

of the committee, looking for sympathy as an oppressed minority, held a sit-in before the door of the Democrats' caucus one afternoon with a sign that begged Chairman Adam Clayton Powell, "Open the door, Adam."

In the end, the committee deleted only one Administration proposal. This would have provided loans, of up to \$10,000 per person employed, to businesses which hired long-term unemployed workers. The committee also opened up the federal Job Corps for school drop-outs to girls and liberalized the section dealing with federal aid to community anti-poverty programs by permitting aid to isolated organizations which were trying to eliminate a cause of poverty in a community even if a community-wide program did not exist or was not being developed.

The only problem which temporarily threatened a split in the Democratic forces - federal aid to private schools - was skirted. The Administration bill would have given federal funds to public schools for educational programs open to both private and public school students. But Representative Hugh L. Carey (D, N.Y.) raised the old question of aid to parochial schools which in the past has doomed bills for general federal aid to primary and secondary education. Carey said private schools should be eligible for aid if they were cooperat-

ing in a community action program, for instance, by lending their facilities for supplementary classes like remedial reading, or by keeping their playgrounds open and attended at night. In the end, the Democratic caucus and the committee agreed with Carey that funds could go to private schools, but limited them to special non-curricular programs open to all children in a neighborhood.

The committee showed some nervousness over the broad powers it was granting to the Office of Economic Opportunity, established under the bill to oversee the War on Poverty. It required the director to use existing agencies and programs whenever possible rather than set up his own, and it barred him from interfering with the curricula of state, local and private schools and colleges.

But all these are relatively minor changes, and if nothing more important is changed on the floor, the Administration will have won a smashing victory in the House. Reportedly, the Rules Committee will not be an obstacle, although it had held up an adult basic education measure almost identical with the one added by the committee, and the bill should reach the House floor without major injury. "I certainly hope it does," one Democratic member comments, illustrating the re-discovery of welfare as political pork, "it'll make a great campaign slogan."



*"Will You Love Me in December  
Like You Do in May?"*

## I Spy, You Spy, It's Alright

Technology has produced an East-West agreement that has never been formally ratified, or even acknowledged. Without any negotiation, the US and USSR have reached a tacit understanding that each will permit the other to conduct aerial reconnaissance over its homeland, providing such surveillance is carried out from satellites in space. "I can show you photos of your military bases taken from outer space," Khrushchev told former Senator William Benton two weeks ago. "I will show them to President Johnson if he wishes."

Nine years ago at a four-power Geneva summit conference, the Russians sharply rejected President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal under which each country would permit the other to conduct aerial reconnaissance missions over its own homeland to assure against surprise attack. That the Soviet Union still rejects reconnaissance by aircraft, but now accepts reconnaissance by satellite, is shown by Khrushchev's statement to Benton that US aircraft photo missions over Cuba are unnecessary because the same informa-

tion can be obtained just as efficiently by satellites.

For at least three years, US reconnaissance satellites, known by the code name Samos, have been traversing and photographing military installations and targets in the Soviet Union and Red China. During 1963, the Air Force launched more than 20 such satellites into orbit. Photos taken by Samos are radioed to earth, like a TV picture, or returned in a small capsule which pops a parachute upon entering the atmosphere and is snatched as it floats down to earth by specially-equipped aircraft flown by sharp-eyed pilots.

Samos satellite pictures in 1961-62 provided the first positive evidence that the Soviets had not capitalized on their early ICBM missile lead and that we had forged ahead in producing and deploying such missiles. It was about this time that the Kennedy Administration clamped tighter security on the Samos program, but its existence had earlier been mentioned in Congressional testimony. It was no secret to the Russians. For example, in attempts to reach international space agreements at the United Nations, Soviet representatives frequently raised the subject of our "spy satellites." Their open literature, such as the book *Military Strategy* published early in 1963, mentioned Samos and its function.

Because of the Russian obsession with secrecy and the shooting down of Gary Powers and his U-2 in 1960, some US officials have been apprehensive that the Soviets might knock down a Samos satellite, or try to capture it in space and return it to earth, to create another incident. The anti-ICBM missile which the Soviets are developing, while probably not effective against a mass attack, should be able to destroy a single unarmed satellite without much difficulty. But this has never happened.

Instead, in March, 1962, the Soviets launched a new series of satellites, referred to as "scientific" and identified by the new name of "Cosmos." The Russians occasionally said Cosmos was intended to measure space radiation, but the satellites were all placed in orbit at altitudes far below the Van Allen radiation belts. In fact, the altitude of these satellites, of which the Soviets have now launched 30, usually is around 125-150 miles — the same altitude at which Samos operates.

Most of these Cosmos satellites remained in orbit for a few days and then appeared to re-enter under command rather than as a result of natural atmospheric drag, suggesting the Russians were recovering reconnaissance photos in much the same way as we do with some of our Samos.

A year ago, Khrushchev was reported as having told Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak, during an interview, that he had photos taken by Soviet reconnaissance satellites.

There have been other hints. When American and

Russian representatives sat down last fall at the UN to consider a mutual declaration to ban weapons of mass destruction from space, the Russians at first insisted on including reconnaissance from space. Suddenly, it was no longer an issue of consequence.

During the past 12 months there have been several instances where Soviet long-range patrol aircraft appeared in the vicinity of our aircraft carriers in the Pacific, suggesting that the Russians had rather precise information on the location of these ships — information which normally is closely held.

So Khrushchev's recent disclosure to Benton comes as no surprise, and since the Soviet Premier was the first to boast publicly of satellite reconnaissance, he will find it hard to challenge similar US activities or to enlist international support for hostile action against our satellites. It is ironic that the space age which the Soviets launched with Sputnik I should have so quickly led to the ripping apart of their cherished curtain of secrecy.

One may wonder why the Russians should need to go to the expense and trouble of deploying reconnaissance satellites, since the US makes little effort to hide the location of its missile sites, air bases and most other strategic targets. Perhaps the Russians suspected that we were exaggerating our military might. Undoubtedly, too, their military men are anxious to know the disposition of our aircraft carriers, strategic bombers and other mobile targets.

There is some indication that the reconnaissance satellite, both ours and theirs, has already played an important role in stabilizing relations. For four years, starting with the Suez crisis, Khrushchev was prone to rattle his ICBMs, warning that he had hundreds of such weapons on the launching pads. He has been much more subdued lately, for his own reconnaissance satellites have shown him that the US has many hundred ICBMs installed in underground silos, with additional missiles going into place every week. And he knows too that US satellites have shown that the Russians have, so far, installed far fewer missiles.

It is interesting to note that the Soviets launched a Cosmos satellite on October 17, 1962, and recovered it four days later, during the hottest moments of the Cuban crisis. Perhaps its purpose was to see whether the US was, as it claimed, mustering its military might. Such photographs must have shown a beehive of activity at our military bases and in the waters around Cuba.

Khrushchev's suggestion that the US could dispense with its aircraft reconnaissance of Cuba and depend instead upon satellites has some merit. Although the precise identification of targets from an altitude of 125 miles can never be as good as from an altitude of 12 miles, it should still be adequate to detect any return of Soviet missiles to Cuba. RAYMOND D. SENTER