

The Names in CIA Files: Some Belong, Some Don't

Part 2/2/75

By Harry Rositzke

Rositzke, who retired from the CIA in 1970 after 27 years with the agency and its predecessors, initiated its liaison with the FBI on Soviet espionage matters. He is author of "The U.S.S.R Today" and "Left On!"

THE HALF-DOZEN inquiries into the charges of "domestic spying" by the Central Intelligence Agency face a challenging task on a confusing terrain.

From a wide range of legitimate counterintelligence activities, involving American citizens, the investigators will have to sift out those cases in which the CIA violated its charter by using secret agents against Americans within the United States.

The legitimate operations cover a broad array of activities in which Americans voluntarily or otherwise fall within the purview of the CIA, with their names properly entering its files.

Countless private citizens, for example, have been "cleared" by the CIA before they are asked to participate in secret or covert operations. Thousands of Americans have helped establish such CIA-sponsored organizations as the Committee for a Free Europe, to set up foundations for channeling funds to covert operations, and to create the proprietary companies that supply logistic support for CIA paramilitary operations.

Hundreds of others have helped CIA make contacts with resident foreigners who are of interest for future intelligence use abroad, or in building up new identities and getting jobs for Soviet and other defectors being resettled in this country. In each case, the FBI and other federal files must be checked, and in some cases a security investigation is carried out as well, before an American citizen is cleared for contact.

Any violations of CIA authority in this security-investigative area can be examined by the committees on a case-by-case basis—an unauthorized telephone intercept or microphone

installation, a surveillance conducted to investigate a reported plot against the CIA director, the use of informants to report on the plans of Washington demonstrators.

FBI-CIA Cooperation

THE TERRAIN is far more confused in the area of secret domestic activities of the CIA's Operations Directorate, especially the Domestic Operations Division (now the Foreign Resources Division) and the Counterintelligence Staff. The Domestic Division has been carrying out intelligence operations against foreigners in the United States since the early 1960s. The Counterintelligence Staff has, since 1946, exercised overall responsibility for CIA's worldwide counterintelligence program. Both have worked closely with FBI.

Internal security, the responsibility solely of the FBI, does not involve the domestic scene alone. Any country's internal security service must have the cooperation of its foreign intelligence service to do its work effectively. This cooperation is not always easy, but for those familiar with conflicts between the domestic and foreign services in England, France or Germany, the differences between the CIA and the FBI are relatively modest. In any case, they have had only minor repercussions on the working level.

It is in this area of domestic counterintelligence that the committees will find it most difficult to establish normal and proper patterns of FBI-CIA cooperation, an essential first step toward detecting what, is improper or illegal.

The patterns are clearest in the most specific form of counterintelligence — counterespionage. Here the targets are persistent and easily identified: the actions of any hostile in-

telligence service directed against the American interest.

For 30 years the CIA and FBI have worked closely against the Soviet and East European intelligence services, especially the KGB, exchanging information about Soviet intelligence officers and providing each other with leads to suspect agents. In the past 15 years the volume of hostile espionage operations has climbed perceptibly. During the 1960s, KGB officers were making more than 200 attempts a year to recruit Americans stationed abroad. In the late 1960s more than 300 KGB officers were stationed in New York City.

The demarcation line between responsibilities of the two agencies has always been clear in the minds of CIA operations officers. The investigation of suspect Americans or foreigners is the exclusive province of the FBI within the physical confines of the United States, of the CIA abroad. From the operator's point of view, there are no "gray zones" in this area.

CIA-FBI cooperation in counterespionage matters is mostly a one-way street, for the great majority of Soviet, East European and Cuban es-

spionage operations against the United States are mounted overseas. From its own sources abroad, from its liaisons with friendly security services, from Americans recruited abroad by a hostile service, the CIA has supplied more leads for the FBI to follow up in the United States than conversely.

In most cases these do not involve American citizenship. For example:

- CIA/Vienna reports from an agent-source the dispatch of a Soviet "illegal," (a staff officer under private cover) to the United States. The

FBI takes over his surveillance at the port of entry.

- CIA/Paris forwards information on a Soviet espionage net in New York City from a Russian who has walked in to the Paris embassy. The FBI conducts the investigation that leads to the arrest of Col. Abel.

Other cases initiated by CIA involve the return of a U.S. citizen from his overseas post:

- An American technician in Italy has been recruited by a KGB officer for the purpose of getting computer data from his home office. The follow-up in Italy is CIA's job; on his return to his headquarters, it is the FBI's job.

- An embassy file clerk in Tokyo is approached by a young KGB officer and accepts his proposition under the direction of the CIA station. When she is about to return to Washington, the FBI is informed, and it can request that the operation be terminated overseas or elect to take over the handling of the "double" in Washington.

A "Chance" Meeting

COOPERATION between the two agencies on counterespionage targets within the United States has been even closer when the CIA can contribute a means of access to a Soviet or East European intelligence officer stationed in New York or Washington. In effect, the operation becomes joint.

A senior East European intelligence officer in New York, the resident in charge, is found to have been the deputy of a defector who has started a new life in Latin America. The defector is brought to the United States by CIA and telephones the resident's wife, with whom he had an affair in the old days. He is most cordially received, and has several night-club meetings with the couple during which he proposes that the resident cooperate with the Americans. The meetings are closely observed by both CIA and FBI officers.

Another joint operation involved an American citizen whom the CIA was preparing for a Latin American assignment. A file-search reveals that at one time he knew fairly well a secret KGB courier who is making a three-day stop in New York City. The American is brought from Pittsburgh and a "chance" meeting with the courier is arranged at an airline terminal, with both FBI and CIA officers in attendance.

These and similar counterespionage operations against foreigners offer a simple paradigm for counterin-

telligence operations against American citizens, the immediate issue before the inquiries. The basic operating rule is the same: Dealing with American dissidents, militants, or terrorists within the United States is the FBI's job; supporting FBI operations abroad is CIA's job.

Here again FBI-CIA cooperation is mostly a one-way street, but now running in the other direction. Since the targets are Americans on the domestic scene, the main flow of leads is from the FBI to CIA for overseas action. Only occasionally does a CIA operation abroad come up with a lead for FBI action at home.

Over the years the FBI has made countless requests for overseas action on American Communist leaders traveling abroad to determine whom they visited, what instructions they received in Paris or Prague, what funds they might bring back. Other FBI targets have been reported on by CIA during their attendance at peace rallies or other Soviet front meetings in Europe.

In the 1960s these requests mounted and broadened in scope as the New Left, on and off campus, began to create turmoil on the American scene.

Thus, a leading anti-war militant makes a trip to Paris, apparently to visit the North Vietnamese delegation. Whom does he meet? What do they talk about? Any other contacts?

A Black Panther on the run flees to Algiers. Does he plan to return? With whom is he in touch? Any contacts with the Soviet or Cuban embassies?

A student activist in Chicago flies to Bonn to make contact with the leader of a revolutionary German student group. Why?

These requests can be multiplied

by the hundred. They are often easy to satisfy with the help of friendly foreign security services that have as great an interest as the FBI in running down the international contacts of their militants and revolutionary groups. Sometimes the answers can be obtained from CIA agents whom the local station has inserted in the wide-ranging Soviet and other Communist establishments to monitor their non-diplomatic activities.

Terrorists and Smugglers

DURING THE SIXTIES some CIA stations in Europe also began to pay more attention to such non-Communist organizations of the New Left as the "proletarian" socialist

parties and the Trotskyists, Maoists and Castroites, which sprang up in great profusion. Many were concentrated on university campuses, and CIA agents within them were able to answer questions on their outside connections, including those with parallel organizations in the U.S. movement.

The names of any Americans that came up in these operations were given the amount of investigative attention they deserved—by the CIA while they are overseas, by the FBI when (and if) they came home.

It is perhaps also worth noting that this same clean-cut division of labor applies to the handling of counterintelligence operations against international terrorists and drug-smugglers, with the leads coming mostly from the CIA to the FBI.

- A CIA agent in a Latin American terrorist group learns of plans for attacking an American embassy (action CIA) or sending a team to New York City (action FBI).

- A CIA penetration of a heroin ring in Istanbul comes up with the name of an American connection. If the connection is in the United States, the action goes to the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration.

It is against this pattern of normal practice that the inquiries can best assess individual cases in which the CIA (or the FBI) may have overstepped its authority. Such cases are likely to fall into that narrow area in which CIA officers carry out operations within the United States that are normally handled by the FBI.

In a typical case, a CIA officer in Europe develops over a two-year period a close relationship with one of his agents, a Communist organizer in the European maritime unions. The organizer is sent for six months to Baltimore to work with the local maritime unions, and the FBI is informed. After a working-level discussion, the FBI agrees that the CIA officer continue to handle him because of their close relationship. His reporting goes to the FBI, and the FBI asks the CIA officer for any information it wants from his contact with the organizer.

Another type of case comes even closer to the thin line between CIA and FBI jurisdiction. In this situation, an American student is being prepared for an assignment to France, where he will attempt to report on Soviet and North Vietnamese contacts with the New Left. CIA helps him develop a cover for his role as a stu-

dent activist by having him associate with radical groups on an American campus. With his bona fides as a "radical" established, he will be more readily accepted by student activists on a French campus.

In cases of this sort CIA's domestic actions are directly connected with its foreign counterintelligence responsibilities. Whether they fall into a white, gray or black area will be a subtle question for the inquiries to determine.

Ground-Level Questions

THE INVESTIGATORS have a three-fold task: to establish facts, judge their legality or illegality, and recommend executive or legislative remedies if they are needed. The operational facts come first. The issue of "domestic spying" is surrounded by so much confusion and suspicion that the inquiries will do the nation little good unless they come up with the facts that will settle questions in the public mind. If civil liberties were violated, whose, how and when? If the CIA or the FBI overstepped its charter bounds, who did what where? If someone broke the law, who did what?

Answers to these ground-level questions may be of more importance to the citizen than recommendations for remedial legislation, tighter oversight, or broad injunctions to the President to ride closer hard on his secret agencies.

It is only by coming up with hard facts that the presidential and congressional inquests can gain public respect and allay public suspicion of their own and the CIA's competence and integrity.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

CIA Fears at the White House

Post 2/4/75

Efforts to politically insulate President Ford from the spreading congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency reached a ludicrous peak when Ambassador Richard Helms, former CIA director, was invited in for an Oval Office chat with Mr. Ford two weeks ago.

Without the President's knowledge, top White House aides quietly took Helms aside before he entered the Oval Office to warn him that the President was "the nation's highest law enforcement officer." Translated, that meant Helms should fully understand that anything he told the President about CIA activities during the time he ran the nation's intelligence operations could be used against him.

Conveyor of that incredible warning, White House aides have confirmed to us, was the President's chief counsel, Philip Buchen. But other senior presidential aides fully supported Buchen's position.

The reason goes to their fear that, in the wake of sensational Watergate exposures of cover-up by President Nixon, Mr. Ford could be vulnerable to charges that he learned about questionable intelligence activities and tried to conceal this knowledge—a new "cover-up."

Inside the CIA, the State Department and the Pentagon, this effort to insulate the President from the facts and to place him, in effect, in an advisory role to the CIA at this time of

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maximum political danger is viewed as an outrage.

At one point White House aides actually considered not allowing Helms to see the President at all on his return from his ambassadorial post in Iran to face congressional inquisitors. That extreme position did not carry, but the warning to Helms did.

The warning dramatizes the post-Watergate mood of fear and recrimination which many top officials feel is undermining the CIA and other intelligence-gathering organizations as the politicians run for cover. The fact is that the CIA, both during and before Helms' directorship, seldom if ever strayed from the secret policy and operational directives laid down right from the Oval Office.

When the story broke Wednesday morning that Richard M. Nixon is looking forward to getting back in politics, a Republican leader in one big Midwestern state received telephone calls from two substantial financial contributors who delivered identical messages; if Nixon is back in the picture, you can count me out.

Capitol Tuesday to ask him to run for President and came away with a note that is being interpreted as, "no, not now, but come back later."

Several rich militant liberals, led by veteran anti-war activists Harold Wilkens and Stanley Sheinbaum, have been conferring with possible presidential candidates (including Church) and came to the conclusion that Church ought to be the one. What's more, Church had seemed more than willing.

But besides meeting with the Wilkens-Sheinbaum group Tuesday, Church that day was named chairman of the Senate CIA investigating committee. He could not mix that with presidential politics, he told his visitors.

The Wilkens-Sheinbaum group left Church downtown and reported the news to a shrewd political operative on the party's left wing.

Don't be disheartened, he advised: Church will go a lot further politically investigating the CIA in Washington than holding press conferences in Durham, N.H. That could be important considering the inability so far of Rep. Morris Udall of Arizona and other liberals to fill the vacuum on the left.

Church does not close the door as to what he may do when the CIA investigation is completed late this year. "He'll go," predicts a fellow liberal senator. "I know that look in his eye."

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Illegal Wiretapping

The recent revelations by former members of the F.B.I. hierarchy — namely that during their tenure illegal wire tapping and bugging was engaged in by them at the Democratic 1964 National Convention and elsewhere — causes bewilderment. I presume most of these men are lawyers and if so why did they carry out these patently illegal orders.

Are these men in any different position than the Watergate defendants who were prosecuted, convicted and disbarred? Does the statute of Limitations against this criminal activity run from the date of the alleged offense or the date of its discovery? These are questions for the lawyers at the Department of Justice.

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