

*The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* by Thomas Powers.  
New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. 393 pp. \$12.95.

Thomas Powers has written an ambitious, thoughtful, but uneven historical survey of the CIA and of Richard Helms's CIA career. Based on extensive research into accessible primary and secondary sources supplemented by interviews with CIA officials, this is the best published book on the subject. For the nonspecialist, it is a useful, comprehensive survey. For the specialist, however, it is decidedly deficient, owing to its limited use of primary sources and its interpretive biases.

Powers's major thesis is that cold war imperatives and executive directives led to the expansion of the CIA's role and the agency's involvement in questionable activities. The CIA, Powers argues, was an executive agency, responsive to presidential demands, and not, in Senator Frank Church's phrasing, a "rogue elephant" making major policy decisions independent of presidential knowledge or authorization. Powers, however, does not convincingly substantiate this implicit refutation of the Church committee's findings. Powers's own research, moreover, supports a "rogue elephant" interpretation. For example, responding to a Drew Pearson column, in March 1967 President Johnson demanded a report on the CIA's role in assassination attempts against Castro and in the assassinations of Trujillo and Diem. In his report, Helms did not advise the president of the CIA's efforts to assassinate Lumumba—after all, Johnson had not specifically requested this information—and that CIA assassination efforts against Castro continued until 1965 (including during Johnson's presidency). Helms's report on Castro stopped at 1963. Furthermore, after delivering his oral report to Johnson, Helms ordered the destruction of all written and interview records used by CIA staff to prepare his report.

Powers's thesis is not vulnerable because of this singular example—which nonetheless raises questions about CIA accountability. More important, this study either fails to discuss, or discusses sketchily, a host of CIA programs: the agency's efforts to assassinate Lumumba; its mail cover-intercept programs, drug programs, domestic surveillance programs; and its role in the abortive effort to secure President Nixon's authorization for the so-called Huston Plan. Excepting the planning of the Lumumba assassination, these programs suggest CIA insubordination and independence. The nature of the recordkeeping on the Lumumba assassination, moreover, underscores why the Church committee concluded that President Eisenhower had authorized this action but that President Kennedy might not have authorized the Castro assassination efforts.

The Lumumba episode, moreover, highlights one of problems confronting the researcher of CIA activities—the intentional incompleteness of the written record. The CIA's drug program highlights another aspect—the intentional destruction of written records, such as those that were destroyed in January 1973 when Helms directed his secretary to destroy the tapes of all his office and telephone conversations (after having received a Senate request to preserve all CIA records pertaining to the Watergate Affair). Does this necessarily mean, then, that the written record is incomplete and thus that CIA activities can only be reconstructed through interviews with CIA officials, which served as Powers's method? Interviews are notoriously self-serving, particularly when involving formerly secretive and sensitive activities. The option that Powers did not pursue and that limits the value of his otherwise thoroughly researched study was to exploit the Free-

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dom of Information Act or the mandatory review provisions of executive orders to secure relevant National Security Council and CIA documents. Thus, whereas in 1975 in a congressional testimony former CIA Director Colby characterized as limited the CIA drug programs, noting that a fuller reconstruction could not be provided because relevant documents had been destroyed, additional documents were in fact uncovered in 1977 as the result of a legal suit invoking the Freedom of Information Act—and these confirmed that the CIA drug program was more extensive and abusive than Colby's 1975 description.

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*Theory of International Politics by Kenneth N. Waltz. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979. 251 pp. \$7.95.*

Professor Waltz has given us a tightly written, tightly reasoned book, elaborating a systems-theory approach to international politics. Two chapters (2 and 3) on "reductionist" and systemic theories appeared earlier in the author's 1975 essay, "Theory of International Relations" (*Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 8, *International Politics*). Waltz has expanded these somewhat. The essential arguments of two other chapters (1 and 6) also appeared in the 1975 essay. The reader must presume that the justification for publishing this book must then be either the more convenient format of a separate paperback or the additional arguments offered in the expanded first six chapters and in the new chapters at the book's end. However, the arguments of these last chapters—that interdependence is low in the current state system and that a bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar system—do not need the preceding chapters. Waltz leads his reader through brilliant demolitions of reductionist theories (Hobson's, Lenin's, and Galtung's theories of imperialism) and through the overly severe criticisms of the not so systemic (according to Waltz) systems theories of Kaplan, Hoffmann, and Rosecrance. He also gives his own conceptions of a systems theory (distilled on pp. 88-101). These are important: it will help us look at the world, and a systems theory, somewhat differently—and more fruitfully. However, while the preliminaries are important in their own right, and the author uses the ideas to defend his balance of power approach to world politics, they are neither used nor necessary for Waltz's last three chapters (although he asserts otherwise). Moreover, the last chapters are disappointing, because the repeated claims Professor Waltz makes for systems theory are not substantiated. We cannot say that, given the author's theory, it follows that a system of two great powers is more stable (and the states more secure and less economically interdependent) than in a system of many great powers. It is plausible perhaps—but still debatable—that such is indeed the case. Systems theory simply does not help the theses all that much, except analogically; and economic theories of the firm and markets are more important analogically than systems theory in Waltz's arguments.

For Waltz, "structure" is the basis of a correct and useful systemic approach to international politics; and structure is to be defined by an ordering principle, by the specification