

1 June 1962 8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of Dominican Operations for the Period  
Immediately Prior to, During, and Subsequent  
to Trujillo's Death.

1. The attached copy is the only one in existence. Because of the sensitive material included in the contents, a single copy was prepared by order of the Chief of the Division.

2. Immediately after Mr. McCone was sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence he met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy complained at some length about a communications and reporting failure on the part of CIA during the hours immediately following Trujillo's assassination. The Division was instructed to prepare a briefing for Mr. Robert Kennedy covering this period. Mr. Allen Dulles subsequently clarified and satisfied Mr. Kennedy on some of the questions raised. However, in as much as there has never been a full briefing of the Attorney General or any other high-level officer on the whole period, the attached paper has been prepared while those who participated in the events and who served in the Dominican Republic during the time under review, were still available for consultation and verification of the facts.

CWH

22 January 1962

SUBJECT: Review of Station Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic  
Operations from 1 January 1961 to Present

1. For five months prior to the assassination of General Raphael Leonodas TRUJILLO Molina on 30 May 1961, the CIA station at Santo Domingo was in charge of a Senior Operations officer

Due to the

"police state" nature of the Trujillo government, the normal operational pattern of a CIA station was not followed in the Dominican Republic. Also, the fact that formal diplomatic relations did not exist at this time between the United States Government and the Trujillo Government was a definite limiting factor on our capability to establish basic clandestine operations. However, the COS in concert with the Consul General was able to establish direct contact with leaders of various opposition groups whose sole aim at this time was to bring about the assassination of General Trujillo. Among the opposition leaders from whom the COS was able to obtain information were prominent local figures who are opposed to Trujillo.

all of whom had direct relations with

the leader of the largest opposition group

In addition to opposition leaders, the Station developed an

and used a agent as.

sources of information in the country at this time.

2. Although the station was not given Headquarters authorization to participate directly in the plans for assassinating Trujillo, the Agency did assist Dominican exile groups in the United States in the form of money and moral support. At a meeting of the Special Group on 12 January 1961,

stated that the Department of State felt that a limited number of small arms and other materials should be made available to dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Operational security considerations prescribed that the dissidents make their own arrangements for receipt by which the source of the arms could not be identified.

3. When opposition plans to attempt the assassination reached the stage that it would be attempted at any time, the COS arranged with an opposition leader for the passing of a coded telephone message which, when made, would confirm that the attempt had been successful. When the assassination was carried out successfully, the station, when it received the message, was able to verify the fact many hours before it was announced officially by Dominican authorities. Immediately following the assassination, the station obtained additional details from an informant and three other sources which had previously been developed by the Station for the purpose of following up on such an eventuality.

4. Communications during the period immediately following

the assassination of Mujillo: On the night of the assassination, the CIA emergency radio equipment was in operation, manned by

Since all commercial communications in the Dominican Republic were suspended at this time, the Agency equipment provided the sole transmission and receiving capability available to the Consulate and to the station during this critical period. This equipment provided uninterrupted service and encountered no technical breakdowns or personnel limitations in servicing the radio traffic of both the Consulate and the CIA station. It was through this facility that the first word of the assassination reached U.S. authorities in Washington; in fact, this information was received about 10 hours before any other radio facility in the Dominican Republic transmitted the information out of the country.

5. At Headquarters during the period 31 May to 7 June, a CIA officer attended several high level meetings of U.S. Government officials where developments in the Dominican Republic were evaluated. The first meeting on 31 May in the War Room of the Department of State was attended by Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Attorney General Kennedy, General Cabell, Mr. Richard Goodwin of the White House, among others. The CIA officer presented a review of current intelligence on the situation in the Dominican Republic and later presented information summarizing Communist activities which could affect the stability of the Dominican government.



6. On 1 June, the Department of State received cable information from Consul General DEARBORN in Ciudad Trujillo that there were reports of fighting in the interior of the country by elements in opposition to the Trujillo government. The CIA employee through the President of the United Fruit Company, was able to obtain information on 2 June to the effect that sources in the interior of the Dominican Republic reported that situation as normal and that no evidence of opposition fighting existed.

7. Other Headquarters actions to meet the critical situation in the Dominican Republic during the period 31 May - 4 June were as follows:

a. Station in Dominican Republic was directed to send selected agents into the interior of the country to determine any activity on the part of insurgent groups.

b. and FBIS were alerted to pay special attention to information concerning the Dominican Republic and any action by Cuba tied in with this matter.

c. Reviewed commercial cover possibilities and evaluated those persons in the Dominican Republic who might be approachable as reporting agents on a crash basis.

d. Prepared to contact agency assets in Puerto Rico with a view of sending them into Dominican Republic at the appropriate time as intelligence reporters.

e. Instructions were sent to Station in Dominican Republic that all intelligence information on crisis should be channeled through CIA communications facilities.

f. Headquarters desk was directed to collect together all information on official Dominican missions sent to Moscow recently and official Dominican contacts with any other Communist countries anything known on Communists visiting the Dominican Republic in recent months and anything known on or suspected on Communists holding positions in the Trujillo Government at home or abroad.

g. A senior operations officer was dispatched to Haiti to report on all activities in that area which had a bearing on developments in the Dominican Republic.

h. A Headquarters officer and two radio technicians were assigned to the U.S. Navy cruiser Northhampton which, with other units of the Navy was standing off the Dominican coast. WH Division case officers in Miami and New York debriefed CONTACTS of General Tomas DIAZ, one of the leaders of the assassination plot. Results of the briefings were made available to the intelligence community.

i. WH Division placed five experienced Cuban radio operators on the alert for immediate dispatch to the Dominican Republic should the situation warrant such action.

j. Reviewed information on the types of arms normally used by the Dominican Army. The purpose of this study was to prepare for any eventuality in the event support was required by forces opposed to the Trujillo government.

k. CIA forward operating base in Miami was directed to determine how it could be used in setting up exfiltration operations from Puerto Rico or possibly from islands in the East Bahamas. It was believed that two boats then under the forward operating bases control could be used in such an operation.

1. A preliminary study was made of the feasibility regarding resupply operations to the Dominican Republic from either Eglin Air Base or Puerto Rico.

m. One Miami base yacht was prepared for possible exfiltration operations in the Dominican Republic. All steps necessary to move the yacht to San Juan, Puerto Rico were made and a CIA officer assumed responsibility for any negotiations with the U.S. Navy that might be necessary to provide dockage in San Juan.

n. Plans for an augmentation force to accompany U.S. ground forces, should they go into the Dominican Republic, were developed in conjunction with the War Plans Staff.

o. Through the efforts of a CIA officer kept the former advised that the situation in the Dominican Republic appeared to be normal. He advised the officer that his assistant manager had travelled to the north and west coasts and found the situation to be quite calm.

8. To avoid any possible charge of U.S. involvement in the assassination by Dominican authorities, the COS and

were withdrawn from the Dominican Republic on June and were replaced by two senior officers who had been dispatched to Ciudad Trujillo on June. additional personnel also arrived at this time and were on duty for the month of June.

9. Due to a more relaxed operational atmosphere, the new CIA officers in the Dominican Republic were able to expand on the






recruitment of agents and within the next five months developed the following sources of information.

Sub-paragraphs a thru ff deleted because they contain information which identifies sensitive CIA sources.

10. Following the departure of the remaining members of the Trujillo family from the Dominican Republic on 19 November 1961, the station has been building up its assets to meet current operational responsibilities. The following informants, etc., have the capability to report positive intelligence on the present Dominican situation.

Sub-paragraphs a thru m deleted because they contain information which identifies sensitive CIA sources.



2,

3,

Agents in Puerto Rico

Sub-paragraphs a and b deleted because they contain information which identifies sensitive CIA sources.

11. As a direct result of CIA assistance to Dominican political exiles when they were living in Washington, New York, and Miami before and immediately after the assassination of General TRUJILLO, the Agency now enjoys extremely close relations with the new government of the Dominican Republic. These relations were principally developed through regular meetings with four individuals who received funds and other assistance, mainly in the field of propaganda, from CIA officers. On a visit to the United States in October 1961, three other leaders met with WH Division officers. Through the contacts living in the United States it was possible for the Agency to pass financial assistance to the wives of members of the



Third National Assets in Place

Sub-paragraphs a thru c deleted because they contain information which identifies sensitive CIA sources.

Dominican Agent Assets which can be Introduced into the Dominican Republic

Sub-paragraphs a and b deleted because they contain information which identifies sensitive CIA sources.

Third National Assets which can be Introduced into the Dominican Republic

Sub-paragraphs a thru c deleted because they contain information which identifies sensitive CIA sources.

after the assassination were forced into hiding; their wives  
the meantime, had fled to \_\_\_\_\_ where they were in des-  
ate financial straits. This Agency-sponsored help has done  
to influence favorably the subsequent actions of

12. Following is a list of Dominican political, military  
and labor leaders who have been developed as Agency assets to  
case officer work in both the United States and in the Domini-  
Republic.

List of covert CIA assets deleted from pages 14, 15, and 16.

13. Current and Future Plans

a. Following the assassination of Generalissimo Trujillo, in the Dominican Republic, the Agency began a program designed to aid and strengthen the development of viable, non-Communist organizations to play an active role in the post-Trujillato political life of the country. The leading instrument we chose was

, a moderate organization composed largely, but not exclusively, of middle class elements. Another smaller group

has worked within the organization its members are pro-United States and strongly anti-Communist. Since the time of the assassination, the / organization has grown considerably and now enjoys a membership of well over 100,000. The majority of leaders are vigorous young men, well-intentioned though at times politically immature. During the Trujillo era, many served in the underground; several were jailed and tortured.



b. A second instrument which is being given Agency support is a leftist group

The leftist group was founded in exile and had no following in the Dominican Republic until after the death of Trujillo when it sent three of its leaders to the country to begin organizational activities there. Lack of popular appeal for this party perhaps can be attributed to the fact that its leaders enjoyed the comforts of exile throughout the years that the Dominican people were subjected to the hardships of the dictatorial regime. A second reason may be the internal strife which has been plaguing the leadership of the party (e.g. of three leaders originally sent to the Dominican Republic to do organizational work, only one is still a member of the organization).

c. A third organization, the Partido Catorce de Junio, was considered for Agency support but none was ever given.

Reasons for this were the increasing indications that the PCJ from its inception was well infiltrated by pro-Communist and pro-Castro elements who had gained effective control of the organization. The PCJ appears to have decisively become a pro-Communist party on 5 January 1962, when the moderate, non-Communist persons at the leadership level resigned en masse.

14. The events of the period 16-18 January 1962 during which the Council of State, composed largely of UCN adherents was ousted for 48 hours by a military coup, headed by General Rodriguez Echavarría, only to be returned to power on 18 January by a counter-

coups against the General, shows the UCN  
as the leading political organization to support in the Dominican  
Republic during this period of coalition government.

15. Until elections for President are held in December 1962,  
it appears that the Council of State, headed by acting President  
Bonnelly, a UCN member, will control the political life of the  
country.

The need for the development of an effective intelligence service is also recognized and a team, under Agency sponsorship, will be sent to the Dominican Republic to examine the existing facilities and make recommendations as to case officer needs, organizational set-up, relationship between military intelligence and police intelligence, etc. More substantive action such as positioning of a case officer in Santo Domingo to aid the government in this field is being processed. An arrangement has been made between WHD and IOD whereby a Covert Associate, is to be dispatched to the Dominican Republic in February on a PCS basis to work in the labor field. This matter is considered urgent since the possibility of establishing an effective nationwide federation exists, but organizational skill is now lacking in the movement. Preparations for Agency activity in the fields of youth, students, and agrarian reform are also being developed by Headquarters in coordination with the field station.