

Explosives

A review of heavily censored CIA documents shows the CIA's use of U.S. police agencies identical to its broadscale misuse of foreign police agencies. Perhaps the most disturbing CIA program for U.S. police personnel--given the CIA's history--is its training in the use of explosives.

The CIA documents report five CIA instruction seminars regarding explosives. From October 6-8, 1967, high-ranking police officials from New York City, Boston, Chicago, Washington, D.C.; and Fairfax and Arlington Counties, attended seminars where "formal presentations included demonstrations of explosives and explosive devices, an exhibit of foreign weaponry, air operations, and paramilitary displays as well as a general tour of the two training sites."

From May 16-18, 1970, a CIA "conclave" was held for "high-ranking officers" from Washington, D.C.; Boston; Montgomery County; and, Arlington and Fairfax Counties. Included among the scheduled participants were Edmund L. McNamara, Boston Commissioner of Police; Jerry Wilson, D.C. Police Chief; Colonel William Durrer, Fairfax County Police Chief; Colonel James S. Mc Auliffe, Superintendent of Police, Montgomery County; and, Vincent S. Free, Prince George's County Police Chief. (A later CIA memo deleted the names of the actual participants except for McNamara and Durrer so it is not known for certain whether the others

participated. If they did not, however, their representatives did except for Free who apparently did not attend or send a representative.) According to a CIA memo: "The seminar included briefings on auto (sic) counter-measures, explosive devices and foreign ordinance." Another CIA memo explained that the CIA "presented a demonstration of explosive and incendiary devices fabricated from common household articles." Former CIA Director of Security, Howard J. Osborn added that "The demolition demonstrations were particularly timely for a group so closely involved with this current problem." Exemplary of the CIA's "cultivation" was the participation of no fewer than five CIA career officers and a dinner in honor of the police officials which was followed by a showing of the CIA-produced propaganda film, "Need to Know."

Besides seminars, the CIA under the heading of "tutorial training" got into the "nuts and bolts" of explosives. In December, 1968; June, 1969; and October, 1970; "Three one-week courses dealing with the construction and handling of terrorist explosive devices were held at the (deleted) Fairfax County, Virginia. This training was attended by a total of 44 police officers representing departments from Washington, D.C., and Arlington and Fairfax, Virginia. The courses were ostensibly conducted by the Northern Virginia Police Academy and non-attributable to the Agency." (Following this sentence were deletions in the

CIA document).

The rather macabre details of the explosives courses were seen in the following quote from a CIA memo.

(deleted), in informal conversations, has indicated that the sum of \$1,000 would be sufficient for a "grandstand" presentation of the course, but would not offer "hands on" training as was given local police officers in the past. "Hands on" training costs about \$150.00 in explosives for each man participating in the training. (deleted), in subsequent conversations has advised that the MPD (D.C. Metropolitan Police Department) would like the "hands on" type of training because of its extreme value in criminal investigations.

Other interchanges between the CIA and police training in explosives were revealed as follows in a CIA memo.

1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, (deleted) provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County police pistol and rifle range....

3. In order to augment the (deleted) mission responsibilities in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, (deleted) officers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposals units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept., and the Los Angeles Police Dept....

While the CIA memo does not clearly enunciate what training transpired, it is disturbing because counter-

sabotage and counterterror suggest the offensive use of explosives. An offensive use of the training was also hinted at in a request from the D.C. police for "sabotage and demolition training...in the face of increased civil disturbance and sabotage threats."

Free Explosives

In addition to its training, the CIA was in the habit of providing free quantities of C-3, C-4, and Flex-X explosives to local police departments, including Fairfax County and Arlington, Virginia. According to a CIA memo, "They were used in police training courses on explosive devices." Another much-deleted CIA memo claimed the explosives were provided by the CIA because "these types of explosives are not available to them through their established sources of supply." The CIA memo did not mention that the arrangement also provided the police departments with untraceable quantities of explosives.

Equally disturbing as the CIA's training in explosives was its combination of this training with training in surreptitious entry. According to a CIA memo, on April 25, 1972, the Washington Metropolitan Police Department "called with a 'priority' request for the training of two members of the D.C. Bomb Squad in an accelerated lock picking course." That the D.C. Bomb Squad specifically

? add - illegal

wanted surreptitious entry training was seen in an earlier CIA memo which stated the following. "MPD advised that although they want to be briefed on quick and 'messy' entry such as door jacks, dent pullers, etc., they now see that what they need most will be the surreptitious entry methods which other MPD groups have received."

The CIA thought the D.C. Bomb Squad request was a grand idea and Director of Security (D/OS), Howard J. Osborn quickly approved granting the request. Osborn, in fact, approved an expanded training program in the areas of photography, surveillance, and surreptitious entry, and he recommended inviting other police departments. Subsequently, the intelligence units of Fairfax (Va.), Arlington (Va.), Prince Georges (Md.), and Montgomery (Md.) Counties were con-
tacted and, according to the CIA, "enthusiastically asked for the training, and spelled out their total needs, which (name deleted) has detailed in Attachment A." (Attachment A was not in the documents released by the CIA.)

Consequently, in July 1972, two members of the D.C. Bomb Squad received CIA training in lock-picking, operational photography, and surveillance training. The photography curriculum included training in the use of cameras; developing, printing, and enlarging photos; and lectures and field exercises in "Surveillance Photography." The sur-

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veillance training curriculum included films, lectures, and field exercises in foot and automobile surveillance techniques for daytime and nighttime use.

In effect, the CIA provided the D.C. Bomb Squad and the others with the ability to surreptitiously plant explosives in buildings as well as automobiles. The CIA's admission of the highly questionable propriety of this program was seen in the deletions in released documents of the names of the training sites, CIA instructors, and attendees as well as orders such as the following which recurred throughout CIA memos.

...appropriate superiors of the attendees will brief them on the fact that neither the agency providing the training, nor the training site should be discussed inside or outside of the respective police departments.

In dealing with the D.C. and Arlington police, the writer has, and will continue to, emphasize the security involved in the treatment of information concerning the sponsorship of the training. (Deleted name) has assured me that (deleted name) will assure that similar briefings are given to its invitees.

The CIA also showed its awareness of the program's questionable propriety in the following remark. "The lock picking is not intended for surreptitious entry per se, but is required to allow the officers to make complete bomb searches." This non sequitur would appear to be a con-

convenient afterthought. Two other CIA memos claim that the D.C. Bomb Squad specifically requested training in surreptitious entry per se. It is also difficult to fathom how training in surreptitious entry allowed the officers to make complete bomb searches particularly since they were already trained in "quick and 'messy' entry" techniques. This defense of surreptitious entry training is also undermined by the fact that the CIA later claimed an entirely different reason. This was that "the latter emphasis (on surreptitious entry techniques) has become of greater importance because of certain preventive investigative responsibilities which have been assigned to them." Of course, this defense is no more tenable than the complete search one. There is no apparent connection between training in surreptitious entry techniques and the prevention of bombings. Even if there is a connection, what justification is there for providing training in surreptitious entry, surveillance, and secret photography to persons capable of constructing, handling and transporting explosives? One inescapable conclusion appears to be that the CIA was creating autonomous squads with secret offensive capabilities. For this reason, the citizens of Washington, D.C. and Fairfax, Arlington, Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties might want to demand to know which members of their tax-paid police departments have been so trained by the CIA.

The CIA's admission of the questionable propriety of its training in the use and construction of explosives was seen in its effort to cover-up the training or as Howard Osborn put it: "to respond with minimal information." Regarding the training in explosives, Osborn came up with the following press release.

In October 1967, eight police officers were invited to attend a demonstration of explosive devices which may be manufactured from readily available commercial materials. This demonstration lasted for a period of two days, and no training of any kind was given.

This press release totally ignored CIA training courses in explosives prior or subsequent to the October 1967 presentation. Obviously, the CIA felt there were reasons to hide these training courses.

Bugs and Taps

The CIA's training in surreptitious entry techniques is, of course, the literal development of a secret police. In addition to this training, the CIA has also provided equipment and training for bugging and wiretapping. The now-defunct House Select Committee on Intelligence (known generally as the Pike Committee) found that the CIA was in the habit of providing "exotic loans" consisting of "decoders, clandestine transmitters, analyzers, and other wiretapping devices."

A staff examination of these practices reveals that CIA officials usually provided equipment on a no-questions asked basis, did not require the production of court orders for eavesdropping gear, and exercised virtually no control over the loaned items.

No? asked
 Indeed, in one CIA memo there was a reference to a transmitter lent to the Montgomery County Police as "Nonaccountable equipment"; and the type of transmitter was deleted from the released memo.

The same Montgomery County Police were involved in the case of Kenyon F. Ballew. The Montgomery and Prince George's County Police (which also received "exotic loans" from the CIA) supported a raid by agents of the Division of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (another CIA collaborator) on Ballew's apartment in June 1971. The Pike Committee reported the following sequence of events.

The raid was conducted pursuant to a federal search warrant for possession of firearms and hand grenades. Plainclothes agents and police officers broke down the door to the apartment when Mr. Ballew failed to answer their knock. Mr. Ballew, a gun collector, picked up a pistol, was shot, and is now permanently disabled. He is partially paralyzed, walks only with the use of a brace and cane, speaks with difficulty, and still has the police bullet lodged in his brain.

Mr. Ballew was never prosecuted for any gun control violations. (My emphasis.) The case received a large amount of publicity and was the subject of a number of investigations of illegal police misconduct....

What was the precipitating factor in this unseemly police operation? Again, I quote the Pike Committee.

A CIA Office of Security employee assigned to liaison with the Montgomery County Police Department told staff that, in a conversation with a police inspector on the Ballew case, the possible use of CIA-loaned bugging equipment was revealed. He was advised that police intercepted a telephone conversation in which plans were outlined to "kill a cop." However, neither the affidavit in support of the search warrant, the subsequent investigations, nor the transcript of the civil suit reflected the existence of any wire-taps.

The CIA while pooh-poohing their role admitted involvement. According to the Pike Committee: "The Agency's position in this case is that the Agency was not involved beyond the loan of audio equipment, which may have been used against Mr. Ballew..."

In fact, immediately prior to the Ballew shooting, the CIA had revamped, what it called, the "covert audio operations" of the Montgomery County Police in May 1971 following a meeting with then Superintendent, Montgomery County Police, Colonel Kenneth Watkins. At the meeting, the CIA, in addition to its previous support, "volunteered to build short range audio surveillance transmitters;" "immediately provide two (deleted) receivers, on a loan basis, as well as additional equipment as requested;" and "volunteered their effort in enrolling a limited number of Montgomery County Police Department personnel in certain courses..." (presumably audio sur-

veillance.) One CIA officer also provided his office and his home phone numbers "for emergency contact purposes involving technical problems." Other CIA officers "volunteered their advice and recommendations regarding future technical problems encountered in the audio surveillance area."

In response to the CIA's disclaimer to the Pike Committee, it should be mentioned that the CIA knowingly lent, or gave "outright," bugging and wiretapping equipment "for use on police operational matters." In one CIA memo it was noted that "the equipment requested by San Francisco Police Department to support their surveillance activity can be made available." Another CIA memo tells us that the lending program was to support the "operational mission" of U.S. police forces. Thus, the CIA has had a history of making possible the secret bugging and wiretapping of Americans by local police departments. With the Montgomery police, we saw the close, initiating role of the CIA in the covert audio surveillance operations. Clearly, one cannot accept the CIA's description of its role in the Ballew case as that of an unknowing, passive lender of equipment.

Political Police

The violent assault on the constitutional rights of Kenyon Ballew poignantly illustrates that secret methods allow the police to target the citizenry while evading the constitution. This is the capability that the CIA has

transmitted to U.S. police departments. The effect is to politicize the police in that they now target and investigate citizens for other than criminal reasons.

The CIA's politicization process was seen in the case of the Chicago police. In 1967, James E. Conlisk, superintendent of the Chicago Police Department accepted CIA involvement for the following reason.

The recent announcement that this city will be the site of the Democratic National Convention in August, 1968, suggests to me that the city may well experience a substantial measure of activity in sensitive areas for some considerable period of time prior to that event. I am, therefore, anxious to move as expeditiously as possible in order to provide for every contingency.

Conlisk was allowing the CIA to come to Chicago, not to assist in dealing with criminals but to deal with political activists. This was further seen following the CIA's visit. A CIA report about Chicago police official, William J. Duffy recorded the following:

Another problem that the (CIA) team noted is an uncertainty about the mission of the Intelligence Division. Director Duffy by background and inclination, feels that his division should be concentrating on long-range intelligence operations against organized crime. However, for the past two years, his assets have been pressed into service to gather tactical intelligence on civil disturbances. This problem was not discussed with Conlisk, but it was discussed with Mulchrone (John) who is Duffy's superior.

The CIA was unhappy with Duffy because he wanted to concentrate on organized crime figures rather than political activists. John Mulchrone, of course, was a different story. "He impressed the (CIA) team as a rising star in the Department and a person well worth cultivating." Only two months after the CIA report, Duffy's star fell, and he was demoted from being Director of the Intelligence Division to district watch commander. Shortly, thereafter, the Chicago police, particularly its Red Squad, undertook regular, large-scale, secret, political police operations in conjunction with the CIA. It even reached the point where the Chicago police were servicing the political whims of Mayor Richard Daley.

The CIA/Chicago scenario has been replicated in the police departments of most major cities in the U.S. This process and outcome were once described as follows by former Senator William J. Fulbright.

If you start in teaching them and becoming their patron, and you are much more sophisticated than they are, they soon become your organization.

The result is a centralized, secret national police force with political objectives because the CIA and the police become one and the same. This is a Gestapo, the greatest fear of Congress when creating the CIA.

I would not say that American police departments constitute a Gestapo at the present time. They have, however, been placed on that road by the CIA which has

created Gestapo's in other countries. Therefore, if the American people do not want their police departments to become local Gestapo's, they must demand that all police connections, indirect and direct, to the CIA be severed. Local police intelligence units should also be placed under tight control and monitoring by a citizen's commission and prevented from undertaking political operations. The citizen's commission should also know all local police officers and officials who have been trained or in contact with the CIA. These individuals must be closely monitored because they, in effect, have been given secret powers with which they can violate constitutional rights. Unless the American people take these and stronger measures, the goodness of Richard Helms' heart which once produced a SAVAK for Iran will culminate in a Gestapo for America.