

The Road to Peace

(Guest editorial consisting of quotations from President Charles de Gaulle's news conference on October 28, 1966.)

We are certain there can be no military victory enabling the Americans to subdue the Vietnamese.

We find it totally detestable that a small country should be bombed by a very big one. . . . But we are not offering any peace plan for the good reason that, at the moment, peace is impossible. This does not prevent us from indicating as clearly as possible what are, in our opinion, the conditions that could lead one day to negotiations to end the war.

These conditions depend indeed on the decision of the Americans. For them it would be a matter of observing the principle according to which each people should settle its affairs in its own way and by itself. The Americans would have to apply this principle to the Vietnamese people.

Consequently, they would have to bring back to America the forces that little by little they have sent to Vietnam after the departure of our forces. They would also have to accept as the basis of a future settlement a real and effectively controlled neutrality of Southeast Asia and assistance needed to help it patch up its ruins and resume its development.

Finally, the Americans would have to recognize that in Asia no agreement, no important treaty, is valid without the participation of China, and they would have to draw the conclusions as regards relations to be established with this great state and as regards its rightful place in the United Nations.

mote control, just in case some climber grows megalomaniacal enough to try ascending at his own pace. Mobutu has been trying just that even if only to a slight degree—enough, however, to lose favor with those who count. He got the wild idea that foreign companies operating in the Congo should stop behaving like unchallengeable owners of the country and should, for a change, pay some heed to the nation's interests. Well, in the Congo that is very, very revolutionary. Even if Mobutu's total demands amount to a mere comma of the late Patrice Lumumba's program, a comma may yet prove punishable by death as much as the full text.

While Mobutu's immediate conflict involves predominantly Belgian concerns, the U.S. embassy in Kinshasa (former Leopoldville) came to the all-out defense of the untouchability of foreign interests. So much so that Mobutu's non-acceptance of U.S. "advice" led to the recall of U.S. Ambassador George McMurtrie Godley. "Personal frictions" between the Congolese President and the U.S. Ambassador were given as the reason for the latter's "indefinite consultations" in Washington, but in actuality the "personal frictions" turn out to involve international interests.

The United States has given, along with \$45-million annually in economic assistance, much advice to President Mobutu to the effect that he should conduct his foreign relations in a calmer manner. (*The New York Times*, October 22.)

Among the insufficiently "calm" relations of Mobutu are those with so dear an American friend as fascist and colonialist Portugal.

Last month, for example, the Portuguese Embassy in Kinshasa was sacked by members of the Government-supported youth movement. More recently the Congolese Parliament voted to break relations with Portugal, and the Congo lodged a complaint at the United Nations that anti-Government mercenaries were being harbored in Portuguese Angola. (*Ibid.*)

But more mortal is Mobutu's sin in entertaining any thought of curbing foreign economic interests:

President Mobutu has quarreled with the Bel-

gian-controlled copper company that provides most of the Congo's income, and with Sabena, the Belgian airline that supplies much of her transportation. The view here is that while Mr. Mobutu had some worthy goals, notably increased participation by the Congolese in the foreign-owned operations, his tactics were unfortunate. (*Ibid.*)

As elsewhere in similar situations, Mobutu's goals would not be objectionable, if only he did not act on them.

Ambassador Godley found it especially convenient to protect the principle of the untouchability of foreign interests in a case in which the American share is hidden from public view by Belgian control. But more important than any particular proportion of Belgian-American interests, is the need to educate Congolese officials that their power stops at the threshold of any foreign concern.

It fell to Mr. Godley, whose manner is blunt, to tell President Mobutu that he should restrain himself. The Congolese leader was angered, and finally was said to have begun to blame Mr. Godley for the rebukes sent from Washington. (*Ibid.*)

Some nations' presidents are not sufficiently tactful to know that they must respond with "Ycs, sir" to a U.S. ambassador's blunt manner. Back home, Mr. Godley should be able to co-author the textbook that undoubtedly is being prepared for President Mobutu in the famous Langley, Va., studios.

No less U.S. attention is given to developments in the formerly French Congo, now the Congo Republic. There things have never been quite to U.S. liking. The voices heard from Brazzaville have a maddening effect on Washington, for they are not likely to contribute to the U.S.-desired "stability" in such areas as the Portuguese territories of Cabinda, Angola and Portuguese Guinea. Since the prosecuted leaders of African national movements are not arrested on sight in Brazzaville, but are allowed to live and to voice their minds, U.S. officials have a pretext for misrepresenting that city as a center of diabolic continental conspiracies. Moreover, the fact that some instructors of the citizens' militia are Cuban, enables U.S. officials to sound the alarm of

Cuban military intervention, penetration, subversion and what not. In actuality, the militia is a popular youth movement affording the government a base of support and protecting it against unceasing foreign intrigues. These intrigues need not be guessed at for only last June some army officers staged an abortive *coup d'etat*.

From Washington was reported what truly worries U.S. officials:

The rising strength of the militia makes it less likely, as time goes by, that any coup in the Congo Republic will topple a Government whose extreme-left orientation has become more pronounced. (*N. Y. Times*, October 23.)

Since France continues to exert influence on the Congo Republic and to supply it with economic aid, its assessment of the situation in Brazzaville is of special interest and may serve to check the accuracy of U.S. propaganda.

In the past the French have not shown great concern over the activities of the Cubans in Brazzaville although their intelligence services have kept a sharp eye on them. (*Ibid.*)

But U.S. perception of reality being often in discord with that of anyone else, Washington presents quite a different picture:

In view of the chronic instability of the area, the organization of an active staging area for guerrilla activity would be an extremely dangerous development, in Washington's view. (*Ibid.*)

While we would hardly object to long overdue changes in such parts of Africa as the Portuguese territories, there is an unfortunate history to instruct us on what is likely to follow such concerns as Washington now has for the Congo Republic.

Both Congos appear to be candidates for what has become a periodic CIA overhaul in Africa.