

New View of Peking . . . By Warren Unna

Shift to Dealing With Reds Has Problems

MONDAY'S Harris Survey reports a significant change in the American public's opposition to dealing with Communist China and a 43 to 43 per cent split over the wisdom of the United States initiating some talks with China in order to avoid nuclear war.



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Last week the Gallup Poll reported that Americans, while still opposed to Red China's admission to the United Nations, are not so opposed as they were when first polled at the outbreak of the Korean War, 14 years ago.

Even aside from these polls, there would appear to be two realities regarding today's U. S. policy toward Communist China:

1. U. S. opposition to China's being invited into the U.N. has come to a dead end, although it is expected to prevail for perhaps a final time at the 19th General Assembly session that opens Tuesday.

2. The United States' bilateral relations with China have come to be regarded as essentially negative and defensive, instead of positive and offensive. And this policy is quickly losing sympathizers, even among America's friends in Western Europe.

THE United States has hardly begun to explore alternative courses. But when and if it does, surely one alternative would be for the United States to move closer to the views of most of the U.N. members.

If the U.N. now really wants China inside in order to pressure her into internationally responsible behavior, the old "Two-China" invitational gimmick would appear to have passed its usefulness.

The neutrals, as well as

some U.S. friends, may have wished to seat Mao Tse-tung's Communist China without having to unseat Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China.

But Mao and Chiang, the two principals involved, will not tolerate this. In good patriotic fervor, both men consider Chiang's exile island of Taiwan a legitimate provincial appendage of the China mainland.

A hard look might show that there are not two China's anyway, but three: The Communist mainland's 700 million people; Chiang's 1½ million Nationalist Chinese refugees on Taiwan, and the 10 million Taiwanese on Taiwan whose welfare always seems to get overlooked.

Most of the Taiwanese come from Chinese mainland Chinese stock. But in recent centuries they have been ruled by the Dutch

the Portuguese, the Chinese mainlanders and, from 1895 to the end of World War II, by the Japanese.

They refer to themselves as "Taiwanese," not Chinese. And, while harboring no love for the mainland Communists, the Taiwanese also harbor no love for Chiang's Nationalists who moved in and forcibly took over after the Communists had pushed them off the mainland in 1949.

On the treaty books, the United States is committed to the defense of the Nationalist Chinese government, which now happens to be on Taiwan. The future ownership of the island of Taiwan itself was never clarified after the Japanese rulers' defeat there in World War II.

ANY real change in American policy would involve a repudiation of this commitment to the Nationalist Chinese. The difficulties would be enormous. How could it be done?

The U.S. commitment to

day might be rephrased to "the people on Taiwan." What the United States might seek in such a positive China policy is a genuine attempt (although it may prove futile, to get the Communist Chinese to behave respectably, and a continued commitment to protect "the people on Taiwan."

This undeniably would be a liquidation of the term of "Nationalist China government on Taiwan." It might only be some long-range way of gaining Communist China's grudging acceptance of an island that at least was not a competing "China."

It would seem likely to involve, almost inevitably:

- A shift of U.S. military personnel now stationed on Taiwan to the U.S. bastion on Okinawa. Some U.S. military officials now there candidly acknowledge that this could be done without fatally impairing U.S. ability to defend Taiwan by air and sea. And it might remove the "taint" of an obvious U.S. presence.

- A resettlement program might then be encouraged for any of the 1½ million mainlanders who want to leave.

Some of the younger generation have already indicated a willingness to be absorbed by saying that it would be more realistic to settle for what they have and abandon the "retaking of the mainland" goals which requires duplicating national and provincial government and a 600,000-man army that now claims one out of every 20 inhabitants.

And already Chiang's mainland elite have belied the

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seriousness of their mainland retaking by dispatching their children to America for indefinite residence—because of better education and job opportunities.

Resettlement would be an enormous problem if it involved any large number—the Arab outcasts from Israel attest to that. And no nations raised their hands

to receive them when Chiang's forces first fled the mainland in 1949.

• With these preliminaries, a move might be made to have the U.N. provide an indefinite trusteeship for "the people on Taiwan," leaving the island's ultimate sovereignty in cold storage.

This would aim at being a face-saving protection for both Mao and Chiang, neither of whom wants to yield his claim on these people nor acknowledge a "Two-China" solution.

Japan, China's most respected neighbor, conceivably could be persuaded to become a U.N. trustor.

MONUMENTAL as the international problems are that would be involved in such a change, they might prove less difficult than the internal political problems in the United States. While the Harris Poll indicates an altering attitude on the question of U.N. admission, it hardly suggests that the country is now prepared for such a dramatic shift.

Many people may find these moves wholly objectionable. But without a positive confrontation of the China problem, Americans may one day find the results even more objectionable.

Generalissimo Chiang is

in his late seventies. When he goes, his successor might decide to accept one of those long-proffered "deals" by which Communist China would grant protection and perquisites to those who hand over Taiwan. Reports often have linked Chiang's son and presumed successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, head of Taiwan's secret police, with just such a possibility.

Who then would the United States be protecting as it stood by its commitments to the Nationalist China government on Taiwan?

Hopes for any solution of the China problem certainly are not enhanced by Peking's current bellicosity. Perhaps the Communists' noises are worse than their actual misdeeds—as some Japanese leaders have tried to tell Americans. But these Communist noises give every move toward a detente the smack of appeasement.

Undoubtedly, an angry, backward Communist China will need a whipping boy for some time to come. And the United States is candidate No. 1.

But a policy that excludes Communist China from the world on its motion or on ours, has such increasing illogicality that an alternative may have to be sought.