

5. Removal of victims
 - a. sequence of removal
 - b. identification of stretchers used
 - c. disposition of stretchers after use
 - d. custodian of stretchers after use
 - e. identification of bullet on stretcher
 6. Place(s) victims taken
 7. Medical personnel in attendance
 - a. educational background
 - b. experience
 - c. specialization, if any
 8. Details of xrays or tests, if any
 9. Visual findings of medical personnel
 10. Details of operative procedures on each victim
 11. Response of President Kennedy to medical attention
 12. Exact time of death of President Kennedy
 13. Precise cause of President Kennedy's death
 14. Treatment of Governor Connally
 15. Location, activities and security on Mrs. Kennedy, President and Mrs. Johnson, and others in presidential party at Parkland Hospital
- E. Movements of Presidential Party Following Pronouncement of Death
1. Preliminary security precautions
 2. Formulation of plans and decision to return to Washington, D.C.
 3. Details of trip to Love Field
 4. Movement of President Kennedy's body to airplane
 5. Swearing in of President Johnson
 6. Return flight
 - a. time of departure from Love Field
 - b. time of arrival at Washington, D. C.
 - c. personnel on board airplane
 - d. identification of personnel who met flight

7. Return and examination of presidential automobile
- P. President Kennedy's autopsy at Bethesda
 1. Times of commencement and termination of autopsy
 2. Personnel in attendance
 - a. educational background
 - b. experience
 - c. specialization, if any
 3. Visual findings of medical personnel
 4. Details of xrays or tests, if any
 5. Details of analytical operative procedures
 6. Conclusion on cause of death

PC 14

February 28, 1964

Lat

TO : Mr. Rankin

FROM: Mr. Wilcox

I believe by this time you have received my memorandum reflecting a conference held a few days ago with Mr. Sturman and Miss Farrar regarding the Commission's files. As I indicated in that memorandum, the Archives specialist intends establishing an extensive file on persons mentioned in the investigative reports. In each person's file will be contained copies of the pages of the reports which concern them.

It is apparent that this effort duplicates the name index currently in preparation under the supervision of Mr. Slowson. I do not think that both projects should be done simultaneously with the resultant waste of our limited manpower. It is my recommendation that the work on the name index be stopped and the results of this work be made available to Miss Farrar. I think that any additional secretarial time that is available should be utilized by Miss Farrar on the overall Commission files.

INV. 10103-12
Connally, John
Kennedy, John F.

January 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: J. Lee Rankin
FROM: David W. Belin

*Green
copy*

SUBJECT: Oswald's knowledge that Connally would be in the Presidential car and his intended target.

According to the Secret Service Report, Document No. 3, page 11, the route of the motorcade was released on the evening of November 18 and appeared in Dallas newspapers on November 19 as shown in Exhibits 6D and 6E (Document No. 3 is the December 18 Secret Service Report).

In examining these exhibits, although the general route of the motorcade is shown, there is nothing that shows that Governor Connally would be riding in the Presidential car.

In determining the accuracy of Oswald, we have three major possibilities: Oswald was shooting at Connally and missed two of the three shots, the two misses striking Kennedy; Oswald was shooting at both Kennedy and Connally and all three shots struck their intended targets; Oswald was shooting only at Kennedy and the second bullet missed its intended target and hit Connally instead.

If there was no mass media coverage that Connally would be riding in the Presidential car, it would tend to confirm the third alternative that Kennedy was the only intended target. This in turn bears on the motive of the assassination and also on the degree of marksmanship required, which in turn affects the determination that Oswald was the assassin and that it was not too difficult to hit the intended target two out of the three times in this particular situation.

In any event, I believe it would be most helpful to have the FBI investigate all newspaper, television and radio reports from November 18 to November 22 in Dallas to ascertain whether or not in any of these reports there was a public announcement that Connally would be riding in the Presidential car. If such public announcement was made, we should know specifically over what media and when.

Of course, there is another element of timing: If Connally's position in the motorcade was not released until the afternoon of November 21, then when Oswald went home to get the weapon, he would not have necessarily intended Connally as a target.

Finally, we would like to know whether or not there was any release to the public news media that Connally would ride in any car in the motorcade, regardless of whether or not it was the Presidential car.

Thank you.

Mr. Redlich

JH
✓ MPI
Connally, J. J.

April 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Melvin A. Eisenberg

SUBJECT: Conference of April 21, 1964, to determine which frames in the Zapruder movies show the impact of the first and second bullets.

On Tuesday, April 21, 1964, a conference was held to determine which frames in the Zapruder film portray the instants at which the first and second bullets struck.

Present were: Dr. F. W. Light, Jr., Deputy Chief of the Biophysics Division and Chief of the Wound Assessment Branch of the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland; Dr. Olivier, Chief the Wound Ballistics Branch of the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland; Dr. Joseph Dolce, Consultant to the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal; Dr. Charles F. Gregory and Dr. Robert Shaw of Parkland Hospital, Dallas, Texas; Messrs. Gauthier, Shaneyfelt, and one other unidentified agent of the FBI; and Messrs. Redlich, Specter, Belin and Eisenberg. Later in the proceedings, Governor and Mrs. Connally, Mr. Rankin and Mr. McCloy joined the conference.

A screening was held of the Zapruder film and of slides prepared by LIFE from the film. Each slide corresponded with a separate frame of film, beginning with frame 171. The consensus of the meeting was as follows:

(a) The President had been definitely hit by frames 224-25 when he emerges from behind a sign with his hands clutching at his throat.

(b) After Governor Connally straightened up at frames 224-26 he starts a turn to the right. As a result of this turn, at no time after frame 236 was Governor Connally in a position such that a bullet fired from the probable site of the assassin would have caused the wound in the chest cavity which Governor Connally sustained--that is, after frame 236 the Governor presented a side view to the assassin rather than a back view. 1/

1/ Mr. Specter disagrees.

(c) In many frames up to 250, the Governor's wrist is held in a position which exposed him to the type of wrist wounds he actually received.

(d) After viewing the films and slides, the Governor was of the opinion that he had been hit by frame 231.

(e) The Governor stated that after being hit, he looked to his right, looked to his left and then turned to his right. He felt the President might have been hit by frame 190. He heard only two shots and felt sure that the shots he heard were the first and third shots. He is positive that he was hit after he heard the first shot, i.e., by the second shot, and by that shot only.

In a discussion after the conference Drs. Light and Dolce expressed themselves as being very strongly of the opinion that Connally had been hit by two different bullets, principally on the ground that the bullet recovered from Connally's stretcher could not have broken his radius without having suffered more distortion. Dr. Olivier withheld a conclusion until he has had the opportunity to make tests on animal tissue and bone with the actual rifle.

J.F.K. 3
MP 1

~~Connolly, J. J.~~
April 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Malvin A. Eisenberg

SUBJECT: Conference of April 14, 1964, to determine which frames in the Zapruder movies show the impact of the first and second bullets.

On April 14, 1964, a conference was held to determine which frames in the Zapruder film portray the instants at which the first and second bullets struck.

Present were: Commander James J. Humes, Director of Laboratories of the Naval Medical School, Bethesda, Maryland; Commander J. Thornton Boswell, Chief Pathologist, Naval Medical School, Bethesda; Lt. Col. Pierre A. Finck, Chief of Wound Ballistics Pathology Branch, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology; Dr. F. W. Light, Jr., Deputy Chief of the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and Chief of the Wound Assessment Branch of the Biophysics Division; Dr. Olivier, Chief of the Wound Ballistics Branch of the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal; Messrs. Malley, Cauthier, Shancyfelt, and two other unidentified agents of the FBI; Messrs. Kelley and Howlett of the Secret Service; and Messrs. Redlich, Specter, and Eisenberg of the Commission staff.

A screening was held of the Zapruder film and of slides prepared by LIFE from the film. Each slide corresponded with a separate frame of film, beginning with frame 171. The consensus of the meeting was as follows:

(a) The President had been definitely hit by frames 224-225, when he emerges from behind a sign with his hands clutching at his throat.

(b) The reaction shown in frames 224-25 may have started at an earlier point--possibly as early as frame 199 (when there appears to be some jerkiness in his movement) or, with a higher degree of possibility, at frames 204-06 (where his right elbow appears to be raised to an artificially high position).

(c) If the reaction did not begin at 199 or 204-06, it probably began during the range of frames during which the President is hidden from Zapruder's camera by a sign, namely, frames 215-24.

cc: Mr. Rankin
Mr. Willens ✓
Mr. Redlich
Mr. Ball

Mr. Belin
Mr. Specter
Mr. Eisenberg

(d) The President's reaction to the first bullet as high as 173 frames. Reaction began. In all likelihood, however, the impact and reaction would be visible as early as possible that the reaction was visible. In terms of frames, the President may have been struck as much as 36 frames before any visible reaction. If the visible reaction begins at 167-06, he may have been struck as early as 167-10; if the visible reaction begins at 167-06, he may have been struck as early as 167-10; if the visible reaction begins at 167-06, he may have been struck as early as 167-10.

(e) The velocity of the bullet would have been little diminished by its passage through the President. Therefore, if Governor Connally was in the path of the bullet it would have struck him and (1) if he was hit he sustained in his chest cavity. Indications that this occurred are provided by the fact that (1) the bullet recovered from Governor Connally's chest does not appear to have penetrated a wrist and (2) if the first bullet did not hit Governor Connally, it should have struck up the wrist but apparently did not. Since the bullet recovered from the Governor's stretcher does not appear to have penetrated a wrist, if he was hit by this (first) bullet, he was probably also hit by the second bullet.

(f) If Governor Connally was hit by both the first and second bullets, it is impossible to say definitively at what point, or by what point, he was hit by the second bullet.

(g) Governor Connally started to straighten up at frames 224-26, and may be reacting to a wound at this point. (If so, it would be a wound from the second bullet.)

(h) Governor Connally started to show an expression of anguish around 224-26. If he was hit with two bullets, this expression may have resulted from his second wound.

(i) After Governor Connally started to turn up at frames 224-26 he starts to turn up at 224-26. As a result of this turn, at no time after 224-26 was Governor Connally in a position such that a bullet could have struck him.

site of the assassin would have caused the wound in the chest cavity which Governor Connally sustained--that is, after frame 236, the Governor presented a side view to the assassin rather than a back view.*

(j) It is not possible to say whether prior to 236 Governor Connally was ever in a position such that one bullet could have caused the five wounds he sustained.

(k) As in the case of the President, Governor Connally could have conceivably been hit two seconds before he begins to react, but the maximum likely time interval between hit and reaction is one second, and the reaction may have been instantaneous. The likelihood of an instantaneous reaction is particularly great in regard to the wrist wound, since pain is usually felt more quickly in a limb than in the torso.

*/

Mr. Specter disagrees with this, and feels the Governor was in position to receive the chest wound up to 242.