NATIONAL AFFAIRS

a Soviet agent. If the Russians had recruited him as a spy, the reasoning ran, they would have advised him to stay in the Marine Corps, where he had some access to military secrets. If they had hired him as a killer, "they wouldn't have sent him to Texas with no money and a Russian wife.

But the question remained—did Oswald, when he got to Moscow on a tourist visa in October 1959, volunteer any information that helped the Russians shoot down Gary Powers's U-2 plane over Sverdlovsk six months later? The possibility seemed farfetched, but the commission, in its hearings, brought out two provocative facts. (1) Oswald, in 1957-58, served as a radar operator at two bases from which U-2 planes operated—Atsugi, Japan, and Cubi Point, near Manila, and (2) when he first visited the U.S. Embassy in Moscow he intimated he knew "something of special interest" that he planned to tell the Russians.

One paper among the 1,555 numbered documents in the Warren commission files was obviously addressed to that question. Commission Document No. 931, a memorandum from CIA director Richard Helms to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, was indexed "Lee Harvey Oswald's access to classified information about the U-2." But the memo itself was labeled "secret" and locked in the vault-like "Classified Records Area" of the National Archives, along with 389 other reports that the commission never made public.

Scratched: Last week, more than six years after the Warren commission was disbanded, the Helms-to-Hoover memo finally surfaced as the National Archives, after a year-long review with the CIA. FBI and other agencies, quietly scratched the "secret" and "confidential" labels from 85 commission documents. The newly declassified material, examined by Newsweek's Charles Roberts, shed little light on the assassination but did provide an answer of sorts to the U-2 riddle.

In his memo to Hoover, dated May 13, 1964, Helms tartly dismissed a letter from the FBI director suggesting that Oswald may have compromised the CIA's spy plane. His rejection of Hoover's inquiry, however, was based almost entirely on his assertion that U-2s operated at Atsugi and Cubi Point from hangar areas that were inaccessible to Oswald. Conceding that "there were rumors and gossip" about the U-2s and that Oswald "could have heard such gossip," Helms maintained "there is no information to indicate, nor is there reason to believe" that Oswald obtained "factual knowledge" of the U-2 or its mission.

Obviously annoyed at his rival intelligence chief, Helms pointed out that his agency's U-2 "did not gain worldwide notoriety" until the ill-fated Powers mission. "Therefore," he wrote, "it is highly unlikely that the term 'U-2' would have meant anything to Oswald, even if he had heard it and had been able to identify the term with any aircraft at Cubi Point, Atsugi or anywhere else."



Oswald and wife in Russia: No secrets

Helms's contention that Oswald was "unlikely" to understand the implications of the U-2 is itself unlikely to satisfy critics of the Warren commission. Neither will new tidbits of information in the other declassified papers. One long-anticipated "secret" CIA report on "Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnaping" is little more than a rehash of known murders and abductions by the Russian security police in the 1950s, with a conclusion by one ex-KGB agent that it was "highly unlikely" Moscow would order the liquidation of a U.S. President.

Grisly Reminders: Along with tran-scripts of four of the commission's eleven meetings, some 300 documents remain classified-kept in a room behind a combination lock that only three archivists are permitted to open. One, a CIA report, bears the intriguing title "Soviet Brainwashing Techniques." Another is a report on the FBI's interrogation of Yuri Nosenko, a KGB agent who defected to the U.S. ten weeks after the assassination. Also on the green metal shelves are such grisly reminders of Dallas as Presi-Kennedy's bullet-pierced jacket, dent Oswald's rifle, the autopsy pictures, the bullet that tell from John Connally's stretcher and even the movie camera with which dress manufacturer Abraham Zapruder filmed the assassination.

Barring a court order—three suits are now pending against the government under the Freedom of Information Act—the archives will not conduct another "declassification review" until 1975. Officials who have seen the still-sequestered documents scoff at the idea they would incriminate anyone other than Oswald. "But as long as there is one piece of paper still locked up," one archivist observed, "there will be somebody insisting that it holds the key to the assassination."

Oswald and the U-2

Among the countless questions left unanswered in 1964 when the Warren commission wound up its ten-month investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy was one that piqued scholars and assassination buffs alike: did Lee Harvey Oswald, when he defected to the Soviet Union, deliver any secrets about America's U-2 spy plane?

In its massive Report and Hearings, comprising nearly 10.7 million words, the commission dismissed, on good evidence, the notion that Oswald was ever

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

1-2 MAY 1964

Commission No

131

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT:

Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Information About the U-2

I. Reference is made to your letter, dated 13 April 1964, captioned "Lee Harvey OSWALD, Internal Security - Russia - Cuba", and to the attachment which contained statements made by one, Dugane J. HCBES, EMC. USN. Your letter requested certain information regarding subject's Marine assignment at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan, in 1987 and 1988. The remarks furnished below are addressed to the contents of your letter and to the statements in the attachment.

- 2. The Atsagi Naval Air Station is located approximately 35 miles south and west of Tokyo, Japan. At the time in question, Atsagi was a "closed" base in the sense that American and indigenous personnel entering the Station were required to possess official identification cards. Within the Station, the flight line areas were restricted, as is the case of all such Stations, and certain hangar areas were further restricted for the performance of classified functions.
- 3. The Joint Technical Advisory Crosp (JTAC) occupied an area within the Ctation, condicting of 20 to 25 individual residences, two dermitories, an office area, a power plant, several Batter-type werehouses, and a club building used for recreation and a backelor officers, meas. The JTAG area was not closed, but it was located about 600 yards from the main

BY DUTON BY BE CHARDEN ////

Name of the compression of the

Dan strift



Station area and there was no occasion for the regularly assigned Station personnel to visit the JIAC area. The club was open only to JIAC personnel and their gentse. Two of the living quarter were occupied by the Navy commanding officer and his deputy because the quarter set JIAC were of hetter quality than the liquing accommodations provided at the Station.

- 4. JUAG air activities were conducted from a classified hangar area at one end of the flight I'me. OSWALD did not have access to this area. Prior to the time in question, MAG had been publicized by itadio Oching as being a headquarters for American intelligence activity. For this reaton, and becau c JTAG was obviously not a past of the Naval Air Station complement, there were rumore and goodly regarding the unit and its activitie . This condition was regarded as normal under such circumstances. Being there at that time, CSWALD could have heard uch gossin; however, there is no information to indicate, nor is there reason to believe, that he obtained factual knowledge regarding STAG and its mission. (For your information, an incident involving the landing of a U-2 in a rice paddy in Managawa Prefecture, Japan, was reported in the press and aroused come public interest. That incident, however, occurred in December 1959, which was one time after OSWALD had left Japan).
- 5. There were no Navy personnel assigned to JTAG. Moreover JTAG did not participate in, or transfer any of, its activities to a Station in Bangkolt. Regarding the statement by HOBBS that a Navy Commander was recruiting Navy Personnel for an assignment in Bangkok, if is noted that the Navy at that time was conducting certain air reconnal esance activity from Atougi using other types of aircraft.
- 6. The following should be considered with respect to your source's assertions that CSWALD's squadron was in Cubi Foint, Philippine Islands in January 1953 where it kept its goar is in what the source now knows to have been a hangar for a U-2 airpians; and that the squadron was back in Atsugt, Japan in May 1958. The term "U-2" was not known rubbiely and did not gain world-wide retoriety until the ill-fated Towers mission some two years later. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the term "U-2" would have meant anything to CSVALD, even if he had heard it and had been able to identify the term with any mireraft at Cuin Point, at Atsugi or anywhere else.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED

By authority et: C.I.P. Lectus of 1-4-7/

- There is no evidence or indication that COVALD and any association with, or access to, the JTAC operation or its program in Japan. This applies also to information regarding the U-2 or its mission. Even if POVALD and seen a U-2 aircraft as Atongi or elsewhere, this fact would not have been considered unusual nor have constituted a treach of security. Umited public exposure of the craft treat but not of its nomentalization or mission was accepted as a necessary risk. It is most unlikely that COVALD had the necessary prerequisites to differentiate between the U-2 and other ningraft engaged in classified missions which were similarly visible at Atongi at the same time.
- 8. A copy of this mercorandum is being forwarded to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.

M(Signed) School Bales

Richard Fleims

Deputy Director for Plans

CSCI - 3/781, 351

CC-President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED By authority of: CIR delice of 1-4-71

Name and title of the problem the charges