secretary of State John and Secretary of State John

and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

This operation succeeded—so much so that it stimulated So-viet intervention on the side of leftist Laotians, who counterattacked the Phoumi govern-ment. When the Kennedy Administration set out to reverse the policy of the Eisenhower Administration, it found the C.I.A. deeply committed to Phoumi Nosovan and needed two years of negotiations and hreats to restore the neutralist egime of Prince Souvanna Bhouma.

Pro-Communist Laotians, however, were never again driven from the border of North Vietam, and it is through that re-tion that the Vietcong in South letnam have been supplied and eplenished in their war to detroy still another C.I.A.-aided roject, the non-Communist gov-rnment in Saigon.

Catalogue of Charges

It was the C.I.A. that built up Ngo Dinh Dlem as the pro-American head of South Viet-nam after the French, through nam after the French, through Emperor Bao Dai, had found him in a monastery cell in Bel-gium and brought him back to Saigon as Premier. And it was the C.LA. that helped persuade the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to ride out the Vietnamese storm with Diem-

probably too long.

These recorded incidents not only have prompted much soul-searching about the influence of an instrument such as the C.I.A.

on American policies but also have given the C.I.A. a reputa-tion for deeds and misdeeds far beyond its real intentions and capacities.

Through spurious reports, gos-Through spurious reports, gos-sip, misunderstandings, deep-seated fears and forgeries and falsifications, the agency has been accused of almost any-thing anyone wanted to accuse it of

It has been accused of: Plotting the assassination of Jawaharlal Nehru of India.

Provoking the 1965 war be tween India and Pakistan. TEngineering the "plot" that became the pretext for the mur-

der of leading Indonesia gen-erals last year.

¶Supporting the rightist army

plots in Algeria. ¶Murdering Patrice Lumum-

ba in the Congo.

¶Kidnapping Moroccan agents in Paris.

4Plotting the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah of

All of these charges and many All of these charges and many similar to them are fabrications, authoritative officials outside the C.I.A. insist. The C.I.A.'s notoriety even

enables some enemies to recover from their own mistakes, A for-mer American official unconnected with the agency recalls that pro-Chinese elements in East Africa once circulated a document urging revolts against several governments. When this inflammatory message backfired on its authors, they promptly spread the word that it was a C.I.A. forgery designed to dis-credit them—and some believed the falsehood.

Obvious Deduction

"Many otherwise rational African leaders are ready to take forgeries at face value," one observer says, "because deep down they honestly fear the C.I.A. Its image in this part of the world couldn't be worse."

The image feeds on the rank-est of fabrications as well as on the wildest of stories—for the simple reason that the wildest of stories are not always false, and the C.I.A. is often involved and all too often obvious.

When an embassy subordi-nate in Lagos, Nigeria, known to be the C.I.A. station chief had a fancier house than the United States Ambassador, Ni-

United States Ambassador, Ni-gerians made the obvious deduc-tion about who was in charge. When President João Goulart of Brazil fell from power in 1964 and C.I.A, men were accused of being among his most ener-getic opponents, exaggerated conclusions as to who had oust-ed him were natural. It is not only abroad that work

It is not only abroad that such C.I.A. involvements — real or imaginery — have aroused dire fears and suspicions. Theodore C. Sorensen has written, for in-stance, that the Peace Corps in its early days strove manfully, and apparently successfully, to keep its ranks free of C.I.A. in-filtration.

Other Government agencies, American newspapers and busi-ness concerns, charitable founness concerns, charitable foundations, research institutions and universities have, in some-cases, been as diligent as Soviet agents in trying to protect themselves from C.I.A. penetration. They have not always been tion. They have not always been so successful as the Peace Corps.

Some of their fear has been misplaced; the C.I.A. is no long-er so dependent on clandestine agents and other institutions' resources. But as in the case of its overseas reputation, its ac-tual activities in the United States—for instance, its aid in financing a center for interna-tional studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology— have made the fear of infiltra-tion real to many scholars and businesses.

The revelation that C.I.A. The revelation that C.I.A. agents served among Michigan State University scholars in South Vietnam from 1955 to 1959 has contributed to the fear. The nature of the agents' work and the circumstances of their employment are in dispute, but their very involvement, even relatively long ago, has aroused concern that hundreds of scholarly and charitable American

efforts abroad will be tainted and hampered by the suspicions

and hampered by the suspicions of other governments.

Thus, it is easy for sincere men to believe deeply that the C.I.A. must be brought "to hee!" in the nation's own interest. Yet every well-informed official and former official with recent knowledge of the C.I.A. and its pivities who was interviewed confirmed what Secretary of state Rusk has said publicate that the C.I.A. "does not hit at actions unknown to the light policy leaders of the Government."

The New York Times survey

The New York Times survey left no doubt that, whatever its miscalculations, blunders and misfortunes, whatever may have been the situation during its bumptious early days and duroumptious early days and during its over-hasty expansion in and after the Korean War, the agency acts today not on its own but with the approval and under the control of the political leaders of the United States Government.

But that virtually undisputed fact raises in itself the central questions that emerge from the survey: What is control? And who guards the guards?

For it is upon information provided by the C.I.A. itself that those who must approve its ac-tivities are usually required to decide.

It is the C.I.A. that has the money (not unlimited but ample) and the talent (as much as any agency) not only to conceive but also to carry out projects of great importance—and commensurate risk.

Action, If Not Success

It is the C.I.A., unlike the Defense Department with its service rivalries, budget con-cerns and political involvements, and unlike the State Depart-ment with its international dipment with its international dip-lomatic responsibilities and its vulnerability to criticism, that is freest of all agencies to advo-cate its projects and press home its views; the C.I.A. can prom-ise action, if not success. And both the agency and those who must pass upon its plans are shielded by security from the outside oversight and review under which virtually all other officials operate, at home

and abroad.

Thus, while the survey left no doubt that the C.I.A. operates under strict forms of control, it raised the more serious question whether there was always the

substance of control.

In many ways, moreover, public discussion has become too centered on the question of control. A more disturbing matter, may be whether the nation has allowed that the matter for the control of has allowed itself to go too far in the grim and sometimes deadly business of espionage

and secret operations.

One of the best-informed men

on this subject in Washington described that business as "ugly, mean and cruel." The agency loses men and no one ever hears of them again, he said, and when "we catch one of them" (a Soviet or other agent), it becomes necessary "to get every-

comes necessary "to get every-thing out of them and we do it with no holds barred."
Secretary Rusk has said pub-licly that there is "a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world." 'It's a tough one, it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely the other side." he said.

the other side," he said.

The back-alley struggle, he concluded, is "a never-ending war, and there's no quarter asked and none given."

'Struggle for Freedom'

'Struggle for Freedom'

But that struggle, Mr. Rusk insisted, is "part of the struggle for freedom."

No one seriously disputes that the effort to gain intelligence about real or potential enemies, even about one's friends, is a vital part of any government's activities, particularly a government so burdened with responsibility as the United States Government in the 20th century.

But beyond their need for information, how far should the political leaders of the United States go in approving the clandestine violation of treaties and borders, financing of coups, influencing of parties and governments, without tarnishing and retarding those ideas of freedom and self-government they proclaim to the world?

And how much of the secrecy and autonomy necessary to carry out such acts can on, should

And how much of the secrecy and autonomy necessary to carry out such acts can or, should be tolerated by a free society? There are no certain or easy answers. But these questions cannot even be discussed knowledgeably on the basis of the few glimpses — accidental or inten-


edgeably on the basis of the few glimpses — accidental or intentional—that the public has so far been given into the private world of the C.I.A.

That world is both dull and lurid, often at the same time. A year ago, for instance, it was reported that some of the anti-Castro Cuban survivors of the Bay of Pigs were flying in combat in deepest, darkest Africa. Any Madison Avenue publisher would recognize that as right out of Ian Fleming and James Bond.

But to the bookish and tweedy

But to the bookish and tweedy But to the bookish and tweedy men who labor in the pastoral setting of the C.I.A.'s huge building on the banks of the Potomac River near Langley, Va., the story was only a satisfying episode in the back-alley version of "Struggle for Freedom."

Tomorrow: Who and what is the C.I.A.?



THE C.I.A.—GOOD, BAD OR OTHERWISE? Much discussed and criticized, the Central Intelligence Agency has not escaped humorous treatment either. Its detractors loudly condemn it, nearly everyone talks about it, but very few really understand it.