

Dear Mr. Lynch,

5/28/84

This copy of my letter to Jim Lesar is not to inveigle you but on the chance some of its content may be of use to you.

I understand that you represent me in the appeal only.

If any of the excerpts I've made from Smith's book are of interest, I've a copy of each that I sent Lesar and can provide them without difficulty.

I am enclosing the reporting of Hunt in Domestic Intelligence Division.

The reference to electronic interception of Oswald in Mexico relates to appeals in the Dallas field office case. Among the relevant records it has and has not disclosed are, at the least, a teletype summary of an intercept and a verbatim transcript of that intercept.

The fact that there was this intercept was disclosed outside the litigation with the disclosure of a letter from J. E. Hoover to the head of ~~the~~ the Secret Service.

Many more details were reported by the Post in a major story of 7-8 years ago that was syndicated widely.

So, all that is withheld from me in the litigated case is the words Oswald used and I don't see how that can be withheld.

I do not recall any response to that appeal. And it ^{and my affidavits} included full details, copies of the disclosed information and news stories, etc.

Sincerely,

Harold Weisberg

of J. C. King, who was a permanent employee of the American Chamber of Commerce. Each year the station provided a large sum in support of the Chamber's Fourth of July celebration and called this a propaganda effort to cement good relations between Americans and Venezuelans.

Because President Kennedy had ordered action, however, the chance to change all this was at hand. When the new fiscal year began on July 1, 1961, WH Division found itself with an additional \$10 million in its budget for the purpose of stopping the spread of Castroism. Unfortunately, in all the countries in the area, including Venezuela, there were no specific projects to spend the money on in order to accomplish this objective.

We did have in Caracas a group of Basques who had fled Franco's Spain. They had penetrated the Venezuelan Communist Party for us, a task made easy because the Communists hated Franco almost as much as they did and an excellent common bond existed between them. This project, however, couldn't accomplish what needed to be done to satisfy President Kennedy's wishes. New, sophisticated political operations and additional intelligence collection were both needed. Above all, we needed links with the Betancourt group, with his Acción Democrática, AD, Party so we could help them help themselves fend off Castro's efforts.

Two phenomena intrigued me in the weeks following my entering on duty in WH, one that was most uncommon in my CIA experience, and one that was very familiar. The uncommon experience was asking, pleading, begging the field station to come up with additional ideas for spending more money. Usually, a desk officer's fate was to tell the field station it had to find new ways to cut costs, not new ways to spend more money. The familiar experience was seeing all those who had been directly responsible for the Bay of Pigs operation being promoted. Being part of a major disaster always led to success in the Clandestine Services for officers below the very top. Thus, although Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell lost their jobs before 1961 had ended, Tracy Barnes had a new division created for him, Domestic Operations Division, and Howard Hunt went to work for him. Jake, the man who directed all daily operations of the Cuban task force,

servicing directly under Barnes, was made chief of operations for the entire Western Hemisphere Division. Dave Phillips went off to a senior field assignment in Mexico City. Gerry Droller became a special assistant for political operations to J. C. King and began traveling around Latin America to drum up projects for spending our new funds.

I recalled that the case officer who had made the first contacts with the Sumatran colonels, providing us all the information which misled us so badly, received an immediate promotion when he returned from Indonesia and was given his choice of assignments. He chose London. No more jungle duty for him. Whether this practice of rewarding an officer for his contribution to horrendous mistakes resulted from a guilt feeling on the part of the top echelon at involving their subordinates in such questionable activities or stemmed from the same motivation as hush money does, I could never decide. Unfortunately, I was never close enough to a disaster to benefit. I got out of the Indonesian adventure before it failed, and the Grand Alliance defeat was swallowed up in the victory of the coalition we put together for Macapagal.

The most interesting thing about my new job was a proposal which our insistence on developing new projects finally brought forth from Caracas. Some friends of Betancourt wanted to start a new daily paper which would be an unofficial mouthpiece of the AD Party and publicize the land reform program and other parts of the Venezuelan president's democratic revolution formula. The station chief didn't think too much of the idea, but I saw it as exactly the kind of activity we needed.

This kind of newspaper was precisely what Paul Linebarger meant when he defined gray propaganda. A paper associated with a leftist-inclined party which frequently opposed U.S. policies would have considerable weight when it occasionally supported us. More important, I saw this as a mechanism for access to AD political leaders. Since they, in turn, had ties with men of like mind in other countries, I could envision our supporting the newspaper as a means of following the plans of this group and trying to influence them.

One of the Venezuelan proponents of the plan was an importer of U.S. and other foreign cars. If he hadn't been involved I was sure the station would never have heard of

Dear Jim,

5/27/84

In addition to Phillips' Night Watch during my morning therapy I've completed Joe Smith's Portrait of a Cold Warrior, Ballantine edition. I'll be sending you xeroxes of some pages after I make the copies and mark them up. I'll annotate them separately, by subject, for your ease in filing ^{if} of any interest you.

My purpose in this separate ~~memo~~ memo is to generalize and offer a suggestion.

I think that these books and others, including Hunt's apologia, are of possible usefulness to you, Bud and other lawyers who have CIA FOIA cases because a) they represent official CIA disclosures and b) because these official disclosures are of precisely the information the CIA swears in FOIA litigation it may not disclose. It has sworn thus in my litigation and in other cases where I've read decisions.

Perhaps you lawyers could get your clients to read and make copies of the appropriate portions that the CIA has cleared for publication, officially. These would include the countries in which it has stations and bases; its official sources within those countries; its people, by name, like Madam Nhu (whose case agent called her The Dragon Lady, according to Smith) and Magsaysay in the Philippines; its projects and its cryptograms^{24 hrs}. With regard to the latter, Smith discloses the meaning of digraphs, MK representing internal security.

Smith also reports the existence of a domestic intelligence division, yet the CIA swears that it is prohibited by law from disclosing any part of its structure. E. Howard Hunt wound up in this domestic component when he quit the Bay of Pigs, as I told you long ago. (Helms swore falsely about this before the Watergate committee because Hunt was with the Mullen agency while he was still CIA, had an office there and used its cover address.)

Smith also spells out how it lies, as for example about its involvement in the overthrow of the Chilean government.

In connection with its lies I have its in camera affidavits in the Heine case, in which it prevailed based on those ~~the~~ affidavits.

Smith also spells out the involvement of the Counterintelligence Division in domestic intelligence. (In my King records case it withheld this identification and that of its operator against Dr. King, Jay Richard Kennedy, and then the FBI disclosed both to Dave Garrow.)

On the Mexico City Oswald intercepts, pertinent in Mark Allen's ^{CIA and mine} requests and my own field offices case now on appeal, where Phillips pretends they were so understaffed the wife of a CIA man had to transcribe the tapes, Smith indicates the exact opposite, that they had large numbers of people transcribing the tapes and that the taping was so extensive its extended to the bedrooms of suspected KGB people. (In my case this also involves a specific appeal, rather several, including

62-109060-287a, unclassified until up for disclosure, when it was classified Top Secret. Those are Dallas records not referred to the CIA. Everything has been disclosed except the exact wording of the intercepted conversation(s).) *

In Smith's account of his disclosures and withholdings, he is not limited to official disclosure of names. He gives the real disclosed names with ^{out} the "official" qualifier.

In Smith's detailed disclosures of those involved with the CIA in Indonesia, names included, he does not include what I'd hoped to find, some account of the Sukarno overthrow. Oswald was a radar operator in at least one, Operation Strongback, and I'm pretty sure another. I'm far from certain that it was called Operation Haylift. ^{Smith} ~~he~~ does ~~not~~ identify cooperating foreign agencies by name.

* Mark Allen and I have ignored requests for this from CIA for at least 8 years. My request is more inclusive.

I may not be able to xerox those pages and annotate them today. I'll hold this to include all of that.

Best,

David