

from this assurance is that none of the vast treasure poured out to the Cuban groups reached Oswald.

Indeed, it was not possible to give this assurance. McCone, accompanied by his then assistant, now the agency's head, Richard M. Helms, followed Hoover on the stand (5H120H). Helms' statement to the Commission is likewise inconclusive, although it was taken to be and without scrutiny seems to be. He said (5H121):

On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all of our records searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card files and our personal files and all our records.

Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been suggested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no material in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated with him.

Shades of U-2, the Bay of Pigs, Laos and a hundred other ghosts! The Commission believed this, or at least said it did. What is missing here also is the assurance the CIA had no way of making, that Oswald had no relationship with it through groups it sponsored or financed.

The FBI and CIA had no way of making these assurances, yet the Commission seemed able to jump to the conclusion that Oswald had no relations with the government even through any front or agency of any government branch.

Going along with this, the Commission also had indication that Oswald was other than he seemed to be, other than it made him out to be. Recall the official story, when added up, that Oswald was a Marxist, Marine, who had a "confidential" security clearance, one of the lower categories, who knew the secret radar codes and told the United States Embassy in Moscow that he was giving them and all other secret knowledge

possessed to the Soviet Union, and for this was never unpunished on his return. What is fact but not conspicuous part of the official story is that he would

When men were being discharged from the armed forces for real or imagined connections with Communism, or those described as "Communist fronts" it is stretching credibility to believe it was Oswald, self-styled a "Marxist," who taught himself Russian and openly subscribed to Russian aims, to have enjoyed any kind of security clearance. This dichotomy did not trouble the Commission. It managed to avoid gathering evidence bearing on this.

My writings on the assassination and its official investigation have been restricted to what comes from the official information. Here I make a minor departure because I think it is important.

At one o'clock in the early morning of December 15, 1963, in the Oakland, California, studios of Radio Station KNEW, I had just finished appearing on a radio program on which listener's comments or questions about the assassination and its investigation. There was a man on the line who had called toward the end of the program. He wanted to speak to me but not on the air. Further, he wanted the assurance that our conversation would be private. This was, of course, mysterious. I took the call.

The caller was disturbed by the "beep" on the line associated that with the required signal for recording. I assured him that the engineer was not on it, that he was not being taped, and that he could talk to the engineer to learn these things. Overhearing this, the engineer explained to me and I to the caller that, with phone-in programs, the beep is automatically built into the line so there can be no possibility of listeners not knowing the conversation is being broadcast. The stranger on the other end of the line was partly

satisfied. He alluded to this being several times in the next hour and a half. We talked that long.

It was part confessional, part shame mixed with self-pity and self-derogation, part fear, and all worry. This man had been in the Marine Corps with Oswald. From his personal experience, he did not believe a single word about the Report. He had agonized in silence for the three years between the issuance of the Report and our conversation because he knew things, he said, that had not been made public and were not in accord with what had been publicized—and he was certain what he knew was correct.

Following his military service, he had built a successful life, had a family, and was worried about the possible consequences of being associated with any account not in consonance with the official Oswald "line." He feared he or his business might be hurt or that his family might suffer. By no means could I assure him that nothing would happen. I did encourage him to consider the importance to the country, to his family and himself, of any information he might possess.

But he would talk only in anonymity. I respect his desires and will not reveal the few unintended clues to his identity that slipped out. I have made and will make no effort to trace him.

Briefly, it is his story that Oswald was bright, not a hunk of any kind, not a blatant or proselytizing Marxist, and really a quiet, serious guy. They knew each other socially and engaged in certain recreational activities together. He never heard Oswald say anything about Communism, for or against, in all this time.

More important is what he disclosed about Oswald's position in the Marine Corps. The unit in which both served, said my informant, was one of three similar ones of which one was always in Japan and the others in the United States. Their function was classified.

Every man in the outfit carried security clearance. They had a security designation of which I had never heard. These were that kind of unusual military organizations.

Of all the men in the outfit, five had special "top" security approvals. The entire complement carried a minimum of "confidential" (the grade the official file records Oswald as having had). Above this there were "secret," "top secret," and a special one, "crypto." Of all the men, only five were "crypto."

One of these was Lee Harvey Oswald!

"Can you possibly be wrong?" I asked him.

He insisted not.

"Could your memory be playing tricks?"

No, he was positive. He went farther when I questioned him about "crypto," which he indicated was "black box" stuff. I took it to mean a connection with nuclear weapons.

If correct, this is more than in disagreement with the nine official story of Oswald, his relations with the government and the assassination. It is an assault on the integrity of many of the members of the staff of the Commission and of the investigative agencies. It raises questions about the transcripts of Oswald's official Marine Corps records. In every way he could, this man insisted he was not in error, that he knew.

And he went into more detail. Correctly stating that Oswald got a "hardship" discharge so he could care for an allegedly destitute mother (it was common knowledge among his mates that Oswald had said he planned to go to Switzerland for study instead), the mysterious caller specified that Oswald spent his last two or three weeks in the service "with CID." It is, obviously, not a requirement of a "hardship" discharge that the enlisted man stay with military intelligence.

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aspects of Oswald's discharge (pages 122-4) that are here appropriate. That section reads:

With but 43 days of his Marine Corps entitlement remaining, or three months if the penalties of the courts martial had been imposed (19H725), Oswald received a "harshness discharge" (19H696). This was a clear fraud about which neither the Marine Corps nor any other government agency ever did anything. Why?

There are 112 pages of photocopies of Oswald's Marine Corps records reproduced at one point in the 16 volumes of hearings and exhibits (19H656-768), but that record is incomplete in at least one major respect.

This series of documents shows Oswald enlisted on October 24, 1956. He was twice court-martialed, once for the drunken offense of many servicemen and once for an even more unusual departure from regulations. The second breach, in non-military language, consisted of swearing at a non-commissioned officer and assaulting him "by pouring a drink on him on or about 20 June 1958 at the Bluebird Cafe, Yamato, Japan." He was sentenced to a \$55.00 fine and four weeks at hard labor; the second part waived on condition of good behavior. Less than six months earlier he had been court-martialed for accidentally shooting himself with his own loaded .32-caliber pistol, possession of which was prohibited. The generous Marines found this injury "was incurred in line of duty and not related to misconduct." His sentence was 20 days at hard labor, a \$50.00 fine, reduction in rank to private, with the confinement at hard labor suspended for six months unless sooner vacated (19H663-4, 682-4, 692, 707-8, 747-52).

Of Oswald's personal activity in the Marines, the Report states: "He studied the Russian language, read a Russian-language newspaper and seemed interested in what was going on in the Soviet Union." Oswald was referred to as "command" and "Oswaldskovich" (R3488). But his clearance to handle classified information was not revoked. It was granted May 3, 1957, "after careful checks." Upon discharge he signed a form acknowledging he had been informed about penalties for revelation of classified information. This included awareness "that certain categories of Reserve and Retired personnel . . . can be recalled to duty . . . for trial by court-martial for unlawful disclosure of information . . ." (19H686). When Oswald defected and appeared in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, he declared his intention to tell the Russians all he knew, and he knew about the radar installations in which he served and of codes (R3612, 161, 193). The Report is barren on the subject, but there have been accounts published of the necessity for changing codes after his defection.

Yet on his return to the United States, Oswald was not kept under regular surveillance (R439), was not charged with breach of security, and was not even confronted with the fraudulent nature of his harshness discharge. Explanations of lack of proof might be offered, no matter how unacceptable, for the failure to charge him with breach of security. But the failure to keep him under surveillance or to do anything about his fraudulent discharge are not susceptible to such facile pleadings. And

Report is incomplete on even this unsatisfactory explanation. It says "No evidence has been found that they used him for any particular propaganda or other political or informational purposes" (R393). There is no reference here to military or security information.

The harshness discharge was to enable Oswald to care for his mother, made not even a gesture in this direction and the Marine Corps did appear to have been aware that he had no such intention. The active date of his discharge was September 11, 1959 (19H686; 22H79). On September 4, 1959, he applied for a passport from Santa Ana, California. It was issued September 10, 1959. Accompanying this application was a Marine Corps certification that had to be filed with the passport application and submission of which is noted on the application. "This is to certify," it read, "that PFC (E-3) Lee Harvey Oswald, 1633330, US Marine Corps is scheduled to be released from Active Duty and transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve (Inactive) on 11 September 1959."

Under "Occupation" on the application, Oswald described himself as a "hopping export agent." The places he intended visiting included Rumania and Russia. During a proposed length of stay of only four months, he said he was going to be a student at "the College of A. Schweitzer" in Switzerland and the University of Turku, in Finland. He had all of transportation arrangements made and specified in the application that he would leave New Orleans by Grace Line ship September 21, 1959 (22H77-9).

The Marine Corps certification of Oswald's imminent discharge that accompanied his passport application at the very time it was processing his harshness discharge was not lost in the mass of the Commission's documentation. Nor is it suppressed in the Report. Instead, the Report notes both this and the fraudulent nature of the discharge in the text of a 13-line section of Appendix XV in which the nature of this charge is not referred to, notes that a statement that "he was about to be discharged" accompanied the passport application (R746). Why not the Marine Corps revoke Oswald's security clearance; why did it keep him in a classified job and cooperate in getting him a passport while it was discharging him so he could support his mother? This is the background of Oswald's now famous trip to the Soviet Union, where he arrived in mid-October 1959.

After an hour and a half of this, when there was nothing but repetition, I wondered if I would be able to waken for a pre-dawn television show in San Francisco. I had to call an end to it, yet was reluctant to because there lingered the hope that, in talking, this man might suddenly find the courage to go public.

Finally, I asked him to write me an anonymous letter, setting forth all he had said and anything else he might recall and noting anything that came to his mind that would tend to substantiate his story. First,

he protested that his handwriting could be checked, I suggested he type it. Typewriters, too, could be traced, he demurred. Finally, he said he might write it all down and then get someone he could trust to transcribe it in a hand that could not be traced to him. He would think it over.

That was eighteen weeks before this writing, although it seems much longer. He has been silent.

Of the things he mentioned, "Crypto" security clearance bothered me; I had never heard of it. From time to time I asked reporters about it. In February 1967, when I was in Boston, I mentioned this strange post-midnight telephone call to Bob Scott, newsmen at WNAO, who has connections with people who had been in military intelligence. He soon phoned to report that there had been such a security designation.

But certain parts of his story sounded provokingly familiar, so as soon as I got home I started checking against the Commission evidence. One thing I recalled closely coincided with parts of this information.

At the first opportunity I reread the May 18, 1964, testimony of Kerry Wendell Thornley, a former Marine Corps buddy of Oswald (11H82H). Thornley was questioned by Assistant Counsel Albert E. Jenner, Jr., who had played the minor part in the New Orleans interrogations, most of which had been conducted by Liebel. One thing was immediately obvious: Thornley's testimony was physically separated from 100 percent of the other testimony about Oswald's Marine Corps career. It is all alone on this subject in Volume 11, which the preface also makes clear. This confirmed my hunch that I had to reread this testimony that I had not studied for two years.

Sure enough, what I seemed to recall is there.

Thornley had an apparently incorrect recollection that, because of his court martial for the enlisted man's dream offense, pouring a drink on his sergeant's head, Oswald had temporarily lost his security clearance and

assigned to janitorial duties. This follows: (11H-

45)

Mr. Jenner: I was going to ask you what losing clearance meant. You have indicated that—or would you state it more specifically?

Mr. Thornley: Well, that meant in a practical sense, that meant that I was not permitted to enter certain areas wherein the equipment, in this case equipment, was kept; that we would not want other unauthorized persons to have knowledge of. And on occasion information, I imagine, would also come to the man who was cleared, in the process of his work, that he would be expected to keep to himself.

Mr. Jenner: I assume you had clearance?

Mr. Thornley: Yes, sir; I was, I think, cleared for confidential at the time.

Mr. Jenner: Cleared for confidential. I was about to ask you what level of clearance was involved.

Mr. Thornley: I believe it was just confidential to work there at El Toro on that particular equipment.

Mr. Jenner: That is the clearance about which you speak when you talk about Oswald having lost it?

Mr. Thornley: Oswald, I believe, had a higher clearance. This is also what based upon rumor. I believe he at one time worked in the security files, it is the SEC files, somewhere at LTA or at El Toro.

Mr. Jenner: Did you ever work in the security files?

Mr. Thornley: No, sir.

Mr. Jenner: And that was a level of clearance—

Mr. Thornley: Probably a secret clearance would be required.

Mr. Jenner: It was at least higher than the clearance about which you first spoke?

Mr. Thornley: Yes, sir.

This story of Oswald's having a high security clearance is not consistent with most material in other volumes or with the Report. Note also Thornley's unprovoked recollection of Oswald's "having worked in the security files, it is the S & C files." This is hardly a normal assignment for enlisted men who learn to speak Russian, ostensibly for themselves, openly subscribe to Communist publications and are ostentatiously pro-"Marxist."

The Thornley testimony is not inconsistent with the information that destroyed the peace of mind of my worried California informant. It is testimony that Jenner, who in late 1966 and 1967 was one of the members of the staff of the former Commission most vocal in its

defense and his own (though he always managed not to show up for those electronic confrontations with me that he had earlier accepted), as a competent and experienced lawyer, should have latched onto and probed and prodded until he had obtained from Thornley all the witness knew. It is not at all out of step with his own and the Commission's record that Jenner did not. Need we wonder longer why this testimony alone was separated from the other evidence on Oswald's Marine Corps career?

Thus, what might have been a major revelation remains instead one of the major mysteries, officially hidden by the Commission but now, I think, smoked out. It is particularly pertinent in the developing New Orleans story.

There are many other things in the record that bear on this, some negatively. For example, no member of the staff ever pursued this strange inconsistency, Oswald the Marxist in a position of high security trust in the Marine Corps. It should have been a troubling legal hangnail to each and every one, and to the members of the Commission. Instead, the Commission used the least desirable method of gathering "testimony" and that on a selective basis only. *Ex parte* and incompetent depositions were taken from Thornley, Nelson Delgado (3H228-65), another former Oswald Marine Corps dunn, and his former superior officer, Lt. John E. Donovan (3H289-303). From all the few others included in the record, there are but brief and insufficient affidavits.

With one exception, all reveal a Commission interest in whether Oswald was a homosexual. That exception is the man who arranged dates between Oswald and his sister.

Lieutenant Donovan, "the officer in command" of the crew in which Oswald served (3H290), when asked about whether the murdered accused assassin had been a homosexual:

Mr. Ely: I believe you mentioned earlier that he did not seem to you particularly interested in girls. Was this just because he was interested in other things, or do you have any reason to believe that there was anything abnormal about his desires?

Mr. Donovan: I have no reason to suspect that he was homosexual, and in that squadron at that time one fellow was discharged from the service for being homosexual. He was in no way tied in with it that I know of.... (3H300)

Perhaps Donovan's most significant testimony tends to cast Oswald in a different role than the Report and indicates the magnitude of the breach of security and military trust he threatened at the Moscow Embassy when going through the motions if not the actuality of defection:

Mr. Donovan: I recall that he got a hardship discharge. We offered to get him a flight—that is a hop from El Toro to some place in Texas, his home. He refused. We considered that normal in that if you take a hop you sacrifice your transportation pay. We offered to take him to a bus or train station. He refused. But that is not particularly unusual, either. I recall that he was gone for some period of time, and shortly before I got out of the Marine Corps, which was mid-December 1959, we received word that he had showed up in Moscow. This necessitated a bit of change of aircraft call signs, codes, radio frequencies, radar frequencies. He had access to the location of all bases in the west coast area, all radio frequencies for all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and the relative strength of all squadrons, number and type of aircraft in a squadron, who was the commanding officer, the authentication code of alerting and exiting the ADIZ, which stands for Air Defense Identification Zone. He knew the range of our radar. He knew the range of our radio. And he knew the range of the surrounding units' radio and radar....

Mr. Ely: You recall that various codes were changed. Now, at what level were these changed? Was this an action of your specific unit, or a fairly widespread action?

Mr. Donovan: Well, I did not witness the changing in any other squadrons, but it would have to be, because the code is obviously between two or more units. Therefore, the other units had to change it. These codes are a grid, and two lines correspond.... There are some things which he knew on which he received instruction that there is no way of changing, such as the MFS 16 height-finder radar gear. That had recently been integrated into the Marine Corps system. It had a height-finding range far in excess of our previous equipment, and it has certain limitations. He had been schooled on those limitations. It cannot operate above a given altitude in setting—in other words, you cannot place the thing above a given terrain height. He had also been schooled on a piece of machinery called a TPX-1, which is used to transfer radio—radar and radio signals over a great distance. Radar is very susceptible

to honing missiles, and this piece of equipment is used to put your radar antenna several miles away, and relay the information back to your site which you hope is relatively safe. He had been schooled on this. And that kind of stuff you cannot change.

Mr. Ely: Did Oswald have any kind of clearance?

Mr. Donovan: He must have had secret clearance to work in the radar center, because that was a minimum requirement for all of us (SH197-8).

Oswald's prerequisite for returning to the United States—a promise not to be prosecuted—is contrary to the regulations quoted from *Whiteuzh* above and with the seriousness of the promised offense. It is hardly enough to say, as does the government, that Oswald said he did not give secrets away. There was no official proceeding to discover the truth after he returned.

One of the longest depositions is that of Nelson Delgado (SH228-65). It was taken April 18, 1964, by Wesley J. Liebler. In its 37 pages much is destructive of the official case as set forth in the Report. Some of the most fascinating leads, whether or not lost upon Liebler, are not in the Report, not even by indirect. Some are consistent with an Oswald-government, Oswald-intelligence relationship.

Delgado concurred with the others in reporting Oswald's access to "secret" data (SH232). He placed Oswald in "the silent area. That is the war room" (SH259), not exactly where one expects the Marine Corps to assign "Communists."

In distributing mail in his barracks, Delgado learned that Oswald was getting Communist literature. Those superiors to whom he reported it, including a Lieutenant Delprado, "just brushed it off. He didn't seem to care" (SH260).

The homosexual questions also brought negatives. When Liebler came to the end of his long interrogation, he asked Delgado, "Can you think of anything else about him?"

Delgado said he had never seen Oswald drunk, though he knew Oswald drank an "occasional beer."

Liebler then asked, "Do you think he had any homosexual tendencies?"

Delgado replied, "No; never once," adding that "in fact, we had two fellows in our outfit that were caught at it, and he thought it was kind of disgusting . . ."

For all its pretended interest in ferreting out every detail of Oswald's history there is indication a few secrets remain, at least in the official record. This is revealed in part of Delgado's testimony that will also interest us in another sense. Oswald had been in Tijuana, Mexico, before the weekend that he, Delgado and some of their companions had a fling. Oswald knew his way around. As Delgado put it:

"We went down to Tijuana, hit the local spots, drinking and so on, and all of a sudden he says, 'Let's go to the Flamingo.' So it didn't register, and I didn't bother to ask him, 'Where is this Flamingo? How did you know about this place?' I assumed he had been there before, because when we got on the highway he told me which turns to take to get to this place, you know. (SH253)

"The bartender was a homosexual." Liebler wanted to be doubly sure. He asked, "Was that apparent to you?"

Delgado was positive. "Oh, yes; it was apparent to us . . ." (SH253).

Oswald's interest was not in this homosexual. He "shacked up" across the street from the bar:

Mr. Delgado: Right across the street from the jai-alai games, there are some hotels, these houses, you know; and as far as I knew, Oswald had a girl. I wasn't paying too much attention, you know, but it seemed to me like he had one. (SH253)

Delgado did not help the official account of Oswald's alleged rifle skill. This part of the story is mixed in with Delgado's complaints about the unfaithfulness of the FBI reports of their repeated pre-deposition interrogations—there were *four* of them (SH256), lasting *four* hours (SH240).

One report that Liebeler did not quote directly, from his reflection of it, placed Oswald, in a shooting competition with 40 men, "fifth from the highest." Delgado: "No; he didn't even place there." Of Oswald's "skill" Delgado said, "It was a pretty big joke, because he got a lot of Maggier's drawers, you know, a lot of misses, but he didn't give a damn." (SH235).

Delgado told the agents that on the rifle range Oswald "didn't show no particular aspects of being a sharpshooter at all" and that he didn't take care of his rifle and was penalized for this neglect (SH233).

The existence of Delgado's difficulties with the FBI agents is made clear but not the reason or reasons. Presumably these came in part from the vanity of one of the agents who spoke Spanish. It was not only native to Delgado, but he carried a military specialty designation for his fluency.

One of the reports entirely misrepresented what Delgado says he told the FBI agents. What Delgado displayed at the end of this excerpt from his testimony (SH238) is a medal:

Mr. Liebeler: Now, the report that I have says that Oswald, like most marines, took an interest in the pool—they call it a pool instead of a pot, but that is the same thing?

Mr. Delgado: Yes; pool.

Mr. Liebeler: Oswald took an interest in the pool, which was started for the marine getting the highest score. It says, however, "Delgado said neither he nor Oswald came close to winning."

Mr. Delgado: No, no; that is erroneous, because I won. He didn't win at all.

Mr. Liebeler: You never told these FBI agents that you yourself did not come close to winning?

Mr. Delgado: No; because I was—I was one of the highest ones there, I always had an expert badge on me.

Mr. Liebeler: You were a good rifle shot?

Mr. Delgado: Yes; just like I got one now (indicating).

Of one of the unpleasant episodes with the FBI that had to do with the agent's own opinion of his own competence in Spanish there is this account:

Delgado: No, I just know it was the spring because that is the everyone goes out to the. It's either going to be warm or it's going to be very cold when they go out there; it's never in between. I could not tell that, but that was the day I was upset, because this guy was badgering me.

Mr. Liebeler: You are talking now about the interview when the multi-speaking agent was present?

Mr. Delgado: Yes.

Mr. Liebeler: Which one of them kept badgering you?

Mr. Delgado: The Spanish agent.

Mr. Liebeler: What was he badgering you about?

Mr. Delgado: He kept on sitting—he'd been talking, he'd been looking at me, you know, and doing this (indicating), you know, and he was sitting just about where this gentleman is now, and I'd been looking at the corner of my eye, because I couldn't concentrate on what he was saying because he kept staring at me, and he was giving me a case of fitters, you know....

Mr. Liebeler: You and this agent did not strike it off too well?

Mr. Delgado: No, I am afraid not. We just spent hours arguing back and forth.

Mr. Liebeler: Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)

Delgado was far from alone in complaining about the "inaccuracy" of the FBI reports. Most witnesses, when asked of conflicts between their testimony and the FBI statements, made this specific. Others volunteered their objections. These include a number of Secret Service agents. Mrs. Sylvia Odio, among others, went further and said the FBI did not ask the right questions, either, as we shall see. This treatment of Delgado is hardly the kind calculated to elicit cooperation, if that is what the FBI wanted.

Liebeler did his own blundering. Although Oswald expended to be a Marxist, few if any of his companions really believed he was, although he always had Marxist literature conspicuously at hand and quoted from it. Oswald was a heavy reader and more serious both above average in intelligence and more serious than his companions. During a discussion of what Oswald read, this ensued:

Mr. Delgado: Yes; and then he had this other book. I am still trying to find out what it is. It's about a farm, and about how all the animals

take over and make the farmer work for them. It's really a socialist book, the way he was explaining it to me, and that struck me kind of funny. But he told me that the farmer represented the imperialistic world, and the animals were the workers, symbolizing that they are the socialist people, you know, and that eventually it will come about that the socialists will have the imperialists working for them, and things like that, like these animals, these pigs took over and they were running the whole farm and the farmer was working for them?

Mr. Liebeler: Is that what Oswald explained to you?

Mr. Delgado: Yes.

Mr. Liebeler: Did you tell the FBI about this?

Mr. Delgado: Yes.

Mr. Liebeler: Did they know the name of the book?

Mr. Delgado: No.

Mr. Liebeler: The FBI did not know the name of the book?

Mr. Delgado: It is called the Animal Farm. It is by George Orwell.

Mr. Liebeler: He didn't tell me. I asked him for the thing, but he wouldn't tell me. I guess he didn't know. The Animal Farm. Did you read it?

Mr. Delgado: Yes.

Mr. Liebeler: Is it really like that?

Mr. Delgado: Yes, there is only one thing that Oswald did not mention apparently and that is that the pigs took over the farm, and then they got to be just like the capitalists were before, they got fighting among themselves, and there was one big pig who did just the same thing that the capitalist had done before. Didn't Oswald tell you about that?

Mr. Delgado: No, just that the pigs and animals had revolutionized and made the farmer work for them. The Animal Farm. Is that a socialist book?

Mr. Liebeler: No.

Mr. Delgado: That's just the way you interpret it; right?

Mr. Liebeler: Yes. I think so. It is actually supposed to be quite an anti-Communist book.

Mr. Delgado: Is it really?

Mr. Liebeler: Yes.

Liebeler seemed suddenly to realize that he had set on record Oswald's anti-Communism before he went to the Soviet Union; he had, further, made this faux pas "alone and unassisted." Liebeler abruptly changed the subject at this point, asking before Delgado said another word if he and Oswald "began to cool off toward each other."

Probably the most provocative ignored part of Delgado's testimony is what can be interpreted not as the improbable interest of the Cuban consul in Oswald but of Oswald's intelligence contacts while he was still in

the Marines. When questioned about it separately, Delgado gave it as his opinion that Oswald's talk about Cuba and going there was not serious and "just barracks talk" (SH1243). In another part of the deposition (SH1250), Liebeler asked, "Did he later tell you he had been to the Cuban Consulate (in Los Angeles, near their base)?"

Delgado replied, "Yes; but I thought it was just his, you know, bragging of some sort."

Liebeler then asked, "You didn't really believe that he had?"

Delgado said, "Well, no . . ."

He volunteered the account of an unusual visitor to Oswald and conduct that could indicate an intelligence connection when answering a question about whether Oswald had visited the Cuban consulate, about which Delgado had no knowledge and which he did not believe. It began this way:

Mr. Delgado: . . . And I took it to be just a—one of his, you know, like you know, saying he was in contact with them, until one time I had the opportunity to go into his room I was looking for—I was going out for the weekend, I needed a tie, he lent me the tie, and I saw this envelope in his footlocker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters—you see, he would never go out, he'd stay near the post all the time. He always had money. That's why. . . . So then one particular instance, I was in the train station in Santa Ana, Calif., and Oswald comes in, on a Friday night. I usually make it every Friday night to Los Angeles and spend the weekend. And he is on the same platform, so we talked, and he told me he had to see some people in Los Angeles. I didn't bother questioning him. We rode into Los Angeles, nothing eventual happened, just small chatter, and once we got to Los Angeles, I went my way and he went his. I came to find out later on he had come back Saturday. . . .

Well, like I stated to these FBI men, he had one visitor; after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MF guard shack, and they gave me a call that Oswald had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve Oswald, who was on guard, to go down there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, 2 hours talking. I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back.

He never mentioned who he was, nothing.

Mr. Liebel: How long did he talk to him, do you remember?

Mr. Delgado: About an hour and a half, 2 hours.

Mr. Liebel: Was he supposed to be on duty that time?

Mr. Delgado: Right. And he had the guy relieve him, calling me about every 15 minutes, where is his the relief, where is the relief, you know, because he had already pulled his tour of duty and Oswald was posted to walk 4 hours and he only walked about an hour and a half before he received this visitor, you know, which was an odd time to visit, because it was after 6, and it must have been close to 10 o'clock when he had that visitor, because anybody, civilian or otherwise, could get on post up to 9 o'clock at night. After 9 o'clock, if you are not military you can't get on that post. So it was after 9 o'clock at night that he had the visitor, it was late at night (8H241-2).

At that time Delgado thought this might have been connected with Oswald's chatter about the Cuban consulate:

Mr. Delgado: . . . because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a late date—time. Also, up to this time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he very seldom received mail from home, because I made it a policy. I used to pick up the mail for our hut and distribute it to the guys in there, and very seldom did I see one for him. But every so often, after he started to get in contact with these Cuban people, he started getting little pamphlets and newspapers, and he always got a Russian paper, and I asked him if it was, you know, a Comrade paper—they let you get away with this in the Marine Corps in a site like this—and he said, "No, it's not Communist; it's a White Russian. To me that was Greek, you know, White Russian, so I guess he is not a Communist; but he was steady getting that periodical. It was a newspaper."

Mr. Liebel: In the Russian language?

Mr. Delgado: Right.

Mr. Liebel: And he received that prior to the time he contacted the Cuban consulate; did he not?

Mr. Delgado: Right. And he also started receiving letters, you know, and no books, maybe pamphlets, you know, little—like church, things we get from church, you know, but it wasn't a church.

Mr. Liebel: Were they written in Spanish any of them, do you know?

Mr. Delgado: Not that I can recall, no. (3H242)

Liebel then asked, "Did you have any reason to believe that these things came to Oswald from the Cuban consulate?" (8H243)

Delgado's response was equivocal, so Liebel rephrased the question: "You don't know for sure

whether it was from the Cuban consulate?"

At this time Delgado said, "No."

And it was "right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people" who were not "Cuban people" that Oswald told Delgado that "once he got out of the office he was going to Switzerland, he was going to school . . ." (8H243). Oswald did, in fact, apply for admission to the Albert Schweitzer college and used this as his excuse for foreign travel. He never went there, never made the pretense of going there, and there is now no reason to believe he ever intended going there. He bee-lined for the Soviet Union. The rest is history.

Bearing on this and to me one of the most fascinating of the too many raveled threads the Commission's lawyers left hanging is an FBI report of November 25, 1963, the first regular working day after the assassination. It is in file 75, one of the larger ones, page 677 of the second volume. It would seem to indicate the intelligence connections in New Orleans of an Oswald who could not have been Lee Harvey Oswald. But the Commission's lawyers were consistent. As they ignored all the abundant proofs of Lee Harvey's intelligence connections, so they left for the future the revelation of the real meaning of this, one of the very first, FBI interrogations.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 11/25/63

OSCAR W. DESLATTRE, Assistant Manager, Truck Sales, Bolton Ford Company, 1483 North Claiborne Avenue, advised that he recalled two men coming to Bolton Ford on January 20, 1961. He remembered the date and following information as he had in his possession:

sion a bid for purchase form made out to Friends Democratic Club, 402 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana (Telephone Number JA 5-0763).

He said a Mr. JOSEPH MOORE, whose description he cannot remember, nor can he furnish any other identifying data regarding him, advised him that he and his friend, were representing the above organization and wished to purchase ten Ford Econoline Trucks. DESLATTTE said MOORE listed the equipment he desired on the trucks, but he did not state whether they were for use here in the United States or were to be sent to Cuba. DESLATTTE quoted him the price and advised that he would make a \$75 profit on each truck. MOORE said that he thought they should get the trucks for no profit for his organization. MOORE then told him that he should change the name on the bid form from MOORE to OSWALD, no first name given. The individual with MOORE then said that was his name and it should go on the form as he was the man with the money and would pay for the trucks, if they were purchased.

DESLATTTE was exhibited a photograph of LEE HARVEY OSWALD and he said he cannot recall ever having seen him before nor could he say this was the individual who had come in with either of the men who came in as it was almost three years ago that they were there and only spent a short time with him. He said he remembered this incident, not by the name OSWALD, but because of the name of the organization represented.

DESLATTTE said that he, himself, filled out the above mentioned bid form completely and neither individual either handled it or signed it. He said that he made the original of this form available to them and retained a carbon copy of this form for his use, which he said he made available to the interviewing Agents.

On 11/25/63 at New Orleans, Louisiana File No. 89-69

WILLIAM F. MC DONALD & W. J. DAN-
JR./Ltr.—Date dictated 11/25/63.

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what the mind can do with an Oswald, not Lee Harvey Oswald, in this sort of relationship with one of the organizations so well known as CIA groups! With its assistance by the Commission, in whose files it exists, else can one do with it save ignore it? It cannot be ignored. It compels conjecture, and demands answer.

Is this Oswald a relative of Lee Harvey? If this is true, then Lee Harvey then in Russia, can it be inferred when he was in Russia he had a relative who had connections with U.S. intelligence, the CIA? If this, in fact, is true, does this indicate anything about Lee Harvey, when he was in Russia or before?

Harvey was not the only one of his name in the employ of the Reilly Coffee Company, his place of work, once he got settled in New Orleans and got a job. Is there a connection here?

The Reilly Coffee Company is across the street from the Main Post Office, which figures in this story, door to the Capital City Garage, where the FBI Secret Service cars were kept and where Lee Harvey hung out, and a block away from the Newman building, to which we will come in due time, where the centerstage actors in intelligence operations and the drama of Oswald in New Orleans could have been found.