

37. C. J. P.

28 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Request for Guidance on the Dominican Republic

1. The following questions are for your use in connection with your meeting with State officials on the Dominican Republic:

To what extent will the U. S. government participate in the overthrow of Trujillo?

- a. Would it provide the internal opposition with the arms and equipment needed to insure a successful revolt? *Not yet.*
- b. Would it provide paramilitary experts to be infiltrated into the area to assist the underground and exfiltrate such individuals as necessary? *No.*
- c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene? *Yes.*
- d. If necessary, would it help establish clandestine radio facilities for commo between the underground and the outside? *Yes.*
- e. Would overflights for leaflet dropping be permitted over the Dominican Republic? *Very close.*
- f. Would the U. S. government use its influence with U. S. labor organizations to effect a labor boycott? *No.*
- g. Would U. S. armed forces be available to enter the area to protect the lives and property of U. S. citizens or at the request of the CAS or a provisional government to preserve stability and order within the Republic? *Yes.*
- e. What will be our policy with respect to recruiting in place or induced defection of Dominican diplomats? *Not I.*

AC/WH/3

WORKING PAPER FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I. PROBLEM

For as long as the present regime of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo has been in power there have been internal and exile groups working toward his overthrow. Within the past few years as the climate for dictatorships has become increasingly unfavorable in Latin America as a whole and as a result of the determination of Fidel Castro and his government to bring about his demise, opposition to Trujillo has become more intense and with more hope for success. As opposition to his regime has increased, Trujillo has been driven to excesses which have further undermined his position. Within the past year the most knowledgeable sources have been predicting that his downfall is imminent.

Until recently the U.S. has remained aloof from these opposition activities against Trujillo. This has caused resentment against the U.S. among influential Dominicans and has seriously damaged our prestige in the Hemisphere for our failure to pursue a policy designed to bring about a democratic regime in the Dominican Republic. It has also brought us dangerously close to a Castro-Communist takeover of the Republic. While the hour is very late, it is still possible for the U.S. to regain some of the prestige it lost on this issue and also forestall loss of the Dominican Republic to Castro and the Communists. Since the fall of Trujillo appears inevitable, it is to our interest to bring it about in such a way that the basic credit for it accrues to the U.S. The U.S. has reason to fear a severe reaction against it no matter how Trujillo falls. The resentment of years against the Trujillo regime built up by the Dominican people, primarily among the intellectuals and the upper classes, will be directed against the U.S. as well as against all members of the Trujillo family, since this group believe that the perpetuation of the regime and its atrocities has been the responsibility of the U.S. Only by taking positive and decisive action now can we hope to reduce the reaction against the U.S. to manageable proportions. Equally, if not more important, U.S. action against Trujillo will prepare a more favorable climate in the Hemisphere for action against the Castro government since most countries consider Trujillo equally if not more undesirable than Castro. The problems of Trujillo and Castro are inseparably linked as far as the Latin American countries are concerned. Our friends in the Hemisphere would have difficulty in accepting and justifying our action against Castro if we allowed Trujillo to stand; it would perpetuate our vulnerability on the issue of supporting or tolerating area dictatorships.

II. OBJECTIVE

To precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 August 1960 or as soon as possible thereafter.

III. PROPOSALS

a) That henceforth the prime motive force against the Trujillo regime will be the U.S. A coordinated program involving overt and covert action will be begun immediately.

b) That the center for exile activities directed against the Dominican Republic will be New York City. The present policy of delegating this role to Caracas or to San Jose enhances the prestige of Venezuela and * of Costa Rica in the Hemisphere rather than the U.S. It is we whose prestige needs to be bolstered. It is highly desirable that unmistakable signs make it evident to the Hemisphere as well as to Trujillo himself that an unofficial covert campaign against the Trujillo regime has been undertaken with at least the tacit approval of the U.S. Government.

c) Inform the nucleus of Dominican exiles we are presently in contact with in the U.S. that henceforth they will be given unlimited assistance in their plans short of paramilitary operations involving the invasion of the Republic by troops of any kind. The short time available would probably preclude such an operation and, according to the exiles, sufficient opposition strength already exists within the country. The underground strength is reported to be between 3-4,000 men. Arms rather than men are needed.

d) On or about 1 August 1960 have a top representative of the U.S. present Trujillo with an ultimatum to resign immediately (State Plan). The representative should be accompanied by a sizeable show of military strength. This military force would be available for the following purposes or contingencies:

- 1) Demonstrate to Trujillo that we mean business.
- 2) If Trujillo succumbs to the ultimatum, the force will be used in the Dominican Republic to maintain order during the transition period from dictatorship to democracy. The force would be invited to enter the country at the request of Trujillo or the OAS.
- 3) If Trujillo rejects the ultimatum, it will be available for entry into the country at the request of a provisional government in the event of a successful revolt.
- 4) It will be available for unilateral military action if it appears that Castro-Communist forces are taking over the country after Trujillo's overthrow.

e) In the event Trujillo refuses to abdicate, consideration should be given to other overt or covert actions designed to effect his removal from the scene.

* political leader

IV. COURSES OF ACTION

- a) Secure immediate approval of the general plan in coordination with the Department of State and the Department of Defense.
- b) Effect such coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service as may be necessary to facilitate the movement of exiles to and from the U.S.
- c) Expand the present nucleus of exiles in New York to include all those exiles deemed essential to the success of the operation and its proper orientation.
- d) Set up channels of communication between the exiles in New York and the underground in the Dominican Republic to make certain that all vital information about the capability of the underground is known and to coordinate plans.
- e) Bring about acceptance as an absolute condition of our assistance that the Communists and Castro sympathizers be precluded from an active role in the downfall of the regime as much as possible and that these groups be absolutely prohibited from participating in the provisional government.
- f) Utilize the activities of democratic exiles led by Figueres and also those located in Puerto Rico. No cooperation will be effected with the exile groups in Caracas or Havana since the influence of the Communists and Castro are too strong in these places.
- g) Bring about general agreement between the exiles as to the composition of the provisional government and as to its orientation. The provisional government basically would be composed of leaders of the opposition within the country.
- h) Utilize the exiles to begin radio broadcasts from covert facilities in the Caribbean in preparation for the overthrow of the regime.
- i) Initiate an airborne leaflet campaign. Production of the leaflets could be handled in Puerto Rico and the overflights could originate from the Virgin Islands.
- j) At some point make Caribbean political/ ^{leaders} witting of our plan.
- k) Mobilize covert assets to begin an intensive anti-Trujillo campaign.
- l) Arrange a boycott of Dominican shipping through U.S. labor and Dominican exile labor groups.
- m) Have CCSEC, the free world international student organization, stage a world-wide student demonstration against Trujillo and wage a continuing campaign against him.

n) Secure the cooperation of the Catholic Church to increase its pressure on Trujillo.

o) Encourage Latin American governments to break relations with the Dominican Republic.

p) Attempt to bring about the defection of high-level Dominicans. Unexplored leads available indicate that perhaps the Dominican Ambassadors to the U.S. and Mexico could be defected.

q) Assure that all agencies of the U.S. Government avoid any action which would have the effect of strengthening the Trujillo regime as well as taking every opportunity to register disapproval of the regime.

V. THIRD

By 1 July all necessary arrangements for implementing this plan must be accomplished. The military force has to be in a state of readiness during the month of July ready to move in the event Trujillo is overthrown before 1 August and it appears that a Castro-Communist take-over is imminent. During the month of July the action phase, involving pressure on the regime through all means, will be carried out.