



Special prosecutor Cox: Dueling with Senator Sam

said, and the papers were never stolen.

■ That the White House, trying to justify its own misuse of the FBI in the Watergate case, ordered up a secret report on the abuses perpetrated by past Presidents. The job went to the bureau's sometime assistant director, William Sullivan, who has since been promoted by his friends in the Administration to a high Justice Department job. Sullivan considered the report so sensitive, Dean has told investigators, that he typed it himself rather than let even his secretary see it. The report, NEWSWEEK sources said, told in anecdotal detail about how Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had used or abused the bureau for political purposes—but curiously omitted Mr. Nixon's old patron, Dwight Eisenhower.

■ That some low-level White House officials at one point considered assassinating Panama's head of Government.

Dean's story is that the Administration suspected high Panamanian Government officials of being involved in the flow of heroin from Latin America into the U.S., and were also concerned about strongman Omar Torrijos's uncooperative attitude toward renegotiating the Panama Canal treaty. Thus, in Dean's telling, some officials found a Torrijos hit doubly attractive. The contract, he said, went to E. Howard Hunt, later a ringleader in the Watergate break-in; Hunt, according to Dean, had his team in Mexico before the mission was aborted. Hunt's lawyer could not be reached for comment.

■ That the White House called off a promising tax prosecution involving Gov. George Wallace's brother Gerald after Wallace agreed to run as a Democrat—not a third-party candidate—in Presidential 1972. Federal agents spent two years investigating Gerald Wallace, among others, in connection with some illegal


campaign contributions to the governor by companies doing business with the state. "We could have gotten dozens of indictments," said one investigator. But the case was shut down after a chat between the President and the governor aboard Air Force One on a flight from Birmingham to Mobile in May 1971. Dean alleged that Wallace's part of the bargain was to take his candidacy into the Democratic primaries—a move that would bedevil the Democrats and sew up the Wallace vote for Mr. Nixon. Wallace had all but settled on running in some Democratic primaries anyway; he flatly denied that he did so as part of a deal with anybody—or that he had spoken to Mr. Nixon at all on the 20-minute flight.

'A Bombshell Every Five Minutes'

The potential for damage to the President and the Presidency if Dean makes even a fraction of his stories stick is enormous. His problem is that he is thus far alone, pitting his word against the President's. His gamble is that, by telling his story in painstaking detail and buttressing it with documents where he can, he will ultimately drag corroboration piecemeal out of the other principals—the Haldemans, Ehrlichmans, Colsons and lesser fry—until their common defense comes apart. "Suddenly," says a friend, "you're going to look up and find that his whole story has been matched by some or all the other witnesses." Dean has accordingly spent weeks underground preparing himself with chronologies, memos and notes to himself—an assemblage his friends now believe may be the doomsday book of the Nixon Presidency. "It's going to be a bombshell every five minutes for maybe three days," one intimate says matter-of-factly. "It isn't going to be pleasant."

The answering strategy among Nixon loyalists was to paint Dean as a palpably guilty man willing to say anything to save himself—even if it means bringing down the Presidency. The Nixonians have run into trouble keeping their own troops together. The Ervin hearings had by last week turned into a confessional for campaign middle managers owning up to sins—and naming names. CRP's deputy director, Jeb Stuart Magruder, had bargained his testimony for leniency; he was said to be prepared to take the blame for the bugging himself, but nobody could be sure. Herbert W. Kalmbach, the President's longtime personal lawyer, likewise agreed to turn state's evidence against Haldeman and Ehrlichman, among others. Former Attorney General John Mitchell was said to believe that somebody up there—he suspects Ehrlichman—had elected him and Dean to be fall guys; friends say he is brooding and intermittently depressed, and his allegiance to his old comrades was no longer considered certain. Even Haldeman and Ehrlichman, the twin praetors of the old palace guard, were having a hard time—perhaps dangerously so—making their stories jibe with one another on matters of time, place and who said what to whom.

Yet a basic scenario did emerge from the long, rambling depositions of Haldeman and Ehrlichman in the Democratic civil case, given last month and made public last week. Both men denied any foreknowledge of Watergate, though Haldeman—plainly anticipating Dean's testimony—said he was "willing to accept the possibility" that Dean had mentioned the preliminary planning sessions to him early in 1972. Ehrlichman, who claims he took over the in-house inquiry from Dean last March, said he learned that Watergate spymaster G. Gordon Liddy proposed one political espionage plan budg-



Colson: Shadowy presence