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(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. On the record.

Rep. Boggs. I would like to say only, to put it in the form of a motion maybe, that in the case of the widow of the late President, and in the case of the President and his wife, that the Commission authorize its Chairman, the Chief Justice, to take whatever steps he deems advisable to get whatever testimony may be pertinent from those people.

The Chairman. What motion would you make concerning Governor Connally and his wife?

Rep. Boggs. They would be included, I would think, under the same terms.

The Chairman. How about Senator Yarborough and whoever else was there in the front seat with President Johnson?

Mr. Boggs. What I was thinking of was of the top people that you as Chairman could handle it. The rest of them I wouldn't have any hesitancy about calling Ralph Yarborough in here and ask him what happened.

The Chairman. I understand. Is that the sense of the meeting, gentlemen? If it is, that will be done.

The next one is Item G under 2, Conference with CIA, Decision as to disclosure of materials to CIA for purposes discussed at meeting of January 14, 1964.

Now, I will just state generally what it is, and then Lee can go on farther. But Lee has been having some discussions with

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~~Charles G. Brigg, Chief of the Bureau
of the CIA, per CIA Ltr. 1/13/75~~

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the CIA concerning any possible connections that Oswald might have had with the Soviets, and they would like to have us give to them certain of our records so they can show them to some of their people, namely a couple of persons who have defected from Soviet Russia, and I raised the question with Lee as to whether we should do that without taking some very careful precautions because if we should do that, and these people should turn out to be counter-intelligence agents, and then something would develop from Russia about this, about the thing as a result of what they saw, this Commission would look awfully bad before the world, and I myself question the advisability of showing those records to any defector.

I personally would be willing to bring the CIA here, let them see what we have in that regard, and then let the CIA do what it thinks should be done in order to verify or disprove it or amplify it in any way, shape or form. Now that is my own view.

Lee, would you like to express yourself further on it. You didn't agree with me exactly.

Mr. Rankin. Well, the Chief Justice also suggested that possibly we should have a meeting with the representatives of the CIA and the FBI and the Secret Service that gave us these materials and see what their suggestion was about handling them. These two defectors are men who were formerly in the service of the comparable unit of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Dulles. KGB.

Mr. Rankin. KGB, and the CIA people say they couldn't hardly

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defect back again without being in plenty of trouble and they don't believe there is any prospect and they say also when they have had anything like that they have had plenty of notice in advance that there was a consideration that they might go back but they do think they could be very helpful because they can interpret these materials and suggest inquiries that we should make to the Soviet, that the CIA personnel wouldn't know how to do in the same way because they don't know the detail of the operation like these defectors.

So they want to know if they couldn't see some basic materials themselves and if they would be permitted to show them to these defectors, and that is our problem. They think that would be very helpful.

Now they suggest, and our conference, Allen went with us on this conference with the CIA, and they suggest that, they think the inquiry to the Soviet should be made government-to-government, if the State Department would approve that, and we would check it out with them, and that the questions to the Soviet should be very pointed, so that if they don't answer them, they can't just answer them in a very general manner and get away with it, but the questions would be in such pointed form, would be did you or didn't you, did Oswald do certain things or didn't he, as much as possible, I am talking about the CIA and the problem of furnishing them part of this information, and they would like to exhibit it to two defectors, who were a part of their intelligence system in

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the Soviet before they came over here and defected, and they have great confidence in them, the CIA, but the question --

Mr. Dulles. They were not before, after they defected in these two cases. They were part of the KGB when they defected.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. And since then have been working very closely with us, one has been working six or seven years and one about two years.

Mr. Dulles. Yes, but prior to defecting they were with the KGB, isn't that right?

Mr. Rankin. They were with the KGB, one was in Vienna and one was in Finland and fairly high up in the KGB. The material they have in mind is nothing that is really classified in one sense. It would be the material that Oswald himself wrote, Oswald diary, letters and things of that kind in Russia, and it would be that type of material. They wouldn't want to show them any material that was sort of generally classified. Some of this has not been disclosed to the President. Some of it has been partially disclosed but it is the form of the writing, and so forth, and things of that kind that are very -- mean a good deal to a man who is working on the inside of the Soviet Secret Service. As I say, it is nothing that normally would be classified. It is only that all of what was obtained from Oswald has not yet been disclosed to the American press.

Sen. Russell. Do you have anything from Oswald by the way of

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diaries or other writings other than what we have seen?

Mr. Dulles. You have seen it all.

Sen. Russell. And the FBI?

Mr. Dulles. There is one thing I have asked about today, that is referred to in the FBI report. We haven't any material at all.

Sen. Russell. They are not going to tell you anything. We would have to forward the questions to the State Department, it would have to be cleared through the Ambassador and cleared with the Foreign Minister and get to the equivalent of their Attorney General and say what are we going to tell these silly Americans.

Mr. Dulles. But they are in a bit of a box, Senator, because if they have any inkling of this and they may have some inkling of this, I don't know, for example, we know or we believe we know from Oswald that he got X amount of money at certain times. Now, I wouldn't tell that to the Soviet. But I would say that we have some information, we don't have to say how we got it, it would be from Mrs. Oswald or however it might be, some of it did come from her, that the Soviet had paid him certain money, would they kindly advise us how much and over what time.

Rep. Boggs. There is not over and beyond what the report shows.

Mr. Dulles. No. But I don't think you ought to tell. I mean, this is a question for this Commission to decide, if we are going to get anything, we have got probably to let the Soviet

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know that we have, or let them induce that we have a good deal.

Rep. Boggs. Where did we get the information from, what he got?

Mr. Dulles. From his letters.

Rep. Boggs. Not from the Soviets?

Mr. Dulles. No. We haven't anything from the Soviet. We know he was hospitalized. We know he tried to commit suicide over there. We know they extended his permission. Now, I think we ought to -- there ought to be questions put to them but don't give them all the answers because they can just take our questions and answers and say these are the answers. I think we ought to give them a clue that we know a good deal because otherwise what is the situation going to be later if we do publish, and I think the Commission probably will publish later all this material. And they will say here you deceived us. I don't mind deceiving the Soviet particularly because I think that might be very helpful.

We can say we gave you a chance to answer these questions, we told you we knew something about this but you never gave us an answer so that the drafting of these questions I think is going to be rather delicate a matter but I think it can be done and I think it ought to be done quickly.

Rep. Boggs. Is it proposed that this be carried out by the CIA?

Mr. Dulles. No.

Sen. Russell. As I understand it, the CIA wants to show this

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to two former secret service men to get suggestions so they can, knowing the background of operations here, they can help the CIA prepare questions to give to the Department of State.

Mr. Dulles. The Department of State will send them without reference but saying from.

Rep. Ford. It would be a request by the Commission through the Department of State.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. The Commission would request the Department of State, in consonance with their foreign policy, to make an inquiry, further inquiry -- the Soviet has furnished information, some of it about the United States, not a word about what happened in Russia, two and a half years he was there not a word, and we know --

Rep. Ford. And it would have the authority of a request by us through proper channels to the Department.

Mr. Dulles. Yes. From some talks I had, incidentally, that is the way the State Department would like it but they would like to see and I think it would be wise, if the Chairman agrees, and the Commission agrees, to show the State Department our letter, so that we don't ask them anything or create a record, I would show them our letter, work it out with Davis or others over there so that they are in entire agreement with what is sent, and the CIA I think has sent you today some suggestions as to questions, I don't know whether they have reached you yet or not.

Mr. Rankin. They have.

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Rep. Ford. May I ask you this, in reference to your question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes.

Rep. Ford. Does it have to be a matter of record for anybody other than ourselves and CIA that these individuals within their agency have perused these documents?

Mr. Dulles. No, not unless they yell.

Mr. Rankin. He is afraid they might give it away.

Rep. Ford. I see.

The Chairman. I thought before we did it, if we were giving an FBI report to the CIA for that purpose, ordinarily, I would say yes, let them see everything, but to show to a Russian defector, before I did that, before I gave the CIA a report of the Secret Service or the FBI, I would want to get the CIA representative in the same room with the Secret Service and the FBI and tell them, "Now this is the situation we are presented with. Is there any objection to our doing it in this way"?

Rep. Ford. And have them as a matter of record approve it.

The Chairman. Yes, approve it.

Rep. Ford. I think that is fine.

The Chairman. I would be afraid to do it otherwise, we might get into trouble.

Rep. Ford. I think that is a good reservation, I agree.

The Chairman. Any objection to that, gentlemen?

Mr. Rankin. I would like to have the record show that we

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have talked to the State Department about designating a man
 we could talk to about the approach to make to the Soviet Union
 but we haven't yet gotten their approval to approach the government
 to-government, and that is to be done yet.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Rankin. So that is still ahead of us.

The Chairman. All right.

Sen. Cooper. We are not making a decision at this moment of
 showing these records to these defectors.

Sen. Russell. I understood if all these different agencies
 agreed to it, yes.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. May I make just a slight amendment to that be-
 cause if the FBI agrees to have its material, I don't think the
 Secret Service should be able to veto that or vice-versa. It
 seems to me one should, through this machinery, clear with the
 agencies whose report it is, and obviously these reports, I don't
 think, would ever be shown to the defectors in the form of an
FBI report. They would be told it is a FBI report.

The Chairman. We don't know if we give it to them.

Mr. Dulles. I would just have that arrangement with them. I
 don't think they ought to be given it as an FBI report. The infor-
 mation in the report will be used in interrogating and questioning
 these fellows.

Sen. Cooper. Why then couldn't the CIA people read the

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report, get from it such information as they needed to interrogate these men without ever discussing to them any source?

Mr. Dulles. They don't need to disclose this comes from the FBI or Secret Service. But if they used, let's say Oswald's memorandum, then that is different. No matter how that had been obtained, whether it had been obtained by the Secret Service or the FBI, they would want to show them the text and maybe the handwriting and the Russian, some of these things are in Russian, to the defectors.

Mr. Rankin. Yes. They said they wanted to show the particular documents because they also think there may be a possibility of codes.

Sen. Cooper. I see.

Mr. Rankin. They would want to go into that, too.

The Chairman. If there are no objections then, gentlemen, that is what we will do.

Mr. Dulles. Would it be clear if the agency involved gives its approval then there is no difficulty, without asking a third party agency to concur, that is the only thing I was afraid of the way it was stated, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Well, this whole thing is intermixed, the Secret Service found one thing in the home of Oswald, the FBI found another, and somebody else found another.

Now I think before we get into the thicket we probably ought to get them all together and if any one of them had a valid reason

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why it shouldn't be done, I would want to respect it whether it

was his record or not. It isn't just permission that we are looking for. We are looking for a measure of protection after this thing is all over so there won't be any come back on from any organization that we disclosed something to the Soviets that were involved in this assassination.

I don't see any reason why we should fear any opposition from the other organization if --

Sen. Russell. They will all come out in the same place on that.

The Chairman. I think so. Do you have any reason to think otherwise, Allen?

Mr. Dulles. I don't know. I don't think anybody can say, Mr. Chairman. I have no reason.

Mr. McCloy. If they do that, they can come back to us.

Sen. Russell. The chap who vetoed it would be embarrassed.

Rep. Boggs. That disposes of that.

The Chairman. We will next go to Item H under Roman Number II, remains of Lee Harvey Oswald, letters received from Nicholas Katzenbach.

Now that situation is that this man is buried in a cemetery, and it takes officers around the clock to watch him, watch and see that they don't come in and exhume him and do something that would further injure the country, and so it has been suggested that to save expense they exhume him and then cremate him. But

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